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Abstract 
 
The treatment and control of individuals with severe mental health difficulties in 
the community has long been positioned as a problem in need of a solution.  This 
thesis investigates one recently introduced ‘solution’ in English mental health 
services - community treatment orders (CTOs) - enacted under the Mental Health 
Act (2007).  CTOs work by imposing conditions on how service users live in the 
community, as well as allowing for them to be recalled for treatment in hospital 
if they fail to meet these conditions, and/or they are deemed to be a risk to 
themselves or others.  Their introduction has brought with it debate on the ethical 
implications of extending compulsory treatment into the community, with 
opinion on their use strongly divided.  This thesis aims to get beyond such 
dichotomous positioning to uncover the potentially multiple and complex ways 
CTOs are conceptualised, interpreted and used by practitioners and service users, 
and with what consequences.   An ethnographic approach is taken to explore 
‘inside’ CTO practice within two Mental Health Trusts, through observations of 
everyday CTO processes, interviews with practitioners and service users, and 
document analysis of policy and practice-related sources.  In this way a dual 
analysis is formed which gives a generative explanation of the pathways a CTO 
might take, and describes how service users and practitioners experience and 
respond to CTOs as a compulsory intervention.   This analysis is guided and 
deepened by a combined critical realist-governmentality framework, which 
informs an understanding of why it is CTOs unfold as they do, and how they 
regulate conduct and encourage self-regulation through assemblages of coercive, 
disciplinary and reflexive forms of power.   As will be shown, a number of 
distinctive conclusions can be drawn about CTO policy and practice relating to: 
the gaps and continuities between policy theorisation, practice-level 
conceptualisation and CTOs in action; the constituting power of agency and 
interaction alongside institutional and cultural factors in shaping various CTO 
outcomes;  the complex and often ambiguous reactions of practitioners and 
service users to CTO ends and means as connected to ethical self-work; and the 
mixed, sometimes unexpected and unintended consequences of CTO use.
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Introduction 
 
The treatment and control of individuals with severe mental health difficulties in 
the community has long been positioned as a problem in need of a solution.  This 
thesis investigates one recently introduced ‘solution’ in English mental health 
services - community treatment orders (CTOs), enacted under the Mental Health 
Act (2007).  Despite their longevity and persistent spread across different 
jurisdictions, CTOs remain a controversial and much debated addition to the 
landscape of community mental health.  Modern mental health services, both in 
the community and in hospital, have always contained elements of compulsion 
and coercion which can be seen as forming a continuum, from informal 
persuasion through to formally mandated hospital treatment (Monahan et al, 
2001).  However, a distinction can be made between the undefined and 
discretionary use of treatment pressure in the community and the legislatively 
defined role of CTOs.  As Churchill et al (2007, 20, emphasis in original) state, 
CTOs are qualitatively different from what has gone before in the countries 
where they have been implemented because they, “enforce community treatment 
outside (and independently) of the hospital, contain specific mechanisms for 
enforcement and/or revocation and are authorised by statute”.  
 
This essentially means that CTOs give mental health professionals the power to 
impose conditions on how service users live in the community, particularly in 
regards to medical treatment, and provide a mechanism for hospitalisation and 
treatment enforcement if these conditions are not met or if the service user’s 
mental health has deteriorated to the extent that they are deemed to be a risk to 
their own health and safety or that of others.  Opinion on CTOs is strongly 
divided, with opponents arguing that an extension of compulsion into the 
community results in an unnecessary and stigmatising focus on risk, a loss of 
liberty and rights for service users, and the neglect of alternative, less coercive 
methods of engagement (Brophy and McDermott, 2003, Geller et al, 2006, 
Pilgrim, 2007).  Conversely, supporters of CTOs argue that they help to engage 
service users who are hard to reach and/or considered a risk, facilitate 
community-based care, reduce rates and length of compulsory hospitalisation, 
encourage better treatment, improve clinical outcomes and promote recovery 
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(Lawton-Smith, Dawson and Burns, 2008, Munetz and Frese, 2001, O’Reilly, 
2006).   
 
As these two positions demonstrate, the reason why CTOs continue to be fertile 
ground for dispute is because they act as a crucible for enduring tensions within 
the field of mental health policy and practice. CTOs have expanded the 
boundaries of legally mandated compulsion in mental health, and in doing so, 
have galvanised debates on where the balance should be struck between rights or 
risk, and freedom or coercion for individuals within the mental health system.  In 
this sense, although the CTO is premised on distinctive historical and cultural 
contingencies, it also brings into sharp focus the longstanding moral and ethical 
balancing acts that frame the treatment (in the broadest sense of the word) of 
individuals diagnosed with severe mental health difficulties.  My position, based 
at least partly on practice experience as a social worker, is that negotiating these 
kinds of tensions as they manifest in practice dilemmas is rarely straightforward.  
My practice background has in recent years been in youth offending, working 
with young people who have committed offences of various kinds.  As an area of 
practice which holds a constant tension between welfare and justice, youth 
justice brings similar dilemmas to the care/control debate intrinsic to mental 
health practice.  It seems to me that this debate is even sharper in mental health 
however, as the behavioural aspect of youth offending which calls for control 
mechanisms is not necessarily present in the same way.  Hence, although I have 
not practiced in a mental health setting, I nevertheless have a long-standing 
interest in mental health practice, based on a fascination with the varying 
explanatory models that are put forward for the experiences of individuals who 
suffer severe mental distress, and the ensuing and often conflicting approaches to 
dealing with such distress.  CTOs provide an ideal exemplar to investigate how 
such debates, models and approaches play out in mental health policy and 
practice, given the issues they raise. 
 
Consequently, I came to this thesis with the view that to move beyond the current 
relatively polarised debates on CTOs, a study which takes account of the 
potential complexity of their practice would bring a new and valuable 
perspective to the existing body of CTO research and more generally, to the use 
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of compulsion in mental health services.  My aim therefore is to get underneath 
the surface of the contested claims made about CTOs: to understand the thought 
behind their introduction; to expose the mechanics of how they work; to explore 
why and in what ways they are used; and to illuminate what the experiential and 
ethical implications of their use are for the individuals who are placed on them 
and for the practitioners who implement them.  Through doing so, I hope to 
provide a distinctively theorised and methodologically realised account of a 
noteworthy phenomenon in community mental health, which is of value both in 
terms of application and theory generation. 
 
In the rest of this introduction I set the scene for the thesis, firstly by describing 
how the CTO regime works in England. This will provide a ‘reference guide’ to 
help navigate the more in-depth discussion of CTO practice in the rest of the 
thesis.  I then briefly sketch out the development of the interconnected empirical 
and theoretical rationales for the thesis, and the subsequent research questions 
which arise from these rationales.  I finish the introduction with a short 
description of how the thesis is structured.   
CTOs in England 
 
CTOs are present in a number of forms in different countries around the world.  
It is worth noting here that because of this, they go under a variety of 
nomenclatures which differ from country to country and indeed from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.  For example, they can be referred to as ‘outpatient commitment 
laws’, ‘mandated community treatment’ or ‘community compulsory treatment 
orders’ among other given names.  For the sake of clarity, I have mostly retained 
‘community treatment order’ and ‘CTO’ throughout the thesis, even when 
referring to other countries, unless it is necessary to do otherwise.  I explain in 
Chapter Four the international background to the evolution of CTOs in mental 
health services, including how that background has influenced the development 
of different CTO regimes.  For now, I focus in a very straightforward way on 
how the CTO works in England
1
.   
                                                 
1
 I should note here that the Mental Health Act (2007) and the introduction of CTOs within that Act, applies 
to England and Wales.  For brevity, and also because my fieldwork only takes place in England, I simply 
refer to England throughout the thesis.  Scotland has a separate provision – Compulsory Community 
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CTOs in their current form resulted from a broader reform programme begun in 
1998, in which the Mental Health Act (1983) was eventually amended by the 
Mental Health Act (2007), and are an example of what is called a ‘preventative’ 
CTO (Churchill et al, 2007).  This means that they have different criteria – a 
lower legal threshold - than for compulsory hospitalisation.  The function of the 
preventative CTO therefore is to prevent mental health deterioration before it 
occurs rather than reacting to deterioration that has already occurred.  
Preventative CTOs tend to be aimed at particular groups of service users, 
especially those who have been described as ‘revolving door patients’, meaning 
they regularly stop their medication and experience relapse, leading to 
continuous movement between hospital and the community.   The large majority 
of individuals placed on CTOs have been given a primary diagnosis of a 
psychosis-related disorder, and are on anti-psychotic medication (Churchill et al, 
2007), which the CTO is intended to ensure they adhere to.  I now describe the 
CTO process with regards to imposition of the CTO; procedures once the CTO is 
in place; and renewal or discharge of the CTO.  Figure One gives a 
diagrammatic overview of this description. 
 
Figure 1: A diagram of the CTO process 
 
(Adapted courtesy of Krysia Canvin and Jorun Rugkasa from the OCTET study, 
University of Oxford) 
                                                                                                                                    
Treatment Orders –introduced under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, which I 
discuss in Chapter Four.  Northern Ireland operates under the Mental Health Order 1986 (NI) and has no 
equivalent of CTOs, although there are moves towards reformation of the legal framework (O’Hare et al, 
2013). 
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Process and criteria for imposition of the CTO 
 
CTOs can only be applied immediately following compulsory hospitalisation for 
treatment under Sections 3 or 37 of the Mental Health Act (1983).  When a 
service user is in hospital, the inpatient team will decide (usually in collaboration 
with the service user’s community team) whether a CTO is the most appropriate 
option on discharge, rather than simply discharging the service user to voluntary 
status in the community.  The practice guidance suggests that the potential for a 
CTO should be discussed as soon as the service user is admitted to hospital, in 
order to allow for proper planning, consultation and preparation (NIMHE, 2008).  
The inpatient psychiatrist makes the formal application for the CTO, with an 
Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP) providing the second opinion.  
The AMHP must approve the decision for the CTO to go ahead, and the 
psychiatrist cannot simply seek the opinion of another AMHP if a disagreement 
occurs.  Although CTOs are described as a “kind of contract” with service users 
in the guidance for their use (NIMHE, 2008, 17), and it is recommended that 
agreement on the CTO is reached with the service user, they do not have to 
consent to the imposition of the CTO.  The criteria for a CTO are outlined below: 
 The patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which 
makes it appropriate for the patient to receive medical treatment. 
 It is necessary for the patient’s health or safety, or for the safety of other 
persons, that the patient should receive such treatment. 
 Subject to the patient being liable to be recalled as mentioned below, such 
treatment can be provided without the patient continuing to be detained in 
a hospital. 
 It is necessary that the responsible clinician should be able to exercise the 
power…to recall the patient to hospital.  
 Appropriate medical treatment is available for the patient. 
(NIMHE, 2008, 11) 
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Process and procedures once the CTO is in place 
 
When a CTO is imposed, the psychiatrist again with the agreement of the 
AMHP, attaches specific conditions to the CTO to which the service user will be 
made subject.  These usually include reference to complying with medication, 
and maintaining engagement with the care coordinator and psychiatrist.  
Although psychiatrists have been advised to keep conditions to a minimum 
(NIMHE, 2008), they can cover any area which is deemed to prevent risk of 
harm or ensure that the service user receives medical treatment.  Consequently, 
conditions might also include abstention from drug or alcohol use, to reside at a 
certain address, or other ‘lifestyle’ conditions.  In addition, two mandatory 
conditions always apply, which combined effectively mean the service user must 
make themselves available for medical examination when necessary.   
Once back in the community on a CTO, the service user can be recalled by their 
psychiatrist to hospital or an outpatient clinic for assessment and treatment for a 
period of up to 72 hours.  The criteria for recall are as follows: 
 The patient needs to receive treatment in hospital; and 
 There would be a risk of harm to the patient’s or others health and safety 
if they were not recalled.   
(NIMHE, 2008, 33) 
 
It should be noted that there is not a requirement for the service user to be seen 
and assessed before recall is decided upon.  The guidance is clear however that a 
service user breaching a condition is not enough in itself to trigger their recall 
(NIMHE, 2008).  In these circumstances, recall can only be carried out if the 
psychiatrist believes that failure to comply with a condition means an immediate 
risk of harm is deemed likely.  Conversely, if the service user is still compliant 
with the conditions but their mental health has deteriorated to the point that they 
meet the criteria for recall, then they can also be recalled.  It is important to note 
that whilst the service user does not have to consent to the CTO, they do have to 
consent to the medical treatment given under the CTO whilst in the community.  
If they do not consent to medical treatment, or withdraw their consent at any 
point, then enforced treatment in the community is not allowed.  The psychiatrist 
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has to decide whether this refusal of medical treatment constitutes an immediate 
risk of harm and whether recall to hospital for enforced treatment is therefore 
necessary.  Recall should not be used regularly and a service user can still be 
admitted to hospital voluntarily even when they are under the CTO.  When the 
service user is told they are to be recalled they are encouraged to make their own 
way to hospital or attend with a member of the community team.  If they refuse 
to attend hospital the ambulance and police service can be called upon to take 
them there.   
 
Once a service user has been recalled, the psychiatrist has three options after the 
72 hour recall period has ended.  They can: 
 Revoke the CTO with the agreement of an AMHP, which means the 
service user reverts back to compulsory hospitalisation and treatment 
under Section 3 or 37.  This happens if the service user is deemed to be 
significantly unwell, and to meet the criteria for Sections 3/37.   
 Discharge the service user into the community back on the CTO.  This 
would happen if the service user has been assessed and treated adequately 
within the 72 hour period, and is deemed stable and low-risk enough to be 
discharged. 
 Discharge the service user into the community with no CTO in place.  
This is unlikely to happen, but may occur if it is believed that the CTO is 
no longer appropriate. 
 
Process and criteria for ending or extending a CTO 
 
CTOs initially run for a period of six months.  They can then be renewed for a 
further six months, and then for a year at a time.  If CTOs are renewed at the end 
of each six month/year period, they can run indefinitely.  Discharge from the 
CTO may take a number of routes:  
 The psychiatrist can choose to discharge at any time during the CTO (in 
practice this usually happens at a mandatory review shortly before the 
CTO is due to expire, where a decision is made whether to renew or 
discharge the CTO). 
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 The CTO can expire automatically at the end of the six month/year period 
(although this is not usual practice, as it would mean a review has not 
taken place).  
 The Nearest Relative can apply for discharge (again, not typical and can 
be overturned by the psychiatrist). 
 The CTO can be discharged on appeal at a Managers’ Hearing or 
Tribunal
2
. 
 
Typically then, the decision to discharge or renew a CTO is made at the 
mandatory review attended by the psychiatrist, the AMHP, the care coordinator, 
the service user, and their carer if applicable.  In order to discharge the CTO, the 
psychiatrist has to believe that the service user no longer meets the criteria for the 
CTO.  If the CTO is renewed at this review, the decision is made subject to legal 
scrutiny through appeal, where it is decided whether the renewal was 
appropriate.   
The foundations for a study of CTO practice 
 
I have described in a very functional way how CTOs work and the legal 
framework for their use, which will be referred to at various points throughout 
the thesis.  I now turn to the various rationales I draw on in the thesis, and how 
together they form the basis for the guiding research questions I use to 
investigate CTOs, beginning with a summary of how the thesis adds to the 
current body of CTO research.   
 
A relatively significant body of international research on CTOs has built up over 
the last thirty years, much of it based on experimental research designs and 
aimed at ascertaining whether CTOs are effective in relation to a defined set of 
outcomes, particularly reduction in hospitalisation rates.  Such research has 
yielded an equivocal picture of CTO effectiveness, with little agreement on the 
conclusions to be reached (Kiseley et al, 2007, Swanson and Swartz, 2014).  
Consequently it appears that these studies have contributed to the further 
                                                 
2
 I explain Managers’ Hearings and Tribunals in more detail in Chapter Nine, when I discuss the appeals 
process. 
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embedding of the dichotomous positions that exist on CTOs.  There are broader 
questions that can be asked about this research agenda, namely that it takes a 
very particular view of CTO outcomes, which does not account for plurality in 
terms of the relative value of such outcomes or indeed, the various implications 
that might arise from CTO use as a complex policy programme.  However, 
whilst there have been a small number of exploratory studies of stakeholder 
perspectives on CTOs, there has been little in the way of studies of everyday 
CTO practice which may help account for such plurality in CTO use.  A 
generative, practice-oriented narrative of change through the CTO process would 
help develop an understanding of how and why CTOs are used, the range of 
potential consequences they can lead to, and how these consequences are shaped, 
interpreted and experienced by service users and practitioners.  Through taking 
such an approach a dual analysis can be formed; one which both explains the 
paths a CTO might take inclusive of stakeholder influence, and describes the 
ways that the CTO affects those who are made subject to it and who implement 
it.    
 
In order to undertake such an analysis I employ both critical realism and 
governmentality as theoretical guides.  A critical realist view of causality can be 
understood as generative and explanatory in nature, entailing the investigation of 
context and causal mechanisms. Given my stance towards CTOs as necessitating 
an investigation which does not take a strong position on their use, I draw from 
the empirical rather than the emancipatory variant of critical realism to elucidate 
CTO context-mechanism-outcome configurations (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, 
2004).  At the same time, such an approach by itself tends to ignore the ethical 
dimension to policy programmes, an understanding of which seems particular 
important for a compulsory intervention such as the CTO.  Governmentality 
allows for an ethical yet non-deterministic and descriptive analysis of different 
kinds of power as they operate through the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2007, 
Dean, 2010). Therefore, bringing critical realism and governmentality together 
provides a framework in which I can address both the reasons why CTOs may 
lead to a variety of outcomes - the effects of policy - and how CTOs work to 
regulate conduct and encourage self-conduct through coercive, disciplinary and 
reflexive means.   To translate this framework to the empirical domain I 
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particularly draw on the work of Pawson and Tilley (1997, 2004) for critical 
realism and Dean for governmentality (2010), which together enable the CTO 
journey to be traced from policy theory through practice to its implications.  In 
this way, I distil the complementary research and theoretical rationales explained 
thus far into the following set of research questions: 
 
1. Why did CTO policy come to exist, and exist in the form that it does in 
England?  How have problems been framed as problems for the CTO to 
solve? 
2. In what ways are CTOs conceptualised by practitioners and service users?  
How do these conceptualisations align or not with policy-level reasoning? 
For practitioners in particular how do they formulate CTO practice based 
on these conceptualisations? 
3. How do CTOs work, and what factors – inclusive of participant action - 
influence why they work in those particular ways?  
4. What are the varying consequences of the CTO that result from these 
practices, how are these consequences thought about by practitioners and 
service users, and how do such consequences relate to policy and 
practice-level reasoning on their use?  How do CTOs work to produce 
change in service user identities and conduct, and in what ways are the 
transformational potentials of CTOs realised or resisted? 
 
For a rounded analysis of CTOs to be achieved which answers these questions, 
an ethnographic approach is necessary that gives a view of CTOs over time, 
within context and through a variety of methods utilised to capture both action 
and meaning in their everyday practice.  I use such an approach to investigate 
CTOs as they are practiced within English mental health services.  In addressing 
these questions in this particular way, I hope to generate and present findings 
which have significance for:  
 Policy, by explaining how CTOs as an indicative case illuminate the 
potential gaps between policy and practice rationalities and the variability 
of outcomes that can arise from policy programmes. 
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 Practice, by showing the differing uses to which CTOs are put, how they 
are practiced and the implications of such practice. 
 Research, by addressing facets of CTO use which have not been fully 
explored, through a research methodology which has not been employed 
in this field thus far. 
 Theory, by bringing to the surface the governmental operation of 
different forms of power in CTO use, and how they are manifested 
through thought, practice and identity work. 
 
Thesis outline 
 
Chapters One, Two and Three respectively present the empirical, theoretical 
and methodological background to the thesis.  In Chapter One I set out the 
research literature on CTOs and what it tells us about CTO effectiveness, 
stakeholder perspectives and CTO practice.  The aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate where the thesis is situated within the current body of research on 
CTOs, and what additional knowledge it could contribute to the research 
literature.  In Chapter Two I develop the theoretical framework for the thesis, 
specifically explaining the rationale for employing a critical realist-governmental 
framework, and how the two are integrated in a way that is philosophically 
coherent.  The chapter concludes with a mapping of this framework via realist 
policy evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 2004) and an analytics of government 
(Dean, 2010) onto the research questions and ensuing ethnographic approach 
taken in the thesis.   In Chapter Three I further detail the methodological 
framework for the thesis, substantiating the research design and methods used.  I 
explain how I embedded an ethnographic approach within a case study design in 
two Mental Health Trusts to bring breadth and depth to the findings, and how 
combining interviews, observations and documentary analysis sheds light on 
different aspects of the research.  The chapter also includes a description of how 
the fieldwork was undertaken, with particular reference to the recruitment, 
selection and characteristics of participants, and the ethical dilemmas faced 
during the fieldwork.   
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Chapters Four to Nine form the main body of the thesis, and elucidate the 
findings. These chapters are aligned with the four sets of research questions 
outlined earlier, and trace a route from CTO policy theory through ‘ground-level’ 
conceptualisation, practice and practice experiences, and reflections on CTO 
‘endings’.  In Chapter Four I undertake a CTO policy review, which aims to 
formulate why and how CTOs came to exist as they did in English mental health 
services.  I draw out the ideational, historical and spatial elements which went 
into constituting CTOs in their current form, and end the chapter by conducting a 
comparative analysis which highlights the particular nature of CTOs as they 
manifest in England.  Chapters Five to Nine move on to present the findings 
generated through the empirical fieldwork.  Chapters Five and Six are ‘mirror’ 
chapters, in that they respectively deal with service user and practitioner 
conceptualisations of CTOs, each exploring the various beliefs that shape 
participant understanding of the CTOs and the associated purposes they see the 
CTO being put to.  Specifically, Chapter Five explores service user identity 
formation in the face of severe mental difficulties, and how such self-perceptions 
influence their view of the CTO as either performing an important role in regards 
to provision, risk, recovery and maintenance, or blocking their ability to reach 
their goals.  Chapter Six describes the disjuncture between policy and 
practitioner reasoning on CTOs, and in turn how practitioners’ reasoning is based 
on particular ethical foundations.   Practitioners described the potential purposes 
of the CTOs in similar terms to service users and I separate these into short-term 
aims related to protection and risk and long-term aims related to stability and 
recovery.  Chapters Seven and Eight are also ‘mirror’ chapters, this time 
exploring the everyday practice of CTOs from the position of the service user 
and then the practitioner, with attention paid to the personal, interpersonal and 
systemic factors that shape CTO practice.  Both chapters are structured around 
the CTO process, starting with a discussion of discharge onto the CTO, before 
moving on to the role of conditions and finally the use of recall.  Chapter Seven 
highlights the connections between service users’ beliefs regarding the CTO, 
their interpretation of how it works and their responses to it.  I also foreground 
the significant mediating influence of the service user-practitioner relationship, 
and how this informed service user experiences of the CTO.  Chapter Eight 
focuses on how practitioners made use of the CTO and the factors that shape that 
23 
 
use, referring to relational work with service users but also broader cultural and 
institutional dynamics.  Chapter Nine is the final findings chapter, and is 
orientated around the decision-making process when discharge from the CTO is 
being considered.  It covers relatively new ground in English mental health 
research through detailing the appeals process for CTOs, and particularly the 
main elements appeal panels consider when making their decision.  It then moves 
onto the more contested decision-making arena of CTO reviews, and illuminates 
how practitioners deal with considerations of risk, evidence, causality and trust 
when deciding whether to end or continue a CTO.  The chapter ends by 
highlighting the balancing acts practitioners perform when weighing up the 
benefits and costs of continuing the CTO, particularly in relation to 
change/stasis, dependency/responsibility and engagement/alienation.  In this way 
the chapter also draws attention to the various intended and unintended 
consequences of using the CTO.   
 
Chapter Ten draws together and analyses the findings in a discussion of CTO 
policy and practice.  I align the findings to the research questions which were 
explained and outlined in Chapter Two.  Accordingly I explore what the findings 
mean for an understanding of CTO policy development, ‘ground-level’ 
conceptualisations of CTOs, the operation of agency, interaction and context in 
CTO practice, and CTO ‘ends’ – their personal and social consequences.  In 
doing so, I make explicit connections between the findings and the specific 
aspects of the critical realist-governmentality framework to which they are 
related.  In the ensuing Conclusion, I elucidate what this discussion signifies for 
current CTO policy and practice, the CTO research agenda, and for the marrying 
of a critical realist and governmental approach. 
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Chapter One: 
What do we know about CTOs? 
Effectiveness, perspectives and practice 
 
The research body on CTOs stretches back thirty years and across a range of 
countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the USA, Israel and the 
UK.  The majority of research on CTOs can be described as attempting to 
measure their effectiveness across a range of outcome measures.  A smaller 
group of studies, mostly qualitative in nature, have sought to ascertain how CTOs 
are viewed by stakeholders.  Practice-focused studies which have explored the 
day to day use of CTOs are even fewer in number.  In this research review I 
describe the kinds of research that have taken place, examining both findings and 
methodology in order to account, in part, for the substantive and methodological 
approach I have taken in this thesis.   
 
Before doing so, a note on the search approach chosen for this review would be 
helpful.  The search was deliberately narrative rather than systematic in scope, as 
my intention was to ascertain the extent of the total CTO research landscape, 
rather than focusing on inclusion or exclusion of studies based on quality criteria.  
The report prepared for the Department of Health by Churchill et al (2007) is still 
the most comprehensive account of CTO research literature to date, and I used 
that as a starting point to evaluate where the main foci had been in studies of 
CTOs.  From their review I was able to get a sense of how to categorise the 
research literature, and more importantly to see what had been prioritised and in 
turn omitted from the knowledge base on CTOs.  I structured my review – and 
this chapter – accordingly, starting with the main body of work on CTO 
effectiveness, before moving on to the smaller groupings of studies on 
stakeholder perspectives and on CTO practice itself.  In order to bring the search 
up to date and to keep the review contemporary, I also searched the main health 
and social care research databases and Google Scholar at six monthly intervals 
during the course of the PhD.  As the PhD progressed and I built up contacts with 
academics in the field, I also kept abreast of key research developments and 
publications in the field, particularly those that came from the Department of 
Health sponsored national OCTET study, and from other English studies such as 
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that undertaken by Stroud, Doughty and Banks (2013).  In this way I developed 
an argument for what kind of methodological approach would be of use in 
extending the body of CTO research, which I present now. 
Do CTOs work? 
 
The effectiveness of CTOs has mainly been tested with regard to how they have 
affected admission rates to hospital, with lower rates being viewed as evidence of 
their effectiveness.  Churchill et al (2007, 178), in their comprehensive review of 
CTO research also identified other reported indicators across 28 studies, 
including:  
length of stay, remaining in contact with services, service intensity and 
compliance with treatment…social functioning, violence/threatening 
behaviour, arrest, employment, accommodation status, mental state and 
psychopathology, quality of life, criminal victimization, number of needs 
for care, carer satisfaction…and adverse events. 
 
Most of this research consists of ‘before and after’ studies (for example Geller et 
al, 1997, Muirhead et al, 2006, O’Brien and Farrell, 2005), which in general 
show a clinical improvement in those made subject to a CTO, but have also been 
criticised for serious methodological deficiencies, particularly a lack of control 
for other factors (Kisely et al, 2005).  More rigorous matched (Kisely et al, 2004, 
Preston et al, 2002) and randomised controlled trials (RCTs) (Steadman et al, 
2001, Swartz et al, 1999) have been more equivocal in their findings, concluding 
that CTOs result in little or no difference, particularly in terms of the primary 
outcome of hospital admissions, but also in regards to contact with services, 
clinical functioning or quality of life measurements.  A Cochrane review (Kisely 
et al, 2005, 2), of this experimental research accordingly concluded “it 
is…difficult to conceive of another group in society that would be subject to 
measures that curtail the freedom of 85 people to avoid one admission to hospital 
or of 238 to avoid one arrest”.  At the same time however, there is some basis to 
suggest CTOs may work in reducing the length of admissions for particular client 
groups (Kisely et al, 2013, Segal, Silverman and Temkin, 2010).  Secondary post 
hoc analyses of the Swartz et al (1999) and Steadman et al (2001) RCT data have 
also been more positive in their evaluations, with Swartz et al (2001) claiming 
that whilst short duration CTOs are not effective, CTOs of longer length led to 
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57% fewer hospital admissions than in the control group.  Other secondary 
analyses of these two studies have shown a correlation between longer lasting 
CTOs and other more distal factors such as a positive impact on care-giver strain 
(Groff et al, 2004), reduction in risk of victimisation (Hiday et al, 2002), and 
reduction in violence towards others (Swanson et al, 2000).  However there are 
two problems with the interpretation of such findings; firstly multiple post hoc 
analyses cannot be relied upon to demonstrate causality due to the increased risk 
of false positive results (Torgerson and Torgerson, 2008); secondly and relatedly, 
given that the two original studies reported no significant differences, these 
secondary analyses can only be seen as exploratory and hypothesis-generating. 
 
The lack of statistically significant differences between control and experiment 
groups in those two RCTs is perhaps due to the inherent ethical and 
methodological difficulties in conducting controlled studies on ‘real-world’ 
policy initiatives such as CTOs (Gould, 2006).  The complexity of CTOs means 
that problems arise in separating out the ‘active’ component under study from 
other localised factors, thus reducing replicability and generalisability.  Indeed, it 
has been argued that a key issue with the findings of such studies is whether it is 
the care and treatment CTOs may engender or their compulsory nature which 
affects outcomes (Kisely, 2005).   Furthermore, given that the two RCTs were 
carried out in the USA, it is difficult to see how they can be applied to the 
qualitatively different English CTO model.  For this reason, the Department of 
Health commissioned the Oxford Community Treatment Evaluation Trial 
(OCTET) in 2008, a national RCT to investigate the effectiveness of CTOs.  As 
with other experimental studies in this area, the main outcome measured by 
OCTET was the effect of CTOs on hospital admission rates, with secondary 
measurements of psycho-social outcomes also taking place.  The study found no 
difference in numbers of readmissions to hospital, with the investigating team 
consequently proclaiming that the use of CTOs is no longer ethically justifiable 
(Burns et al, 2013, Burns and Molodynski, 2014).  As with the previous RCTs, 
there have been criticisms of the fidelity of the research undertaken, particularly 
with regards to protocol violations (Curtis, 2014).  Even so, the continuing rise in 
involuntary admissions in England - 10% over five years (Health and Social Care 
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Information Centre, 2012) - appears to be consistent with the more general claim 
that CTOs have not brought about a reduction in hospitalisation rates.   
 
Despite the findings of OCTET however, there remains little consensus on CTO 
effectiveness, with proponents and opponents continuing to use effectiveness 
research in a rhetorical sense to support their stance (see Swanson and Swartz, 
2014).  As Kiseley et al (2007, 12) comment in a systematic review of CTOs, “it 
is striking how reviews of the same studies can come to markedly different 
conclusions”.  Arguments on these grounds are often made with recourse to 
ethical reasoning, which in turn is limited to the question of whether CTOs 
‘work’ or not.  Such an approach may be problematic for three reasons.  Firstly, 
even if the evidence for CTO effectiveness was unequivocal, it “may not provide 
sufficient justification for CTO use without the availability of additional 
information about potential negative consequences”, (Churchill et al, 2007, 19), 
some of which may not be obvious or easily discerned. Equally, equivocal or 
negative evidence does not necessarily negate the use of CTOs in particular 
circumstances, suggesting a weighing up of the implications is required.  
Secondly, the choice of what counts as an important measurable outcome is 
dependent on epistemic positioning, as demonstrated by the focus in much of the 
effectiveness research on rates of hospitalisation and length of inpatient stay. 
CTOs can incorporate a range of outcomes, which will be differentiated in 
importance both between and within stakeholder groups such as policy-makers, 
practitioners, service users and carers.  Light (2014, 7) refers to this when posing 
the question “should CTOs be determined in lacking in efficacy based on a 
disputed primary research finding of no difference in readmission rate in a small 
number of randomised controlled trials and other studies?”  In a related sense, 
experimental studies by their design prioritise outcome measures over process or 
output measures. For example, the OCTET study did not account for rates of 
recalls to hospital as they were counted as a process measure rather than an 
outcome measure.  This raises questions around what counts as a meaningful 
consequence of an intervention.  Keeping with the recall example, it can be 
posited that if an individual was recalled to hospital, that would likely feel a very 
real consequence of being on a CTO.  Perhaps then, the implications or results of 
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being on a CTO can be seen in broader terms than that which is generally 
understood in experimental research.   
 
Finally, whether outcomes are viewed as positive or negative depends on ethical 
stance, as is particularly evident in regards to hospital readmission rates for those 
on CTOs, where increasing rates of hospitalisation are consistently positioned as 
a negative outcome.  It may be the case however that increased/static 
hospitalisation rates could be a positive sign that CTOs are working in 
identifying relapse early.  As Kahan et al (2009) hypothesise, cultural cognition - 
the pre-existing cultural beliefs that people hold - may shape perceptions of the 
overall effectiveness of CTOs.  This in turn suggests that in the study of CTOs, 
there is a requirement for “a more pluralistic approach to constructing the 
necessary knowledge of CTOs to enable communities to make sound decisions 
about their use” (Light, 2014, 8).   The next section will develop further this 
argument in relation to the perspectives of service users and professionals 
regarding CTOs. 
What do people think of CTOs? 
 
Research approaches to ascertaining the views of stakeholders on CTOs can be 
categorised into; surveys of psychiatrists, qualitative studies involving 
practitioners, service users and carers as participants and experimental studies 
which contain outcome measures of service user perspectives.   Research 
findings in this area have been dominated by the mixed-methods New Zealand 
Otago CTO study, which included a national survey of psychiatrists (Romans et 
al, 2004), and semi-structured interviews with 42 CTO service users, their 
psychiatrist and a family member.  Various aspects of the qualitative section of 
the study have been reported on, including, the Maori experience of CTOs 
(Gibbs et al, 2004), perceived dilemmas for practitioners (Mullen, Dawson and 
Gibbs, 2006), family perspectives (Mullen, Gibbs and Dawson, 2006), women’s 
experiences of CTOs (Gibbs, 2010), as well as a general overview (Gibbs, 
Dawson and Mullen, 2006).  A similar mixed methods study was carried out in 
Saskatchewan, Canada, involving a survey of psychiatrists (O’Reilly, Keegan 
and Elias, 2000) and semi-structured interviews with 14 CTO service users, their 
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family members and care coordinators (O’Reilly et al, 2006).  Qualitative 
interview-based research has also taken place in Australia with smaller cohorts, 
(Brophy and Ring, 2004, Rolfe et al, 2008, Light et al, 2014).  The American 
contribution to research on stakeholder views has conformed to an experimental 
research agenda, measuring subjective facets of CTO use such as service user 
attitudes to the fairness of CTOs (Swartz et al, 2004), and whether CTOs are 
rated as coercive by stakeholder groups as compared to alternative scenarios 
(Swartz et al, 2003).  As with research on effectiveness, few opinion-focused 
studies have taken place in England post-CTO introduction, with the majority 
being on stakeholder views of its precursor, Supervised Discharge, and/or the 
proposed introduction of CTOs (Crawford et al, 2000, 2004, Franklin et al, 2000, 
Canvin, Bartlett and Pinfold, 2002, 2005, Gault, 2009).  The exceptions are a 
recent survey of English psychiatrists’ views on the CTO as it is currently being 
used (Manning et al, 2011) and a qualitative study on the perspectives of carers, 
service users and practitioners on CTOs within the context of personalisation 
(Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013). 
 
Practitioner perspectives 
 
Three of the four surveys that have been undertaken on CTOs (O’Reilly, Keegan 
and Elias, 2000, Romans et al, 2004, Manning et al, 2011) reported a positive 
attitude towards CTOs amongst psychiatrists, with the majority being in favour 
of a system that included their use.  Interestingly, Manning et al (2011) reported 
a potentially positive shift in views over time amongst English psychiatrists.  A 
previous survey of 1171 psychiatrists across England (Crawford et al, 2000) 
stated 46% supported the plans for CTOs and the authors concluded a “clear 
consensus on the need to extend compulsory powers into the community does not 
exist” (Crawford et al, 2000, 1).  Out of the 566 useable responses Manning et al 
(2011) received, 60% were in favour of the CTO.  A comparison of the two 
surveys needs to be treated with caution due to their different response rates and 
contexts, but it may be that the integration of CTOs into clinical practice resulted 
in them being deemed more acceptable than when they were only a theoretical 
possibility.  Respondents to Manning et al’s (2011) survey also generally agreed 
with statements that CTOs complemented pre-existing powers and that the 
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increase in powers CTOs represent would benefit service users.  Combined with 
on average strong disagreement with the statement that ‘CTOs would not be 
necessary if community services were better resourced’, this suggests that 
psychiatrists believe that CTOs distinctively ‘fill a gap’ in provision and 
legislation.  Despite the general acceptance of CTOs, a significant minority in 
both Romans et al (2004) (31%) and Manning et al (2011) (19%) held concerns 
that CTOs would hinder the therapeutic alliance between psychiatrist and service 
user.  These surveys also highlight an important issue for the study of practitioner 
views on CTOs; the perspective of psychiatrists has been privileged over other 
professional groups, perhaps because they are the primary ‘formal’ decision-
maker when applying CTOs.  However, in England, it can be argued that the 
care-coordinator is likely to have a more in-depth understanding of the day to 
day use of CTOs than the psychiatrist.  In addition, AMHPs also play an 
important secondary role in formal decision-making on CTOs and consequently 
their opinion on the merits or otherwise of CTOs should be considered.   
 
The studies that have incorporated semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
have included a broader range of practitioners and have allowed for a thematic 
analysis of practitioner perspectives. In these findings it is evident that 
practitioner views on CTOs were largely context-dependent, and involved 
balancing potential benefits and harms.  O’Reilly et al (2006) found that the 
majority of practitioners interviewed valued CTOs for the potential they brought 
for stability in the community, but some were concerned about the less easily 
quantifiable effects resulting from coercive experiences.  Similarly Mullen, 
Dawson and Gibbs (2006) reported the uncertainty involved for practitioners in 
deciding whether CTOs would be helpful and the difficulty in considering the 
broad range of factors at play in individual cases.  In this study, justification for 
the use of CTOs was linked by practitioners to the role they felt CTOs could play 
at the start of a long-term process of rehabilitation.  By way of contrast, concerns 
were also reported that being placed on a CTO may remove an individual’s sense 
of autonomy and foster dependency on services and practitioners, as the CTO 
acts to ‘bind’ service users to services.  From a legal perspective, AMHPs 
interviewed as part of the study by Stroud, Doughty and Banks (2013), although 
the most critical of all the practitioners interviewed, were of the view that CTOs 
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gave more legal protection and structure for service users than pre-existing 
legislative provision.   What is also evident here is that practitioners’ views on 
why they valued CTOs were variable, and did not always cohere with each other. 
For example, in contrast to the well-reported views referred to above that CTOs 
were seen as positive as they could allow for stability in the community, Stroud, 
Doughty and Banks (2013) report the key purpose given for CTOs by 
psychiatrists was to facilitate fast and preventative recall to hospital, as a risk 
management exercise.   
 
Such findings reinforce the need for research to account for the plurality of 
CTOs.  More specifically, the different purposes practitioners state CTOs can be 
put to suggests that there may be corresponding implications for how they are 
used, which could be explored further, taking a ‘practice-focused’ approach to 
research. In this regard, whilst these studies provide valuable evidence on the 
perceived advantages/disadvantages of CTOs and why practitioners think CTOs 
are necessary, they do not enable an analysis of how practitioners use elements of 
the CTO, what influences are instrumental in their perceptions and practice of 
CTOs, and what day-to-day ethical and practical challenges practitioners face in 
implementing CTOs. 
 
Service user perspectives 
 
An overarching theme in all the qualitative studies that include service user 
participants is considerable service user ambivalence towards the use of CTOs, 
with benefits like security being described alongside references to CTOs’ 
stigmatising effects and the loss of freedom they entail.  Themes that arose from 
studies were uncertainty about what service users felt they were allowed to do 
when under the CTO and strong views on the coercive element of CTOs, which 
were described as restrictive and carrying an underlying threat of sanctions 
(Brophy and Ring, 2004).  Some service users were also concerned that being 
made subject to a CTO placed an additional label on them on top of their 
diagnosis, which might serve to differentiate them within services, and 
consequently negatively affect the way they are treated by practitioners (Brophy, 
2009).  The focus that CTOs placed on medication could be resented and seen to 
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displace other forms of support (Brophy and Ring, 2004, Gibbs, Dawson and 
Mullen, 2006).   
 
However, at the same time, the studies highlight that service users could also 
appreciate the safety net CTOs provided, believing they allowed for quicker 
access to hospital if necessary and that they enabled the provision of higher 
quality, more attentive services (Gibbs, Dawson and Mullen, 2006).   CTOs 
could also be viewed as helpful in providing structure and stability in the 
community through difficult periods in service users’ lives (Gibbs, Dawson and 
Mullen, 2006).  If the CTO had been experienced as helpful during difficult 
periods, then service users could become ‘volunteers for compulsion’ (Gibbs et 
al, 2005, 365).  Similarly, Swartz et al (2004) found that if CTOs were believed 
to be effective by service users, they also tended to be perceived as fair.  There 
was an associated theme that service users were likely to prefer CTOs in terms of 
freedom to hospitalisation (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013, Gibbs, Dawson 
and Mullen, 2006).  Swartz et al (2003) used vignettes to ascertain which 
outcomes would be least acceptable to different stakeholder groups and found the 
service user group had similar findings to the other groups in that being placed 
on a CTO was significantly more acceptable as an outcome than experiencing 
rehospitalisation, violence and poor interpersonal relationships.  Service users 
interviewed in qualitative studies reported more ambivalent views on restrictions 
to their freedom through CTOs; Gibbs, Dawson and Mullen (2006) mention 
restrictions on medication choices, travel, residence, and more fundamentally a 
feeling of being prevented from making decisions, as being described by service 
users.   
 
More broadly, comparing CTOs positively to hospitalisation does not necessarily 
tell us about the feelings of disenfranchisement that may result due to the CTO in 
itself or allow for a deeper understanding of service users’ lives whilst on the 
CTO in the context of their experiences in hospital and the community.  In this 
sense, Light et al (2014) make the point that the experience of CTOs is not as 
simple as a choice between freedom and control, and that ambivalence towards 
CTOs points towards deeper, more complex aspects of living under compulsion.  
Instead, being on a CTO can accentuate ontological questions of what it is to be 
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in the world as an individual within the mental health system.  Indeed, an 
exploration of compulsion in the community in relation to coercion and its 
corresponding potential to affect sense of self, identity and belonging are aspects 
of the CTO experience that have been highlighted as requiring further attention 
(Churchill et al, 2007).  Newton-Howes (2010, 218) in describing how 
compulsion should be dealt with ethically in practice, notes that: 
When considering the ‘harms’ of coercion and compulsion it is the 
requirement to do ‘good’ that acts as a counterpoise….In other words the 
consideration of any …coercive ‘loss’ is outweighed by the potential for 
‘good’ to come…There is an increased burden on the professionals 
involved to be clear what that good is.   
 
It is interesting that in the CTO research literature, much more attention has been 
paid to investigating the potential concrete benefits of compulsion, than the 
perhaps more nebulous and ambiguous effects it might have on an individual. If 
this argument is followed further, such an analysis would not only explore the 
effect CTOs may have on those who are placed on them, but would also take 
account of how individuals orientate themselves to the CTO and incorporate it 
(or not) into their lives over time.  In other words, exploring how individuals see 
themselves in relation to the CTO would also shed light on how they perceive 
and respond to particular elements of the CTO, such as conditions and the recall 
process, and how those responses may influence the path the CTO takes.   
How do CTOs work in practice? 
 
The combined literature on practitioner and service user views on CTOs gives us 
an understanding of how CTOs are viewed.  As I have highlighted however, how 
and why CTOs function in particular ways, inclusive of the positions 
practitioners and service users take towards CTOs, are aspects of CTO research 
that can be taken further.  Whilst studies of stakeholder opinions on CTOs are 
fewer in number than experimental studies of CTO outcomes, research on how 
CTOs work in practice is even less common.  Here, I will thematically describe 
the findings of that research which includes reference to CTO practice. 
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Challenges in using CTOs 
 
In outlining how they felt about CTOs, practitioners also discussed the 
challenges that have manifested in their use.  The additional burden of paperwork 
was highlighted in Manning et al (2011) as a factor that discouraged psychiatrists 
in England from using CTOs.   Similarly, O’Reilly et al (2006) found that 
practitioners struggled with some of the procedures for CTOs, as not being ‘fit 
for purpose’ and overly bureaucratic.  In more embedded systems however, such 
as New Zealand (Mullen, Dawson and Gibbs, 2006), such concerns had 
diminished over time.  Both surveys in New Zealand (Romans et al, 2004) and 
England (Manning et al, 2011) stated a key concern for undermining the use of 
the CTO was lack of access to services and particularly supported 
accommodation for individuals returning to the community from hospital.  
Community service provision is less of a factor in the use of CTOs in England as 
it is in countries like the USA, where a fragmented health system means CTOs 
are viewed as important in holding services to account in provision, particular on 
discharge from hospital (Collins, 2005).  Nevertheless, having the framework in 
place to support the CTO through a careful care-planning process was seen as 
necessary (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013).  In this sense, multi-
agency/professional communication, and the local context of provision and 
‘politics’, for example the state of relationships between inpatient and 
community staff, were mentioned as influencing the progression of CTOs 
(Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013, Manning et al, 2011).  
 
Decision-making and reasoning 
 
An important element of cooperative working is a shared understanding of what 
the CTO is for and how it works by professionals.  Understanding of CTOs can 
be variable between different stakeholder groups (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 
2013), and there could be uncertainty for professionals in making decisions. 
What is missing from research into decision-making and reasoning on CTOs 
however is how they work ‘downstream’ (Dawson et al, 2003) particularly in 
relation to the central interlocking mechanisms of conditions and recall, and in 
regards to the legal oversight of CTOs,  specifically the appeals process. The 
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research that has investigated decision-making practice has focused on the 
‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of the CTO process.  Mullen, Dawson and Gibbs (2006) 
highlight the dilemma practitioners faced in deciding whether to discharge a 
CTO or not.  They report that this dilemma came down to the weighing up of 
probabilities and making a judgement on whether any positive progress made 
will continue following discharge.  Deciding on discharge was dependent on the 
level of risk a practitioner was willing to accept, given their past experiences of 
CTOs and the profile of the individual they were making the decision about.  It 
can be inferred from this that although CTOs may for some individuals prevent 
‘short, sharp’ compulsion via involuntary hospitalisation, they may result instead 
in ‘defensive’ decision-making in the community, resulting in individuals being 
under compulsion for much lengthier periods of time.  Nevertheless, risk 
management as it can be understood in terms of the protection of others is not 
necessarily viewed as being a significant element of practitioner reasoning in 
deciding on the use of CTOs.  An interesting finding from the surveys (Romans 
et al 2004, Manning et al, 2011) is that CTOs were supported by psychiatrists on 
clinical grounds rather than in relation to risk management.  Both surveys 
described how psychiatrists  rated supporting treatment adherence, provision of 
authority to treat, contact with professionals, identification of relapse and 
protection of patients from consequences of relapse in their ‘top five’ decision-
making factors for using CTOs, with reduction of risk of violence to others given 
lower importance.  These findings also suggest that practitioner reasoning 
follows a particular chain of logic, with emphasis being placed on enabling 
mechanisms (for example authority to treat) and ‘foundational’ outcomes (such 
as treatment adherence) rather than what could be classed as secondary 
outcomes.   
 
The role of insight in the justification and use of CTOs 
 
Not adhering to treatment is commonly attributed by CTO advocates to a lack of 
insight by individuals into their disorder which makes them unable to make 
rational treatment decisions (Munetz and Freze, 2001, Swartz et al, 2004).  
Research has suggested that people diagnosed with severe mental illness who 
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have poor levels of treatment compliance tend to display worse psychotic 
symptoms, relapse more quickly and are hospitalised more frequently 
(Valenstein et al, 2002, Eaddy, Grogg and Locklear, 2005).  Accordingly, 
development of insight was ranked in the top two factors for psychiatrists in 
deciding whether to discharge a CTO (Romans et al, 2004, Manning et al, 2011).  
Insight in these terms is defined as an individual’s ability to see themselves as 
mentally ill and to frame their experiences in pathological terms (David, 1990).  
Further, defining insight in such a way is associated with the view that a lack of 
insight is a ‘neurological deficit’ which manifests as a clinical symptom of 
mental disorder (Arango and Amador, 2011). Insight is therefore framed as a 
specific, measurable entity which is likely to be missing in individuals diagnosed 
with a severe mental disorder, especially schizophrenia.  Through testing the 
hypothesis that a lack of insight leads to non-compliance, Swartz et al (2004) 
found that those individuals who did not adhere to treatment before being placed 
on a CTO tended to be less likely to perceive themselves as ill or to accept 
neurological explanations for their condition.   
 
Focusing on a lack of insight as the cause of noncompliance, particularly as a 
neurological symptom of illness, provides greater justification for enforced 
treatment as it is based on the premise that the individual needs to be acted upon 
as opposed to the external factors that may contribute to their level of 
engagement. It also means that the individual’s view of their own experiences 
may be underplayed in ascertaining the best way forward.  Taking this stance 
towards cognition may limit the researcher or practitioner’s ability to explore 
individual’s explanations of their experiences, which could yield valuable 
knowledge and lead to different conclusions on treatment pathways or whether 
compulsion is necessary (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  Dawson and Mullen 
(2008), in a paper on the findings of their qualitative study relating to insight, 
suggest that if a service user does not hold the same view as their psychiatrist, 
capitulation may be required from the service user for discharge from the CTO to 
occur.   More specifically, the use of insight as a concept in CTO research and 
practice can lead to tautological reasoning, where resistance to treatment is 
automatically equated to a lack of insight.  A broader point can be made here 
about CTO research, in that it is largely descriptive in nature, and rarely seems to 
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theorise or critically analyse CTOs and the concepts CTO practice is based on.  
For example Swartz et al (2003, 90), in finding that the majority of their research 
participants did not endorse CTOs as personally beneficial, speculated that it was 
too much to expect a “recovery of insight manifested as an autonomous 
retrospective endorsement of…having been coerced into treatment”.  Returning 
to the practice of CTOs, Dawson and Mullen (2008, 270) comment that insight 
can be used as a ‘covert standard’ in decision-making on CTOs, in which 
“treatment adherence is used both to measure insight, and attributed to degree of 
insight, at the same time”.  In this regard, whilst attempts have been made to 
‘objectify’ insight in CTO research, it is subjectively applied as a measure by 
both practitioners and researchers and as such it remains an “unhelpfully inexact” 
concept, particularly in the way it is used to underpin legal decision-making 
(Diesfeld, 2003, 371).   Nevertheless, Dawson and Mullen (2008) report that 
insight in itself, whilst an important concept for practitioner understanding of 
service user situations and subsequently CTO progression, was not necessarily 
relied on inflexibly as an indicator for decision-making.  The importance 
psychiatrists attached to insight did not always preclude the discharge of a CTO 
if insight was deemed not to be present but compliance with medication was still 
viewed as likely. 
 
Treatment adherence and CTOs 
 
The routine conflation of a lack of insight and noncompliance has been 
challenged.  In particular Beck-Sander (1998) highlights studies where levels of 
insight have been defined separately from treatment compliance, which found a 
poor correlation between the two.  Similarly, in comparing the attitudes of non-
adherent and adherent patients to psychotropic medication, Scott and Pope 
(2002) did not find an association with measured levels of insight. More broadly, 
as Chakrabarti (2014) points out, the rate of compliance with medication tends to 
be similar across physical and mental illness, which challenges the theory that 
noncompliance is due to an inherent inability to value treatment in individuals 
diagnosed with psychotic disorders. 
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Noncompliance with medication can be seen instead as a complex process, 
dependent on social and service factors, life circumstances, resources, priorities 
and available information (Chakrabarti, 2014).  Social factors that can contribute 
to noncompliance with medication include the stigma attached to being a mental 
health service user, the availability and closeness of a support network, housing 
instability, employment status and levels of substance misuse (Van Dorn et al, 
2006). If a service user fears that compulsion may arise through maintaining 
contact with services, or feel that they are not included in treatment decisions, 
then levels of compliance can be affected (Oehl, Hummer and Fleischhacker, 
2000).   
 
The well-documented potential side effects of anti-psychotic medication (Calton 
and Spandler, 2009) and the possibility of treatment resistance (NICE, 2014) can 
also contribute to individuals deciding to reduce dosage or stop medication 
altogether.  As Wales and Hiday (2006) point out, the arguments in favour of 
CTOs as a medication enabler are the consequence of assumptions that are rarely 
critically examined in the CTO research literature, about both the typical 
characteristics of individuals diagnosed with a severe mental illness and the 
usefulness of medication, specifically antipsychotics.  NICE (2014) suggests that 
up to a third of people do not respond to antipsychotics, and if an individual 
displays treatment-resistance to one type, it is unlikely that they will respond to 
others.  Some systematic reviews have provided evidence for antipsychotic 
effectiveness in helping reduce positive symptoms, improve functioning and 
lower the rate of relapse (David and Adams, 2001, Marder and Wirshing, 2003, 
Adams et al, 2013). Others have been more ambiguous in their findings when 
comparing individual antipsychotics to placebos, particularly taking account of 
the highly variable quality of research reviewed (Irving, Adams and Rice, 2006, 
Omori and Wang, 2009, Rattehalli et al, 2010, Matar and Almerie, 2013).  As 
Fisher and Greenberg (1997, 362) conclude in an earlier review, “the potency of 
any [psychotropic medication] is typically inverse to the degree to which the 
drug trial in which it was tested was adequately controlled”.   In a wider sense, it 
has also been suggested that the neo-Kraepelinian view of discrete diagnoses in 
mental health can lead to flawed prescription practice, where alternative drug 
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regimes may be more effective than those given simply because an individual has 
received a certain diagnosis (Bentall, 2004).   
 
A common response to treatment resistance by psychiatrists is to combine 
different types of antipsychotic medication, or to increase the dosage beyond the 
standard dose recommended by the British National Formulary, which is set to 
maximise the balance between therapeutic gain and side-effects (NICE, 2014).  
However, neither of these strategies have been proven effective (Taylor, 2010), 
and in the case of ‘over-dosing’ can lead to worse outcomes due to the escalation 
of side-effects.  Consequently, it could be concluded that if medication non-
response is beyond the ability of psychiatrists to control, it could lead to relapse 
and hospitalisation for some proportion of service users, which partially 
challenges the claim that noncompliance is the primary cause of mental 
deterioration (Weiden and Glazer, 1997).  Studies on service user opinions 
around medication management in mental health suggest that practitioners may 
not always listen sufficiently to concerns around treatment side-effects, or try and 
act to alleviate them, which may lead to medication self-management in the form 
of reduction or ceasing of medication (Gray, Wykes and Gournay, 2002).   
 
Van Dorn et al (2006) examine the relationship between CTOs and perceived 
barriers to seeking support.  They suggest that the complex interplay of personal 
and environmental factors that can lead to noncompliance means that those 
individuals who tend to be put under the greatest pressure to comply with 
medication via leverage such as being placed on a CTO, can also face the 
greatest barriers in being able to do so.  In addition, they hypothesise that the 
CTO as a tool that should facilitate treatment and engagement may instead act to 
further estrange individuals, making it less likely that they will engage 
voluntarily.   In finding a relationship between low level usage of services and 
CTOs, they considered that this may either be because practitioners were 
targeting those individuals who would not otherwise participate, or because 
CTOs have had the effect of “further alienating some individuals and 
strengthening the internal barriers that keep them from participating voluntarily 
in treatment” (Van Dorn et al, 2006, 504).  Social support networks were a 
positive mediating factor in individuals’ perceptions of barriers to support even if 
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they were on a CTO, and Van Dorn et al (2006) propose that practitioner support 
which focuses on quality of life may lessen the likelihood that individuals will 
avoid services and treatment.  Given these findings and that CTOs “may 
constrain autonomy in multiple ways…[but] the heart of the matter, for 
proponents and critics alike, is the scope of the individual’s autonomy to make 
medication choices” (Wales and Hiday, 2006, 459) an argument can be made that 
research is required that explores how treatment is negotiated in the context of 
the CTO, and how the CTO may influence service user responses to medication, 
and support more broadly.   
 
This is particularly the case considering the association of CTOs with the use of 
depot, which is an injectable form of anti-psychotic medication with long-acting 
effects, often used as a way of managing noncompliance (Brophy, 2009).  
Lambert, Singh and Patel (2009) in a demographic study of service users in 
Victoria, Australia, found that those on CTOs were more than twice as likely to 
be prescribed depot rather than oral antipsychotics.  Whilst the use of depot is not 
as widespread in England as oral antipsychotics, Lambert, Singh and Patel 
(2009) go on to suggest that the introduction of CTOs may lead to a rise in their 
use, as the status of being on a CTO could lead to greater consideration of such 
methods to manage noncompliance.  In their analysis of a sample of CTOs, the 
Care Quality Commission (2010) found that 65% of the cases were given a depot 
injection as part of their CTO treatment plan.  Similarly, Patel et al (2011) found 
that the rate of depot use within their sample of 138 individuals on CTOs 
(63.8%) was double the rate reported in the mental health population.   However, 
it is not clear whether this treatment pathway is chosen as part of the decision to 
use a CTO or is more a reflection of the type of cases where CTOs are being 
applied.  Depot injections can be viewed by service users as more stigmatising 
than oral antipsychotics due to the method of administration and painful side 
effects (NICE, 2014).  Just as importantly in terms of this discussion, the long-
acting nature of depot, and the passive experience of receiving it are likely to 
result in increased feelings of coercion and a lack of control for service users.  As 
Patel et al (2009, 1486) state in their study of the relationship between coercion 
and depot injections, “the power of others that is lack of true autonomy is more 
notable for those on depot than those on oral tablets…As depots are ‘given’ 
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rather than ‘taken’ this sense of power may be seen as more potent”.  Alongside 
an exploration of service user response to medication and the negotiation of 
medication within the context of community compulsion, it may be helpful to 
investigate practitioners’ perspectives and treatment decisions in light of such 
findings.  Using CTOs and depots in conjunction raises questions for research 
around how conditions around medication are formulated by practitioners and 
how a dual-action approach of legal and ‘proximal’ compulsion (Watts and 
Priebe, 2002) is considered in relation to least restrictive principles. 
 
Service user responses to the CTO process 
 
As has been inferred throughout this chapter, the response of stakeholders to the 
CTO, inclusive of the specific elements through which it works, is an area of 
research that can be developed further. Central to potential responses to the CTO 
is how individuals relate to compulsory activities and events.  Newton-Howes 
(2010) defines coercion as a potential, but not inevitable, product of compulsory 
intervention.  In these terms compulsion is the objective ‘event’ that occurs, and 
coercion is the possible subjective reaction experienced in response.  In support 
of this argument Newton-Howes (2010) highlights the complex range of informal 
and formal leverages that can be used on service users and provides an example 
from his research where a significant minority – a quarter - of voluntary 
inpatients he interviewed experienced feelings of coercion, to demonstrate that 
the relationship between compulsion and coercion is not entirely straightforward.  
What he and others (Olofssen and Jacobsson, 2001, Haglund, von Knorring and 
von Essen, 2003) suggest matters in mediating experiences of coercion are the 
‘interactive processes’ that occur between service users and practitioners.  The 
large-scale MacArthur coercion study (Monahan et al, 1999) used the concept of 
procedural justice to suggest that perceived fairness in the process of decision-
making by practitioners can lead to lowered feelings of coercion.  In particular, 
important factors for service users included feeling heard by practitioners, being 
respected and treated with dignity, getting clear and honest explanations for 
decisions in favour of compulsion, and of the future steps necessary for 
compulsion to be lifted.   
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A foundational element therefore for service users in formulating a response to 
the CTO is how they respond to practitioners’ explanations of what the CTO is 
and what it entails.  Research suggests that service users are not well-informed 
about the CTO, the CTO process, or about their rights in respect of the CTO.  
Rolfe, Sheehan and Davidson (2008) conducted a survey of service users in 
Western Australia, and found that a sizeable minority stated that the CTO and 
associated care plan had not been discussed with them, and that they were not 
made aware of the right to a tribunal and the process for reviewing the CTO.  
Evidently a survey cannot answer whether individuals received this information 
and did not remember it, but even if that were the case, it suggests there is a need 
for information-giving to be carried out in a more meaningful and enabling way.  
Stroud, Doughty and Banks (2013) found that even when practitioners stated 
written information had been given, service users did not remember receiving it.  
Assimilating and understanding information is the first step to being actively 
involved in the process and they also found that service users were not clear 
about discussions on the CTO, and reported not playing a part in them. Similarly, 
Brophy and Ring (2004) found that the majority of their participants did not 
know the legal criteria for applying a CTO, believing it was a straightforward 
clinical decision made by their psychiatrist, with no recourse to law and 
guidance.    In England, the practitioner guide for CTOs (NIMHE, 2008) 
suggests service users should be as involved as much as possible in the CTO 
process.  However the process of how a CTO is made and maintained, whereby 
CTOs can be drawn up by the inpatient team but implemented by the community 
team may militate against such involvement.  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
service users in Stroud, Doughty and Banks (2013) described that they felt little 
sense of choice and control in the CTO process.   
 
In regards to dealing with the everyday reality of the CTO, it seems likely that 
individuals who are placed on them may take different approaches, dependent on 
interpretation of the CTO and involvement in the CTO process, but also based on 
perception of self and others, and previous experiences.  Canvin, Bartlett and 
Pinfold (2002) undertook a qualitative study of the predecessor to the CTO, 
Supervised Discharge (SD), and developed a model of ‘compliant’ service user 
responses to its imposition:  fatalism and resignation, whereby compliance with 
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SD was seen as unavoidable and ‘the system’ was perceived to hold total power; 
dependency on SD as a perceived conduit of services and support, and 
consequent anxiety about it being discharged; a feeling of ‘ownership’ of SD, 
with service users using it to become actively involved in their care and take 
responsibility for their actions whilst on SD; and bargaining, where negotiation 
for reciprocal outcomes such as accommodation underpinned acceptance of SD.  
Resistance, as in pushing the boundaries of SD, for example missing 
appointments, was also present in service user accounts, and was seen by the 
authors as a way for service users to maintain a sense of self-efficacy.  As the 
authors state, these responses demonstrate a diverse and dynamic range of self-
determination within the parameters of compulsory community care.  Therefore, 
although CTOs are qualitatively different from Supervised Discharge, the model 
presented by Canvin, Bartlett and Pinfold (2002) provides a potentially helpful 
theorisation of how service users may respond to CTOs.  
 
The therapeutic relationship 
 
Canvin, Bartlett and Pinfold (2002) conclude by suggesting responses to the 
CTO that are characterised by compliance are reliant in part on the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship service users have with practitioners.  This coheres with 
the earlier discussion of Van Dorn et al’s (2006) findings, which considered that 
a central mediating factor for treatment adherence is the interaction between 
practitioners and service users.  Practitioner concerns about the impact of CTOs 
on the therapeutic relationship are well documented (Manning et al, 2011, 
Romans et al, 2004).  As Churchill et al (2007, 188) state, problems in the 
relationship between practitioner and service user may arise because:  
The implementation of CTOs requires that mental health professionals 
fulfil potentially incompatible roles, becoming both “game-keeper” and 
“poacher”, providing treatment to unwilling patients, and monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with this treatment.   
 
This may place practitioners in an uncomfortable position where the power 
disparity inherent within their relationship with service users is further 
emphasised by the legally mandated use of compulsion outside the prescribed 
boundaries of hospital and the extension of their role as supervisor. 
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Consequently, research on the practitioner-service user relationship within the 
context of the CTO has tended to focus on what effect practitioners and service 
users believe the CTO has had on the relationship, and as can be expected, 
findings are mixed.   
 
The responses of service users in O’Reilly et al’s (2006) study contained 
ambivalence towards their psychiatrist, resenting the perceived paternalism of 
coercive measures taken under the CTO, but at the same time understanding why 
such decisions were made.  Psychiatrists in the study described having to accept 
that they were going to be viewed negatively because of the CTO, but also the 
importance of knowing an individual well before placing them on a CTO, in 
order to have a therapeutic foundation to work from.  Likewise, Mullen, Dawson 
and Gibbs (2006) highlight the concern of practitioners that if the use of 
authority to mandate compulsion occurs at the beginning of the relationship 
between them and a service user, it may influence how the service user perceives 
future action by them.    Indeed, they go on to state that the practitioners they 
interviewed held the paradoxical belief that a compulsory intervention such as 
the CTO can only be effective when the service user collaborates with the CTO 
within the context of an engaged relationship.  However, the view of 
psychiatrists in the Romans et al (2004) survey was that a combative relationship 
at the beginning of the CTO was not necessarily insurmountable, because 
damage to the relationship can be ameliorated over time, as the service user may 
become accustomed to the CTO and change their attitude to its use.   In this way, 
practitioners held the view that the CTO could act to improve the relationship 
through the framework it provided for consistent engagement. As a consequence, 
the general consensus was that the negative influence the CTO might have on the 
therapeutic relationship would be outweighed by the benefits it would bring 
(Romans et al, 2004).   
 
These findings relate to the effect a sense of general coercion could have on 
interaction between practitioners and service users.  Stroud, Doughty and Banks 
(2013) also reported on specific elements of the CTO that could cause particular 
tension.  Although service users in their study generally reported good 
relationships with professionals, both service users and practitioners felt that the 
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requirement for regular appeals could bring to the surface disagreement and 
undermine the supportive relationship practitioners might have with individuals.  
Similarly, practitioners reported that the process of recalling an individual to 
hospital highlighted the importance of having the skills necessary to maintain a 
positive connection within the context of coercion.   The challenges of sustaining 
a therapeutic alliance seemed to be of more significance for care coordinators, 
rather than for the psychiatrist who may not see an individual very often.  More 
specifically, some care coordinators in the study reported feeling concerned that 
they now had to take on ‘formal’ legal aspects of work that they hadn’t 
previously, which they felt affected both their sense of role and the nature of 
their practice with service users.    
 
The research described here tells us much about how concerns regarding the 
practitioner-service user relationship have manifested.  It seems that practitioners 
believe the state of the relationship can be important to the working of the CTO, 
in that positive interaction signifies collaboration with the CTO.  The influence 
the CTO has on relationships is dependent on time, the nature of prior 
relationships, and changing responses to the CTO in itself.  The structure the 
CTO may provide can also have a positive influence on the relationship between 
practitioners and service users. Particular tensions may surface through elements 
of the CTO process and this can mean skilled work has to be done by 
practitioners in order to maintain a good working relationship with service users.  
Different groups of practitioners have a range of perspectives on the relational 
effect of the CTO, dependent on their proximity to the service user and possibly, 
because of their role.  These findings have implications for how future research 
into CTOs is carried out, particularly in highlighting the value a longitudinal 
approach might have, and reinforcing the point made earlier that more 
importance needs to be placed on the experiences and perspectives of those 
practitioners who carry out the everyday work of the CTO.   The findings also 
raise a number of follow-on questions which could be addressed, such as: what 
changes do practitioners think CTOs bring for their practice; what actions 
practitioners may take to mitigate any damage; and in taking Canvin, Bartlett and 
Pinfold’s (2002) work further, how such relationships might influence feelings 
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towards the CTO, and how such relationships might be acted upon by 
practitioners and service users to influence the progress of the CTO.   
Ways forward in CTO research 
 
In this chapter I have considered the substantive and methodological aspects of 
existing CTO research, and in doing so I have attempted to highlight four 
interconnected themes which form the basis for the approach taken in this thesis: 
firstly, in order to gain a fuller picture of the nature and significance of 
compulsory community care, an approach that takes into account the 
multifaceted ways CTOs are understood, used and with what implications is 
necessary.  Secondly, such an approach would at least in part involve a deeper 
exploration than has occurred thus far of the everyday practice of CTOs and the 
mechanisms through which they work.  Thirdly, central to the analysis of 
everyday CTO practice is a consideration of the diverse motivations and actions 
of practitioners and service users in the context of the CTO; in particular their 
responses to the CTO, the mediating influence of their interaction with each 
other and the way such responses affect how the CTO unfolds.  Finally, in order 
to understand how practitioners and service users approach CTOs, it is also 
necessary to get a sense of where they are coming from, particularly in regards to 
the exercise of power the CTO represents.  For practitioners this refers to the 
underlying beliefs that influence their stance to CTOs and underpin the various 
ways they balance the tensions that may arise in the use of CTOs.  For service 
users, this would involve an exploration of how the CTO interacts with their 
identity and sense of self in the world within the context of consistent 
‘background’ and sometimes foregrounded compulsion.  A point that is worth 
reemphasising is that this last theme draws attention to the significance of such 
research not only for understanding the workings of the CTO, but also for 
understanding how the CTO may shape those individuals who experience it, both 
practitioners and service users alike.  The CTO research landscape tends towards 
the descriptive and an analysis along the lines described here would go some way 
towards both generating theory and contributing to the application of certain pre-
existing conceptual frameworks.  In the next chapter I will explain and explore 
these frameworks further, with reference to the methodological implications they 
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incur, and with the aim of demonstrating how they may enhance an analysis of 
CTOs in practice.  
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Chapter Two 
Making sense of CTOs:  
Developing a theoretical guide 
 
In the preceding chapter, I outlined how research has been conducted on CTOs 
thus far, with the aim of contextualising the development of this study.  
However, research aims are not solely dependent on the research landscape 
within which they reside.  My interpretation of the current body of research on 
CTOs and the conclusions I have reached as to what research would be valuable, 
is dialogically related to the beliefs I hold on how to best make sense of the 
world.  Whilst the relationship between philosophy and methodology is not 
straightforward, it is nevertheless important to draw out the connections between 
my ontological and epistemological inclinations, and the choices I have made in 
what aspects of CTOs to study and how to study them.  As Greene states, 
“epistemological integrity does get meaningful research done right” (Greene, 
1990 in Shaw, 1999, 22) and in these terms, I will explain how a critical realist 
philosophy has informed this study.  The ontological concerns which lie at the 
heart of critical realism means it can be classed as a meta-theory, and as such it 
has underpinned the theoretical approach I have taken, namely governmentality.  
Critical realism and governmentality are not easily aligned, and I will explain 
how and why I have integrated them for this study, before describing how they 
have underpinned my methodological and analytical approach.  This will then set 
the context for the next chapter, which will address the more practical ‘doing’ of 
the research. 
Approaching the everyday practice of CTOs: path-finding in ontology, 
epistemology and theory 
 
To recap on the previous chapter, whilst the majority of CTO studies have been 
experimental in design and aimed at measuring CTO outcomes, a small number 
of qualitative studies have been carried out which have sought the views of 
service users and practitioners on CTOs (Brophy and Ring, 2004, Gibbs et al, 
2006, O’Reilly et al, 2006). However, given the potential variability in how 
CTOs can be used, there is considerable scope for enquiry in regards to finding 
out how and why they are being practiced in a ‘localised’ setting and with what 
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consequences for those affected by them.  Such research would illuminate what 
CTOs look and feel like, thus joining the abstract political questions they 
engender with the concrete practical-moral concerns that surface in their use.  
The term practical-moral is used here as interpreted by Lishman (2000, 2) who 
characterises practice as a “complex, uncertain and ambiguous” activity, which 
involves the continuous evaluation of various responsibilities and standpoints.  In 
this sense, although policies such as CTOs are based on certain ideas about 
human thought and behaviour, as service users and practitioners engage with 
each other and the broader system they also shape the playing out of policy in 
differentiated ways.  Thus, gaining a sense of the operation of CTOs in practice 
should involve exploration of individual responses and micro-social interactions 
alongside the contextual factors (cultural, political and institutional) that mediate 
the CTO process as it unfolds over time.  This, of course, needs to be considered 
as a mutually constitutive process, not only in terms of how the responses of 
practitioners and service users to the CTO influence the workings of the CTO, 
but also how the CTO shapes aspects of identity and choice for both groups.  In 
this way, I want to formulate a dual analysis: both tracing the pathways that a 
CTO could take and what these pathways might lead to, as well coming to an 
understanding of the varying ways the CTO might shape the experiences and 
perspectives of practitioners and service users. 
 
The tendency however in CTO research has been to take rather more linear 
approaches to investigating CTO outcomes.  The trend in this body of research, 
although equivocal and contested, has been to suggest that CTOs do not deliver 
on key outcomes such as hospitalisation rates (Churchill et al, 2007).  Most 
recently, as discussed in the last chapter, OCTET, a randomised controlled trial 
of CTOs in England, found they made no difference to numbers of readmissions 
to hospital, with the researchers then advocating that CTOs be abolished.  As 
they conclude,  “We believe that there should be a moratorium on the further 
imposition of CTOs (and consideration of those already in place) other than in 
research settings unless and until convincing evidence of their effectiveness is 
obtained” (Burns and Molodynski, 2014, 5).  Yet, as also highlighted, research 
on practitioner opinions of CTOs has tended to find practitioners justifying CTOs 
on the basis they ‘work’ in a range of ways.   Indeed, an interesting illustration of 
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these contrasting findings is provided by a psychiatrist (Mustafa, 2014, 1) in 
critical response to the Burns and Molodynski paper, where he relates the 
following rhetorical and hypothetical vignette:  
 
Take the scenario of a…patient who is known to discontinue treatment 
immediately after discharge from hospital, invariably leading to rapid 
relapse and hospitalisation. Since discharge from hospital on CTO 3 
months earlier, his mental stability has been maintained and he has been 
accepting his fortnightly antipsychotic depot injections. His positive 
psychotic symptoms are minimal. He has become more sociable and has 
applied for a part-time college course. A psychiatrist tells his patient and 
their carer that he is going to lift the CTO.  To his dismay, the carer asks 
the psychiatrist ‘have you not seen with your own eyes that the CTO 
works?’  The psychiatrist replies, ‘yes I have, but a RCT says this could 
not have been possible’.    
 
Mustafa ends the vignette by asking, “would this be evidence based practice?” 
Mustafa is not claiming that such a conversation would take place, but instead is 
making the point that simply accepting that a RCT proves CTOs do not work is 
problematic.  Knowledge generated from the examination of patterns of 
regularities between variables may not always translate into ‘on the ground’ 
experiences of outcomes based on particular pathways (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  The 
prioritisation of certain forms of knowledge can lead to other forms of 
knowledge being discounted.  Put simply, only asking ’what works’ in the case 
of policy interventions does not always give a satisfactory answer for the world 
of practice.  Incorporating complexity into the research process allows for a 
much wider range of questions to be addressed about the ‘work’ (in the broadest 
sense of the word) a particular policy programme does.  Such an approach 
acknowledges that programmes can have multiple outcomes, in terms of both 
intended and unintended consequences.  It also accounts for plurality in how 
these consequences are balanced, how they can be designated as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
and which consequences matter to whom.  The moral and political dimensions of 
research are thus expanded by incorporating a broader and more complex 
theorisation of the consequences of CTOs, beyond only asking whether they are 
deemed effective by predetermined measures.    
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The potential of a critical realist approach 
 
Acknowledgment of complexity has epistemological implications. Taking such a 
stance as a researcher can be aligned with a critical realist approach, where 
change is understood as explanatory and generative in nature.  Put simply taking 
an explanatory approach means to draw conclusions on causality, or in other 
words, on why change comes about.  Doing this in a critical realist way involves 
an attempt to turn the ‘black box’ of causal relations ‘white’ (Scriven, 1994).  
Clarifying what happens when change occurs relies on an analysis of generative 
mechanisms, which can be defined as the interactions between various properties 
which may produce change or maintain stasis.  This analysis in turn depends on 
an investigation of contingency, which includes an exploration of context and 
interventions, the latter incorporating the thoughts, actions and interactions of 
those individuals with a stake in the substantive matter under review (Maxwell, 
2012, Pawson and Tilley, 1997).   
 
Critical realism has much to offer research in the field of social work, as it 
complements the contingent ‘open systems’ nature of practice, but does not 
accept a relativistic view of the reality inhabited by practitioners and the 
individuals they work with (Oliver, 2012).  In this sense critical realist research 
offers potential to bridge competing ontological and epistemological positions, as 
it is founded on an ontological acceptance of reality and a ‘weak’ constructivist 
epistemology that premises our understanding of the world as imperfect and 
partial (Sayer, 2000).  This is to say that critical realism assumes we construe, 
rather than construct the world.  Construal can be described on the basis that the 
world (incorporating the social) can be to varying degrees
3, ‘mind-independent’ 
(Sayer, 2000, 41), yet at the same time can only be known by us via 
interpretation.  In making this distinction, critical realism avoids what Archer 
(1995) terms ‘downward conflation’, where agency is negated because the world 
exists for us only in discourse.  At the same time however, emphasising the 
                                                 
3
 It is worth saying here that although it is beyond the parameters of this thesis to go into in any depth, I am 
aware that the relationship between mind ‘dependence’ and ‘independence’ is complex (see Haslanger, 2012 
and Hacking (1986) on ‘making up’ people and naming ‘kinds’).  There is a constitutive interaction between 
what is in the world and what we make of it, the balance of which differs dependent on the object in 
question.  Further, as I highlight in this discussion of the ‘real’, ‘mind-dependent’ objects may become 
independent, in that they can be causally implicated (see Hacking (1995a) and ‘the looping effect’). 
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construed nature of the world also allows for an acceptance of the fallible nature 
of knowledge.  As Blom and Morén (2009, 117) highlight, there are degrees to 
which a ‘white box’ can be achieved, dependent on the degree of complexity 
under study; what the researcher may want to explain; and indeed what is 
explainable in the field.  In other words, we cannot know everything about 
anything, but we can know something about some things. 
 
Critical realism thus provides a framework to explore and distinguish between 
the map (the transitive) and the territory (the intransitive) (Bateson, 1972).  
Taking this further, the theory of causation which lies at the heart of critical 
realism relies on a stratified or ‘deep’ understanding of reality; what Bhaskar 
(1975) deems the empirical, the real and the actual.  The empirical refers to what 
we can experience and/or know of the world; the real refers to structures and 
mechanisms that exist regardless of whether they are observable or not; and the 
actual to what happens (the events that occur) when the properties of such 
structures and mechanisms are activated (Hartwig, 2007).  It is important to note 
here that experiences and conceptualisations can also belong to the domain of the 
‘real’ in that they can function as properties in themselves with potential for 
activation as mechanisms. In this sense the cause of change can be ideational as 
well as material (Sayer, 2012, Hacking, 1995b, 1998).  In turn, such a stratified 
view of reality means that causality can be understood as resulting from the 
confluence of various factors, or the “power of…particulars” as Sayer (2012, 
181) describes.  Emphasis is placed on the role of contingency in emergent states 
of change or stasis, whereby generative mechanisms occur when properties are 
activated and interact in particular ways to produce (or indeed block) change. We 
as conscious beings also bring contingency to the process, in that we can 
intervene and influence as well as be influenced by the process of change (Sayer, 
2012).   
 
It has been said that because critical realism places such a strong emphasis on 
ontological considerations, it can perform as a meta-theoretical “under-labourer” 
for the “reconstruction of particular theories” (Parr, 2009, 374).  In this thesis, 
critical realism is used as a framework in which to embed and supplement 
Michel Foucault’s conception of governmentality, or an ‘analytics of 
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government’ (Dean, 2010).  The purpose of this particular combination is to 
theoretically ground an understanding of CTOs as an exemplar of compulsory 
community care, within an analysis of power.  The theoretical and functional 
integrity of CTOs depends on their ability to ensure some form of conformity to 
particular goals.  Consequently, developing an understanding of CTOs through 
the lens of power holds relevance in two ways: in a broad sense CTOs are an 
intervention intended to bring about change, which relates to power as a 
“summarising term for situations where some change is made to happen…” 
(Sayer, 2012, 181).  More specifically, CTOs are about change through 
compulsion and thus foreground the role of different forms of power within 
social relations and institutional settings. A critical realist approach sheds 
explanatory light on the transformative potential of CTOs from macro to micro, 
whilst governmentality offers us one particular and helpful perspective on how 
CTOs might be thought and made into being for the ‘conduct of conduct’ via 
coercive, disciplinary and reflexive means (Foucault, 2007).  Such an analysis 
does not orientate power necessarily as a hegemonic force, but rather as fluid and 
dispersed.  Thus, through bringing together generative (why) and descriptive 
(how) analytical accounts, a view can be taken on CTOs which encompasses 
causality, but which avoids determinism by focusing on the decentralised 
relations and settings within which the CTO plays out.   
 
Taking such an approach to the analysis of power as exemplified through CTOs 
both encompasses and enhances the dual analysis I am aiming for.  Specifically, 
bringing governmentality and critical realism together allows me to address both 
the reasons why CTOs might lead to a variety of outcomes - the effects of policy 
- and how CTOs work (or indeed don’t work) to regulate conduct and encourage 
self-conduct.   The intention therefore is to allow for a flexible yet anchored 
analysis of power in action which accounts for, but is not bound by, theories of 
power as either inherently structural or devolved.  It should be noted that whilst 
an argument can be made for the relevance and usefulness of embedding 
governmentality within critical realism, for it to be a coherent argument some 
philosophical problems need to be worked through, and these will be addressed 
shortly.  Before doing so however, it would be helpful to expand on the 
foundations for governmentality that exist in Foucault’s work.   
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Power, knowledge and ethics  
 
Foucault critiqued the idea of sovereign power in which power is operationalised 
in a centralised, repressive and hierarchical way.  Instead, Foucault contended 
that “power is everywhere” (Foucault, 1990, 93), being omnipresent and 
dispersed.  As such, power is not ‘possessed’ by a few but is a force that is 
relational in nature and in constant flux within society; Foucault therefore 
“challenges the polarisation of such categories as ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’” 
(Pease, 2002, 139).  Consequently Foucault argued that power does not have to 
be thought of in coercive terms, but can also be productive and indeed necessary 
– an integral part of how societies work (Gaventa, 2003).  Such a 
conceptualisation of power shifts the focus from an analysis of sovereign power 
to disciplinary power and how it manifests at a ‘micro-political’ level.   
 
Foucault derived disciplinary power as a particularly modern invention, 
emanating and evolving from the Enlightenment period: “‘The Enlightenment’, 
which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (Foucault, 1977, 
222).  Disciplinary power is thus reliant on scientific discourses regarding the 
nature of human thought and behaviour, and associated techniques and strategies 
of objectification and subjectification, which are not premised on the use of 
force.  In contrast to sovereign power then, disciplinary power is “a modest, 
suspicious power [which] regards individuals both as objects and as instruments 
of its exercise” (Foucault 1977, 170).  The aforementioned techniques and 
strategies that underpin disciplinary power consist of various systems of 
surveillance and categorisation, made possible through the creation of the human 
sciences and associated expert-based disciplines such as social work, psychiatry, 
psychology and criminology.  In this way a ‘disciplinary society’ is created, 
where individuals are measured against normalising judgements, and are 
disciplined, or discipline themselves accordingly.   
 
As inferred here, Foucault’s conceptualisation of disciplinary power is entwined 
with another of his central ideas, that of ‘power/knowledge’.  Whilst Foucault did 
not conflate knowledge and power, he was interested in the complex and 
inextricable relationship between them, arguing that “power produces 
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knowledge…power and knowledge directly imply each other” (Foucault 1977, 
27).  The formation of a ‘disciplinary society’ is reliant on particular ‘regimes of 
truth’ which as dominant discourses constitute normalising judgements and in 
turn the regulation of conduct, as Foucault (1977, 27) goes on to say:  
Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' 
but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the 
real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true.' 
Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails 
constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice.  
 
The question that therefore arises is how discourse - via power/knowledge - 
constitutes the subject, in particular through the human sciences and the 
accompanying application of expertise. Accordingly, power is locally dispersed 
rather than centrally coordinated, using small-scale rather than hegemonic 
means. 
 
Foucault also posits how subjects might interact with and work at their own 
constitution through ethical ‘practices of the self’.  Foucault’s view of what ‘the 
self’ might mean is not easily categorised.  He rejected humanism and the idea of 
an unchanging and universal human nature which allows each of us primacy over 
our selves and in a greater sense, our destinies and our world.  However in his 
development of ‘practices of the self’, which is based on a ‘self-self’ reflexive 
relationship, Foucault does not take a nihilistic position. His focus is not on 
defining human nature, but as Hacking (2004, 288) posits, on how people 
become who they are; the “dynamics of human nature”.  This presupposes that a 
flat, rather than vertical relationship exists between self-government, government 
by and of others, and government of the state (Dean, 1994, 196).  If we accept 
that particular moral codes have held sway at particular junctures, and in turn 
interact with how we relate to ourselves and others via ethical practices, then the 
focus is on how we choose to form ourselves through a variety of means and in 
relation to a multiplicity of moral codes in the present. What this means is that:  
“Foucault – most assuredly, not a sociologist – offers us a thoroughly 
sociological sense of self that does not reduce the self to the social” (Dean, 1994, 
216). 
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In this sense, Foucault is not quite as far removed from an existentialist 
perspective on the role of agency as has sometimes been supposed (Hacking, 
2004).  His ‘practices of the self’ refers to four dimensions necessary for ethical 
self-work: ‘ethical substance’ or the focus for moral conduct; the external 
stimulus that leads to recognition of moral obligation; ‘ethical work’ or the 
means by which we attempt change; and the telos of such work, the end person 
that is aspired to (Foucault, 1997a).   As we shall see, these four dimensions map 
closely to those which make up an ‘analytics of government’ as developed from 
governmentality by Dean (2010).  Governmentality thus brings together 
disciplinary and reflexive power, connecting the processes by which we work on 
ourselves to broader governance processes by which we might be worked on.  
 
Governmentality  
 
Governmentality can subsequently be constituted in two ways: firstly in the 
original sense it was defined by Foucault as an evolution in the ‘art of governing’ 
by and within the state at a particular historical juncture; secondly as it has been 
developed as an analytical framework to illuminate the ‘how’ of governing 
across a continuum that stretches beyond sovereign power, to a dispersed 
disciplinary ‘microphysics of power’, to reflexive power via reformation of 
identity and regulation of the self.  Given that CTOs can be seen as a particular 
embodiment of power in action, the analytical framework offered by 
governmentality provides a helpful tool to make sense of their use.  Specifically, 
an ‘analytics of government’ is focused on delineating various manifestations of 
the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2007, 192), which can be defined as “any 
attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behaviour 
according to particular sets of norms for a variety of ends” (Dean, 2010, 10).  
Mckee (2009, 466, emphasis in original) draws out the dual foci of thought and 
action that an analytics of government explores as: 
Both the discursive field in which the exercise of power is rationalised – 
that is the space in which the problem of government is identified and 
solutions proposed; and the actual interventionist practices as manifest in 
specific programmes and techniques in which both individuals and 
groups are governed according to these aforementioned rationalities. 
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Governmentality then is concerned with both how conduct is problematised and 
how such rationalities are subsequently put to work through technologies which 
direct and reform conduct.  However, the ‘conduct of conduct’ is not only in 
relation to how others are governed, but as highlighted in ‘practices of the self’, 
how we govern ourselves.  In other words, how “individuals recognise 
themselves as particular kinds of persons and…work upon and transform 
themselves in certain ways and towards particular goals” (Hodges, 2002, 457).  
Individuals make choices in how they integrate influences; logically an 
individual who can respond positively to external mandates and techniques can 
also respond negatively. Foucault (2007, 75) terms such responses as ‘counter-
conducts’, which he defines as ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by 
these people, at that price”.  ‘Counter-conducts’ therefore are not rejections of 
government in itself, but an expression of seeking different forms and means of 
government. Within governmentality, forms of conduct and counter-conduct 
reflect each other and are interdependent – they both rely on the same processes 
of rationalities, technologies and reformation.  As such, counter-conduct does not 
translate to resistance in terms of a revolutionary and emancipatory ‘stepping 
outside’ of pre-existing power structures.  Disciplinary power operates at the 
micro-level and Foucault posited that so did counter-conducts. “Thus there is no 
grand refusal, only dispersed and shifting points of resistance” (Death, 2010, 
239) which draw on ‘subjugated knowledges’ to form alternative ways of 
thinking and going about governance. 
 
Where governmentality has been empirically applied, such research has been 
criticised for being overly concerned with the ‘discursive’ aspect of 
governmentality and a corresponding neglect of the realisation of rationalities in 
practice (Clarke, 2004, Stenson, 2005, Marston and McDonald, 2006, Parr, 
2009)
4. This focus on discourse analysis emphasises a view of the “‘social as a 
machine’ reforming and constituting everything it comes into contact with” 
(Hunter, 2003, 331), which does not account for the techniques and technologies 
of government.  I would take that argument further to suggest that the focal point 
                                                 
4
 Nikolas Rose is perhaps the best know figure for analyses of governmentality as manifested in discourse 
and rationalities.  I draw on his work as related to mental health and the ‘psy’ disciplines in Chapter Four 
when discussing the semantics of CTOs.     
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of governmentality - conduct itself - requires more detailed empirical exposition.   
The emphasis placed on discourse foregrounds power/knowledge whilst 
neglecting power/knowledge/ethics and the relationship between conduct, 
counter-conduct and ‘practices of the self’.  Specifically, this would involve 
study of the complex, unpredictable and contradictory nature of life as it is lived 
with agency and as embedded in varying and variable social relations and 
institutions.   
 
Integrating governmentality and critical realism 
 
As has been suggested, most notably by Stenson (2005, 2008) in his 
conceptualisation of ‘realist governmentality’, a full analytics of government 
cannot ignore questions of ‘the real’ which involves drawing together accounts 
and manifestations of power, ’from below’ and ‘from above’ (Lippert and 
Stenson, 2010).  Despite his acknowledgement of realism however, Stenson (see 
Lippert and Stenson, 2010) does not set his vision of governmentality within a 
critical realist framework.   This is because he views critical realism as solely 
aligned with a Marxist materialist approach that emphasises structurally 
constituted power and a central aim of resistance and emancipatory change, as 
developed over recent years by Bhaskar as dialectical critical realism (Brown, 
Fleetwood and Roberts, 2002, Bhaskar, 1993, 2000, Bhaskar and Callinicos, 
2003).   
 
Indeed, Stenson is right that the focus on structural power and the ensuing 
privileging of the ‘is-ought’ relationship that is present in this version of critical 
realism, is not easily integrated with governmentality.   The previous discussion 
on conduct and counter-conducts highlights Foucault’s particular take on 
resistance as taking the mirror form to compliance.  As Dean (2010, 40, 48) 
argues, through such prioritisation of process in power and of ‘how’ questions, 
governmentality rejects the theorisation of power as a “zero-sum game” and 
therefore does not “formulate a set of general principles by which various forms 
of the ‘conduct of conduct’ could be reformed”.  In other words, through 
focusing on the descriptive, governmentality avoids the monolithic ideation of 
power present in ‘grand theories’. If power is seen as fluid and not engrained in 
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particular unchangeable patterns within society, then the focus of critique shifts 
from a dichotomous ‘either/or’ lens to one which accounts for a range of 
imagined possibilities. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these cautionary provisions, two closely interlinked 
arguments can be made for why embedding governmentality within a critical 
realist framework is theoretically consistent and viable, one to do with how the 
operation of power can be conceptualised and the other to do with the value 
position of the researcher.   Taking the conceptualisation of power first, a more 
nuanced perspective on how power can be thought about in both governmentality 
and critical realism allows some form of confluence between them to take place.  
Sayer (2012) suggests that Foucault’s avoidance of ‘the real’ was not reflected in 
his theorisations of how individual and population-wide change is produced.  
Consequently, Sayer (2012, 185) highlights that Foucault’s theorisation of power 
allows for “the interdependence of dispersed/capillary power and 
centralised/arterial power” to be acknowledged.  In dismissing the ‘false choice’ 
that can be made between dispersed (disciplinary) and centralised (sovereign) 
power, Sayer (2012, 185) also suggests that the separation of ‘how’ (descriptive) 
and ‘why’ (explanatory) questions is fallacious:  
Explaining how power works, that is how multiple causal powers are 
activated and interact to produce effects, and in virtue of what, tells us 
why those effects occur; and conversely to explain why they do, we have 
to explain how the mechanisms work, what the powers and 
susceptibilities of the relevant elements are and how they work when 
activated 
 
Connections can be made between Sayer’s critical realist reading of Foucault and 
the work of Dean (2010, 8) who has argued that his interpretation of 
governmentality allows for the elucidation of “sovereign and coercive 
rationalities and techniques” alongside and in interaction with disciplinary and 
reflexive forms of power.   
 
Dean (2010) explains how this can be understood, starting with Foucault’s 
(2000) contrasting notions of the ‘city-citizen’ and the ‘shepherd-flock’, derived 
from historical accounts of the Greco-Roman era and the early Christian church 
respectively.  Both notions exemplify particular forms of ethical self-conduct 
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comprising of how one sees oneself, and how one sees oneself and acts in 
obligatory relations with others.  The individual as citizen can be defined as 
operating within a juridico-political structure, on equal footing with other 
citizens in the exercise of freedom and rights.  By its nature, this conception 
relies on there being a boundary between those who could be classed as citizens 
(due to their ability to exercise freedom and rights) and those who cannot.  
Within the ‘shepherd-flock’ concept, the individual can be understood in pastoral 
terms as “a living being who can be known in depth, whose welfare is to be cared 
for as an individual and as part of a population, as one submits to integration 
within complex forms of social solidarity” (Dean, 2010, 100, emphasis in 
original).  Such an understanding is based on the belief that all individuals should 
be cared for.  Whilst Foucault did not suggest that these concepts can be 
transferred unproblematically into modern times, he did argue that their enduring 
presence in some form holds implications for the administration of liberal 
government.  Notions of pastoral care and citizenship bring between them 
inherent tensions because they depend on “human beings as both self-governing 
individuals within a self-governing political community and clients to be 
administered, governed and normalised with respect to governmental objectives” 
(Dean, 1994, 209).   
 
This brings us to what Foucault deemed the potential ‘demonic’ possibilities 
inherent in liberal government, which can arise from the interaction between 
discourses of citizenship and welfare (Foucault, 1988).  It is Dean’s (2010, 156) 
argument that such tensions, if sharp enough, can lead to the paradox of ‘liberal 
illiberality’, whereby the subject is managed via ‘dividing practices’ along the 
axes of autonomy and responsibility: “the subject is either divided inside himself 
or divided from others” (Foucault, 1983, 208).  Such divisions often have a 
strong biopolitical element, which can be seen from extreme manifestations such 
as forced sterilisation of particular members of a society ‘for their own good’ and 
for the perceived good of everyone else, through to pervasive ‘whole-population’ 
messages on self-care and well-being.  Certainly, CTOs can be seen as an 
example of a biopolitical intervention, as they are based on a particular 
understanding of embodied madness and their foundational function is to ensure 
the management of such madness via medical means.   
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Dean’s development of governmentality thus chimes with arguments (Jessop, 
2010, Olssen, 2010) that governmentality in its original incarnation does not 
disregard institutional and political power relations in the way some more recent 
approaches to governmentality suggest.  At the same time, in his work on ethics 
Foucault also did not negate the role of individuals in changing themselves and 
their surroundings.  Here we can see how the plotting of a path through the 
overlapping borders of each body of theory can occur,
5
 which is still defined 
enough to underpin a meaningful analysis of power in action.  This ‘middle’ 
route is particularly salient for the purposes of my thesis, as CTOs can be 
theorised as containing both inclusionary and exclusionary elements which in 
turn are mediated by reflexive, disciplinary and overtly controlling processes.  
 
In a broader sense, coming to an ontological reckoning on the nature of power 
also has epistemological implications for how power can be known about, and 
specifically what place the researcher has, if any, in making value judgements on 
the operation of rule in society.  In a divergence from the variant of critical 
realism as proposed by Bhaskar and others (Bhaskar, 1989, Archer et al, 1998), 
there exists an alternative broadly defined ‘school’ of critical realism which has 
drawn out and developed the empirical implications of critical realism for 
questions of causation, and which does not insist on their inextricable 
relationship with political implications for emancipation
6
.  Underlining the 
difference between these two strands of critical realism is the variable answers 
they give to the question of value-position in research.  The strong position 
Bhaskarian critical realism takes on research as furthering the emancipatory 
project, places emphasis on the researcher as taking a particular normative stance 
that is orientated to this goal.  By way of contrast, Hammersley (2009, 8, 
emphasis in original), critiques such a standpoint as privileging the 
understanding of the researcher:  
                                                 
5 I am thinking of the following quote from Stuart Hall: “I want to suggest a different metaphor for 
theoretical work, the metaphor of struggle, of wrestling with the angels.  The only theory worth having is 
that which you have to fight off, not that which you speak with profound fluency”  (as interviewed in 
Grossberg (1996)) 
6 See Maxwell (2012, 4) for a fairly exhaustive list of scholars who have taken an empirical approach to 
critical realism, perhaps most notably Donald Campbell, who Maxwell states had ‘historical priority’ in the 
use of the term critical realism.  In this thesis, I have drawn particularly on the ideas of Pawson and Tilley 
(1997, 2004), Hammersley (1998, 2002), and Maxwell (2012).  As is evident, I have also made much use of 
the work of Sayer (2000), who, as inferred here, has a rather distinctive take on critical realism. 
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My point is simply that social scientists…have no distinctive expertise to 
determine what is good or bad about the situations they seek to describe 
and explain; or what, if anything, should be done about them…even 
where value judgements rely on research evidence they also necessarily 
depend upon other factual assumptions and upon value principles that are 
plural and often in conflict. 
 
Taking this point further, Pawson (2006) argues that the ‘critical’ part of critical 
realism should apply to the relationship researchers have to each other, rather 
than with the world at large.  This is a perspective that broadly chimes with that 
which has been developed through governmentality, and is integral to its 
descriptive focus.  Foucault (1997b, 131) takes an implicit stance against 
scientism when he states “The role of an intellectual is not to tell others what 
they have to do.  By what right would he do so?” As alluded to earlier, an 
analytics of government “breaks the shackles of inevitability” through the 
avoidance of reductionist and totalising critiques of policy and practice (Marston 
and McDonald, 2006, 8).  However, as Sayer (2009) suggests the position taken 
by Hammersley and others on the interaction between fact and value risks being 
as prescriptive as that which is being critiqued.  Indeed, it is difficult to entirely 
escape the place of value within the field of social work research, with its applied 
nature and general orientation to individuals, groups and communities who can 
be described as marginalised.  Thus, whilst I have largely drawn 
methodologically from what could be described as an empirical approach to 
critical realism, it has still been necessary to take a position on how to research 
the operation of power, with reference to questions of value and specifically to 
questions of “flourishing and suffering” (Sayer, 2012, 192).   
 
Returning to the work of Sayer (2012) and Dean (2010), a more gradated 
approach can be taken to subjectivity and a consideration of value, which flows 
from the ‘middle-ground’ formulation of power developed earlier.  Sayer (2012) 
argues that the ‘is-ought’ relationship has been overly simplified and neglects to 
consider that firstly, the process of ‘thick’ description of what is real necessitates 
some form of evaluation and secondly, that normativity does not have to consist 
of “that short but imperious word ought” (Darwin, 2004, 120).  In other words, 
the researcher cannot escape their own moral perspective on what they see 
occurring in their field of study, but at the same time drawing critical attention to 
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what happens in society is not the same as ‘legislating’ on what change should 
occur.  Such a way of thinking is compatible with a Foucauldian orientation of 
making the self-evident seem strange.  Whilst Dean (2010) argues that an 
analytics of government should not invoke judgement, he also states 
governmentality is not ‘value-free’.  Instead, its objective is to excavate the 
foundations of the ‘taken for granted’ so that space is opened up to consider 
“what is at stake when we try to govern in a particular way and… the 
consequences and effects of thinking and acting in these ways” (Dean, 2010, 48).  
This then implies that a critical approach involves the destabilisation of pre-
existing and apparently well-embedded ways of thinking, doing and being.  
Coming back to the matter at hand, whilst much has been said about the general 
‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of CTOs, it is not my intention to make such a value 
judgement here.  In taking the ‘middle ground’ through conceptualisations of 
power and questions of value, I hope to avoid the entrenched positions that have 
formed on CTO use.  By exploring the plural ways that CTOs are understood,  
justified and exercised, their ‘greyness’ and specifically the various ethical 
compromises and balancing acts which make up their use, will be illuminated.  In 
this way, mapping how and why CTOs are used and with what consequences, 
may help others consider how and why they should be used.  The next section 
will describe at a methodological level how this mapping will take place.    
 
Exploring the everyday practice of CTOs: developing a research focus  
 
Before discussing methodology, it would be helpful at this stage to reiterate and 
state clearly the aim and associated research questions addressed in this thesis 
and what analytical frameworks have been called upon to develop them.  To 
briefly recap the argument that has been made so far: the CTO framework leaves 
much room for practitioner discretion; there has been little research to date on 
CTO practice in itself; using a hybrid critical realist/governmentality approach 
allows for a rounded and theory-driven analysis of CTO practice as a particular 
manifestation of power in action; specifically, such an approach means both 
descriptive and causal questions can be addressed, including what is happening, 
how it is happening and why.  Taking this into account, the overarching aim of 
the thesis is to establish how the implementation of CTOs has been realised and 
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with what effects on the practice and experiences of service users and 
practitioners.    
 
Drawing up an analytical map 
 
Two frameworks – derived from critical realism and governmentality - have been 
drawn upon and synthesised in order to shape the questions that ensue from this 
aim: respectively Pawson and Tilley’s (1997, 2004) framework for realist policy 
research and Dean’s (2010) analytics of government.  Critical realism has 
sometimes been critiqued for not being easily applicable to the world of research, 
and so using Pawson and Tilley’s (2004) framework provides a focus point for 
distilling critical realist sensibilities in a useable analytical form.  Their work 
falls into the camp of critical realism which is generally empirical rather than 
emancipatory in nature, and which emphasises the generation of mid-level 
explanations for social phenomena.   Therefore, they do not align themselves 
with ‘traditional’ critical realist philosophy, but the stance I have taken does not 
entirely conform with a Bhaskarian model either, as can be seen in my treatment 
of criticality and normativity.  The important point to make here is that Pawson 
and Tilley’s model includes the constituent elements necessary to make a critical 
realist analysis of causality, taking into account depth, contingency, emergence 
and consequently complexity.  Specifically, Pawson and Tilley (2004, 6) take a 
‘configurational’ approach to considering policy evaluation and as such, it is 
suited for an analysis of the policy and practice of CTOs.  Prospective policies 
are “theories incarnate” (Pawson and Tilley, 2004, 4) but are also embodied 
within pre-existing and open systems which shape how policies come into play.  
In this thesis, such an analysis entails knowledge generation on the ways CTOs 
work (mechanisms), with whom and in what circumstances (context), and how 
the relationship between these two elements produces differentiated 
consequences, both intended and unintended (outcome patterns).  By its nature 
then this analysis is suited to a broad analysis of power as can be understood in 
generative terms.   
 
Dean’s (2010) analytics of government takes a different yet parallel approach by 
elucidating the various dimensions in which ‘regimes of practice’ and their 
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associated programmes manifest.  ‘Regimes of practice’ possess four distinct yet 
reciprocal dimensions: visibility, thought, practice and identity.  An analysis of 
these dimensions allows for associations to be made between CTO discourse at 
national and local level, as well as how these discourses are played out in 
‘regimes of practice’: “those…assemblages through which we…cure, care, 
relieve poverty, punish, educate, train and counsel” (Dean, 2010, 40) and at an 
individual level via ‘practices of the self’.  In this sense, an analytics of 
government adds an additional element to Pawson and Tilley’s (2004) 
framework for realist policy evaluation.  Realist policy evaluation as Pawson and 
Tilley define it is generally functionalist in nature, in that its aim is to help 
policy-makers ‘do things better’.  I am not criticising that aim or dismissing its 
role for this study; however in terms of what I want to achieve here, an analytics 
of government brings an additional explicit, critical and destabilising framework 
within which to understand how power operates. In doing so, it brings an 
additional and distinctive element to understanding power in social terms. I now 
explain how the two approaches can be brought together to form an analytical 
framework for the study of CTOs.   
 
Pawson and Tilley (2004) assert that policy programmes begin as theories – what 
is the problem that requires change, and in what way can that change be brought 
about.  In order to evaluate a programme, an important first step is to understand 
the theory behind the programme.  In a governmental sense, analysing the field 
of visibility refers to examining how a problem to be governed is framed as a 
problem – how it is brought to light – and specifically pinpointing “who and 
what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are 
constituted…what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to be 
sought” (Dean, 2010, 41).  Dean (2010, 42) suggests that the evolution of policy 
goals is both a “rational and thoughtful” process and an “intensely moral 
activity” (2010, 19), in that it involves a clear and systematic explication of ‘how 
things ought to be’.  In this sense, the art of government necessitates the belief 
that the world can be made a better place, and therefore contains a Utopian 
element of continuous improvement. Undertaking an analytics of government 
should include working to “extract this Utopian aspect” (Dean, 2010, 44).   In 
terms of CTOs then, the initial task is to trace how and why CTOs came to be 
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seen as necessary and why they came to exist in the form that they did, taking 
account of policy drivers and constraints; and to consider how particular ‘kinds’ 
of individuals became constituted as the focus for intervention through the CTO.   
 
Moving from the macro of policy to the micro of practice, for a realist reading it 
is necessary to also understand what starting point those individuals at ‘ground 
level’ – practitioners and service users – are coming from in response to a policy 
programme.  In order to fully make sense of the ways in which a programme 
functions, the translation of ideas from policy to practice level needs to be 
accounted for, both in terms of the connections and gaps between policy and 
practice rationales, and the reasons why individuals do or do not ‘buy into’ a 
programme.  Alongside this, the second dimension of a governmental analysis – 
thought – requires that the forms of knowledge, expertise and know-how that are 
drawn upon to realise the conduct of conduct are excavated.  To this end, the 
second task is to examine the motivations of practitioners and service users in 
relation to CTOs:  what purposes they do or do not see CTOs meeting; how these 
purposes align or not with policy-level conceptualisations; and for practitioners 
in particular how they formulate CTO practice based on these purposes. 
 
The third point of investigation shifts again, this time from thought to practice.  
Pawson and Tilley (2004) argue that the heart of a realist policy analysis is an 
understanding of programme mechanisms – what it is about a policy programme 
that brings about an effect.  They explain programme mechanisms as the 
“process of how individuals interpret and act upon the intervention strategies” 
present in a programme (Pawson and Tilley, 2004, 6, emphasis in original). In 
this sense they suggest that programme mechanisms can be seen to work in 
negative as well as positive terms.  Further, such action cannot be understood as 
‘stand-alone’, but should be analysed in conjunction with context, which they 
define as encompassing participant characteristics and relationships as well as 
circumstances: “Context must not be confused with locality…what is 
contextually significant may not only relate to place but also to systems of 
interpersonal and social relationships…” (Pawson and Tilley, 2004, 8). As they 
go on to suggest, contextual factors influence the ways individuals respond to a 
programme and are therefore integral to understanding what it is that helps or 
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hinders a programme’s success.  Taken together, this means CTOs will be 
analysed in light of how they are “interpreted and acted upon in different ways 
by different participants in different positions” (Pawson and Manzano-Santaella, 
2012, 180).  The complementary dimension of a governmental approach is an 
analysis of the technical aspects of government - the ‘means’ by which 
governmental ‘ends’ are reached.  As Dean (2010) states however, this practical 
element of regimes of practice is a condition of governing, ‘a means to an end’, 
but also can act to constrain what is possible to achieve.  The third task therefore 
is to investigate the workings of the CTO, specifically: how the techniques 
incorporated within the CTO regulate behaviour; the ways programme 
participants act on the central components of the CTO; and the contextual factors 
which impinge on this process. 
 
The final focus takes theory, thought and practice to their conclusion – the 
consequences of the CTO.  Taking a realist approach through understanding the 
theory of a policy, and how it plays out in context-mechanism configurations 
allows us to form a broader view of what we mean by outcomes.  Pawson and 
Tilley (2004) do not differentiate between outputs and outcomes, allowing for a 
fuller causative view of a programme.  Furthermore, instead of being 
predetermined measures, we can see outcomes as intended and unintended 
consequences generated through the programme process; and instead of being 
discrete, we can see how these outcomes relate to each other.  In this sense it is 
just as important to understand how the consequences of a programme are 
weighed up by those who have some stake in them.  Here is where a 
governmental analysis supplements a realist approach through a consideration of 
reflexive and ethical ‘self-work’ in response to governmental practices.  Potential 
outcomes are not necessarily limited to changes in behaviour and yet hoped for 
behaviour change is at the heart of policy programmes such as CTOs.  
Governmentality sees this in an internal as well as external sense – how 
individuals are encouraged to identify with new subjectivities that cohere with 
governmental rationalities.  It is necessary then to reach an understanding of how 
individuals go about ‘practices of the self’ –the ways we think about and act on 
ourselves – and how these practices relate to the process of governance.   
Accordingly, the fourth and final task is to investigate the transformative powers 
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of the CTO; what their consequences are and how these consequences relate to 
policy theory and purpose; how and if they bring about individual change; and in 
what ways they might be implicated in forms of conduct via the development of 
various “capacities, qualities and statuses in particular agents” (Dean, 2010, 44) 
as well as forms of counter-conduct.  
 
To sum up what this exposition means in the development of guiding questions 
for the thesis, I will be investigating the following: 
 
1. Why did CTO policy come to exist, and exist in the form that it does in 
England?  How have problems been framed as problems for the CTO to 
solve? 
2. In what ways are CTOs conceptualised by practitioners and service users?  
How do these conceptualisations align or not with policy-level reasoning? 
For practitioners in particular how do they formulate CTO practice based 
on these conceptualisations? 
3. How do CTOs work, and what factors – inclusive of participant action - 
influence why they work in those particular ways?  
4. What are the varying consequences of the CTO that result from these 
practices, how are these consequences thought about by practitioners and 
service users, and how do they relate to policy and practice-level 
reasoning on their use?  How do CTOs work to produce change in service 
user identities and conduct, and in what ways are the transformational 
potentials of CTOs realised or resisted? 
 
In the ensuing final part of this chapter I will expand on the framework within 
which these questions will be addressed, translating the theoretical to the 
methodological.  
 
Drawing up a methodological map  
 
In order to explain phenomena, a realist methodology “endorse[s] much of 
hermeneutics [but also] insists a) on the material commitments and settings of 
communicative interaction, and b) on the presence of a non-discursive, material 
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dimension to social life” (Sayer, 2000, 17-18).  It has been said however that 
critical realism is a “philosophy in search of a method” (Yeung, 1997, 51), and it 
has often been aligned with a pragmatic, mixed methods approach (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997, Danermark et al, 2002).  Nonetheless, because critical realism can 
be aligned with different methodological approaches, its implications can be 
developed regardless of the approach taken and consequently a convincing case 
can be made for marrying critical realism with qualitative methodologies 
(Maxwell, 2012).  Byrne et al (2009, 3) for example suggest that qualitative 
research has been given a more prominent role in policy research in recent years 
because: “quantitative approaches have proven inadequate in addressing the 
issues of context and complex causation which underlie social interventions”  
Furthermore, Shaw (2003) makes the point that integrating qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in mixed methods research can bring challenges that test 
the way knowledge claims are made in both kinds of data.  In this thesis then, 
some attention has been paid to how varying forms of data collection can be used 
in a complementary way, where differences that arise can be put to use in 
clarifying rather than confounding the questions at hand.  In order to do this, I 
have adopted an ethnographically informed methodology; an approach which 
draws on diverse sources and methods in order to form a deeper understanding of 
the social world.   
 
The potential of ethnography is well recognised in the critical realist and realist 
governmentality literature.  Sayer (2000, 21) describes an ethnographically 
orientated approach to questions of depth in his explication of  ‘intensive’ realist 
research designs, where questions might be asked such as ‘how does a process 
work?’, ‘what produces a certain change?’ and what did the agents actually do’?  
The researcher thus seeks to go beyond the perspectives of participants; to find 
ways of examining the context they are acting within, the relationship between 
the two and what might arise out of this relationship over time.  More 
specifically, Hammersley and Atkinson in their development of a ‘subtle realist’ 
approach to research suggest ethnography has much to recommend it in seeking 
to answer such questions, particularly because it focuses on the “meanings, 
functions and consequences of human actions and institutional practices, and 
how these are implicated in...wider contexts” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, 
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3).  Maxwell (2012) takes this further when he suggests intensive, long-term 
involvement in the field can help researchers to gain a clearer picture of causal 
process by allowing for the testing out of theories and interpretations.  In sum, 
ethnography can be considered through a critical realist lens because it allows for 
experiences, actions and events to be considered together; it has an intrinsic 
focus on context; and it allows for social processes to be examined over time.  
More specifically, this particular argument has already been made in regards to 
CTOs.  Swanson (2010, 185) notes that little research on CTO practice as it 
happens has been carried out, and thus argues: 
To understand a topic as important and complex as...OCLs
7
 , we need a 
variety of types of evidence, produced by a range of methodological 
approaches. We could…use an ethnographic accounting...to situate the 
story of OCLs in the particular context of social actors and groups and the 
social matrices of their thought and behaviour 
 
There is a strong foundation therefore to suggest ethnography can give an insight 
into the workings of CTOs in a way more general qualitative research has not.  In 
a broader sense, ethnographic studies of how policy is translated into practice are 
few and far between (Povall, 2006).  ‘Policy ethnography’ as Povall calls it, 
“provides for lessons at the macro level, looking upwards to shed light on and 
deepen understanding of the processes there” (Povall, 2006, 1).  This chimes 
with the move in governmentality studies away from pure discourse analysis and 
towards a more grounded approach.  As Marston and McDonald (2006, 7) 
suggest, “an analytics of government is particularly relevant to the re-emerging 
genre of ‘street-level’ policy evaluation…because it focuses attention away from 
the institutions of government towards the actual practices of government”.  As 
such, ethnography is suited to the premises of governmentality as it allows for 
attention to be paid: 
…to the messy actualities of the empirical world; the multi-vocal nature 
of governing practices and their consequences; the experiences and 
perspectives of ‘targeted’ populations; and the tensions and conflict 
between shifting modes of power – all of which are in keeping with 
Foucault’s original analysis. (Mckee, 2009, 482) 
 
                                                 
7 As already mentioned, the terms used for CTOs vary from country to country. In the USA, where Swanson 
is writing from, one term used is Outpatient Commitment Laws (OCLs). 
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Ethnography thus forms the final ‘layer’ of the map, showing a route through the 
ontological and epistemological landscape formed by the melding of critical 
realism and governmentality.  Specifically, ethnography allows for the distinct 
questions on CTOs generated by a critical realist/governmentality analytical 
framework that were highlighted earlier to be explored.  The next chapter will 
focus on the particular methods through which these questions will be addressed, 
alongside the concrete concerns of the research process.   
Summary 
 
This has been a complex chapter to write, and I want to sum up here the process 
that I have worked through as the chapter has unfolded.  The research literature 
as described in the previous chapter highlighted various areas for further 
development in the study of CTOs – notably the everyday practice of CTOs, how 
it is understood and acted on by practitioners and service users and with what 
implications.  These conclusions on what is needed in CTO research are 
connected to a general orientation towards a critical realist approach, with its 
focus on explanations of generative change.  Whilst I did not want to take a 
typical emancipatory approach to critical realism, nor did I want to ignore the 
ethical questions that the operation of power through the use of the CTO raises.  
Governmentality as a theory and tool for an analysis of the operation of power at 
the micro-level offers one particular and alternative way that such questions can 
be addressed.  Specifically, it brings together Foucault’s central concerns with 
power/knowledge, disciplinary and reflexive power to delineate manifestations 
of the ‘conduct of conduct’.  The incorporation of governmentality with a generic 
realist approach has been considered before – most notably by Stenson (2005) in 
his development of a realist governmentality.  However, there are inconsistencies 
between critical realism and governmentality which needed to be considered in 
order to enable a coherent theoretical foundation for the study of CTOs.  In this 
chapter, I spent some time developing a path between the two bodies of theory, 
which firstly relied on an understanding of the tensions Foucault understood to 
be intrinsic to the ‘art of governing’ and secondly on a particular reading of 
critical realism which questions the role of value judgements in research.   Put 
briefly, coercive forms of power can be considered alongside more subtle forms 
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of governance and self-governance, and an analysis of such forms of power can 
be taken in an ethical but non-prescriptive way.  In the penultimate section of this 
chapter I brought the focus back to the object of study – CTOs – by grounding 
these theoretical ‘workings out’ in an analytical framework which addresses 
questions of causality (‘why’) and description (‘how’).  This framework – 
combining Pawson and Tilley’s approach to realist policy evaluation with Dean’s 
analytics of government – has, alongside the conclusions I reached in the 
previous chapter, informed the development of a set of research questions.  In the 
final section of this chapter I argued that these research questions can be 
accounted for through a broadly ethnographic approach – a methodology which 
is advocated for in critical realist and governmentality literature, as well as the 
literature on CTOs.  I move further towards a concrete consideration of research 
practices in the next chapter, where I consider the methods I will draw upon in 
conducting the research, alongside questions of study design, selection, 
recruitment, analysis and ethics.   
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Chapter Three 
Examining CTOs:  
How the study was conducted 
 
The assumptions of both critical realism and governmentality can be well 
matched to the loosely ethnographic approach taken in this research 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, Sayer, 2000, Marston and McDonald, 2006, 
McKee, 2009).  How this ethnographically influenced methodology has been 
embedded within a multiple case study design forms the first section of this 
chapter, in order to give an oversight of the study as a whole.   Ethnography 
typically draws upon an eclectic mix of methods, “in fact gathering whatever 
data are available to throw light on the issues…that are the focus of inquiry” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, 3). In the ensuing section I explore how the 
methods employed in this study illuminate varied aspects of CTO use, and 
specifically how they addressed the research questions.  The use of multiple 
kinds of data, along with the inclusion of knowledge claims from practitioners 
and service users, means that the analysis process has been a complex task.  With 
this in mind, in the next section I highlight the strategies used to help make sense 
of and manage the data.  The practical ‘doing’ of research is then addressed, 
focusing on how decisions were made in regards to selection at the different 
levels of the case study, and the processes of gaining access and recruitment.  A 
consideration of ethics played a large role in the research process, partly due to 
the NHS setting for the research which determined a rigorous scrutiny of the 
study’s ethical standards, and partly due to the nature of the study, in particular 
its inclusion of service users with complex histories, who are often deemed to be 
vulnerable.  In recognition that managing ethics in social research is a reflexive 
undertaking, the various ethical issues that arose both during and after the study 
are expanded on in the final section.   
Research design 
 
Ethnography, “focuses on people’s ordinary activities in naturally occurring 
settings, uses...flexible methods of data collection, requires the researcher to 
be...involved in the field...and explores the meanings which...human activity has 
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for...people themselves and wider society” (Brewer, 2000, 20).  Brewer goes on 
to state ethnography is not necessarily premised on particular methods.  Instead, 
it is distinguishable by its aim to gain an “intimate familiarity” (Brewer, 2000, 
11) with the participant experience.  Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, 3) add 
that ethnography can be distinguished by the unstructured, naturalistic gathering 
of data, the use of a few small-scale cases and an analysis of data that focuses on 
the “meanings, functions and consequences of human actions and institutional 
practices, and how these are implicated in...wider contexts”.  In other words, a 
naturalistic study becomes ethnographic when the data collected is connected to 
the broader milieu it is produced within.  This study may not perhaps be entirely 
classifiable as ethnography according to these definitions, as the characteristics 
of the research setting means that the data collected could not be completely 
unstructured.  Indeed, it should be recognised that ethnography as defined in 
traditional cultural anthropological terms differs significantly to how sociological 
ethnography can be understood (Barfield, 1997).  However, in being guided by 
ethnographic principles, the study enables an insight into CTO practice from the 
‘inside’.   
 
Going further, a multiple case ethnography enables two types of analysis to be 
made, as Yanow (2000, 13) suggests, using the concept of a ‘frame’ for research: 
“Frame” as a noun suggests a comparative analysis across communities 
of meaning...of the...ways in which a policy...has been “framed”... 
“Frame” as a verb suggest a more dynamic analysis of change...“framing 
“over time...These two types of study suggest different constituencies: the 
duration and depth of the latter suggests an interest in 
understanding...processes; the former suggests more of an issue focus...  
 
The objective of undertaking a multiple case ethnography is to combine the depth 
of ethnography with the comparative potential of a multiple case design, thus 
tracking CTOs over time and across settings.  On this basis, the study is designed 
as an embedded multiple case study (Yin, 2003) on two different levels, the first 
being the inclusion of different CTO ‘constituents’, inclusive of the service user 
who is on the CTO, and the professionals involved in their CTO-related care
8
.  
                                                 
8
 The original intention was to also include people who have caring responsibilities for individuals on CTOs 
but for various reasons that was not possible.  7 out of the 18 service user participants had individuals in 
their lives who could be described as having significant caring responsibilities for them.  However, out of 
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To gain a holistic analysis, understanding multiple perspectives is necessary, as 
Naidai and Mader (2005, 7) argue, “...the findings from different fields should 
provide us with answers to different questions like elements of a puzzle that are 
put together to form a complete picture.  Since the object of study spans more 
than one social world, it cannot be reconstructed by exploring only one field”.  
Following CTO cases as they unfolded allowed me to see the particular factors 
which came into play within and across each case over time.  It also served a 
practical purpose in making it easier to gain consent from participants for all the 
methods used within the study.  Furthermore, enabling service users to be heard 
develops a notion of democratic policy analysis, by including voices usually 
absent from the policy discourse (House and Howe, 1999).   
 
The second level is premised on the inclusion of different field sites.  Yin (2003) 
recommends multiple case studies of this kind, either through direct or 
theoretical replication.  Direct replication is where cases are chosen so they 
produce similar findings, whereas theoretical replication is where cases are 
picked to produce different findings for predicted reasons (Yin, 2003, 47).  A 
comparative analysis between cases can then be made.  Not enough was known 
about CTOs in this country at the time of picking research sites to carry out 
theoretical replication, so cases were initially picked on the basis of direct 
replication.  Both Mental Health Trusts (‘Trusts’) where the research was based 
had a relatively large number of CTOs.  However, as the study progressed both 
similarities and contrasts between the sites emerged, which are noted later in the 
chapter.  The study therefore builds on Yin’s (2003) approach, as it allows for 
concepts and contradictions to emerge that may not have been expected within a 
direct replication framework.  Figure Two gives an overview of the research 
design as representative for both field sites.   
  
                                                                                                                                    
this 7 I was only able to recruit 2 carers for interview, either because they or the service user did not wish 
for them to be involved.  As the research focus is on CTO practice and the experiences of those individuals 
who are immediately affected by it, the carer experience was deemed to be ‘nice to have’ rather than 
essential to the study.   
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Figure 2: Overview of research design 
 
 
Fieldwork took place within the two Trusts over a period of eight months, with 
time being split equally between each Trust.  To maintain the familiarity 
necessary for ethnography, the majority of time was spent embedded within one 
Assertive Outreach Team (AOT) in each Trust. I was the sole researcher in the 
field, and each week was split between the two Teams to ensure consistent and 
longitudinal contact over the eight month period.  Because the main purpose of 
AOTs is to work with ‘difficult to engage’ service users, they can attract a high 
volume of CTOs, and thus were selected on the basis that they would provide 
ample opportunity to observe CTO practice.  At the time of fieldwork both teams 
carried on average a third of their caseload as CTOs.  18 CTO cases across the 
teams were tracked over the fieldwork period; this enabled CTO cases to be 
followed as they unfolded in different ways, thus forming the basis of an analysis 
of generative mechanisms.  CTO cases were chosen to reflect a range of 
characteristics and perspectives of participants, and CTOs at different stages, 
although this was naturally constrained by concerns with risk and vulnerability. 
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The core of the study data derived from these cases and includes observations of 
key meetings, taking of notes from case files and semi-structured interviews with 
the service user, their care coordinator, the AMHP and the psychiatrist involved 
with their case.  Throughout the fieldwork period, contextual information on the 
use of CTOs was also collected via key informant interviews with relevant 
stakeholders, field notes of daily team practice, observations of team meetings 
and attendance at Trust training and research events.  The next section will 
explain in more detail how the three methods of interviews, observations and 
document analysis were put into practice. 
Methods 
 
McKeganey, Macpherson and Hunter (1988) write convincingly about the 
benefits of combining different kinds of data collection, especially interviews 
and observations, when exploring professional practice.  As they say, interviews 
allow for individual cases to be explored in depth and to develop a sense of a 
timeline of events.   Conversely, observations of meetings are not as helpful for 
this as they capture actors coming together at a particular time and place, and 
cannot account for ‘back-stage’ interactions.  What observations do bring is a 
sense of how particular processes play out, and how different actors interact 
within that setting.  Bringing the two together then allows a picture of a case to 
be built up from a number of different vantage points.  The addition of document 
analysis to this equation means a source of data is included that is unmediated by 
the research process and helps give a sense of how actions and decisions are 
accounted for and justified in a professional context.  As document analysis has 
been deployed for a review of CTO policy-making, it also sheds light on policy-
making at a macro level.  Table One maps how these three methods link to the 
guiding research questions for this study. 
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Table 1: Research questions and associated methods 
 
Interviews  
 
The interviews were semi-structured, using a topic guide
9
 to help explore 
participants’ thoughts, feelings, perceptions and experiences of CTOs.  In 
designing the topic guides, I drew from Patton’s (2002, 359) suggestions on 
formulating questions that are open-ended, neutral, singular and clear. I also took 
advice from McCracken (1988) and ‘set the scene’ with informational questions 
about participant background before moving on to open, non-directive ‘grand 
tour’ (Spradley in McCracken, 1988, 35) questions underpinned by planned and 
                                                 
9 See appendices one, two and three for all supporting documents including topic guides, information sheets 
and consent forms. 
Research question Methods 
Why did CTO policy come to exist, and exist in the 
form that it does in England?  How have problems been 
framed as problems for the CTO to solve? 
Document analysis 
(macro-level) 
In what ways are CTOs conceptualised by practitioners 
and service users?  How do these conceptualisations 
align or not with policy-level reasoning? For 
practitioners in particular how do they formulate CTO 
practice based on these conceptualisations? 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
How do CTOs work, and what factors – inclusive of 
participant action - influence why they work in those 
particular ways? 
 
Observations; 
interviews; document 
analysis (micro-level) 
What are the varying consequences of the CTO that 
result from these practices, how are these consequences 
thought about by practitioners and service users, and 
how do they relate to policy and practice-level 
reasoning on their use?  How do CTOs work to produce 
change in service user identities and conduct, and in 
what ways are the transformational potentials of CTOs 
realised or resisted? 
Observations; 
interviews 
document analysis 
(micro-level) 
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floating prompts. I took particular account of McCracken’s suggestions in 
‘manufacturing distance’ (1988, 22) to bring to the surface taken-for-granted 
beliefs and experiences, for example questioning participants’ key terms and 
significant words.  Interviews with service user participants covered the 
significance of the CTO to them; the effect it may have had on relationships; 
their understanding of what the CTO meant; their involvement in the process and 
decision-making; compliance with the CTO; their understanding and experiences 
of the key mechanisms of the CTO; and their hopes for the future.  Interviews 
with practitioner participants covered their experiences of using CTOs, drawing 
on the case in question as well as other cases; the effect practitioners believed 
CTOs had on their practice; decision-making processes and factors; and their 
views on the CTO more generally, including their purpose for using them and 
views on CTO policy.  All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed.   
 
The 18 service user interviews mostly took place in the participants’ homes, with 
the exception of four, where the service user expressed a preference to be 
interviewed in an interview room at the respective team office. People with 
severe mental health problems can experience certain difficulties in the interview 
process that it was important for me to be aware of and manage.  McCann and 
Clark (2005) note that the interviewer must take account of the cognitive effects 
of both the disorder and medication on the service user’s ability to converse.  
Therefore careful thought was given to the method of questioning and types of 
questions asked to ensure they were concise and concrete.  I also made it clear to 
the service user that they could participate at their own pace and ask for 
questions to be repeated or rephrased.  Finally, the duration of interviews was 
altered to suit the participants’ needs, and provision was made for shorter 
interviews and for breaks in the interview if participants required them.  This 
resulted in interviews ranging from twenty minutes through to an hour in length, 
dependent on the participant.  Out of the 18, only one interview was stopped 
prematurely, and this was due to my feeling that the person was not 
demonstrating the capacity to understand why they, or indeed I, were there.  The 
care coordinator or another worker was present for three of the interviews, in two 
cases because it was not felt safe to leave me alone with the participant and in 
one case because the service user requested their presence for support.  This 
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inevitably lent a different dynamic to those interviews, and it cannot be 
ascertained how much impact worker attendance had on what the service users 
told me.     
 
It was always intended that a second wave of interviews with service user 
participants would take place near the end of the fieldwork period to explore any 
changes in their perceptions of CTOs.  However due to time constraints I decided 
upon a more focused approach, whereby only those service users whose legal 
status had changed during the fieldwork period (meaning they had been 
discharged from their CTO, or had been admitted back into hospital at some 
point) would be interviewed.  This amounted to five service users, four of whom 
were re-interviewed.  One interview was not possible due to the service user still 
being in hospital and lacking capacity to participate at that stage.  These second 
wave interviews were in general much shorter, lasting between ten and thirty 
minutes in length.   
 
Altogether 36 practitioners participated in interviews, the majority being 
practitioners working ‘on the ground’ in services, and a smaller number being 
key informant interviews with clinical leads and managers.  These interviews 
took place within the workplace and it was made clear that the interview would 
be adaptable to their needs, so for example a number of practitioners undertook 
the interview in two sessions due to work commitments.  In general, interviews 
ranged from 45 minutes to an hour and a half, with the majority being over an 
hour in length.  Although a semi-structured guide was used, many of the 
interviews had a narrative flavour, with practitioners telling in-depth stories of 
the CTO cases they had dealt with, particularly in response to the questions about 
cases when a CTO had or had not worked well.   
 
As noted in the Introduction, the legal oversight of CTOs is maintained through 
an appeals process, where Tribunals or Managers’ Hearings are convened to hear 
evidence on whether the CTO should be discharged or not, and to make a 
decision on that basis.  The perspectives of these decision-makers have only 
rarely been explored in the literature (with the exception of Jaworowski and 
Guneva, 2002).  To develop a more rounded picture of CTO decision-making, I 
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undertook two group interviews with Managers’ Hearing Chairs (8 participants 
altogether) within the Mental Health Act offices of the respective Trusts.  These 
interviews focused on the appeal process and their decision-making.  The 
premise of conducting the interviews in groups rather than individually was so 
that the Chairs could draw on each other’s experiences and compare and contrast 
to stimulate discussion. 
 
Observations 
 
Observation forms the foundation for much ethnographic research and is used to 
further understanding through watching and listening to what people say and do 
(Brewer, 2000).  Observation gets the researcher closer to everyday practice than 
any other method and has been described as the “gold standard for the study of 
processes” in healthcare (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007).  In the context of the 
study, observation generated data on decision-making in action, and particularly 
shed light on what discourses were prevalent in decision-making and how 
practitioners and service users engaged with each other in relation to the CTO.  
Advice was sought from practitioners in the field as to which meetings would be 
appropriate and feasible to observe, and on that basis consisted of a range of the 
following: 
 Observation of a selection of team and handover meetings within each 
team 
 Observation of CTO review meetings 
 Observation of Managers’ Hearing and Tribunal appeals 
 Observation of informal meetings between service users and practitioners 
 
In addition, I spent sustained periods of time in each team noting events that 
occurred naturally that were particularly relevant to CTOs.  Field notes were 
taken of observations, using strategies described by Lofland et al (2006) as a 
framework.  This involved making notes on significant elements of the observed 
situation; the concrete detail of what was said and done; and how the observed 
situation related to other events that had occurred.  Care was taken when 
developing fieldnotes to distinguish as far as I was able between descriptions and 
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analytical/evaluatory considerations.  Spradley’s (1980) dimensions of social 
situations were also helpful for structuring fieldnotes when working them up, 
making reference to the space, the actors, the activity, actions, sequencing, goals 
and expressed feelings.  Due to the ethical restrictions in place, these meetings 
were not recorded, but hand-written notes were taken both during and after the 
meetings.   
 
I took different stances in relation to observation dependent on circumstance.  
Spending on average two days a week in each team over the fieldwork period 
meant I got to know the practitioners fairly well, and my role developed and 
shifted as the fieldwork progressed.  However in formal meetings such as 
Tribunals, I was always in the role of a complete observer.  Combining the 
widely used classification of participant observation (Gold, 1958), with 
Spradley’s (1980) phases of observation, fieldwork progress can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
First phase (two months): I was more observer than participant, spending time 
getting to know the fieldwork environment, the complex systems within 
community mental health services and building relationships with participants.  
Observation was therefore necessarily broad to ascertain what aspects of practice 
to focus on. 
 
Second phase (five months):  The research role moved more towards active 
participation as I made a place for myself within the teams.  In this sense, it was 
particularly helpful to identify as a qualified practitioner situated within 
academia, as a number of the practitioners were engaged in post-qualifying 
training and requested advice and resources.  I also tried to make myself helpful 
in other ways, for example passing on messages and information within teams.  
A two-way relationship was therefore developed with many of the practitioner 
participants which meant I began to be told more consistently about when CTO 
related events were occurring and observation therefore began to take on a more 
focused character.  Getting to know practitioners also led to an increase in the 
undertaking of informal ‘interviews’ in the field, which meant I was able to 
develop an understanding of the detail of CTO practice as it happened.   
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Third phase (one month): This phase was largely taken up with managing 
endings and subsequently a conscious decision was made to shift position back to 
being more observer than participant, with less intensive time periods being spent 
in the teams.  Various checks were carried out to ascertain I had the correct 
details of cases and selected observations of events which had not been able to 
take place earlier were completed.   
 
The observations were separated between those that were ‘formal’ (appeals, 
reviews, training days) and ‘informal’ (within the office environment, team 
meetings, interactions between service users and practitioners).  Formal 
observations were between half an hour and an hour in length, with the majority 
being nearer the hour mark.   Informal observations varied widely, although most 
team meetings were around an hour in length.  Where possible, verbatim notes 
were taken during or immediately after observations.  After formal observations, 
contextual notes were also completed.  Informal observations were incorporated 
into written up field notes, giving detail of what happened on a day to day basis 
within teams.  Observations were also split between those that were case related 
and those that informed the more general workings of CTOs.  Table Two shows 
the kinds and number of case-related observations taken.   
 
Table 2: The number of each type of case-related observations 
Reviews Managers’ 
Hearings 
Tribunals Hospital discharge 
meetings 
Miscellaneous* 
12 8 2 3 7 
 
* AMHP interviews with service users, AMHP interviews with family, and the 
general weekly visit between the care coordinator and the service user. 
 
Altogether 32 case-related observations took place.  On average 2.5 meetings 
were attended for 13 of the 18 CTO cases.  It was not always possible to attend 
relevant meetings for each participant for a number of reasons.  Particularly early 
on in the fieldwork, I would at times not be informed when reviews were 
happening, or as often happened, their date would be changed at short notice and 
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occur when I was not present. At times, practitioners did not feel it was 
appropriate for me to attend, especially if a lot of people were to be present, and 
on one occasion the service user told me they did not want me to attend a 
meeting. In regards to appeals, these did not always happen within the fieldwork 
period.  Due to the legal framework regarding their use, Tribunals in particular 
were rare occurrences.  In one Trust, the team was based in the hospital site and 
therefore it was possible to attend ward rounds and discharge meetings, but in the 
other the team was based in the community at quite a distance from the hospital 
and attendance at ward rounds and discharge meetings by practitioners was not 
as frequent.  In four cases participants were discharged from their CTO before 
any meetings could be attended and in one case, the participant was recruited at a 
later stage in the fieldwork and no meetings occurred before it ended.   
 
Document analysis 
 
The final form of data that were included was documents, at micro level (case 
files, minutes) and macro level (practice guidance, legislation, policy 
frameworks, policy-making process).  Using documents as data can “provide a 
new and unfiltered perspective on the field and its processes” (Flick, 2009, 261) 
as they have not been created specifically for the research.  Their potential 
usefulness for analysis in the study was two-fold.  Firstly, they provided 
information on the development and eventual form of CTO policy itself, thus 
enabling a review of the policy-making process to occur.   Secondly, they also 
give an insight into how CTOs are written about by practitioner communities and 
more broadly, the decision-making process on CTOs.   
 
For the policy review, searches of Hansard and associated parliamentary papers 
(such as Joint Committee reports, oral evidence to the Joint Committee, 
Commons research papers, policy documents and responses to lobbying) were 
conducted.  Alongside this, policy analyses by bodies such as the Mental Health 
Alliance, and academic papers (some of which included ‘elite’ interviews with 
policy-makers) on the formation of the Mental Health Act and the history of 
mental health policy, provided valuable historical knowledge.  Finally, the 
international context was accounted for, by drawing on academic, policy and 
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legislative sources to help construct a picture of how CTOs have developed 
globally over time.  These two latter elements were essential to understand in a 
comparative sense how and why CTOs manifested in the English system as they 
did, and thus formed a large part of the analytical framework of the policy 
review, namely knowledge transmission over time and space.   
 
For the case file review, the hard files and electronic records of 17 of the 18 
service user participants were investigated over two months near the end of the 
fieldwork period.  One participant did not give consent for their records to be 
accessed.  Participants’ paper files were held in the Trust Mental Health Act 
office
10
, and included details of formal decision-making on CTOs and copies of 
the reports made by practitioners for appeals.  As much of the material was 
handwritten, a great deal of copying out of information was required, into 
separate anonymised
11
 documents for each participant.  Spending time within the 
Mental Health Act offices of both Trusts whilst completing this task provided a 
serendipitous alternative perspective on CTO use, as I was witness to the 
comings and goings of practitioners for legal advice and many frustrated phone 
calls when the administrators felt practitioners had not followed the legal 
framework.  These paper files were complemented by the day to day recording of 
events by practitioners on the Trusts’ database.  For each participant, a search 
was made of the Trust database, starting from just before their earliest CTO had 
been applied.  Each entry was read, and if it was relevant to the use of CTOs, it 
was copied and pasted into a document, which was then systematically 
anonymised.   
 
The dual process of searching the database and the paper files led to two 
documents being made for each participant, one of ‘official’ decision-making 
contained in the paper files, and one of daily decision-making as demonstrated in 
the database entries.  These two documents were then combined, in 
chronological order, forming one document, or ‘time-line’ of decision-making 
                                                 
10 Mental Health Act offices oversee any use of the Mental Health Act within the Trust.  Their duties 
include: keeping a database of current active use of the Act in the Trust; maintaining and auditing case 
records; offering legal advice and managing any ‘illegal’ use of the Act in the Trust; and coordinating 
appeals.   
11 Anonymity does not only refer to the taking out of names and places, but also any detail I felt was so 
specific it was obvious who the participant was. 
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for each participant.  As can be expected, these are fairly lengthy documents, 
with the longest being 22,000 words in length, and the shortest 2000, dependent 
on participant history.  However, the majority of the documents are around 9000 
words and give a good sense of the development of each case over time. 
Analysis 
 
The process of analysis in ethnography can “best be described...as a dialectic 
movement between data and theory, being shaped and reshaped as knowledge 
expands and deepens” (Sharkey and Larsen, 2005,179). To support this process, I 
built in time for reflection and interim analysis into the fieldwork, in order to 
create a foundation for the final analysis. Analysis was based on transcriptions 
from the interviews, document analysis and on detailed field notes and memos 
generated through observation.  
 
A combination of thematic and narrative analysis were employed, in recognition 
of the need to create a network of cross-sectional themes but also to represent the 
ways that CTOs unfolded over time (Floersch et al, 2010).  By using both 
thematic and narrative analytical approaches, CTO ‘story-lines’ became 
apparent, where the CTO was followed from participant conceptualisation of the 
CTO, through to active use of the CTO and finally decision-making on whether 
to discharge the CTO, taking into account contextual, interpersonal and personal 
factors at each stage.  I managed this process by drawing on McCracken’s (1988) 
suggestions for analysis, which involves a close line by line reading of texts to 
understand first order concepts before moving on to develop second order 
concepts.  These second order concepts were then developed into a thematic 
framework, made up of concept groups, for each of which I wrote a detailed 
account.  As a practitioner I felt more ‘at home’ with professional perspectives 
and so began this process by analysing service user interviews so that I could 
explore the data from a less familiar starting point.  Once I had developed a 
foundational framework from this data, I repeated the process firstly with 
practitioner interviews, then with the observations, and finally with the 
documents, thus moving from first person viewpoints through to enactments and 
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recording of the CTO process.   I ended up with a framework of concepts for 
each kind of data (see appendix four for an example of a framework). 
 
Given the volume of data that the research generated, data management was not 
an easy task.   I decided however not to use a software package, as I felt that I 
would be closer to the data by taking an immersive approach.  Once the 
analytical frameworks were developed, I used review functions in Microsoft 
Word, and a bespoke software programme to sort and separate out the respective 
data into discrete documents, each pertaining to a distinct concept contained 
within the framework for that data.  I then went through these documents in turn 
to compare and contrast the data so that it could be separated into sub-categories.  
At the same time, I also continuously modified these sub-categories and 
corresponding memos in the analytical frameworks to ensure the ideas they 
contained matched the changes that were being made. In this way, I expanded 
and refined the frameworks.  The penultimate stage involved bringing the 
conceptual frameworks from the different data sources together, to note 
connections and distinctions, both in terms of how concepts were approached, 
but also in how the different frameworks shed light on varied aspects of the field, 
and thus related back to the research questions. 
 
In the final stage leading up the presentation of the data as findings, I created and 
built up configurational ‘maps’ of CTO stories (Sayer, 1992), incorporating the 
concepts emerging out of the practitioner and service user interviews, 
observations and documents.  In this way, by moving through time and between 
first person, observational and documentary data, I was able to see how the 
factors that surfaced during the thematic analysis crystallised in the process of 
individuals interacting with CTO components, which helped lead to theory 
development on the different generative paths a CTO might take.  In turn, 
following the narratives highlighted the kinds of outcomes that came of these 
interactions.  Just as importantly, returning to the interview data shed light on 
how those outcomes were perceived in partial and differential ways by 
practitioners and service users.  The next section will explore in more detail the 
research process itself, starting with the recruiting and selecting of participants.   
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Fieldwork considerations: participants 
 
62 participants were involved in the study; 18 were service users, 20 were 
practitioners working with those service users, 16 were practitioners recruited as 
additional key informants, and 8 were Managers’ Hearing Chairs.   
 
Trusts and teams: recruitment, selection and characteristics 
 
The initial approach to selection of Trusts was to write to the senior management 
(typically at Director or Chief Executive level) of ten Trusts geographically 
situated in the North of England (see appendix five).  I was told early on in the 
research process by a researcher experienced in NHS-based mental health 
research that I would struggle to get access, particularly as I had no strong pre-
existing practice links and it was at the beginning of a time of significant change 
and churn within services (mid-2011, following the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government being elected the previous year and the start of 
their reform programme for the NHS).  In this sense, selection was a pragmatic 
decision based on which Trusts would give me access. None of the ten Trusts I 
approached directly refused access, but given the timescales I was working to, I 
had to make a decision quickly when Trusts did show an active interest.  Even 
so, the two Trusts who agreed for me to carry out the research held some 
interesting characteristics, which fitted into a theoretical model for selection 
where a comparison could be made between different local practice regimes and 
cultures. Both Trusts covered areas with a high level of poverty and deprivation. 
However, the contrast between their approaches to mental health service 
provision is marked.  Table Three gives an overview of their key differentiating 
characteristics. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the two Trusts 
 
                                                 
12 Care Clustering was brought in by the Coalition government to support the ‘Payment by Results’ model in 
the NHS, and basically refers to clustering service user groups and linking them to specific tailored teams 
and services based on key characteristics. 
 
 
Characteristics Trust one Trust two 
Geographical 
and socio-
economic 
Large urban area with high 
levels of unemployment, 
poverty and deprivation 
A small urban centre and a 
large semi-rural hinterland. 
High levels of unemployment, 
poverty and deprivation  
Mental health 
service 
provision 
Strong community focus 
with a large number of 
‘satellite’ team offices. 
Little inpatient provision. 
Outreach approach with few 
visits by service users to the 
office 
Strong hospital site focus with 
most teams based within the 
hospital grounds. 
Relatively high number of 
inpatient beds 
Office-based approach with 
many appointments taking 
place on site 
Structure Large centralised Mental 
Health Act Office.  
‘Traditional’ model of tiered 
services with Community 
Mental Health Teams, 
Assertive Outreach Teams, 
Crisis Teams, Early 
Intervention Teams 
Dispersed administrative 
support through small 
localised Mental Health Act 
staff teams. ‘New’ model of 
services based on Care 
Clusters
12
, including Recovery 
Team (psychosis, complex 
needs), Social Inclusion Team 
(psychosis and mood 
disorders, low-level needs) as 
well as Assertive Outreach. 
CTO use Larger numbers of CTOs.  
Average length of CTO > 1 
year. 
Fewer CTOs.  Average length 
of CTO 8 months. 
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Gaining agreement through various levels of gatekeepers within the context of 
NHS bureaucracy was a lengthy and complex task.  The senior managers of the 
two Trusts who responded positively did so because they believed that the use of 
CTOs in their Trusts was an issue worth investigating.  One of the Trusts had 
higher usage of CTOs than the national average and they were concerned about 
overuse; the other Trust had recently taken over services in an area where the use 
of CTOs was very different to the rest of the Trust and management wanted to 
find out how CTOs were being practiced in the Trust. The advocacy of these two 
managers was essential in filtering the research request down through the 
management structure to team-level.  Throughout, negotiating access was an 
iterative process, moving between various levels of managers in the two Trusts, 
the Trusts’ respective Research and Development Offices and the NHS Research 
Ethics Committee.   
 
Within the two Trusts, I decided to focus on Assertive Outreach Teams (AOT) 
because they tend to have the highest number of CTOs and so would provide 
useful data on their use.  Similarly, both of the AOTs which were selected were 
done so on the basis that they were the busiest and largest AOTs in the two 
Trusts.   The two team managers were both receptive to my involvement, I think 
because they were both relatively new in post and were keen to gain an ‘outside’ 
perspective on team practice.  
 
Practitioner participants: recruitment, selection and characteristics 
 
Once an arrangement was made with the AOT Manager, I arranged to attend a 
team meeting in order to present the research and give practitioners information 
sheets.  Following NHS Ethics and Trust-level approval being formalised, I then 
contacted practitioners individually to go through the information sheet/consent 
form, answer any questions and gain consent.   Due to the case-led design of the 
study, practitioner consent forms were made specific to the level the practitioner 
was expected to participate; so if practitioners were working with service users 
on CTOs who were also recruited to the study, I asked the practitioner to agree to 
be interviewed and observed in meetings.  All other practitioners in the team 
were asked to agree to my presence for general observations.   
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In addition to the ‘case-specific’ practitioners recruited from the two AOTs, 16 
practitioners were included as key informant interviewees only, either because 
they were able to provide an overview on the use of CTOs (3 clinical 
leads/managers), or because I thought they would answer interesting questions 
that were raised during the fieldwork period.  These interviews occurred more 
organically at a later stage in the study, when I was able to take advantage of 
recommendations and links built up within the two Trusts.  For example, a 
number of AMHPs had mentioned in their interview that CTOs were used in a 
much more restrictive way within Learning Disability services, so a cross-section 
of practitioners (5) from Learning Disability services were included on this 
basis
13
.  When examining the figures for CTO use within one of the Trusts, I 
noted that the other AOT in the Trust used CTOs a lot less than the AOT where 
the majority of fieldwork took place, and interviews were conducted with that 
team’s Manager and psychiatrist to investigate this difference.  Thirdly, the 
AMHPs interviewed thus far had all been ‘in-house’, based within the two AOTs 
to deal with those teams’ cases and also taking on the dual role of care 
coordinating.  I decided that it would be useful to also include duty AMHPs (2) 
who did not hold caseloads and who therefore dealt with CTOs as and when they 
arose across a Trust. Finally, some care coordinators (4) were interviewed from 
other types of teams, where CTO use was lower, including two ‘typical’ 
Community Mental Health Teams and an Early Intervention in Psychosis Team.  
This was to explore the differences in practice and perspectives that might occur 
in settings where CTOs were rarer.   
 
Within one Trust 15 practitioners were recruited, with two not responding to my 
contact with them.  21 practitioners were recruited from the other Trust with four 
non-responses, so altogether 36 practitioners were recruited. Table Four shows 
practitioner participants by role and professional background.   
                                                 
13 The interviews with Learning Disability practitioners were eventually not included in the analysis and 
write-up for this thesis, as they were so different to the focus of the rest of the study.  They provided 
interesting insights however into the use of CTOs within Learning Disability services and I intend to write 
them up in a standalone paper.  It should also be noted that although the pool of participants was expanded 
to allow for contrasts, few marked differences came up in the analysis of data – for example between ‘team’ 
and ‘duty’ AMHPs’ accounts.  The only notable difference is commented on in the findings – that between 
the AOT where few CTOs were used as compared to the AOT where CTOs were used in large numbers.   
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Table 4: Practitioner participants by role and profession 
 
Out of the 36 practitioners, 20 were female and 16 male, and gender was 
weighted towards women among all professional groupings, except for the 
psychiatrists.  The majority (32) were White British with the remaining four 
participants being British Asian or Black African, again represented more in the 
psychiatrist grouping.  A wide range of practice experience was demonstrated, 
with forty years being the longest time working in mental health services and one 
year the least.  The participants’ career length played quite an interesting part in 
interviews, with those who had worked longer being able to share their 
perceptions of changes in services over the years and those who had very short 
careers to date believing that they were less sure of how ‘systems’ worked, which 
in turn had an effect on the confidence they had in understanding CTOs. 
 
The largest professional group represented was social work (16), with nurses 
making up the majority of the remainder of participants (12).  In this sense, 
taking a case-led approach helped to rebalance previous research that has tended 
to focus more on the perspective of psychiatrists, and to understand CTOs as 
embedded in daily practice.  It has been argued (Allen, 2014) that social work 
brings a distinctive set of values to multi-disciplinary mental health practice, but 
I found little evidence of that in the field sites in reference to CTOs.  There was a 
similar and comparative range of value perspectives within all professions – 
social workers, occupational therapists and nurses – who took on the role of care 
 Care 
Coordinator 
Psychiatrist AMHP Manager Total 
Nurses 11   1 12 
Social Workers 5  8 3 16 
Occupational 
Therapists 
1   1 
 
2 
Psychiatrists  6   6 
Total 17 6 8 5  
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coordination.  Differences in perspectives were generally premised on role rather 
than professional background.  Hence although the AMHPs were all social 
workers, the distinctive perspective they took was related to their legal mandate 
rather than their profession.  Similarly, psychiatrists as the primary decision-
makers on CTOs tended to take a particular view which could be separate in 
some ways from their colleagues.  Accordingly in the findings, I refer to 
practitioner contributions by role and not profession. 
 
Service user participants: recruitment, selection and characteristics 
 
Service users were initially approached via their care coordinator, who gave a 
brief explanation of the research to them, gave them an information sheet to read 
and asked their permission for me to contact them directly.  Following a period 
of approximately two days, if they had agreed that I could, I contacted the service 
user and arranged to meet with them, in order to go through the information 
sheet/consent form, answer any questions and check their capacity to understand, 
retain and assimilate the information given, and communicate choice in regards 
to the research (Appelbaum, 1998).  Service users were able to bring a ‘trusted 
supporter’ when negotiating informed consent and taking part in interviews 
(Ulivi, Reilly and Atkinson, 2009).   
 
Within each team, all individuals on a CTO were considered; emphasis was 
placed on the characteristics of the CTO ‘case’ rather than the individual service 
user, specifically recruiting individuals who were at different stages of the CTO 
to ensure a range of CTO experiences were accounted for.  With that in mind 
however, service users were not included if their care coordinator declined to 
take part in the study; if they were deemed to lack capacity to make an informed 
decision in regards to participation in the research; had a learning disability or a 
diagnosis of dementia; did not speak English; or were under 18.  In one team, 22 
participants were considered, and 10 eventually recruited.  In the other, 8 
participants were recruited out of a potential pool of 38.  The reasons for not 
being able to recruit are outlined in Table Five. 
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Table 5: Service users who were not recruited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This related to the Care Coordinator stating they did not feel the person would 
agree to take part as they were deemed too hostile to services in general. 
** There were a small group who had agreed to meet, but for one reason or 
another, such as a change in circumstances or missed appointments, the initial 
contact didn’t go ahead. 
 
Two thirds (12) of the service users were male, as reflects the national and 
international trends on gender and CTOs (Care Quality Commission, 2011a, 
Churchill et al, 2007). Given that this is a qualitative study, the weighting of the 
selection to fit national trends was not intentional; however, an effort was made 
to ensure women were represented in the selection due to the known gender bias 
of CTO use.  Almost all (16) identified as White British, which was indicative of 
the ethnic make-up of the field sites, but not of the higher than expected (as 
compared with the general population) national rates of CTOs for people 
particularly from Black ethnic groups (Care Quality Commission, 2011a).   
 
As might be expected given the well-documented social exclusion and stigma 
experienced by individuals with severe mental health difficulties, the majority of 
the participants were socially isolated, with little in the way of support from 
family, friends or the wider community.  All participants received Disability 
Living Allowance and most were on other benefits of some kind, with three 
working in a self-employed capacity.  Five participants were also on 
appointeeships, which meant the local authority managed their money for them.  
Declined 7 
Risk 8 
Capacity 10 
Care coordinator not recruited 5 
Gatekeeping* 9 
Miscellaneous** 3 
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Most participants were single (14) and lived on their own in the community, 
either in supported accommodation or a local authority tenancy.   
 
Most participants (14) were in their forties or fifties and had been involved with 
services for a number of years (range of 3 to 33 years); all had been diagnosed 
with some enduring form of psychosis.  However this picture is complicated by 
the majority of participants also being given a number of different diagnoses over 
the years as well as half of the participants having secondary diagnoses of 
personality disorder and/or substance misuse.  I found it problematic to approach 
participants from a diagnostic stance.  Not all participants’ saw their own 
experiences as fitting within such a conception and indeed were resentful of the 
labelling and subsequent stigma they felt diagnosis had brought with it.  
However, interesting themes particularly arose from practitioner interviews on 
the relationship between diagnosis (particularly personality disorders) and use of 
the CTO, and so such a framework was necessary to explore this data further. 
 
During their time in services, all participants had had at least one involuntary 
admission to hospital, with the most experienced by a participant as over 30.  In 
this sense, some but by no means all participants fitted the criteria for the 
‘revolving door’ patient which CTOs were originally intended for.  Another 
stated policy purpose for CTOs was to help practitioners’ manage the risk of 
harm to others (Department of Health, 2012) and in the selected group of 
participants, risk was a documented issue in almost half of the cases (8).  
 
Most participants had only been on one CTO, although a sizeable minority (7) 
had experienced two or more.  These experiences meant those particular service 
users were able to describe their experiences of CTOs in some depth, both 
relating to the present and the past. The length of participant’s current CTO 
ranged from three months to just over two years.  Just over half of participants 
could be described as stable on their CTO, with only five having experienced one 
or more recalls to hospital, either on their current or on previous CTOs, and 
another three having been admitted voluntarily to hospital on their current CTO.  
Five of the eighteen participants were discharged from their CTO during the 
course of the fieldwork period and one was discharged shortly before it began, 
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but still included in the research due to the perspective they were able to give on 
their experience.   
Fieldwork considerations: ethics 
 
Given the study’s focus on the ethical consequences and dilemmas of mental 
health policy and practice, it seemed particularly pertinent to pay close attention 
to ethics when making decisions on research design.  It has been noted that 
research with mental health service users can be sensitive for a number of 
reasons, such as the potential to cause distress through talking about difficult 
experiences, the fear that involvement will impact negatively on services, and the 
complexities around informed consent (Keogh and Daly, 2009).   The attainment 
of NHS ethics approval involves a rigorous and detailed ethical planning 
process
14
, which although at times convoluted and bureaucratic was ultimately 
helpful in making me carefully consider all ethical aspects of the study.  In order 
to provide a framework for ethical research to take place, I implemented a 
number of procedures and safeguards, which are detailed in appendix six.   As 
has been noted more generally in both health and social care settings (Murphy 
and Dingwall, 2007, Shaw, 2008), undertaking qualitative research also involves 
a continuous consideration of ethics throughout the research process, by 
consciously being a ‘moral researcher’ when making reflexive decisions in the 
field.   
 
Ethical reflexivity in fieldwork 
 
Being a social worker who nevertheless had little previous experience in mental 
health practice, I could be described as on the “inside ‘out” (White, 2001, 104), 
and it took a number of careful preparatory meetings with service users before I 
felt enough trust had been built to ask them to participate in the research.  With 
practitioners I became aware that I would sometimes slip into ‘coded language 
and communication’ culturally common to myself and the participant (Kanuha, 
2000, 443) and had to consciously remind myself to question what was held as 
self-evident. The keeping of a personal fieldwork diary and debriefing sessions 
                                                 
14 As my research was non-clinical, it was examined and approved by the national Social Care Research 
Ethics Committee 
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with supervisors helped me to work through these issues and my sometimes 
contradictory thoughts and feelings on how I could see CTOs being used.   
As the fieldwork progressed however, I did experience challenges in maintaining 
the balance between insider and outsider perspectives that ethnography demands 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  My identity as a practitioner who has 
worked in very similar teams in the past, meant it was easy to become engaged in 
familiar tropes of practice language and activity.  This made it difficult to remain 
in the position of ‘acceptable incompetent’ (Lofland, 1971), and also to retain a 
marginal position where distance could be kept between myself and participants, 
particularly practitioners.  Being in the teams over time meant sometimes being 
asked to contribute by the field members in unexpected ways which disrupted 
such a sense of distance and could create significant anxiety and discomfort.  
Quirk (2008, 134) in his ethnography of a mental health inpatient ward runs 
through a range of common anxieties for ethnographers including: being able to 
‘pull the research off’, the problems of discreet note-taking, identity management 
and being an ‘unwanted guest’, the response of participants to his findings and 
threats to his well-being.  All of these anxieties became familiar to me 
throughout the fieldwork, but as Quirk also notes, there is something about 
conducting ethnography within an institutional setting which can be distinctively 
destabilising.  For me, his description of having an ambiguous institutional role 
rang particularly true; of being characterised by different actors as having 
particular sympathies, which in turn at times mediated what I was allowed to 
observe and know.  Ethically this could be tricky to navigate.  One service user 
participant following our interview asked me to write a letter for her upcoming 
Tribunal stating that she did not need to be on a CTO.  I explained I could not 
intervene in cases, but could provide her with information about advocacy 
services if she wanted.  At the next meeting I was expected to attend, she decided 
she no longer wanted me to be present; I had misjudged how she had understood 
the research process and she had misunderstood my role.   
 
At the same time, being positioned by participants, whilst sometimes leading to 
ethically difficult places, could also generate potentially helpful insights.  For 
example, I attended an appeal where the care coordinator was unable to be there 
and so the Team manager (who had never met the service user in question 
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before) reluctantly stepped in.  As I had met the service user a few times by that 
point, prior to the appeal starting the panel members asked me some questions 
about the case, which in answering felt like I had overstepped a boundary which 
I had no control over; that lack of control emanating from being present in such a 
formal setting with individuals who held unambiguous authority.  The service 
user came in, looking quite overwhelmed and commenting repeatedly about all 
the people present.  I think probably because I was the only familiar face to him, 
the manager suggested he sit down next to me and he asked me nervously twice 
how I was doing.  There is much that can be said in academic terms about the 
nature of meetings and how they may mediate service user (dis)enfranchisement.  
Being placed in a position where I felt I had no choice to answer questions I did 
not want to, coupled with feeling that I was the anchor for the service user in that 
setting, brought home in a fleeting but nonetheless immediate and intuitive way 
how difficult and disempowering such meetings can be.  It also made me think 
carefully about how I could position myself in future meetings; for example, 
instead of already being in the meeting room, I began to experience the journey 
and preamble to the meeting alongside service users, thus acknowledging the 
importance of ‘mobility’ and ‘informal spaces’ for social research and practice 
(Ferguson, 2010, Ross et al, 2009).  This served the dual purpose of both eliciting 
interesting data on how processes prior to such meetings worked/were 
experienced, and placing myself in a position that may have been more ethically 
sensitive to service user participants.   
 
Ethical reflexivity does not end when exiting the field.  Shaw (2008) highlights 
some of the ethical dilemmas social work researchers face in writing up and 
dissemination activities, including the risks inherent to the ‘taking and re-
making’ of participant stories. Qualitative research involves the analysis of 
participant narratives beyond their initial descriptive meaning and so creates a 
tension between researcher and participant understanding and ownership. 
Furthermore, Finch (1986) argues that within qualitative research with its 
traditionally small sample sizes, it is important to not ‘betray’ individual 
participants by representing their group in ways which can reinforce public 
stereotypes. This point seems particularly pertinent for research with individuals 
who have diagnoses of severe and enduring mental illness, given the stigma they 
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already face in society.  In presenting the research I tried to remain sensitive to 
original meanings and in how individuals may ‘look’ to various audiences. In 
this way, the thesis has been informed by a relational ‘ethics of care’ that 
attempts to “ground principles such as respect, integrity and justice in the 
concrete relationships of actual research” (Hugman, 2010, 162).   
 
Connectedly, respecting practitioner perspectives whilst maintaining research 
integrity needed careful thought.  It is important that the research experience is 
perceived as generally positive by participants and gatekeepers, both for intrinsic 
moral reasons, but also so that attitudes towards research and researchers in 
general are not adversely affected, thus affecting potential future access.  To 
reassure team managers and practitioners, I emphasised from the beginning of 
the research process that my intention was not to do a ‘hatchet job’ of practice.  
By the point I started to share my research in various forums in the Trusts 
(including Trust Board meetings, Trust lecture series, AMHP and psychiatrists 
forums, service user and carer groups, and with the teams themselves) I had been 
embedded in the teams for some time.  This familiarity sharpened the sense of 
responsibility I felt for how I presented findings, and what I did and did not 
include.  With significant change afoot in both Trusts I was aware how sensitive 
the team managers were to how they were seen in the wider Trust context.  In 
addition, there were dynamics in both teams that I became aware of over time, 
which whilst relevant to the research would need to be handled sensitively when 
reporting findings.  Both teams had undergone recent changes in personnel which 
were still ‘bedding in’.  There is no straightforward answer to these kinds of 
ethical dilemmas, but I have tried to strike a balance between such competing 
factors in an honest and open way that has maintained good relationships with 
research participants along with ensuring the findings are presented with 
integrity.   
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have outlined my methodological approach to the study, starting 
with research design before delineating methods, analysis, recruitment and 
selection criteria, and ethical considerations.  In taking a case-based approach I 
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have been able to follow CTOs as they develop over time, gain access to a range 
of perspectives on their use, and utilise my chosen methods to their fullest extent.  
Through combining interviews with observations and document analysis I have 
orientated the study to the research questions I set out to explore.  These methods 
have respectively allowed for an analysis of:  participant reflection on CTOs, the 
everyday practice of CTOs, and an unmediated timeline of CTO decision-
making, as well as a macro-perspective of CTO policy-making.  My analysis of 
the data that has arisen from these methods has attempted to do justice to the 
complexity and range of material generated.  I have amalgamated different 
participant perspectives and different data sources to allow for an analysis which 
accounts for cross-sectional themes and the development of CTO stories over 
time.  In the latter half of this chapter I particularly focused on how the research 
was carried out, by giving a sense of the participants and their circumstances, as 
well as the ethical challenges I faced in carrying out the field-work.  In this way, 
I hope I have given an account of the study which enables the reader to approach 
the findings presented in the next few chapters with a good understanding of 
where they have come from.   
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Chapter Four 
CTO policy development: 
The ‘how’ and ‘why’ of compulsory community care 
 
This chapter represents the beginning of a narrative about CTOs which will 
follow their progress from a policy idea through practice to their various 
conclusions.   Its primary aim is to ‘set the scene’ for the empirical findings 
which are to follow.  The dual foci of the policy analysis that are presented here 
are how and why CTOs came to be present in the English mental health system in 
the form that they take.  This is in keeping with the framework I highlighted in 
Chapter Two, of synthesising critical realism and governmentality.  The former 
concept is addressed by theorising on why CTOs were introduced, in particular 
what the drivers were that led to their inception, and why CTOs were introduced 
in the configuration they were - that is, the enabling and constraining factors 
which mediated their final form in England.    The latter concept is dealt with by 
illuminating how the problems CTOs were meant to solve were made visible and 
corporeal, and how certain kinds of knowledge and expertise informed the 
development of CTOs.  In bringing the two together, an analysis which pinpoints 
the formation of a rationality of government in regards to CTOs, but also 
accounts for the complex nature of political processes and the diversity of 
influencing factors, is made possible.  It should be noted that the incorporation of 
a realist approach (why) to this policy analysis alongside governmentality-
informed questions (how) does not necessarily mean that all elements of why 
CTOs came to be in their present form in England have been accounted for.  
Indeed as stated in Chapter Two, realist accounts do not tend to claim to be a 
‘complete’ picture of what they are studying.  As representations of reality they 
are “fallible and theory-laden” (Sayer, 1992, 5) but nonetheless endeavour to 
illustrate and explain through a close analysis of materials what is happening in 
the field of study.  This policy analysis of CTOs has drawn on a range of 
historical secondary sources to develop such an explanatory narrative. 
 
It is necessary to trace the development of CTOs spatially as well as over time.  
Specifically, using a framework derived from the literature on policy transfer 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, Evans and Davies, 1999), the relationship between 
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domestic and international expertise and experiences is drawn out to illustrate 
how particular kinds and sources of knowledge were used to make the case for 
CTOs.  Broadly summarised, policy transfer refers to the process “in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc in one 
time and/or place is used in the development of polices, administrative 
arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996, 344). As a form of knowledge transmission, “policy transfers and 
political rationalities are seamlessly intertwined: transfers make possible the 
existence of different political rationalities by quite literally putting political 
ideas and knowledge into action” (Moisio and Luukkonen, 2014, 12).  In this 
regard, how CTOs came to be rationalised is ineluctably connected to the role of 
knowledge flow across jurisdictions.  At the same time, it should be recognised 
that policy knowledge is not simply reproduced within a linear model, but 
instead is transformed through application in particular places and times (Wedel 
et al, 2005).  Studying the interaction between local and global knowledge thus 
helps to shed light on why CTOs took the specific policy path they did, through 
an acknowledgement of the role of policy actors in shaping final outcomes within 
a hotly debated area of policy.  Following on from this, a comparative analysis of 
CTO regimes helps to explain the nature of CTOs as they have been realised in 
England and some of the significant cultural and institutional factors which may 
have led to that particular realisation.  Before doing so, a discussion of how and 
why CTOs became thought of as necessary both in England and elsewhere, will 
take place, beginning with some historical context. 
The rise of compulsory community care: policy drivers and problem formation  
 
CTOs internationally have taken a number of different forms over the last forty 
years. Ironically, given the human rights protestations they now engender, CTOs 
were initially developed as part of the patient rights movement in the USA 
during the 1960s and 70s, as a way of maximising individual liberty by 
minimising involuntary hospitalisation (Hiday, 2003).  This ‘first wave’ of CTOs 
have been classified as ‘least restrictive’ (Churchill et al, 2007), as they 
effectively allowed for compulsory community care under the same legal criteria 
as compulsory inpatient care, thus creating an alternative to detention.  However, 
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‘least restrictive’ CTOs were little used as it became evident that it was 
politically and practically unviable to treat people in the community who met the 
risk criterion for detention in hospital.   
 
In response to these constraints on their use, a new kind of CTO, the 
‘preventative’ CTO became prevalent from the 1980s (Churchill et al, 2007).  
Preventative CTOs have lower thresholds for use, and instead of being an 
alternative to inpatient detention, became a way of compulsorily treating 
individuals in the community either following their release from hospital, or 
before they reached the threshold for involuntary hospital treatment.  
Preventative CTOs thus have different legislative criteria from involuntary 
inpatient treatment and are often aimed at specifically targeted individuals, 
usually those defined as ‘revolving door’ patients who have a history of non-
compliance and who go through rapid cycles of release from hospital, 
deterioration and re-detainment.   In this sense, preventative CTOs are more 
explicitly concerned with risk management both for the individual and for 
society rather than the earlier aim of promoting civil liberty (Hiday, 2003).  It is 
this type of CTO that has become most widespread and formed the foundation 
for the development of CTOs as they are used currently.   
 
There is no definitive list of where preventative CTOs have been enacted, but a 
review of the literature suggests they are in place in around 70 jurisdictions, 
including in most US states by 1994 (Torrey and Kaplan, 1995), in all Australian 
states by 1999 (Power, 1999), Israel in 1991 (Bar et al, 1998), New Zealand in 
1992, Canada in 1994, Scotland in 2005, almost all US states by 2006 (Churchill 
et al, 2007) and England and Wales in 2008.  CTOs then seem predominantly to 
be enacted in countries with similar cultural backgrounds, and in the case of the 
Commonwealth countries, legal heritage. Less widely reported is their use in 
European countries; Norway has had preventative CTOs in place since the 1960s, 
but became a rare example of a state revising the law to enable least restrictive 
CTOs in 2001 and Sweden legislated for CTOs in 2008 (Sjostrom, Zetterberg 
and Markström, 2011).  Switzerland and the Netherlands have also been reported 
to have CTOs (Dawson, 2005, Kortrijk et al, 2010). 
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Although the majority of countries where CTOs are present have aligned with the 
preventative model, within that broad category CTOs encompass a shifting range 
of legal and medical mechanisms dependent on the cultural and societal norms of 
the jurisdiction in which they are enacted.  However, despite differences between 
countries, it is still possible to highlight broad trends that have instigated what 
Brophy and McDermott (2003, 86) term a “domino effect” in the global spread 
of compulsory community care.   Delineating the possible policy ‘drivers’ for 
CTOs helps us to understand how different jurisdictions may develop similar 
rationales for their use.  This is necessary to contextualise policy-making, 
because as Hall (1993) suggests, the role of ideas and ideology need to be 
accounted for in policy formation as the normative structure that is taken for 
granted by the general policy-making community, but which nevertheless shapes 
what are viewed as policy problems to be solved.  The expansion of CTOs in 
developed countries has arisen from an array of interacting factors, beginning 
with the process of deinstitutionalisation, the ensuing increased focus on risk and 
community safety in mental health services, and what can be described as the 
associated dominance of a neurobiological approach, which emphasises the use 
of drug treatment as a ‘solution’ to mental disorder.  CTOs can thus be described 
as a consequence of the burgeoning movement towards community care in the 
last fifty years, combined with the perceived need to maintain some form of 
control through treatment over individuals deemed as posing a risk to themselves 
or others (Brophy, 2009, Campbell, Healy and Brophy, 2006).  All of these 
factors can be related to themes which have framed the growth of CTOs, and 
which reflect the concerns of mental health policy in general.  As Moynihan 
(1996, 13) states: 
The challenge for social policy in the mental health arena has been to find 
a way through four competing claims: the state’s interest in protecting the 
well-being of its citizens; the traditional value placed on medicine as a 
means of addressing issues of illness; the normative demands of citizens 
for the elimination of danger; and the recognition of rights of individuals. 
 
It could also be added that although not a ‘claim’, certainly a constraint on 
mental health policy and services, as within any welfare domain, are questions of 
resources, such as to whom and in what ways they should be made available.  In 
regards to CTOs this is particularly relevant in considering its broader 
implications for mental health services and service users more generally; CTOs 
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can be viewed in one respect as the latest means to managing areas of pressure in 
the system, such as bed shortages.    
 
The devolution of care 
 
To fully understand this coalescence of policy drivers for CTOs, we need to 
understand the foundational role deinstitutionalisation has played.  
Deinstitutionalisation refers to the process in a number of Western societies from 
the 1960s onwards, whereby the focus of mental health care moved from the 
‘total institution’ of the asylum (Goffman, 1961) to care in the community, 
driven by a combination of the growth of patient rights movements, the advent of 
anti-psychotic medication and the rising costs associated with inpatient care.   
Whilst community care has provided many people with a better quality of life 
(Leff, 1997), it has also been critiqued for letting down those service users who 
have characteristics that mean they struggle to survive in society and 
consequently have been left ‘rotting with their rights on’ (Appelbaum and 
Gutheil, 1979, Novella, 2010).  Thus, particularly in countries such as the USA 
where healthcare is more fragmented, CTOs have been framed as a way of 
obligating services to provide quality care (Wagner et al, 2003).  Whilst not 
articulated in the same way in England, changes in resources did play a part in 
policy reasoning.  The number of beds in inpatient units in England fell from 
154,000 in 1954 to 33,000 by 2005 (Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health 
Bill, Session 2004-2005, HL 79-1/HC 95-1: Para 183) and continue to fall as 
recent concerns reported in news media about pressures on inpatient provision 
highlight.  The Government explicitly linked CTOs with this phenomenon when 
drafting the legislation for it, with Lord Warner, a Minister of State in the 
Department of Health stating, “supervised community treatment is probably the 
key change in the Bill…It is important not just from a patient and public safety 
angle but because clinical practice itself has changed…” (HL Deb, 28th 
November 2006, Vol. 687, Col. 656).  Indeed, the impact assessment carried out 
by the Department of Health (2007) predicted that CTOs would save the NHS 
approximately £34 million per year by 2014-15, due to a presumed 10% 
reduction in admittance to hospital under Section 3.   
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Troubled or troubling individuals? 
 
As well as concerns about service users being abandoned to their fate, 
community care has become associated with public fears about insufficiently 
controlled individuals presenting a risk of harm to the community at large.  
Whilst the evidence of a link between violence and mental disorder is contested, 
it has become increasingly accepted that a co-occurrence of substance misuse 
and/or dependence with diagnoses of severe mental illness can lead to an 
elevated risk of violence (Monahan et al, 2001, Elbogen and Johnson, 2009, 
Fazel et al, 2009, 2010).  However, it is also the case that substance misuse, and 
other environmental factors associated with mental illness and violence, such as 
socioeconomic status or experience of childhood abuse, are also correlated with 
general population levels of violence, regardless of the presence of mental illness 
(Stuart, 2003).  Consequently:  
it is simplistic as well as inaccurate to say the cause of violence among 
mentally ill individuals is the mental illness itself; instead…mental illness 
is clearly relevant to violence risk but…its causal roles are complex, 
indirect, and embedded in a web of other (and arguably more) important 
individual and situational cofactors. (Elbogen and Johnson, 2009, 159). 
 
Furthermore, although the relative risk of violence may be slightly higher for 
those with diagnoses of severe and enduring mental illness, the absolute risk is 
still very low, which means that acts of homicide are unusual and isolated events 
(Taylor and Gunn, 1999).  However, it could be argued that this ‘expert’ view is 
not deemed as important as the public, ‘lay’ view on mental disorder and 
violence by policy-makers.  As Madden (2003) states, large-scale statistical 
studies do not address ‘catastrophic’ events when they do occur.  It is clear that 
even though the majority of violence committed by individuals with a diagnosed 
severe mental illness is towards people they know, such as family members 
(Monahan et al, 2001), the public, “most fear violence that is random, senseless, 
and unpredictable and they associate this with mental illness” (Stuart, 2003, 121).  
Surveys of attitudes towards people with severe mental illness have shown that a 
large proportion of the public, whilst holding sympathetic attitudes, also 
experience feelings of uncertainty and fear, particularly towards individuals with 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2006).   
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Rose (2002a) describes how in this regard the focus of the debate has shifted 
over the years since the 1980s. Increasingly, instead of service failure being 
discussed in terms of the ‘plight’ of service users, it is now “posed in terms of the 
failure of assessment, prediction, and management of risky individuals and the 
minimisation of risk to the community” (Rose, 2002a, 216).  CTOs as a tool for 
regular monitoring and medication compliance can therefore be posited as a 
political response to public concerns, most obviously in the North American 
practice of naming their introduction after the victim of homicide by a mentally 
disordered individual (for example, Brian’s Law in Ontario, Kendra’s Law in 
New York and Laura’s Law in Florida).  Sjostrom, Zetterberg and Markström  
(2011) describe how in Sweden, a number of high-profile incidents in 2003 
(including the death of a government minister), although not acted on by 
government at the time in terms of introducing more compulsory measures, did 
resurface in parliamentary discussion five years later, when CTOs were debated 
with reference to dangerousness being the primary concern.  A similar narrative 
was evident in England, beginning in 1998 when the then Secretary of State for 
Health, Frank Dobson proclaimed that ‘community care has failed’ (Dobson, 
1998).  As with Sweden, USA and Canada, a spate of much reported homicides 
committed by individuals
15
 in contact with mental health services provided 
impetus for policy reform, with the Home Office as well as the Department of 
Health shaping policy based on public safety.  The public inquiries that arose 
from these killings attracted substantial media attention, particularly in relation to 
their key findings, which drew attention to common service failures and made a 
range of recommendations, including that legislation should be examined, 
particularly in regards to compulsory treatment and supervision in the 
community (Blom-Cooper, Hally and Murphy, 1995; Sheppard, 1997).  
Subsequently, the development of CTOs in England was part of a broader reform 
programme in which the Mental Health Act (1983) was to be replaced with a 
new legislative framework.  The Government made it clear early on in the reform 
process that they believed the existing legislation for community supervision was 
                                                 
15 The most well-known and widely cited case was that of Jonathan Zito, a young man murdered in the 
London underground in 1992 by Christopher Clunis, who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  The subsequent 
inquiry highlighted a number of cumulative systemic failures in Clunis’ management and care in the months 
prior to the murder.  Jonathan Zito’s wife went on to set up the Zito Trust, which lobbied strongly for risk-
related reforms in policy and practice, and specifically for the introduction of CTOs.  The Zito Trust closed 
in 2009, stating that its objectives had been met with the introduction of the Mental Health Act (2007). 
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outdated, and had failed to either benefit service users or to protect the public 
(Department of Health and Home Office, 2000).  As the then Minister for Health 
Services, Rosie Winterton made clear, the argument for CTOs was closely linked 
to risk:  
There are 1,300 suicides every year and 50 homicides by people who 
have been in contact with mental health services.  We believe that 
supervised community treatment is vital to helping patient continue to 
take treatment when they leave hospital and to enable clinicians to take 
rapid action if relapse is on the horizon (HC Deb, 18
th
 June 2007, Vol. 
461, Col. 1193). 
 
As Pilgrim (2007) notes, the purpose of the reform and the contention it created 
were not unique to present times; an enduring feature of mental health law-
making has been debate over balancing issues of rights and liberty with those of 
risk and constraint.  Even so, commentators suggested that “an illiberal stance 
and an obsession with risk minimisation did dominate ministerial deliberations 
about legal reform” (Pilgrim and Ramon, 2009, 284).  In this sense the reforms 
could be viewed as evidence of a general policy shift to the realm of the social 
under New Labour, which constituted an interventionist ‘culture of control’ 
(Lawton-Smith, 2005). 
 
The will to empower
16
 
 
However, it would be simplistic to suggest an overriding concern with risk was 
the sole driver behind policy-making on CTOs.  CTOs have also been associated, 
albeit much less overtly, with a somewhat paternalistic version of the recovery 
approach in mental health, where it has been surmised they can act to provide a 
secure foundation for individuals to operate from and to encourage self-efficacy.  
The debate on whether CTOs will enable or constrict self-determination has been 
central to both CTO policy-making and resistance to CTOs.  In turn, this has led 
to deeper questions on the concepts of choice and free will in mental health.   A 
New York campaign group arguing against the introduction of CTOs in that state 
made the point that “people recover when they have a choice among alternative 
                                                 
16 Title in reference to Barbara Cruikshank’s 1994 book, The will to empower: Democratic citizens and 
other subjects, in which she undertakes a Foucauldian genealogical analysis of the concept of empowerment 
in liberal democracies. 
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treatments and services, when they are empowered to make their own 
decisions…and when they are offered hope.  These conditions are impossible 
under outpatient commitment” (Swanson, 2009, 183).  The centrality of 
medication within CTOs is an especially problematic issue in regards to choice, 
where it has been suggested by campaigning groups that the relatively cheap and 
quick nature of medical treatment combined with the compulsory power of CTOs 
will result in its inappropriate and unreflective use by clinicians, a further 
decrease in choice and involvement in treatment decisions by service users, and a 
lack of consideration of non-medical approaches.  
 
Conversely, Dawson (2009, 29) argues that an understanding of CTOs as 
enabling self-direction and choice is philosophically grounded in the concept of 
positive liberty (Berlin, 1969) which he defines as “our capacity for self-
governance…our ability to set goals and have some chance of meeting them, and 
to maintain important relationships, without being dominated by internal 
constraints that prevent this occurring”17.   The framing of CTOs as a conduit for 
individual growth and empowerment is most evident in Munetz and Frese’s 
(2001) assertion that CTOs are reconcilable with the recovery model and indeed, 
can act as an opportunity for individuals to become ‘well enough’ through long 
term medication adherence to start the recovery process.  In this way, they 
suggest longer-term outcomes of being on a CTO could include service users 
sustaining meaningful activity in the community, experiencing better quality of 
life and holding better relationships with significant others.   The result of this 
thinking is that arguments for individual freedom are constructed as morally 
hazardous, as it is not enough to simply offer services and medical care which 
service users are free to reject (Kinderman and Tai, 2008).  Munetz goes as far as 
to say that practitioners who do not accept the necessity for compulsory 
community treatment are negating their “obligation as helper and healer” 
(Munetz, Galon and Frese, 2003, 178).  Sjostrom , Zetterberg and Markström  
                                                 
17 However, it is arguable that Berlin (2002) would reject this interpretation of his theory, where the case for 
paternalistic compulsion in the present is justified by the potential for self-determination in the future.   In 
his essay (2002, 39) on types of liberty he states that it has become a “familiar and depressing phenomena” 
for positive liberty to be used “as a cloak for despotism in the name of…freedom”.  In other words, the 
rhetorical use of positive liberty to justify restrictive interventions misconstrues its original conception, 
which is dependent on the ability of individuals to make choices, and for ensuing individual action only to 
be constrained if it is contradicts such choices.  
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(2011, 425) comment that even though adverse incidents provided the ‘window’ 
for CTOs to be introduced in Sweden, “where the official rationale for the policy 
was eventually spelled out, it is striking to observe how reducing risk was pushed 
to the background by an agenda oriented towards treatment and rehabilitation”.   
Although less prominent as a rationale in England, CTOs were nevertheless 
defended with recourse to recovery in parliamentary debates: 
Supervised community treatment…will allow patients, so far as possible, 
to live normal lives in the community. This will reduce the risk of social 
exclusion and stigma associated with detention in hospital for long 
periods of time or with repeated hospital admissions, (Roll and Whittaker, 
2007, 21). 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the foundational argument for using CTOs for both 
risk management and recovery purposes has been the ability it would bring to 
ensure medication compliance.  In this regard policy debates around the use of 
CTOs have mostly been based on a view of mental ‘illness’ as primarily a 
medically treatable concern, with the odd exception such as Kinderman and Tai 
(2008) who argue that CTOs should be implemented on the basis of behavioural 
and functional criteria, as opposed to the use of an illness approach which is 
reliant on symptomology.  CTOs thus reflect the common culture of mental 
health policy and services, where biological explanations for mental illness are 
given causal precedence, and medication is consequently the dominant 
intervention with medication compliance the primary aim (NICE, 2014).  
Although it has been suggested that the biomedical model in the UK has been 
increasingly competing with other approaches in recent years (Pilgrim and 
Rodgers, 2009), research on the increasing rates of medication usage in mental 
health services and the shortage of alternative interventions indicate that it 
remains the prevailing policy and practice framework (Herrman and Harvey, 
2005, Domino and Swartz, 2008).    
 
In and out of the community: the language of CTOs 
 
It seems then that the underpinning discourse for additional compulsory powers 
in the community can be understood in terms of biopolitics and biopower, 
offering a way of ensuring both ‘optimisation’ and control of ‘biological 
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citizenship’ (Rose, 2007).  Returning to Dean’s (2010, 156) conception of 
‘illiberal liberality’ introduced in Chapter Two, in relation to given attributes of 
responsibility and autonomy CTOs can thus be characterised as differentiating 
and categorising ‘low-risk’ individuals who are ‘empowered’ to become 
responsiblised, autonomous, and self-regulating members of society from ‘high 
risk’ individuals who require external regulation (Kemshall, 2002).  In this sense, 
mental disorder is not only framed in biomedical terms, but as a problem situated 
outside of societal norms that requires management.  Bentall (2004, 176) 
describes this latter perspective in the following terms: 
The distinction between the pathological and the non-pathological 
inevitably involves some kind of implicit reference to human values….it 
is not enough that a…characteristic is shown to be statistically unusual in 
order for it to be regarded as pathological; it must also be perceived as 
undesirable, or at least to have consequences that are undesirable  
 
As Rose (1996, 12) emphasises, “professionals…are not so much required to 
cure as to teach the skills of coping, to inculcate the responsibility to cope, to 
identify failures of coping, to restore to the individual the capacity to cope”. If 
this is not possible, then the generation and sharing of risk knowledge through 
professional networks of communication and surveillance enact ‘circuits of 
exclusion’ in which the threat that ‘high-risk’ individuals pose within the 
“territory of the community” is managed (Rose, 1999, 262).  Policies and 
practices that develop to meet this requirement are, by their nature, preventative 
in their aims and objectives. 
 
Within this framework, CTOs can be viewed as a mechanism which contains 
both inclusionary and exclusionary facets so as to both manage risk and bring 
individuals into the fold of citizenship.  CTOs enable the reformation of 
individuals and their conduct if possible, but also allow for control and 
separation of the individual from society and the application of sanctions, should 
this transformative optimism prove unwarranted.   The terminology of CTOs 
reflects these dual objectives.  They have a highly contractual flavour, most 
specifically in the use of the term ‘conditions’ which service users must ‘agree’ 
to. Behaviour control in this sense is concerned with a relatively abstract 
conceptualisation of risk, where prudent individuals are expected to make their 
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own way in society whilst complying with complex rules and requirements, or as 
Rose (2002b, 19) puts it in regards to mental health, “’play the game’ of 
community care”.  Citizenship is therefore defined conditionally, and ‘irregular 
citizens’ (Zedner, 2010) are expected to earn their way to full citizenship through 
conforming to prescribed expectations.  As Zedner (2010, 397) describes, the use 
of ‘contractual devices’, specific to the individual, subvert “the universalism of 
the… law and [delegate] considerable quasilegislative powers to the public 
officials who determine their precise terms”. In this way, CTOs change the state 
of play in regards to the rights that those who are placed on them hold, as 
compared to ‘regular citizens’. 
 
However, the inclusion of the word ‘order’ in their title suggests CTOs can also 
be viewed in a more concrete way as a preventative and potentially punitive 
‘early detection’ system for events that have yet to, and may never, occur.  
Indeed, CTOs in England were acknowledged by Lord Hunt, the then Minister of 
State for Health for the Government, to be perceived by opponents as a 
‘psychiatric ASBO’ (HL Deb, 2nd July 2007, Vol.693, Col. 842), thus situating 
them within the wider discourse of public order policy.  Moreover, the defining 
characteristic of the CTO as a preventative community intervention, means that it 
can be used for a broad range of risk-related reasons, including early intervention 
and thus encompass a large number of service users.  In England, the rationale 
for CTOs relied on a particular definition and categorisation of the ‘revolving 
door patient’; an individual who is repeatedly returned to hospital.  This term has 
become a signifier for who has been made knowable for CTOs to work on, 
through the formation of such individuals via research expertise (see Churchill et 
al, 2007) into a homogenous group who share similar characteristics and patterns 
of behaviour.  Within the legislative process, the Government overturned 
amendments attempted in the House of Lords which would have limited the use 
of CTOs to those individuals who fell within a ‘hard’ definition of revolving 
door such as having a certain number of previous compulsory hospitalisations, as 
happens in other countries (see later discussion on discretion).  Instead they 
stated that clinical expertise on who does, or more importantly may in the future, 
belong to this particular group should take precedence.  As Lord Hunt argued, to 
legislatively limit who was placed on a CTO would “immediately risk excluding 
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patients who might benefit…and would fetter clinical judgment” (HL Deb, 2nd 
July 2007, Vol. 693, Col. 843).  Thus the accompanying Code of Practice for the 
Mental Health Act 2007 (Department of Health, 2008) advises that CTOs be 
aimed at the ‘revolving door scenario’ but does not state what this might mean.  
 
Therefore, CTOs in England are not legislatively targeted and can be applied to 
any inpatient facing discharge, including those on their first admission and those 
who may agree to voluntary treatment.  Indeed, the Care Quality Commission 
(2010) analysed 208 CTO cases and found 30% of them did not have a history of 
noncompliance or disengagement and therefore could be classed as having the 
potential to be treated voluntarily.  Here then we can see how particular problems 
became identified as problems for CTOs to solve; more specifically tracing the 
way CTOs were explained at policy-level highlights who is being made ‘visible’ 
in order to be governed and how ideas on individual reformation via CTOs have 
developed. 
The contestation and constitution of CTOs in England 
 
Moving beyond the broad ideas that shaped CTOs to the ‘microphysics’ of their 
becoming, it is possible to identify the forms of knowledge and expertise that 
were drawn upon in constituting the ‘truths’ upon which CTOs were founded in 
England, as well as significant elements of the local causal narrative that 
determined their eventual form.    Policy-makers drew on historical, practitioner 
and international knowledge in both rhetorical and substantive ways.   
 
The evolution of a problem and a solution 
 
Although CTOs have been constructed as the most recent manifestation of a 
preoccupation with risk in mental health (Kemshall, 2002, Campbell et al, 2006), 
it is interesting to note that they have been considered as a policy in England for 
over three decades.  The evolution of CTOs in England can be traced back to the 
late 1980s, when the Royal College of Psychiatrists proposed their introduction 
in response to increasing legislative challenge of their use of existing community 
powers.   The Conservative government instead legislated for supervised 
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discharge as part of the Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act in 1995.  
Supervised discharge was similar to CTOs in that when released from hospital, 
individuals could be placed on it, with conditions, in order to protect themselves 
and others.  However there was a higher risk threshold for their use, in that there 
had to be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ before it could be imposed.   In 
addition, supervised discharge only allowed for individuals who were non-
compliant to be conveyed to a hospital or clinic for treatment, but did not allow 
for treatment to be enforced once there.  It was this latter proviso which meant 
supervised discharge was widely believed to lack the level of compulsion 
necessary to ensure adherence to treatment (Holloway, 1996, Pinfold et al, 1999) 
and consequently was not well used by practitioners.  In this regard, Fennell 
(1996, 285) appears to predict CTOs when he stated at the time:  
The introduction of supervised discharge may be merely the first stage of 
an inevitable extension of these powers, where…instead of defaulting 
patients being assessed for readmission, they would simply be taken to 
‘treatment centres’ to be forcibly medicated and then returned home. 
 
Although replacing supervised discharge, CTOs are perhaps most similar in 
practice to so called ‘Section 17 leave’, where detained patients are given leave 
from hospital as long as they comply with certain conditions.  As with CTOs, 
patients on Section 17 leave remain ‘liable to be detained’, that is under Section, 
which means they can be forcibly recalled to hospital for compulsory treatment.  
Section 17 leave was supposed to be used for relatively short periods of time, in 
order to allow detained patients’ access to the community or to prepare for their 
eventual discharge (Owino, 2007).  However, during the 1980s when community 
care was escalating, Section 17 leave began to be used increasingly by 
practitioners as a ‘long leash’18 mechanism, in order to resolve the tensions 
between deinstitutionalisation and the perceived need to maintain control over 
certain patients (Glover-Thomas, 2002).  In this way Section 17 leave acted as a 
‘de facto’ CTO, where patients were kept on extended periods of leave by briefly 
recalling them to hospital in order to renew their original detention Section 
before sending them back to the community.  Some commentators (Bartlett and 
                                                 
18 However, it should be acknowledged that this type of leave was first introduced in the 1959 Mental 
Health Act and immediately began to be used as a ‘long leash’ by clinicians (although not to the extent that 
occurred by the 1980s).  It was also questioned much earlier than the legal challenges to its use which began 
in the 1980s (see Fennell, 1996, 286) and was referred to as ‘a misuse of powers’ by the 1978 
Interdepartmental Review of the Mental Health Act 1959.   
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Sandland, 2007, Woolley, 2010), have suggested that CTOs do not add anything 
new to the provision that already existed under Section 17 leave, and indeed 
could limit the flexibility and discretion that Section 17 provided.  However, long 
term Section 17 leave has been subject to considerable human rights challenges 
through the Courts (Owino, 2007) and although more recent judgements have 
upheld the decisions of practitioners to use Section 17 leave in this way 
(Gledhill, 2007), it remains the case that a complex and undependable framework 
has evolved in regards to the basis on which Section 17 can be applied.  Thomas-
Glover (2002) argues that this legal process acted as a significant motivation for 
the development of CTOs, as the powers that extended Section 17 leave afforded 
to practitioners could no longer be relied on.   
 
In this light, CTOs can be seen as a response to the concerns practitioners had 
about existing community provisions.  CTOs in a sense formalised extended 
Section 17 leave, thus giving practitioners a consistent legislative structure in 
which to operate.  Additionally, practitioner knowledge of the ‘failure’ of 
supervised discharge confirmed that the dual problems of risk and rehabilitation 
required a stronger version of existing community provisions.  In this way, the 
‘gaps’ that psychiatrists suggested existed in provision reinforced the idea of a 
‘problematic’ in need of a solution (Rose and Miller 1992). The testimony of 
psychiatrists was regularly used in parliamentary debates to this effect, for 
example: “the existing powers do not enable us properly to do what we are doing 
through community treatment orders…Many psychiatrists know that they are not 
really intended for the purpose that they are using them for.  CTOs will give 
them that tool and that power” (HC Deb, 18th June 2007, Vol. 461, Col. 1187). 
 
In constituting CTOs, policy-makers also looked outwards to how CTO policy 
had been enacted elsewhere and with what effects.  Policy transfer is not a 
straightforward concept to apply to the policy-making process however as it 
encompasses a wide range of activities, actors and ideas. As Evans (2009) 
describes, policy transfer can take many different theoretical forms, including 
‘bandwaggoning’, social learning, convergence, diffusion, emulation, 
hybridisation and lesson-drawing.  Evans (2009, 244) goes on to argue that to 
make the study of policy transfer meaningful, it should be limited to the analysis 
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of “action-oriented intentional learning: that which takes place consciously and 
results in policy action”, thus focusing on the actions of agents of transfer.  In 
this regard, both Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and Evans and Davies (1999)
19
 
have outlined questions that are helpful to delineate the policy transfer process, 
and which will be used in a heuristic and amalgamated form to trace the policy 
transfer journey of CTOs to England. 
 
Who are the agents of policy transfer? 
 
Conceptions of agents of transfer emphasise pluralist governance, and the role of 
networks of policy-makers.  Agents can therefore originate from a broad group 
of actors, from ‘state players’ such as politicians and bureaucrats, to policy 
entrepreneurs, academicians, pressure groups, national, trans and supra-
international organisations (Stone, 1999).  Cairney’s (2009, 681) research, which 
involved key informant interviews with those who played a part in the 
development of the Mental Health Act (2007) for England, concludes that there 
was “often low ministerial interest, but consistently high commitment”, to the 
core provisions, suggesting that elected officials were integral to keeping CTOs 
on the agenda.  Here, CTO policy transfer relied heavily on expert knowledge 
transmitted through ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992), a term that denotes 
“communities…comprised of natural and social scientists or individuals from 
any discipline or profession with authoritative claims to policy relevant 
knowledge…” who share similar beliefs and values (Evans, 2009, 252).  From 
the parliamentary debates and submissions to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Mental Health Bill (Session 2004-2005, HL 79-2/HC 95-2), it is evident that 
international experts informed government thinking on CTOs.  It is equally 
notable that the use of this expert knowledge was treated with scepticism in some 
quarters.  In particular, reference was made by Tim Loughton, a then shadow 
Minister for Health, to the ‘predictable dozen’ experts who regularly briefed the 
government at the time in a positive manner on CTOs, including researchers 
                                                 
19 I want to note here that I am aware there are differences in perspectives between key authors in this field, 
but my intention is not to develop theory on policy transfer itself.  Instead I use it as a helpful learning 
device about the policy-making process in the particular case of CTOs.   
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from the USA who had conducted favourable studies of CTOs (HC Deb, 18
th
 
June 2007, Vol. 461, Col. 1188).   
 
Why do actors engage in policy transfer?   
 
The lesson-drawing analogy used in policy transfer suggests a rational process of 
identifying policy problems, looking elsewhere to find solutions, before adapting 
said solutions to the local context (Dolowitz, 2009).  Certainly, CTOs were 
introduced during a time when the discourse of evidence-based policy was at its 
height, with the Cabinet Office (1999) proclaiming government “must produce 
policies that really deal with problems; that are forward looking and shaped by 
evidence rather than a response to short-term pressures; that tackle causes not 
symptoms”.  In this light, overseas experts and their research knowledge were 
presented as playing a key role in providing technical advice from arenas where 
CTOs had already become embedded.  Such knowledge was combined with 
certain quantifiable kinds of ‘local’ expert knowledge in order for the 
government to construct a convincing narrative that the introduction of CTOs 
would be evidence-based.   In particular attention was paid to the National 
Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by People with Mental Illness 
(Appleby et al, 2006) which found that of the 249 homicides committed between 
1999 and 2003, 40 (16%) were immediately preceded by noncompliance with 
medication and loss of contact with services.  The authors go on to suggest that 
CTOs may have been effective in preventing this type of homicide, a claim that 
the Government subsequently used in support of CTOs. 
 
Alongside the utilisation of international experts, two further themes are evident 
in the parliamentary debates; firstly, the use of other countries’ experiences to 
highlight the liberal nature of the proposed regime in England, as Rosie 
Winterton, then Minister of State for Health Services, stated (incorrectly), “It is 
only in Canada that it is necessary for a patient to be detained before going on to 
a CTO.  Even in those circumstances, the detention need not take place 
immediately beforehand, as it must under our proposals” (HC Deb, 18th June 
2007, Vol. 461, Col. 1190).  Secondly, that if so many other jurisdictions are 
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using them, despite evidence to the contrary, they must be doing something right, 
as Lord Warner at the time argued: 
Supervised community treatment is a new, modern and effective way to 
manage the treatment of patients with serious mental health problems.  
Whatever the detailed reservations about particular studies, they do not 
set aside…the clear positives I have mentioned.  It is perhaps significant 
that other countries have not ceased using CTOs, and have continued to 
see benefits in using them (HL Deb, 17
th
 January 2007, Vol. 688, Col. 
703).   
 
The use of an international context thus supported the positioning of CTOs as a 
modern, normative and reasonable response to problems in community care.  In 
this regard, shared understandings of ‘how things are’ in the world helps not only 
in the importation of knowledge, but also in the formation and validation of 
political rationalities (Moisio and Luukkonen, 2014).   
 
However, the necessity for rhetorical argument also demonstrates that it should 
not be assumed that a straightforward translation of knowledge into action took 
place.  Conflicts and contestations which played out through the motivations, 
actions and interactions of particular actors also had effect on the path CTOs 
took through the policy process, which illuminates the ‘messiness’ that 
characterises the introduction and implementation of new policies and practices.  
England was distinctive as a jurisdiction that introduced CTOs in an especially 
oppositional and entrenched context, which undoubtedly affected how the policy 
process progressed.  Institutional and external constraints including a sustained 
process of revision by the House of Lords and fierce opposition from pressure 
groups (most notably the campaigning group the Mental Health Alliance, formed 
expressly to challenge what was viewed as the new legislation’s unjustified focus 
on public safety) meant it took nine years for the Mental Health Act (2007) to be 
passed.  Following a convoluted process of reviews, consultations and redrafts, 
the Government announced in 2006 that the then proposed Mental Health Bill 
was to be scrapped and replaced with a Bill that amended the Mental Health Act 
(1983) rather than fully supplanted it.  Despite these pressures, the position of the 
government remained relatively consistent over time, with the key contentious 
areas of policy, including the use of CTOs, being retained in the amending Act.  
A Department Of Health official reported as saying, “it was trench warfare” but 
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“there was never any wavering…[against] the stakeholders’ position” (Cairney, 
2009, 681). Indeed, certain forms of knowledge, in particular service user 
knowledge were relatively disregarded as part of this process. Cairney (2009, 
676) reports a civil servant involved with the Mental Health Act (2007) as 
stating:  
I was on the bill team for the 1983 Act.  That was a piece of consensus 
legislation as was the 1959 Act.  So the tradition is consensus.  The new 
Act is the first departure from that.  The UK has had a proud history and 
place in the world in mental health and is currently throwing that out.  So 
this Act represents a blip in political history.   
 
It is notable in the case of CTOs that the Department of Health commissioned a 
wide-ranging review of the international use of CTOs (Churchill et al, 2007), 
which concluded that there was little evidence to support either positive or 
negative outcomes for CTOs.  That the government did not appear to incorporate 
any negative lesson-drawing from these findings suggests that their choice of 
expert advice was partly driven at least as much by political as evidential 
concerns.  As Wolff (2002) argues in her analysis of the English mental health 
reform agenda, the policy problem - the purported failure of community care - 
was leading to policy solutions that were designed to mitigate political as well as 
actual risk.  She goes on to suggest the government was managing the political 
risk of ‘error-in-judgement’ by deploying experts to support their view, and the 
political risks of ‘ineffectiveness’ and ‘inactivity’ by taking a ‘shotgun approach’ 
where in the absence of certainty about answers to the problem of ‘troublesome’ 
individuals in the community, a number of different initiatives, including CTOs, 
were going to be implemented at once in the hope that one of them would work.  
This can be characterised as defensive policy-making, where the government is 
seen to be trying all means possible to limit risk, even if certain strategies fail.  
This is hardly the idealised “rational and thoughtful activity” that Dean (2010, 
42) refers to when describing ‘the art of government’20. Instead, such a reading 
of policy-making indicates how selective interpretation of international research 
by key actors legitimises reform, by presenting “policy lessons from abroad…as 
                                                 
20 This is not necessarily to say that the introduction of CTOs did not have a governmental Utopian element 
(Dean, 2010, 44) as implied earlier in the discussion of how the transformative potential of CTOs has been 
theorised in terms of recovery.  The analysis of policy formation presented here does however partly delink 
the reflexive ‘rational and thoughtful activity’ present in the ‘art of government’ (Dean, 2010) from planned 
Utopian ends by highlighting the messy, ‘politic’ nature of political reasoning.  
120 
 
politically neutral truths” (Robertson, 1991, 55).  Policy transfer therefore 
becomes more rhetorical than transformative (Dolowitz, 2009).   Hence the 
reasons why policy transfer is called upon stem in the first instance from how 
policy problems are framed.  
 
What conclusions can be drawn from the nature and extent of policy transfer?   
 
Similarly, an analysis of the nature and extent of CTO policy transfer indicates 
the ways knowledge from elsewhere was put to use within the extant cultural and 
institutional context.  Taking the question of the nature of policy transfer first, 
Evans and Davies (1999) distinguish between ‘soft’ transfers, such as ideas, 
ideologies and attitudes and ‘hard’ transfers, such as tangible programmes and 
instruments.  Dolowitz (2009) takes a slightly different perspective, arguing that 
‘hard’ policy transfers are associated with voluntaristic, rationalist approaches to 
learning, whereas ‘soft’ transfers are more common, because the policy-making 
process is likely to be conditional on factors such as cultural biases, institutional 
frameworks and ideological pre-dispositions that limit both what knowledge 
policy makers recognise and what they can implement in the prevailing system.  
From parliamentary speeches, we can see that proponents of CTOs used 
examples from a range of different policy regimes, and so perhaps the idea of 
what problems CTOs could solve mattered more than the mechanics of what they 
entailed.  By taking this approach the link between policy form and outcome is 
downplayed, where “policy objectives may be borrowed but the form of 
implementation, the tools and procedures adopted in various locales may result in 
quite different outcomes” (Stone, 1999, 56).  Indeed if we move on to the second 
question, the extent of policy transfer, CTOs can be seen as an example of 
transformative hybridisation of policy whereby elements of programmes from 
other regimes are combined to produce a culturally relevant policy, as opposed to 
direct copying or emulation (Evans, 2009, Peck and Theodore, 2010).   Through 
conducting a comparative analysis of CTO regimes, the ‘character’ of English 
CTOs, as well as some of the cultural and institutional factors which contributed 
to it will be highlighted. 
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CTO policy regimes compared 
 
In a helpful paper, Dawson (2006) used the metaphor of ‘fault-lines’ in order to 
contrast the divergent treatment of key concepts in CTO legislation across 
countries.   He mentions among others, the principles of capacity and reciprocity, 
and the pre-requisites for use of a CTO.  Additional differences that can be 
considered are how risk is dealt with and what oversight of the system exists.  
Taking forward the point that English policy-makers paid most attention to the 
experiences of Canada, the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Scotland
21
, this 
section will compare those countries in reference to the above concepts.  Table 
Six provides an overview of the analysis. 
 
Table 6: A framework for assessing the differences between CTO policy 
regimes 
 
                                                 
21 CTO provisions are made at state level in Australia, Canada and the USA and so there are a number of 
distinct CTO regimes within each country.  As within-country jurisdictions tend to be similar, for the 
purpose of this analysis, CTOs will be referred to at a country level, unless there are specific differences 
worth noting. 
 Capacity  
clause?  
Risk 
Level  
Reciprocity 
clause? 
Constraints on discretion 
Conditions 
for use 
Judicial 
approval 
England  No  Low  No  Weak  No  
Vic, Australia  No Low  No  Weak  No  
New Zealand No  Medium  No  Weak  No  
W Australia  No  Medium  No  Weak  No  
NSW, 
Australia 
No Low Yes Medium Yes 
Scotland  Yes  Medium  Yes  Weak  Yes  
Saskatchewan, 
Canada 
Yes  Medium  Yes Medium  No  
Ontario, 
Canada  
Yes  High  Yes  Medium No  
USA  Yes  High  Yes  Strong  Yes  
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Capacity 
 
Capacity refers to the ability of individuals to make informed decisions about 
their treatment (Appelbaum, 1998). The inclusion of capacity criterion in CTO 
legislation tends to reflect a general approach to capacity in mental health in that 
particular country.  For instance, in the USA and Canada only those individuals 
deemed without capacity can be treated without their consent in hospital, and the 
same principle applies to whether CTOs can be imposed.  This aligns mental 
health law with the ethical principles of autonomy and competence held in 
general healthcare, and consequently “removes the suggestion that the law 
discriminates against mentally disordered people when it applies less favourable 
rules to their psychiatric treatment” (Dawson, 2006, 486).  However, including a 
strong capacity clause may preclude a preventative, longitudinal approach to 
treatment, which can take account of the fluctuating nature of mental health 
(Fistein et al, 2009).  Hence the recently reformulated mental health legislation in 
Scotland (2003) has included a lower threshold for capacity, which goes some 
way to meeting both clinical ‘best interest’ principles and the principle of 
autonomy, as it requires that a patients’ decision-making ability must be 
‘significantly impaired’ due to their mental disorder before any formal use of 
compulsion, including CTOs, takes place.   In this sense, Scottish and English 
mental health law have diverged, with the English government explicitly stating 
it did not see the merit of including a capacity clause in the new Act on the basis 
that it may enable individuals who pose a risk but nonetheless maintain capacity, 
to refuse treatment (Department of Health, 2005).  English law is most similar to 
Australasian statutes, where criteria for CTOs are based on the presence of 
mental disorder and an associated risk of harm, with no mention of capacity.    
 
Risk 
 
In North America the threshold is set high for risk, with probability of 
‘dangerousness’ and risk of ‘serious harm’ featuring widely in criteria, and a 
number of states requiring evidence of previous violence to initiate a CTO.  The 
criterion for what constitutes risk in English mental health law, including for 
CTOs, is broad and largely undefined, referring to whether an individual poses a 
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risk to the ‘health and safety’ of themselves or others.  Fistein et al (2009, 152) 
argue that when no capacity test is adopted, a stringent risk test should be 
adopted to counterbalance its absence, and vice-versa.  This would, “avoid overly 
paternalistic treatment of people who are able to make their own decisions” 
whilst protecting against potential serious harm.  The flexible criterion for risk in 
the new Act, combined with the lack of a capacity test, sets a low threshold for 
compulsion.  Indeed the new Act is placed near the bottom of Fistein et al’s 
(2009) table rating autonomy in mental health legislation in Commonwealth 
countries.  As has been noted, (Campbell, Healy and Brophy, 2006, Lawton-
Smith, 2005) in some jurisdictions such as in Australia, a ‘low-risk criteria/no-
capacity test’ CTO regime may contribute to an increasing and defensive use of 
community compulsion.  
 
Reciprocity 
 
One way of justifying the use of compulsion in the community is to include a 
reciprocity clause in legislation, so the individual who is subject to a CTO would 
at least gain some benefit from their status (Wales and Hiday, 2006).  
Furthermore, it has been argued (Swartz et al, 2001, Wagner et al, 2003) that in 
order for CTOs to be effective, they must be combined with high quality care, 
which would make reciprocal arrangements a necessary part of the system.  The 
principle of reciprocity can be incorporated into CTO criteria through the 
inclusion of arrangements for outpatient care and social support.  CTOs therefore 
become contracts that work both ways, by binding services to provide quality 
care as well as compelling individuals to engage.  The USA and Canada have the 
strongest duties imposed on services to provide care and support, whereas 
Australasian jurisdictions implement weaker criterion with no reciprocal 
arrangements specified, aside from New South Wales (Churchill et al, 2007).  In 
Scotland, there is a duty placed upon clinicians to inform a Tribunal if services as 
per the care plan are not being delivered, and the Tribunal can revoke the CTO 
on this basis, although even with this procedure in place, it is questionable how 
much it is being implemented (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2009).   
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When the legislation for the Mental Health Act (2007) was in process in 
England, the Joint Parliamentary Committee that oversaw the Bill argued that the 
Scottish model should be followed and services should be guaranteed to those on 
a CTO as an obligation, so that extended compulsion could not be imposed 
without an associated level of care (Department of Health, 2005).  However, 
there is not a direct reference to provision of community services in the CTO 
criteria, and the government argued that it was not necessary in an Act for which 
the prime purpose is to enforce treatment without consent (Department of Health, 
2005).  In further support of their approach, the government stated that those on a 
CTO would in any case be entitled to Section 117 aftercare services, which place 
a duty on health and local authorities to provide an appropriate level of free 
support and accommodation to discharged patients.  However, it has become 
clear over the years that the provision of Section 117 aftercare is not consistently 
applied and legal challenges have suggested that health and local authorities have 
a large amount of discretion in deciding what counts as appropriate, given 
resource limitations (Bartlett and Sandland, 2007).  It is for precisely this reason 
that Dawson (2006) suggests jurisdictions such as New Zealand have weak and 
carefully drafted duties of care for service providers in CTO legislation, in order 
to avoid liability should they fail to provide services.  By making changes to 
mental health law in terms of compulsion but not service obligations, it appears 
that England has followed suit.   
 
Discretion 
 
Discretion in the case of CTOs refers to the ability of a mental health practitioner 
to make judgements on when to use them and how to use them.  The legislation 
on CTOs can constrain or enable this in two ways: firstly by the number and type 
of conditions that have to be met before a CTO can be used; and secondly 
through the level of oversight that CTOs are subject to.  Pre-conditions include 
risk and capacity criteria as already described, but also whether an individual 
must have a history of hospitalisation and/or has been given the opportunity to 
engage voluntarily.  In Canada and the USA, CTO legislation generally stipulates 
that a person has to have been detained for a certain period of time, or number of 
occasions in the past two years and in addition, most US states include a clause 
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that individuals must have been given the chance to participate of their own 
accord.  Similar provision is made in New South Wales, but the rest of the 
Australasian jurisdictions and Scotland do not mention hospitalisation or prior 
engagement at all in their legislation.  The criteria for English CTOs also leave 
considerable room for clinician discretion, particularly in the aforementioned 
refusal of the government to introduce criteria which would legislatively limit the 
application of CTOs to particular cases.  In terms of oversight, only a few of the 
jurisdictions (New South Wales, Scotland and the USA) require that practitioners 
must apply to a Court with evidence in order to secure a CTO.  Whilst England 
has a rather complex framework for legal oversight once the CTO is in place, 
initially an individual can be discharged onto a CTO entirely at the discretion of 
specified professionals.  Following a judicial process can protect service user 
rights and ensures treatment is ‘proportionate’, but policy-makers may try to 
avoid it if it also places an extra administrative burden on the system (Dawson, 
2006). 
 
Through comparing the CTO as it has been defined in England with other 
countries, the nature of what has been implemented in England becomes clearer.  
It is evident that if CTOs were placed on a spectrum from those that contain a 
higher legislative threshold for use (USA, Canada, Scotland) to those where the 
threshold is low and practitioner discretion plays a large part (majority of 
Australasia), the English CTO would be included in the latter group.  Mental 
health law in England operates via a system of parens patriae whereby it is 
“highly reliant on the judgement of the practitioners who are required to apply it” 
(Peay 2003, 118) and it appears that CTOs maintain this cultural tradition.    This 
contrasts with the USA for instance, where the majority of states require a greater 
number of criteria to be met before CTOs can be applied, and where the process 
is controlled by Mental Health Courts from the outset.  In this latter sense, the 
USA CTO is constrained by pre-existing parameters (the embedding of a judicial 
process into their mental health system) which do not apply in England, and 
helps us to account for similarities and differences in the actual form that CTOs 
take in practice.  As has been noted (Dawson, 2006, Lawton-Smith, 2005), 
‘looser’ CTO legislation is a key factor in enabling high levels of usage and 
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therefore it is not altogether unexpected that CTOs have been implemented in 
relatively large numbers in England (Care Quality Commission, 2012).   
 
This is not to say however that the pre-existing cultural milieu in England only 
acted to encourage the broad applicability of CTOs.  Returning to the historical 
narrative of law-making leading up to CTOs in England described earlier, and 
taking a ‘rights’ perspective, CTOs go further than supervised discharge in 
constraining rights in that they allow for compulsory treatment in hospital, but 
protect rights more than extended section 17 leave in that they contain a more 
robust system of oversight.  Indeed, over the significant period of time when the 
Mental Health Act (2007) was being contested and revised, although the idea of 
CTOs were fiercely defended by policy-makers, they did become less restrictive 
in nature.  When CTOs were originally proposed they allowed for the 
practitioner to choose whether to compulsorily treat an individual in the 
community or in hospital and were called ‘non-resident’ and ‘resident’ orders to 
reflect this.  Sustained lobbying by the Mental Health Alliance in particular on 
the practical and more importantly, ethical consequences of forced community 
treatment led to the revised ‘compromise’ version eventually implemented, 
where an individual can only be placed on a CTO following hospitalisation for 
treatment under the Mental Health Act (1983) and can only be forcibly treated in 
a hospital setting.  What this demonstrates is that the shape of CTOs in England 
has been partly determined by an overarching and consistent concern in domestic 
mental health policy-making with what balance needs to be struck between rights 
and risk.  Over time, a slow progression towards and then away from the border 
of what is acceptable within this formulation has occurred.  Where that balance 
lies has been influenced by external forces. The European Convention on Human 
Rights was cited by opponents to the original CTOs, and although this in itself 
might have been unlikely to have influenced policy-making beyond the minimum 
necessary to comply, the government would have been aware due to their review 
of legislation elsewhere that, “the line that emerges from the study of the statutes 
and from law reform debates, as the Rubicon that should not be crossed, is the 
authorisation of ‘forced medication’ in community settings” (Dawson, 2006, 
489). It is evident that a widely held and normative concern with ‘first 
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generation’ human rights in the field of mental health has played a role in 
ensuring the form CTOs may take can go so far but no further.   
 
Tracing the policy journey of CTOs 
 
As the analysis of the formation of CTOs presented here demonstrates, through 
giving due consideration to both ‘how and ‘why’ questions, it is possible to track 
the ‘twists and turns’ of policy-making, taking account of constraints and 
contestations, whilst at the same time acknowledging the role of dominant 
discourses and how they translate into regimes of practice.  In the case of CTOs, 
broad and commonly held cultural concerns around risk and recovery fuelled 
their creation, but were only triggered by specific historic processes and events in 
the countries where they have been introduced.  Taking England as a specific 
case study, these dominant discourses made visible specific problems and 
‘problematic’ individuals in need of reform, but were mediated by alternative 
discourses of liberty and human rights which limited what CTOs could become.  
Grounding an analysis of CTOs in the actuality of policy-making at the time 
further suggests that whilst particular forms of expertise were utilised to found 
CTOs on certain ‘truths’, this was not an entirely rational endeavour (Dean, 
2010).  The difficult environment CTOs were born into in England necessitated 
the rhetorical and strategic inclusion and exclusion of different kinds of 
knowledge by political actors.  In turn, the final form that CTOs took as a 
disciplinary technology incorporated methods which arose from the logics of the 
‘conduct of conduct’, but also emanated from particular combinations of cultural 
and institutional structures, mediated through a highly pragmatic political 
process.  In the next five chapters, I will take this analysis further, into an 
exploration of ‘on the ground’ practice; as Dean (2010, 88) suggests studies of 
governmentality can gain critical traction from analysing the disjunctures and 
connections between policy rationalities and the internal and implicit logic of 
governmental practices.  Moreover, I posited in Chapter Two that a neglected 
aspect of governmentality as empirically applied has been how conduct and 
counter-conduct are mediated through ‘practices of the self’.  Given that the use 
of CTOs in England depends so much on practitioner discretion, this further 
reinforces the argument made in the preceding chapters that this study provides 
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fertile ground for an analysis of ethical self-work by both practitioners and 
service users in relation to CTO use.  In this way we should be able to formulate 
an understanding of how and in what ways CTOs are theorised and used by those 
constituents who are affected by them. 
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Chapter Five 
Thinking CTOs through:  
How service users conceptualised community compulsion 
 
In this chapter I highlight the various ways CTOs are conceptualised by service 
users.  As will be seen, this and the next chapter are connected, in that the 
following chapter takes the same approach to the perspectives of practitioners.  
Since the focus of both chapters is on participant perspectives, the data in each is 
drawn mainly from the interviews I conducted.  In both chapters I firstly discuss 
the various beliefs that shaped participant ideation of the CTO and secondly the 
different purposes that service users and practitioners felt CTOs might have. The 
chapters are separate because a distinction needs to be made between how 
individual service users understood the purpose of CTOs as related to their 
specific treatment, and how practitioners thought about their purpose in a more 
abstract sense as related to the service user group they worked with.   
Nevertheless connections can be made between the two, which highlight how the 
guiding rationalities practitioners and service users employ for CTOs both 
coalesce and diverge.  Hence these chapters need to be read as two parts of the 
same story, and I defer summing up to a combined conclusion at the end of the 
following chapter.   
 
Returning specifically to this chapter, I begin with an overview of service users’ 
experiences of mental distress and instability.  How service users incorporated 
such experiences and more significantly how they negotiated a sense of self in 
the face of adverse circumstances is discussed next.  Participant 
conceptualisations of CTOs did not arise from nowhere; the varying ways service 
users viewed themselves and their experiences had a strong influence on how 
they perceived the CTO, for good or ill.  I describe how service users who felt 
positively about the CTO saw its purpose for them, which is separated into four 
categories: provision, risk, recovery and maintenance.  I then explore the 
perspectives of those service user participants who could not see a 
straightforward purpose to the CTO; half of the participants expressed 
ambivalent or wholly negative thoughts and feelings about the CTO.  These 
views are discussed in relation to how service users felt the CTO might act as a 
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kind of ‘anti-purpose’ by creating an additional barrier to the realisation of their 
goals and dreams, and also accentuate ‘cross-purposes’ between them and 
professionals.   
 
Self and the CTO 
 
As with any intervention, service users did not come to CTOs with a blank slate,  
and much of the participant interviews was taken up with talk of their 
experiences of mental distress, medication, services, and how their sense of self 
had developed in relation to all three.  Whilst I cannot fully detail the service 
users’ hinterland of experiences here, it is important to sketch out such ‘self-
work’ as it underpinned how service users then went on to form perceptions of 
the CTO.   
 
On shifting ground: the consequences of mental distress 
 
All of the participants had lengthy histories of mental distress, and associated 
periods of time where they had felt out of control of their lives, or had control 
taken from them.  Behaviour associated with psychotic or manic states, and the 
subsequent response of services, had made it difficult for many of the 
participants to maintain stability.  Patrick told me how the constant repeat 
hospitalisations he was subjected to meant that everything stops and this seemed 
to sum up the paradoxically dual sense of instability and being ‘stuck’ that 
participants described.   
 
Being unable to maintain an uninterrupted life in the community could be 
described as an indirect consequence of severe mental distress, mediated by the 
institutional factors inherent in the process of hospitalisation.  However, perhaps 
the most poignant accounts service users gave related to the direct impact of 
mental distress, especially the loneliness, isolation and associated fracturing of 
relationships that they had experienced because of their situation and the 
responses of others to it.  Less than half of the participants’ had someone in their 
life who they described in terms of non-professional support, and in these cases, 
relationships were generally discussed as complex, precarious and difficult.  
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Exploring the various individual and social impacts of mental distress on 
participants highlighted the sense of flux a majority of them had experienced or 
continued to experience. Subsequently, the additional challenges living with 
mental distress brought to constructing a cohesive and settled identity and 
integrating dissonant aspects of self was present as a theme in most of the 
participants’ narratives.   
 
Identity formation in the face of adversity  
 
One way in which participants tried to assert control over identity was how they 
explained their experiences of mental distress.  Participants had a variety of 
causal explanations for their current circumstances, some more aligned with the 
language of diagnosis and biomedical models of illness than others.  Often it 
would be the case that participants believed drugs (both illicit and legally 
prescribed) they had taken in the past were what had triggered their difficulties, 
as with Gwen
22
: I started on anti-depressant medication and it progressed from 
there you see.  So I’m convinced it’s the medication that’s done it whereas 
everybody else believes it’s psychosis.  Or they might offer alternative diagnoses 
to the one they had been given.  Simon explained that he felt he had trapped 
himself into a diagnosis of schizophrenia by lying to professionals about what he 
was experiencing in order to get help.  He described what he experienced in 
terms that were differentiated from diagnostic criteria: it’s more like I’m restless, 
I’m on the edge of life.  Similarly, Sarah took the diagnosis ‘schizoaffective 
disorder’ out of the medical domain by using the ‘affective’ part to explain her 
situation:  
I think schizoaffective disorder sums it up, because one thing affects another 
thing affects another thing, affects your family, affects your relationships, the fact 
that your family and relationships are affected affects you again and 
there’s…there’s social consequences to having this illness, it’s not just a medical 
thing.  
 
In general then, many participants resisted or reshaped the meaning of their 
diagnosis to help them make sense of who they had become.   
 
                                                 
22 All service user participants have been given pseudonyms.   
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In a broader capacity, participant sense of self was often explained in terms of 
who they felt they ‘should’ be, particularly in terms of self-efficacy.  Graham 
described the sense of institutionalisation that was present in some participants’ 
stories when he said he: Wanted to start taking my life into my own hands a bit.  
Start doing things for myself.  Here we can see a desire for independence which 
contrasted with the reliance Graham felt he had on professionals.  Resentment 
about the involvement of services in certain aspects of life could follow, as Irene 
described when discussing her last experience of being hospitalised under the 
Mental Health Act: I’ve shown self-reliance and so I haven’t needed all that big 
type approach.  And I’ve resented it, yes.  That’s all.  However, this self-
conception sometimes contrasted with the described effects of participants’ life 
experiences and associated stories of fragility, as Irene summed up: I think 
there’s a vulnerability about me.  Sarah, who had been in and out of hospital 
over a period of twenty years, felt that her age now meant that: I’m more 
frightened now then I was about the possibility of being in hospital again.  It’s 
happened so many times it’s knocked the stuffing out of me.  As it happens more 
often, it’s making me less and less confident, less and less able really.  This 
illustrates the ongoing struggle that many participants went through to retain self-
belief despite challenging circumstances.  At times, on-going and repeated 
experiences of compulsion led to a resigned acceptance of dependence in the face 
of authority 
 
Alternatively, an acceptance of dependence could be caught up in an individual’s 
view of him or herself as subsumed in a ‘deficit’ identity.  Simon was the 
youngest of the participants, but had been in contact with mental health services 
and the criminal justice system since very early adolescence.  He described 
himself in ‘professionalised’ terms: because I am a poly drug user; an identity 
which shaped his relationship with services: And so for me it is like most people 
who have mental health problems and are on drugs, hospital is a safe 
environment, away from society, away from everything.  A similar process could 
be seen for those participants whose identity was shaped in response to others’ 
beliefs about their abilities to cause harm.  Michael drew a contrast to the gentle 
demeanour he presented when he responded to the question of who he thought 
CTOs were for: I don’t think it’s something for everyone, it’s something that is 
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good for violent, psychotic people like me.  In this sense, ‘dangerousness’ was a 
category that appeared to have been accepted by some participants as applicable 
to themselves, but which understandably could also be difficult to assimilate.   
 
As can be seen here, participant narratives of identity segued between 
wellness/illness, independence/dependence and safeness/dangerousness.  The 
overarching narrative however which incorporated all these facets of identity was 
that of being or becoming ‘normal’.   The concept of ‘normality’ was one 
referred to across participant accounts, either directly or indirectly.  In 
comparison to those participants who saw their identity at least in part through 
the lens of professional concerns, being ‘normal’ was used by others as a way of 
distancing themselves from, and questioning the attribution of mental illness to 
their experience. Although Brendon was accepting of the diagnosis he had been 
given, he still struggled to accept what this meant: The doctor has suggested 
giving me some stronger medication.  I was agreeable to it, although I was a 
bit…after he left I thought, ‘I’m a normal lad really’, I am a normal lad, and I 
don’t really need it.  In stronger terms, achieving what was deemed a normal life 
could be linked to rejection of professional involvement, as the emblem of 
difficult and ‘abnormal’ experiences.  In this context, for some individuals a 
wholesale rejection of what the mental health system had to offer seemed 
necessary in order to preserve a certain sense of self.  However, more typically a 
complex relationship existed between participant’s view of themselves and their 
stance towards services in general and CTOs in particular.  Accordingly, the 
following sections explore the range of participants’ perspectives towards CTOs.   
 
Service users’ perceptions of what the CTO could do for them 
 
Such talk of struggles with security and identity resonated through service users’ 
descriptions of what the CTO meant for them.  The relationship between 
compulsion as an objective event and coercion as a subjective experience is not 
straightforward; the former does not necessarily lead to the latter (Newton-
Howes, 2010).  For service users who saw the CTO as a positive development, it 
offered a range of purposes which connected to how they felt about their lives 
and themselves.  Service user views on the aim of the CTO revolved around four 
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dimensions; provision, risk, recovery and maintenance.  Provision, particularly 
access to support when needed through the CTO, could provide a much-needed 
sense of security and certainty about how difficulties would be dealt with.  Risk, 
recovery and maintenance were more directly connected to identity.  The CTO’s 
role in managing risk to others as well as self was connected with participants’ 
views of themselves as unable to manage such risk alone; recovery and 
maintenance were indicative of participants’ hopes for both stability and positive 
change.  All four dimensions of participants’ aims for the CTO are now explored 
further.  
 
Provision 
 
‘Provision based’ accounts, similarly to service user accounts in previous 
research (Gibbs, Dawson and Mullen, 2006) included references to the higher 
quality of service provision some participants believed they received due to the 
CTO.  As was noted in Chapter One, the function of CTOs in reciprocally 
‘binding’ community services to service users who need intensive support is not 
as central in England as it is in countries like the USA.  It could be argued 
however that the very legal framework of the CTO, particularly in terms of 
regular appeals, may prompt more scrutiny and regulation of CTO practice.  In 
observations of appeals for example, the panel members habitually questioned 
the care plan as whole, rather than focusing solely on the legal status of the CTO.   
 
Accordingly, participants referred to the CTO providing a clearer structure for 
what they should expect in terms of service response, and subsequently more 
leverage for them over services.   This was particularly the case in regards to 
gaining admission to hospital.  As has been noted, CTOs were in part introduced 
to alleviate the revolving door phenomenon, and the majority of participants 
could be described as ‘revolving door’ service users.  This cycle is typically 
described as due to the actions of the individual and the CTO is aimed at 
ensuring compliance in such cases, thus stopping the revolving door.  However, 
participant narratives of their movement between the community and hospital 
also highlighted the systemic forces that could influence this cycle (which were 
also highlighted by practitioners, as will be described in the next chapter).  
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Common experiences were related to professionals not having the time to try and 
avert involuntary admissions, as in Sarah’s case: They've wanted to keep me out 
of hospital but every time something happens they're either short of time, they 
can't really see me very long, they just do it [sectioning] for the sake of ‘better be 
safe than sorry’.  A number of participants had previously had to wait until crisis 
point before being admitted, usually involuntarily by that stage.  The CTO meant 
participants felt services would respond much faster when relapse was occurring.  
This was deemed particularly important in stopping the relapse spiralling out of 
control, as Glenn explained:   When it's mental health you need it sooner rather 
than later. The earlier you catch it the better, otherwise it just escalates.  They 
don't have to mess about. It's not going to get any worse.  Difficulties with access 
to crisis care are a long standing and on-going problem within English mental 
health services, and it may be that participants viewed the obligations the CTO 
represents via recall as a means of ensuring they could get help when they 
needed it, rather than when best fits the system.  For these participants, the idea 
of being recalled to hospital was not viewed in a punitive sense, but as a 
reassuring safety net should things go wrong.   
 
The CTO also represented access to legal protection in other ways.  James felt 
that the CTO framework limited practitioner discretion and therefore acted to 
protect his freedom:  
It’s there to protect you again. It protects you here and it protects you in hospital 
because under the rulings that are on it they’ve got to abide by that CTO. They 
can’t just keep you in indefinitely for 3 or 4 months or 6 months again. It’s there 
to say, ‘look, he’s back on his meds, he’s listening to us okay, he’s responding 
well, send him back out’. It’s kind of two-fold. 
 
More broadly, participants also expressed the view that the CTO could act as a 
‘passport’ to ensuring their access to support was protected in other arenas.  
Specifically, participants referred to access to benefits, and being able to use the 
fact they were on a CTO in order to demonstrate that it was necessary for them to 
receive financial support.   On-going changes to the social security system which 
make it harder for individuals to successfully claim support, meant those 
participants felt that the CTO helped their chances by signifying the level of their 
difficulties.     
  
136 
 
Risk 
 
Risk was discussed by participants in terms of ‘staying safe’ (Stuart), with the 
CTO offering a preventative framework to protect self and others.  For Michael, 
the CTO was not linked to his level of engagement:  I accept visits from the 
nurses and the social worker.  Nor did he link the CTO in a direct sense to 
maintaining his mental stability: I don't get the injections because of the 
psychosis. Michael’s view of himself as being dangerous when unwell meant that 
he saw the CTO as primarily being of benefit to others: It's required by law that I 
take injections now because my mental health affects other people, not just 
myself.  I think they did it for the benefit of the community.  Well, the name says it 
all, community treatment order.  Protect the community from me.   
 
As can be seen from Michael’s perspective, the main aim of the CTO for him 
was to manage his behaviour when he felt he could not do so himself.  In similar 
terms, Nick described how the CTO provided him with firm and clear boundaries 
which he had found reassuring both for himself and others: 
It’s given us a structure.  I know what I’ve got to do. I’ve got to attend probation, 
I’ve got to get my injections, I can’t refuse them.  In the past I’ve had nothing 
like that, I’ve just refused and I’ve been taken in on Sections, but being on a CTO 
if the truth’s known, I know deep down I’ll never ever get to the point where I’ve 
totally lost control like I’ve done in the past. 
 
The CTO performed an important psychological function for participants like 
Nick, through imposing control on them when they did not feel they were able to 
exercise self-control.  They appreciated that the compulsory nature of the CTO 
brought boundaries which acted to keep them on what they perceived to be the 
right path.  This was also the case for participants who talked about the CTO in 
terms of self-protection, as Christine describes:  You’ve got an order and if they 
want you back in you’ve got to go back in.  And you’ve got no choice have you, 
really?  But I think it’s good, because you could harm yourself or….  The theme 
of delegating choice to an external force was significant for a number of the 
participants and in this regard, belief in the power of the CTO was as important 
as the actual power of the CTO.  
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The CTO could be seen by participants as leverage for positive risk-taking by 
professionals, as Patrick explains, I can’t see them not changing my medication, 
because if I am on a CTO it’s much safer than not being on a CTO…If things go 
wrong, it’s much easier for them to react.  In this sense, the CTO could be 
viewed as a safe space within which to try out different approaches.  However, 
the CTO in itself could also present a personal risk.  For those participants who 
believed the CTO had ‘worked’ for them, in that it had helped them achieve a 
level of stability they had not been able to have for some time, taking steps 
forward could be at times disconcerting.  Attempting to live and address 
problems in a different way to usual presented a challenge, as Nick explains:   
But all these feelings are coming back and I don’t know how to cope.  And it just 
builds up and builds up and I just lose it, I just lose my temper.  And I find it 
really hard.  Really hard.   I need to sort my head out.  I just want to carry on the 
way I’m going.  Hopefully these feelings will go away, I don’t know.   
 
The fear of things going wrong could become more anxiety-inducing when 
things were going right, and yet at the same time established patterns of coping 
strategies (in Nick’s case the triggering of admissions to hospital) were disrupted 
by the CTO.  It is indicative of the symbolic power the CTO can hold that even 
though recall was not actively used in Nick’s case he still saw the CTO as a 
significant mediator of his actions.   
 
Recovery 
 
Enabling recovery has not played as large a role in the empirical or discursive 
literature on CTOs as managing risk.  Furthermore, whilst promoting stability in 
the community has been cited as a reason to use CTOs (O’Reilly et al, 2006), it is 
only one aspect of recovery, and recovery as a broader, future-orientated concept 
has not been fully addressed
23
.  However recovery as a purpose for the CTO was 
evident across participant accounts.  The concept of recovery as it is applied here 
correlates with the broad definition of recovery as living a fulfilling and hopeful 
life alongside personal difficulties, with support from significant others through 
an on-going process (Anthony, 1993).  Recovery was seen by participants as a 
                                                 
23 Two notable exceptions are Munetz and Frese’s 2001 paper on mandatory treatment and the recovery 
model, and Dawson’s (2007) comments on the potential of CTOs to aid individuals in achieving positive 
liberty.  For more detail, refer back to Chapter Four.    
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process of positive change, leading from the opportunity the CTO provided for 
stability. In this sense, stasis and change were entwined in participant narratives.   
 
When participants talked about the CTO as promoting recovery, this tended to 
involve looking to the past and comparing where they were now favourably with 
where they had been, and then looking to where they wanted to be in the future.  
Connections could be made here with participants’ shifting sense of self.  
Changes in identity could be related to the movement between being ill and 
being in recovery.  James felt that: compared to when I first came on the CTO 
and now, it’s like two different people…I mean from negative to positive.   That’s 
the difference…I mean my feelings towards people, my actions towards people.  
For James, the CTO had given him a sense of responsibility for safeguarding his 
future.  James related this to the contractual nature of the CTO, with him 
upholding his side of the bargain:  You’re responsible for yourself. That’s what 
the CTO is about, isn’t it? So the responsibility for taking your meds, for coming 
to your appointments, for seeing your doctor, I mean, yes, it’s a huge 
responsibility.  Participants who spoke about recovery however tended to speak 
mostly in terms of sharing purpose and trust with the professionals working with 
them.  Brendon expressed this most clearly when he said: because I’d spent so 
long in hospital, the psychiatrist, and others, they wanted to safeguard a good, 
steady future, and a better quality of life.  So that was their reasons for the CTO 
really.   
 
There was a sense of precarious hope about these narratives, as Brendon went on 
to illustrate:  I suppose being on a CTO and the right medication I’ll conquer it, 
hopefully I’ll get over things, but we’ll see.  In this regard, participants viewed 
the CTO as helping them navigate through difficulties that might cause previous 
patterns of events to be repeated.  The CTO then was the next process in an 
ongoing process (Sarah), and participants talked in staged terms, with stability 
bringing change.   Being able to stay well led to maintenance in the community, 
which could in turn lead to incremental differences in quality of life: 
I never went to my church for quite a while and then with having the CTO in 
place it just-, it’s a very slow-, I don’t think it’s instantaneous help. It’s a long 
slow process and lately in the past few months I started going back to church 
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forming a relationship with-, making friends but forming a relationship…yes, it 
has helped. It has (James) 
 
Given the entrenched nature of the majority of participants’ difficulties, like 
James, they talked about change as a slow, gradual process, but nonetheless 
change which went beyond engagement with services and medication, and that 
affected various fundamental aspects of their life.   
 
Maintenance 
 
Furthermore, maintenance in the community in and of itself was viewed as a 
valuable aspect of being on the CTO.  The CTO could be viewed as a favourable 
alternative to hospital, but also as a way of avoiding traumatic admissions in the 
first place.   Participants thus did not only talk of being at home as compared to 
being in hospital, but also getting out of, and staying out of hospital. In this latter 
regard one of the participants, Sarah, suggested that the CTO should be weighted 
more towards keeping individuals in the community:  
Well I think it would be better if the community health team had more powers to 
help keep us out of hospital because it would stop that high feeling, those high 
intense- you know when the adrenaline is pumping, because if you're brought 
into hospital against your will, there's a lot of panic there, there’s a lot of feeling 
there...I don't know but from my point of view it’s good for me to stay out of 
hospital 
 
For four of the participants, the CTO had come at a time when they were at a 
crossroads, with the hospital treating team deciding what level of compulsion 
they should be made subject to.  For example, Christine told the story of how 
when she was an inpatient, the decision for her future was between sending her 
to a secure unit or placing her on a CTO: 
I saw the doctor without Sharon [her care coordinator and AMHP].  And I says, 
‘I’m looking forward to being discharged.’  And he says, ‘Well we’ll see about 
that.’  He says, ‘I’ll ask Sharon to come to the meeting next week.’  And Sharon 
were reluctant to get me discharged you know, she kept saying, ‘Oh no, I’m 
sending her to a secure unit’ because she said that all time, ‘I were going to a 
secure unit.’  But the doctor piped up and he says, ‘Christine’s very well now on 
lithium, on this tablet and we don’t see no reason why she should go to a secure 
unit.’  Well I were smiling, you know (laughs), and then a couple of week after 
that I got discharged on the CTO.   
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Being discharged onto the CTO was therefore not always straightforward, and 
could involve negotiation between professionals, as well as with service users, 
across a surprisingly broad spectrum of options, from secure compulsion at one 
end, to community compulsion at the other.  For Christine (and the three others), 
the possibility of the CTO gave them an opportunity to avoid being sent to more 
specialist ‘heavy-end’ services.    
 
Similarly, for those participants who had had lengthy stays in hospital, getting 
out of hospital signified a return of hope, as Brendon, who had been in hospital 
for two years, describes: When I was in hospital I felt … I don’t know, I felt 
condemned.  Being at home even if still feeling ‘fragile’, was widely perceived 
by participants to be an environment which was more conducive to recuperation 
than hospital, and the CTO was perceived by some to help with that immediate 
goal:  they said I can appeal against the CTO but I never bothered.  I felt it was 
needed to help me to recover easier living at home (Graham).   
 
The CTO as a barrier: accounts of ambivalence and resentment 
 
As noted earlier, the above views on the purpose of the CTO were expressed by 
participants who evidently saw some value in the CTO.  Ambivalence could still 
feature in those accounts however; views on the CTO were not usually 
articulated in straightforwardly negative or positive terms.  Indeed, it should be 
acknowledged that for a small number of service users, ambivalence meant 
having no strong feelings about the value of the CTO at all.  Particularly for 
those individuals who expressed resigned attitudes towards authority, the CTO 
was seen as simply another unremarkable manifestation of their treatment.  Gwen 
for example, said: I’ve not got any feelings about it.  It’s there because it’s there.  
I never looked into the ins and outs of it and delved into it.  I’ve just accepted it. 
For such participants, the CTO was of no particular consequence and they saw no 
reason to actively engage with it.  In this section however, I look at how 
ambivalence in terms of mixed views was expressed, as well as participants who 
felt more undiluted resentment towards the CTO.  Again, as with more positive 
conceptualisations of CTOs, strong connections can be made to participant self-
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conception, particularly in relation to dreams of recovery and ‘normality’, and 
the framing of mental distress and how it is treated.   
 
‘Anti-purposes’ 
 
For those who were ambivalent ranging to negative about the CTO, it could take 
the form of a coercive ‘anti-purpose’ for them, blocking or disrupting their 
attempts at accessing provision, at achieving recovery, at maintaining stability 
and at taking control of their lives.  The Damoclean sense that the CTO was 
‘hanging over’ them was raised by participants as being difficult to deal with, as 
Sheila describes: life would be so much better [without the CTO].  So much more 
freedom and getting rid of this horrible heavy weight of waking up every 
morning and thinking ‘I'm on the CTO’.  I’d rather I was in charge of my own 
affairs and in charge of my own life.  Sheila’s view of the CTO was strongly 
grounded in her experiences of services over the years and her rejection of a 
biomedical model of mental illness and associated treatment. Sheila had been on 
and off a CTO since they were first introduced five years earlier and over the 
fieldwork period I attended three (unsuccessful) appeals that Sheila brought, and 
witnessed the anger and distress the CTO caused her.  In this regard, the CTO 
could be seen to be almost iatrogenic in its effects, as Sarah describes: the 
decision [to be placed on a CTO] was made out of my hands and that's 
something that's upset me over the years, that lots of decisions get made out of 
my control and it causes other mental health problems, the fact that my life is out 
of my control.  Ambivalence about the CTO could therefore be complex; for 
example Christine appreciated the way the CTO would be activated to protect her 
if necessary, but at the same time expressed a consistent fear that the CTO would 
be used even if it wasn’t necessary, meaning she felt she was always: looking 
over my shoulder seeing if they’re coming for me.  I feel so well I don’t want to 
do it, you know, I don’t want to go back.   
 
Indeed, ambivalence was often in response to participants feeling that the 
purposes the CTO represented for them were in tension with other long-term 
aims they might have.  Individuals could struggle to reconcile where they were 
with where they wanted to be.  For instance, Michael stated:  
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I could relapse so I'm quite happy with the way it is, but I do find it a bit of a 
burden because I do want to go to university to study and they said under the 
CTO they’d still need to visit me and give me injections.  I want to live a normal 
life and be able to work and study but the doctors said stress is a major issue. 
  
At the heart of Michael’s ambivalence about the CTO was a struggle with how 
he saw himself; on the one hand, he felt strongly the CTO in the immediate term 
provided him with the control over his actions that he had been lacking, on the 
other, he felt that it hampered his plans for the future.   For many of the 
participants, being well over a sustained period of time could shift their view on 
what they felt was necessary to keep them well.  Being told that they had a 
chronic and recurring condition did not always extinguish hope for participants 
that they would one day have a full clinical recovery and become medication-
free.  Michael encapsulated this when asked about his future: I have to take 
medication for the rest of my life probably.  I hope though that I’ll make a 
recovery of some sort miraculously and then I wouldn’t have to take medication 
anymore.  In recovery terms then, coming off the CTO could be seen as the point 
at which progress could be made, as Simon states when asked if it was 
significant to him when he came off the CTO: it was actually, so I can move on 
and go in the army, it was the next step to doing that.   In both Michael’s and 
Simon’s accounts we can see that the CTO may be viewed as antithetical to 
dreams of ‘normality’.  Some practitioners struggled to understand how the CTO 
could be experienced as stigmatising given it is an ‘invisible’ intervention.  
These accounts suggest that the relationship between the CTO and stigma could 
be subtle, related to the CTO being viewed as a barrier to life lived without 
difference.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, such discussions on normality were often associated with 
participants’ views on the stigma attached to their status in society.  Craig framed 
his diagnosis in terms of punishment, stating: I mean the stigma of being labelled 
mentally ill, once you’re labelled nobody believes a word you say.  Once they 
label you, that’s it, you’re mentally ill and you always will be.   This sense of 
having their personhood devalued and pathologised resonated in the majority of 
participants’ experiences of discrimination and harassment due to their mental 
health status.  Whilst participants who viewed the CTO in a more positive light 
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felt that it contained and over time diminished stigma by enabling them to live a 
life in conjunction with the majority of society, for others the CTO enhanced the 
‘outsider’ status they already keenly felt.  How participants constituted their 
pathway towards normality was therefore central to how they viewed the CTO. 
 
Cross-purposes 
 
Resentment about the CTO could also be related to feeling at cross-purposes with 
professionals as to the thinking behind the use of the CTO.  Compliance with 
medication was viewed by all participants as the primary aim for practitioners 
when using the CTO and could be seen not only as a means to an end for 
practitioners, but as an end in itself.  This is unsurprising, given that CTOs 
provide a framework for treatment in the community, and ‘treatment’ although 
defined legislatively very broadly, tends to be viewed in medical terms.  
However, for service users it could be a cause of tension if firstly, they wanted 
the focus of the CTO to be on secondary goals, and secondly if they believed that 
practitioners disregarded ways to achieve those secondary goals that were not 
necessarily about medication, such as social and psychological support.  A 
concern raised when CTOs were first introduced was that they may lead to 
further restriction of treatment options and certainly the views expressed here 
reflect previous research, where service users have expressed resentment at the 
focus within CTOs on medication (Brophy and Ring, 2004).  This was a concern 
shared by some participants, as Sarah summed up when she stated,  if the 
purpose of the CTO is to keep you out of hospital then I'm all for it, but it does 
seem to come down to medication which over the years I've sort of gone against.  
Indeed, medication compliance in and of itself did not strongly feature when 
service users talked about their own aims for the CTO.   
 
Contrary to participants who saw practitioners as trusted allies in realising their 
purpose for the CTO, those who manifestly disagreed with the CTO viewed it 
solely as a mechanism for control. Patrick gave an account of when he was 
discharged from hospital onto the CTO and how agreeing to the CTO was an 
additional barrier to surmount before discharge from hospital could become 
possible: They kind of forced me to do it.  They said, ‘look you’re not getting 
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discharged unless you get on the CTO’.  So, I was between a rock and a hard 
place.  Like Patrick, a number of the participants believed they would not have 
been discharged from hospital without ‘agreeing’ to the CTO and all that came 
with it.  Such participants believed the CTO served professional interests, in that 
it allowed for defensive decision-making: It’s [the CTO] a way of controlling the 
situation or controlling someone's behaviour, which puts people’s minds at ease 
and [sarcastically] I think everybody’s minds have got to be at ease (Craig).  In 
this light, practitioners were viewed as using the CTO as a way of managing risk 
to their reputation.  In turn, an associated, and underpinning perceived purpose of 
the CTO was to ensure monitoring and surveillance, or as Andrew noted, just so 
they can keep an eye on me, so I can’t operate.  Craig was perhaps the most 
vocal participant about having his rights denied through the CTO, as he says 
here:    
Nobody has written that my life or anybody else’s was in danger, you don't need 
more than that.  I think it’s highly unfair, there's no choice.  You should have 
choice over your own health.  If you've never hurt anybody else there's no 
justification for you to be medicated against your will.   
   
Potential aims of the CTO were not only explored by participants as to do with 
the perceived motivations of practitioners, but also in more systemic, abstract 
ways.  Irene believed that she was put on the CTO because: they have a 
procedure which they go through with people and instead of me feeling that I’m 
taken as an individual I’m treated like the run of the mill.  The CTO was viewed 
by Irene as a deindividualised and routinised occurrence, with no specific 
purpose.  Similarly, the role of resources was raised as a factor beyond the remit 
of individual practitioners, instead driven at a macro policy level.  Patrick 
reflected on this based on his own experiences:  I think it’s a much used thing 
now.  Because I know quite a few people on them, they seem to brandish them 
about a lot.  I suppose it costs a lot of money to keep a person in the hospital.  
I’m sure it’s cost driven.  This was a view held by a number of practitioners too, 
and in this sense the CTO was seen by participants across both groups as being 
enmeshed in wider systemic patterns.  On that note, I move on in the next chapter 
to practitioner views of CTOs. 
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Chapter Six 
Thinking CTOs through: 
How practitioners conceptualised community compulsion 
 
This chapter is a ‘mirror’ of the previous one, in which I discussed the different 
ways that service users thought about the purpose of the CTO.  In this chapter, I 
continue that theme from the practitioner perspective, examining how they 
thought about, justified and explained CTOs.  To fully make sense of practitioner 
views of the CTO I firstly consider the ethical underpinnings for such views.  I 
start by highlighting the gaps the practitioners felt existed between CTO policy 
and practice rationalities.  This discussion of the disjuncture practitioners’ 
believed existed between CTO policy and practice in turn brought to the surface 
practitioner beliefs about how and why CTOs ‘should’ (or should not) be used.  
As with service users, practitioner perspectives on the value of CTOs were 
shaped by their contextual experiences and individual beliefs.  Specifically, I 
relate this to practitioners’ understanding of what ‘good’ practice entailed, and 
how practitioners weighed up the potential consequences – both positive and 
negative – of CTOs for service users.  Despite the ethical discomfort many 
practitioners felt about CTOs, they all saw some value in them, and in the second 
part of the chapter I delineate the various purposes practitioners felt were met by 
CTOs.  These purposes are separated into immediate aims – protection and risk 
management - and longer-term goals related to stability and recovery.   
 
Policy, practice and consequences: coming to a view on CTOs 
 
Similarly to service users, practitioners expressed scepticism as to what they saw 
as the aims policy-makers had for CTOs, which they did not see as aligned 
necessarily with their perspectives.  Accordingly, I start this section with 
practitioners’ views on the framing of CTO policy, before I move on to a 
discussion of practice beliefs and practitioners’ ethical ‘weighing up’ of CTOs.   
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Policy and practice  
 
Although practitioners were generally sceptical about policy claims on CTOs, 
similarly to recent practitioner surveys on CTOs (Manning et al, 2011), they all 
felt that the CTO ‘filled a gap’ in policy and practice.  As outlined in Chapter 
Four, CTOs effectively replaced two legal provisions: supervised discharge and 
Section 17 ‘long-leash’ leave.   In relation to supervised discharge, practitioners 
believed that CTOs carried more power and therefore would be more effective in 
ensuring treatment adherence.  Supervised discharge was widely believed not to 
have the ‘teeth’ of the CTO and consequently was viewed as more dependent on 
how service users responded to the idea of authority rather than having any 
intrinsic power to compel.  As a psychiatrist noted: We’re now getting the 
benefits of what supervised discharge should have given us but didn’t.   
 
In relation to Section 17 leave, commentators (Bartlett and Sandland, 2007, 
Woolley, 2010) have suggested that CTOs do not bring any additional benefits 
and indeed that long-term use of Section 17 would be preferable to psychiatrists, 
because it allows for more discretion and is easier to use.  There were mixed 
views within the practitioner group about Section 17 leave as compared to CTOs.  
Whilst some did agree with this perspective, particularly psychiatrists who 
emphasised the bureaucracy of CTOs compared to Section 17, in an echo of 
previous research (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013) other practitioners felt 
CTOs were more beneficial for service users in that they include stronger 
safeguards for rights. As an AMHP explains: if someone’s on Section 17 leave, 
the psychiatrist they can just say, ‘right, we’re withdrawing your Section 17 
leave, come in’, without having to justify it.  And the person might not have any 
understanding of why that’s happened.  The greater capacity for discretion in 
Section 17 leave meant these practitioners believed it was more restrictive than 
the CTO, and would affect the daily life of service users in a concrete way that 
the CTO would not.  CTOs were also contrasted favourably to Section 17 leave 
because Section 17 leave meant service users still had inpatient status, and 
consequently it was believed not to provide a ‘clean break’ from hospital.  As 
long term Section 17 did not allow for a separation between hospital and the 
community, it was thought to hinder individuals moving on: The Section 17 leave 
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was a fudge wasn’t it, because you stayed as an inpatient, and how does that 
help you psychologically to rebuild your life in the community if you’re still on 
paper an inpatient. (Psychiatrist) 
 
Although many of the practitioners thought that CTOs were an improvement on 
what had gone before, there was still a gap between how they thought about the 
purposes of the CTO, and why they thought CTOs had been introduced as a 
policy.  Practitioners were particularly critical of how CTOs had been presented 
in regards to risk and public safety, whilst at the same time acknowledging their 
role in risk management, as discussed later in this chapter.  Policy-makers 
emphasis on risk was believed by practitioners to be influenced by public 
opinion, as a psychiatrist put it: 
I’d like to think that somebody thought that there was a group of patients who 
deserved a better deal, but I think I’m realistic and old enough to realise that 
actually one of the policy drivers behind that was this idea that there were 
homicidal maniacs who were being lost to services, and they needed a 
framework to contain them.  
 
There was a widely held view by practitioners that policy-makers were doing 
both service users and practitioners a disservice in how they ‘sold’ CTOs.  
Furthermore, and similarly to other areas of policy and practice where risk is at 
the forefront (for example child protection), practitioners felt that policy-makers 
did not account for the realities and limitations of risk management in how they 
represented CTOs.   Hence, practitioners generally saw at least some value in the 
CTO, but this did not necessarily align with its perceived presentation by policy-
makers as a panacea to longstanding problems in community care: the politicians 
or the policy-makers justified it like ‘people are being managed in the community 
we've got a CTO, and it's all singing and all dancing’ and it’s not. (AMHP) 
 
In contrast to the broadly therapeutic reasoning practitioners expressed for CTOs, 
there was a widespread belief that the policy reasoning for them was also 
premised on reducing resources and saving money.  Resource management was 
not only understood as keeping people in the community, but also using the CTO 
as a way of discharging them from hospital more quickly in the first place, as this 
care coordinator states: But I just think it’s almost like we'll do it on the cheap, 
we’ve got a piece of law that will compel people to come out [into the 
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community].  Resource management was connected to ‘mechanistic’ practice, in 
that it was believed that community compulsion might lessen the need for ‘deep’, 
potentially more resource-intensive work with service users.  As one AMHP 
commented in relation to ‘typical’ CTO cases:  
You have psychosis, you're difficult to engage, you've had this number of 
admissions, therefore CTO for you, and actually all that involves is maybe that 
you get your depot every fortnight, it's going to keep you to a level of wellbeing 
where you’re not putting yourself or others at risk, but maybe that's all people 
are going to get. 
 
Practitioners understood CTOs in this sense within the wider context of service 
and policy shifts.  Reference was made by a number of practitioners to the 
‘Payment by Results’ model which has recently been introduced to mental health 
services
24
 and how CTOs could be seen as part of a broader agenda of 
rationalising and rationing services: With Payment by Results, people are 
clustered into a pigeon hole; this is your illness, this is your type, so therefore 
your care plan will be prescribed and it might be quite minimal and quite 
restrictive and actually the CTO will be part of that (AMHP).  Similarly, cuts to 
services figured in practitioner concerns about CTOs.  In both Trusts day and 
respite services had recently been closed, the community resources that service 
user relied on were also diminishing and there were ongoing staffing constraints 
and restructuring in community teams.  Whilst CTOs were viewed critically as 
part of this shift to residualised services, they were also seen as a pragmatic way 
of supporting service users in such a climate:  
It would be fantastic if we had loads of resources to be able to manage people, 
because I think if it was an ideal world we would possibly be able to manage 
people in a different way.  We haven't got those resources, and we have to think 
about the best ways of managing people without them. (Care coordinator) 
 
In contrast to concerns that CTOs would lead to restricted care, this pragmatic 
view was premised on the basis that CTOs might channel resources to those who 
                                                 
24 Payment by Results was implemented in its current form across many public services from 2011 onwards.  
Payment by Results (now called Mental Health Payment Systems) was introduced to mental health services 
in 2012.  Essentially Payment by Results is a commissioning and service provision system where provider 
organisations are paid according to their ability to meet certain pre-determined outcomes.  In mental health 
services, this entailed separating service users into one of 21 ‘care clusters’, differentiated by diagnosis and 
level of need, for example  ‘ongoing psychosis with high disability’.  Each cluster has an associated care 
package and tariff which is paid to the provider per service user.  Although it cannot be addressed here, it is 
worth noting that Payment by Results has proved difficult to implement and has come under sustained 
criticism for a number of reasons relating to form, function and philosophy. 
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were deemed to need the most support, due to the obligations CTOs placed on 
services:   
Patients can go to their appeal and say ‘my care coordinator hasn’t seen me 
once in three weeks and I'm quite happy to meet him but he hasn’t come round’. 
The Tribunal will just say ‘well the CTO’s a nonsense, we can take them off it’. 
Because we’re not doing our side of the bargain. (Care coordinator) 
 
Practice beliefs and the CTO 
 
As suggested here, practitioner views on the influence CTOs might have on their 
practice had an ethical dimension, related to what ‘kind’ of practice they valued.  
When practitioners talked about the ethics of the CTO, they broadly considered 
what constituted ethical practice, and also the ethical implications of CTOs for 
the individuals they worked with.  Taking ethical practice first, practitioners 
discussed CTOs in relation to what they thought was ‘good practice’ within an 
AOT.   Assertive Outreach is premised on working with individuals in their 
environment, meeting frequently over a sustained period of time, and using a 
needs-focused approach (Sainsbury Centre, 2001).  Consequently Assertive 
Outreach work has a particular ethos and focus which practitioners drew upon, 
specifically in relation to: how they defined ‘skilled’ work; the difference 
between ‘assertive’ and ‘coercive’ engagement; and the difference between 
tailoring services to individuals rather than individuals to services.  As a 
psychiatrist summed up:  
We’re a team that’s expected to use assertive means to engage people, but 
without necessarily being coercive. Rather than blaming the individual, it's about 
what services can do to engage. So we’re finding what we’ve got in common with 
patients, working with that, and finding what it is that they want, what’s going to 
be the currency that engages them. 
 
Within this approach, ‘skilled’ work was defined in relational terms:  
We always try and use interpersonal skills, use therapeutic risk taking, be a good 
resource for them in the community.  I think we have a way of being able to 
encourage people to do the right thing.  Not always, but a lot of the time.  I think 
it’s because of that long relationship, it’s not any special powers that we've got, 
it’s just because we know people so well.  (Care coordinator) 
 
Alongside this, practitioners talked about being used to working with a high level 
of risk and ‘crisis’ in Assertive Outreach work, which meant they had become 
accustomed to working with incremental change, and handling uncertainty when 
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making decisions in complex situations.  Such an approach was contrasted to 
how many practitioners saw CTO practice, which was broadly defined as ‘quick 
fix’ with little need for theorising, understanding or relating.  Within this context, 
one psychiatrist who was very ‘pro-CTO’ still worried that CTOs: can be 
deskilling for the team, because it can make us lazy, we don’t have to try and 
engage or we're less creative about how we try.  I think with the CTO some of the 
way we work can be lost.  In this sense, it may be that CTOs have the potential to 
change practice configurations as well as service user experience, with more of 
an emphasis on ‘surface’ practice (Howe, 1996) based on legal leverage.  It is 
worth noting that practitioners viewed such practice changes via the CTO as 
potentially detrimental to them personally as well as service users, in that some 
felt their work would become less rich, complex and interesting as a result.   
 
There are connections here with the concerns practitioners raised about broader 
policy shifts towards a rationalisation of services, as discussed earlier.  At the 
same time however, links can also be made to the more pragmatic view that 
some practitioners took about managing cases in difficult circumstances.  From 
this perspective, some practitioners saw Assertive Outreach as a ‘natural fit’ for 
CTOs:  
Because Assertive Outreach works with people at this very narrow end of the 
spectrum, they don't want to see anybody, they don’t want to take tablets, they 
don't want us to interfere, they want to be left alone to take their drugs, and be 
mentally ill on their own.  So I think you have to have compulsion in that way. 
(Care coordinator) 
 
CTOs could also be seen as positively affecting the workload of the team as a 
whole, meaning they allowed more time for ‘everyday’ work with service users.  
One care coordinator commented:  The resources of this team are not as 
stretched because CTOs are being used instead of referring people to us 
[Assertive Outreach]. I think as well for some people who are in a routine 
because of their CTO, they’re being chased a lot less, so we have more time.  
Going beyond the pragmatic view expressed earlier that the ‘contractual’ nature 
of CTOs would oblige practitioners to provide a certain standard of care, from 
this perspective CTOs might even encourage better care.  It can be surmised 
therefore that how CTOs played out in practice was not straightforward. As will 
be discussed in the next two chapters, whilst CTOs could encourage ‘routinised’ 
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practice, they could also ‘kick-start’ relationships, and practitioners still 
demonstrated creative ways of working within compulsion.  Indeed despite their 
concerns, the purposes practitioners felt CTOs could be put to suggests they tried 
to shape CTOs to their practice approach rather than the other way round.  
Before I turn to those purposes, I want to say something about the second ethical 
consideration practitioners discussed in regards to CTOs - that of their 
consequences for service users.   
 
An ethical balancing act 
 
Despite practitioners’ qualms about the possible effects of CTOs on practice, 
none of them expressed an outright negative attitude towards CTOs.  As noted 
earlier, even when practitioners expressed considerable doubts about the policy 
framework, they still perceived some value in CTOs.  Instead, practitioner 
perspectives on CTOs ranged across a spectrum of ambivalence, in that how they 
felt about CTOs was very much grounded in day to day practice and tailored to 
individual cases.  Consequently, practitioners took a ‘balancing act’, weighing up 
the pros and cons of CTOs for service users in ethical terms and considering both 
sides of the argument. Sometimes, practitioners did not feel they had the 
‘answer’ as to whether CTOs were harmful or helpful, as this care coordinator 
explained:    
If we look at outcomes we may well say it’s of benefit, but if we look at human 
rights you might say this person should have the same right as myself to choose 
not to accept services.  Or does the CTO mean that people have more human 
rights because if they're unwell it means that we have more of a responsibility to 
them?  But I'm still, a bit…the jury's out 
 
Concerns about rights, unnecessary coercion and the reduction of choice and 
autonomy for service users were expressed by many of the practitioners, 
particularly in regards to medication, where it was felt CTOs could lead to side-
effects being ignored and service users not being given the opportunity to try a 
different medication regime.  On this basis, practitioners referred to the dual 
dominant discourses of recovery/choice and risk/control in mental health and the 
‘mixed messages’ they could engender:  
It’s really difficult to do all that education with somebody and then say ‘I want 
you to have control, I want you to recover at your pace, I want you to set your 
152 
 
goals…oh and by the way, if you don’t stick to these conditions, we’re going to 
whip you back into hospital, you're going to stay on this medication, you can't 
have a choice in what you take’.  It just feels…sometimes it feels a bit odd. (Care 
coordinator) 
 
Relatedly, it was felt that the short-term gains of the CTO in managing 
engagement could undermine the potential for longer-term and lasting change: If 
you can work with somebody and help them to understand their needs and what 
they need to do to stay well, that becomes a much more powerful protector for 
the individual in the long term than the coercive, ‘you have to take this because 
the law says you have to take it’. (Care coordinator)  In a similar sense, some 
practitioners talked in terms of using their knowledge of individual service users 
and how they responded to intervention in order to weigh up whether the 
potential damage to engagement and the therapeutic relationship the CTO could 
cause was worth it:  
The dynamics of the CTO for some people where they're resisting against it and 
resent us, then it makes a lot more difficult because they don’t see us as people 
who are working with them, often they see us as people who are working against 
them which makes a big difference. You end up in a stale mate. Because they're 
just angry we can't build on other areas of their life which would probably make 
a lot of difference as well, which would help to move on and hopefully relinquish 
the CTO (Care coordinator).   
 
If practitioners felt that engagement could be managed without the CTO, they 
could also question its usefulness: Sometimes I question the CTO because mine 
and Andrew's relationship is reasonably strong that I think that he would still 
engage with me, there would still be hiccups with appointments, you know 
but…sometimes you question whether or not it works or not. (Care coordinator) 
 
Deciding whether the benefits of CTOs outweighed such ethical difficulties was 
talked about by practitioners in terms of best interests and risk.  In relation to best 
interests, and contrary to the above perspective, some practitioners took the view 
that CTOs meant ‘short term pain for long term gain’, in that they could help 
service users reach a point of stability:  
We want to work with people rather than against them, but sometimes it feels 
that we have to act in the person’s best interest.  And you're almost saying ‘okay 
well there are two opinions here, yours and mine but we'll go with mine’.  But 
just keep in the back of your mind that this is for the greater good to help them in 
the long term. (Manager) 
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In regards to risk, the majority of practitioners felt that they could justify the 
CTO when more ‘gentle’ approaches would not be feasible, and also in utilitarian 
terms for the wider benefit of society: As much as we are about helping 
vulnerable people and social justice and all that good stuff, we’re also about 
protecting the public from some people that are potentially quite dangerous, but 
that’s hidden away, isn’t it, in social work values. (Care coordinator) 
 
Where practitioners placed themselves ethically in relation to CTOs defined 
whether they felt the CTO should only be used when absolutely necessary for 
tightly defined reasons, or should be used for a wide range of circumstances and 
people
25
.  If practitioners were more of the view that CTOs had the potential to 
cause harm to the service user, and/or they thought in the majority of cases 
positive outcomes could be achieved by less coercive means, they tended to see it 
as a ‘last resort’.  For these practitioners, CTOs were believed to hold a great 
deal of power and not to be used lightly:  
We’re selective because we reserve it for when we think it’s really needed, rather 
than for when it might be helpful.  As soon as we get somebody on a CTO, we're 
always aiming to get them off it as quickly as possible. Because there’s a terrible 
danger of using it purely because you can and you've got that power and you can 
use that power then to affect somebody's life. So we're very careful about how we 
use them and only using them where the problems become intense, where either 
the risks to themselves or others increase and we don’t have a choice.  Not 
because of social chaos, that’s totally different. (Psychiatrist at comparison AOT 
where CTOs were used less) 
 
In contrast, for those practitioners who did not feel the CTO would have much of 
a negative effect on service users and/or that they could be an effective means by 
which positive outcomes could be achieved, CTOs were seen as a tool to be used 
proactively, preventatively and often:  
At the time when they first started to be talked about, I think very quickly you 
were thinking ‘oh that would be great for Mr X or Mrs Z ‘.  And the first lady I 
put on, they'd only be introduced a month or two beforehand when we went for it, 
and straightaway I thought that would be perfect for this lady for the sole reason 
of reducing the distress around admissions. (Care coordinator) 
 
                                                 
25 I should note that ethical beliefs were not the only influence on how much practitioners felt CTOs should 
be used.  The efficacy of local policy/practice systems was also influential - if the methods by which CTOs 
were supposed to work were not effective, then practitioners may lose faith in the process and did not see 
the point of using them.  This is looked at further in Chapter Eight.   
154 
 
Such practitioners might be more likely to believe in CTO efficacy and to 
evaluate such efficacy broadly.  In this sense, judging that CTOs are a success 
could have a low threshold; for this psychiatrist as long as medication adherence 
was being achieved then positive outcomes would automatically follow: In my 
view each and every CTO has worked at least to some extent. I don't think there 
has been any kind of big failures with the CTOs, because under the CTO the 
authority is given to us, we are able to keep them in treatment and that cannot be 
a bad thing.  The purpose of the CTO – what outcomes it could achieve – is 
therefore interpreted positively for a range of individuals and situations.  Indeed 
both the reasons why, and the ways how, practitioners thought CTOs should or 
should not be used played out in their talk on the purposes of the CTO.  It is 
worth repeating that practitioners did not take a ‘black and white’ ethical view of 
CTOs and all saw some purpose to their use.  These purposes are discussed next, 
and pick up many of the themes developed here around risk, best interests, 
autonomy, short-term and long-lasting effects, and prevention.    
 
Short-term and long-term goals: practitioner perspectives on the purpose of the 
CTO 
 
Practitioners viewed the CTO as meeting immediate goals, as well as longer-
lasting purposes, dependent on whether they believed the CTO could stimulate 
positive change (personal and contextual) or not.  Such purposes mapped 
significantly onto the service user perspectives discussed in the last chapter and I 
will highlight the connections here.  The strongest theme in the immediate goals, 
and the one that is addressed first, is that of the CTO providing protection of 
various kinds to service users. This, somewhat surprisingly given the policy 
agenda behind CTOs (although maybe not if we take into account previous 
research which has reported similar attitudes (Manning et al, 2011)), held 
primacy over references to risk and risk management, which are addressed next.  
These two themes can be seen as relatively short-term aims of the CTO; purposes 
that can be met fairly quickly.  Practitioners also talked of how they saw the 
purposes of the CTO over time.  As with service user accounts on recovery, this 
talk was aligned with both maintenance and change, with the CTO being seen as 
a potential platform for meaningful transitions.   
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Protection  
 
The use of the CTO as a form of protection for service users was conceptualised 
in a number of different ways by practitioners.  In particular, a view that echoed 
service user thinking was that the CTO - via recall - worked to provide easier 
access to hospital, which in turn served three protective purposes.  The recall 
function meant the CTO could be understood as: ‘protecting’ service users from 
difficult Mental Health Act (MHA) assessments; identifying and treating relapse 
early on; and providing a ‘short-cut’ in an overloaded mental health system.  
Taking the first purpose, practitioners talked about the CTO as being used in 
order to make compulsion ‘kinder’.  It has been suggested that the experience of 
being repeatedly sectioned may lead to severe anxiety and Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Watts and Priebe, 2002).  Certainly, the CTO could be viewed by 
practitioners as a way of using mediated coercion to mitigate the effects of more 
forcible and direct coercion.  A care coordinator talked about the CTO being 
used for one of the women she worked with solely for this purpose: 
The restrictions that were placed on her were about accepting her medication 
and .... accepting contact with the community mental health team, but those 
things she pretty much did anyway, it was more about this lady was going to 
relapse, she'd had lots of relapses even when she was medicated ....that was the 
nature of her illness, but we needed to be able to get her into hospital without the 
distress for everybody else including herself. 
 
The interesting point to note here is that the CTO was not used in this case for 
medication adherence.  As discussed in Chapter One, the fundamental premise of 
the CTO is that they are there to ensure medication is taken.  This assumption 
can be problematic if we consider people for whom medication does not entirely 
work.  The use of the CTO in this case only to protect against distressing 
admissions demonstrates the flexibility of the purposes to which they can be put.   
Other practitioners also talked about using the CTO for this reason, comparing 
the relatively low-key and planned nature of recall to the often reactive, 
potentially traumatic and stigmatising event of a full MHA assessment.  Another 
care coordinator summed this up when discussing two individuals she was 
working with who were both placed on a CTO: 
Both had fairly traumatic experiences I would say with the Mental Health Act 
assessment, at their homes you know, the Police being called, and all the drama 
around it and the others being there.  And I think for me it was an opportunity to 
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look at a CTO to prevent that happening, or try to minimise the stigma that goes 
with it, and the whole street knowing that they’ve been admitted to hospital.  
 
In a broader sense, practitioners talked about CTOs as being preventative in that 
they allowed for relapse to be dealt with proactively.  Similarly to service users, 
practitioners talked about the difficulties of gaining an inpatient admission on a 
voluntary basis.  They also talked about the problems that arose even when crisis 
point was reached, particularly the challenges in securing a Section when 
individuals might ‘mask’ symptoms during MHA assessments, meaning 
professional agreement could not be reached on whether compulsory admission 
was necessary.  As recall has a lower threshold and only involves one formal 
decision-maker, it could allow for a ‘short-cut’ into hospital, thus bringing about 
faster treatment.  In turn, dealing with relapse early was explained as being about 
the ‘best interests’ of service users as not only helping them through immediate 
distress but also protecting longer term well-being:  
It’s almost been this protective measure, that when people become unwell we’ve 
been able to react and catch clients before they deteriorate to such a level that 
they need lengthy admissions and perhaps increased medication because of that 
level of deterioration.  We haven't had to wait until they've lost all their dignity, 
lost all their skills and gone into the state where they'll have to be in hospital for 
months or years. (Care coordinator) 
 
In an echo of the ethical ‘balancing acts’ described earlier, it should be noted 
here that not all practitioners were comfortable with recall being used in this 
way.  Recall may be felt to give ‘protective’ rights to access to hospital when 
needed, but a contrasting view was that the additional discretion it brings to 
compulsory hospital admissions could also erode service user rights to make 
fundamental life choices, as this Manager argues: Nobody should ever be put on 
CTO just so they can be got back into hospital quickly. If I were a patient I think 
I would prefer to endure the odd Mental Health Act assessment rather than a 
recall on a CTO and having a CTO hanging over me all the time.  This point will 
be returned to when the use of recall is looked at in more detail in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. 
 
Moving away from recall, other aspects of the CTO meant that practitioners 
believed they could be used to protect individuals who were deemed unable to 
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care for themselves sufficiently in the community.  Practitioners felt that having 
a legal structure for access enabled them to support service users who may be 
vulnerable to exploitation by others, or have physical health needs that were not 
being met.  A psychiatrist discussed a case where the individual was placed on 
the CTO to help control Diabetes, by making a condition that they had to allow 
access to the Diabetes nurse.  As he said, if the individual had breached this 
condition it would not have been enforceable with recall, but: if you know the 
person and you know they are going to comply with that, then I think it was a 
good condition in place, the patient managed his Diabetes after that so... 
 
An interesting question such thinking on the CTO raises is the broad sense in 
which ‘health and safety’ was constituted by practitioners.   The CTO could be 
put into place to deal with not only proximal risk to self, but also as demonstrated 
here more nebulous risks to do with self-neglect and ‘chaotic’ living. Similarly, 
practitioners also discussed the CTO as being used to ensure socially acceptable 
behaviour and to protect individuals from ‘shameful’ experiences.  One service 
user, Sheila, who was strongly opposed to the CTO had been on it for a 
considerable length of time because her care coordinator felt her actions when 
unwell caused significant difficulties for her in the community where she lived: 
She's never been a risk to herself, or a direct risk to others, but her going out into 
the community and coming out with all these delusions, it’s a small community 
that she lives in and then she has to return back there, so the risk of the 
community knowing all about her, all about her business, all about...you know 
it’s not very nice for her.  So to protect her in that way.  
 
Risk  
 
The use of CTOs to manage risk of harm to family members and to the wider 
community was talked about by practitioners as being very much framed by the 
kinds of individuals they worked with within Assertive Outreach.  As one care 
coordinator who had recently transferred from a generic Community Mental 
Health Team said, he had felt it: unfair to keep CMHT patients on the CTO, 
because they aren’t heavy duty cases like here at Assertive Outreach.  
Practitioners certainly felt CTOs filled a particular gap in this regard, related to 
the presence of individuals who had come through forensic services to Assertive 
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Outreach.  Individuals who are placed on a criminal treatment Section of the 
MHA (Section 37) can also be made subject to restrictions in the community 
under Section 41 once they leave hospital, referred to as a ‘37/41’.  This may 
occur if the individual is deemed to be of particular risk to public safety due to 
the nature of their offence.  The 37/41 effectively operates on similar terms to a 
CTO in that when they are in the community, individuals on a 37/41 have to 
abide by certain conditions.  Individuals supported by the AOT could have a 
forensic history involving violence towards others and yet not be on a 37/41 for 
various reasons.  Practitioners effectively saw the CTO as being the ‘next best 
thing’ for these particular individuals in managing risk.  As an AMHP described 
about one of the individuals who participated in the study: lots of people on 
CTOs now come from the criminal justice system, you know, and with the case of 
Glenn, his 37 expired and he got put on a 3.  So-, yes, so as a result, he couldn’t 
be a 37/41 so the CTO is the best thing that we’ve got. 
 
However, in reflection of their scepticism around the ‘selling’ of CTO policy in 
risk terms, practitioners were still ambivalent about the ability of CTOs to 
manage risk effectively.  None of the practitioners felt the CTO made much 
difference to the ability to monitor risk:  
Whether or not it reduces dangerousness is a debatable issue.  People’s risks will 
fluctuate daily whether they are on a CTO or not.  They will fluctuate dependent 
on lifestyle choices, drugs and alcohol, stressors, relationships, all the things 
that we know that...deterioration of physical health, mental health, their psyche, 
their personality.  
 
As this care coordinator went on to say, even seeing a service user twice a week 
cannot account for events that occur in the meantime.   Where practitioners felt 
CTOs were able to respond to risk was in its ability to ensure medication 
compliance through the use of conditions and recall:  
I think for the service users we have, you know with a high risk history, people 
are staying in treatment and if they slip out of treatment they are getting picked 
up and taken back and being given treatment a lot more quickly than previously, 
where you would have been waiting for things to deteriorate. (AMHP) 
 
However, whilst medication compliance could help manage risk for many 
individuals, for others (for example those who did not respond to medication, or 
where their risk was associated with personality disorder or substance misuse 
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issues) their level of risk was not necessarily mediated by medication, and the 
CTO therefore could not serve that purpose as effectively.  In this sense, 
practitioners understood the CTO to be as much about managing perceptions of 
risk rather than risk itself.  The decision to place someone on a CTO could be 
weighted by defensive thinking, as this care coordinator explains:  I think we all 
worried that if something ended up in the coroner’s court they would say ‘why 
didn't you put that person on a CTO, these were the risks’.   However, it should 
be noted that the defensive use of CTOs was not only related to image 
management and ‘back covering’.  Some practitioners spoke in very personal 
terms about the reassurance the CTO gave them when working with people who 
were deemed ‘high risk’.  A care coordinator talked about a woman who she had 
recently started working with who had a significant history of violence and 
aggression:  
So I’m really pleased it’s there just in case, it gives me a bit of... because the 
care coordinator she had before me was literally living and breathing her name.  
She said ‘there you are, she's all yours’, and I thought 'oh, I'm never going to 
sleep again!'  I was terrified and I mean terrified.  But I told myself...’I've ticked 
all the boxes and I've done everything and there's nothing else I can do, I can't be 
there for 24 hours a day and what she does, she does’.  But it’s not easy, so I'm 
glad she's on it. 
 
Connections can be made here with the service user discussion of risk; not only 
did the CTO support a psychological purpose of feeling in control for service 
users, but for practitioners too. 
 
Even so, a view held across the majority of practitioners (psychiatrists excepted) 
was that although they saw the value of CTOs in managing risk to others, the 
primary purpose of the CTO for them was not necessarily about risk management 
in itself.  Indeed, practitioners spoke of the CTO being helpful in ‘least 
restrictive’ terms for example in that ‘risky’ individuals who had had long 
admissions or who may not have been discharged previously being given that 
opportunity because of the CTO.  Furthermore, the management of risk was not 
necessarily what practitioners hoped to achieve through the CTO as summed up 
here by a manager: It is in part a risk management tool, isn’t it? That’s an aspect 
of it. It would be hard to deny that, if we’re being honest.  But the bigger part for 
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me is aiding the person on the recovery process. The next section will examine 
the more ‘Utopian’ longer-term goals practitioners felt CTOs could help towards. 
 
Maintenance and recovery 
 
In contrast to the immediate goals of protection and risk management, the future-
orientated aims of maintenance and recovery did not rely explicitly on the 
functions of the CTO, particularly recall.  Indeed, when talking about these latter 
aims, practitioners saw the active use of the CTO as signalling failure in reaching 
them, as this care coordinator notes in relation to one individual who posed 
particular risk issues: there would be a good call for recall but we don't, because 
we're trying to allow people to change and have additional support and see what 
we can do.  It should be noted here that even individuals considered high-risk 
could be worked with in a way that was not solely risk-focused through the CTO.  
In this sense, there was not an automatic ‘match’ between what might be 
expected to be the purpose of the CTO and the actual purpose it was put to with 
service users. 
 
Not all practitioners were entirely uncritical of a maintenance and recovery 
agenda for the CTO however.  As noted earlier in the section on ethical 
balancing acts, if individuals responded in a strongly negative way to the CTO, it 
could be seen as blocking the possibility for work to be done in any area of their 
life, thus meaning they could become ‘stuck’ whilst on the CTO.  More broadly, 
the use of CTOs as a pathway for recovery was seen as promoting an 
individualising approach to the problems service users face in the community, in 
that it placed the onus on the service user to maintain stability, despite adverse 
factors beyond the remit of the CTO or the control of service users.  Furthermore, 
it was felt by some practitioners that this focus on a narrow, policy-directed view 
of recovery foregrounded independence and downplayed the roles of 
dependency, care and ‘asylum’:  
There's nowhere for people to go to feel safe anymore.  So I think because we've 
got CTOs there are more people thrown to the wolves then should be.  But I think 
the whole thing about mental health is you've got to recover, it’s all about 
recovery whatever recovery is.  And for the vast majority that's absolutely fine 
161 
 
but for the people who it isn’t fine for, it’s really not fine.  And I think it puts 
them at more risk, but (sarcastically) we've got a CTO so that's alright. 
 
This AMHP was one of the practitioners who placed greater emphasis on 
proactive and protective use of the CTO in order to counteract such a narrative. 
The ‘non-use’ of the CTO to keep people out of hospital was therefore viewed as 
against the best interests of some of the individuals she worked with.   
 
Even so, protection, maintenance and recovery come from a similar value 
position in that they are all are rooted in different aspects of paternalistic care.  
As highlighted earlier, the use of recall was seen as protecting individuals’ from 
themselves.  The CTO as an ‘invisible’ yet controlling framework to maintain 
stability is based on the view that firm boundaries in the present will bring about 
positive change in the future.  Reflecting the prior discussion of practitioners’ 
concerns about service changes, it was also recognised that services had a 
reciprocal role to play in this process.  Whilst reciprocity principles do not make 
a formal appearance in CTO criteria, there was understanding by most 
practitioners that the CTO needed to be planned and put into action carefully by 
services for stability to be safeguarded.  Furthermore, although all practitioners 
felt they would provide the same level of treatment regardless of whether a CTO 
was in place or not, it was also acknowledged that the CTO could enhance 
obligations to service users.  There was a strong moral component to reciprocity, 
as a psychiatrist explained: 
There were people who were getting a raw deal.  They weren’t getting good 
community psychiatric care, and they weren’t getting the stability that they 
needed to prevent the disability accruing. If you’ve got to take something away 
from somebody, you have to give them something back, so what do you give them 
back?  If they contract to take the medication that you think is going to benefit 
from them, you don’t leave it at that, you start to work in other ways.  
 
Consequently, for practitioners maintenance was talked about in reference to 
stability in the community providing a foundation for service users to move 
forward and out of particular cycles. Stability in the community meant being able 
to stay well for sustained periods of time and subsequently being able to maintain 
housing, relationships and finances, and take part in fulfilling activities.  A care 
coordinator discussed this in relation to a service user she was working with: 
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So she was your classic revolving door patient...when CTOs were being 
discussed, she was clearly identified as being somebody who would be a good 
potential candidate for a CTO.  She’s never been readmitted to hospital since 
she’s been on a CTO, it's sort of kept her in treatment and family have reported 
recently that this is the longest stable period she’s had, and they feel that she’s 
generally much more settled, that was their word, since then.  
 
It was generally hoped by practitioners that through achieving stability, service 
users’ feelings of coercion related to the CTO would lessen.  This was seen as a 
mutually constituted process, whereby longer periods of being settled would 
mean service user attitudes towards the CTO would soften and it would: fade 
into the background, ceasing to be of importance to them.  In turn, a change in 
service user stance towards the CTO would be further reinforced not just by 
continuing stability, but also by the occurrence of positive changes due to such 
stability.  Dawson (2007) has used Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) theorisation of liberty, 
specifically positive liberty, to explain how the CTO can act as a framework for 
self-determination.  As noted in Chapter Four, this reading of positive liberty is 
not without problems, but it certainly corresponds with many of the practitioners’ 
understanding of the overarching purpose of the CTO.  The purpose of the CTO 
here was seen to be acting on service users, in order to give them an opportunity 
to overcome internal constraints and to get on with life.  This was seen as a 
process, starting with, but not limited to medication adherence: 
Because the intention of it is you stabilise somebody, they keep them on 
medication long term and they engage in the other elements of therapeutic 
engagement.  And then they build on that to improve to the point where they have 
an acceptance that the medication and the services are of value to them.  And 
they negotiate ways to go forward with their life.  That’s the underpinning hope 
of it. (Manager) 
 
As this quote suggests, compulsory medication was viewed as the platform on 
which psychosocial work could be done, with the eventual aim of increasing 
service user agency.  Such thinking on the aim of the CTO was also associated 
with how practitioners viewed the duration of the CTO; achieving stability and 
change was recognised as a long process and consequently seen to require 
lengthier CTOs to ensure progress was secured.   
 
This quote also makes reference to the connection practitioners made between 
changes in circumstances and individual change in beliefs and attitudes.  Part of 
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the aim of recovery therefore was the development of reflexivity in service users; 
that they would not only accept the CTO, but that being placed on it would help 
them to ‘realise’ the ‘right’ way to think about their situation so that they could 
sustain recovery.  In other words, the CTO becoming ‘invisible’ to service users 
by fading into the background would also signify the inculcation of its message.  
The CTO therefore was seen as a psychological catalyst to support the 
internalisation of particular norms.   
 
Practitioners talked about this in terms of service users developing insight, which 
as in the research literature (Dawson and Mullen, 2008), was often conflated with 
treatment adherence.  However, awareness that insight can be a problematic 
tautological concept was demonstrated by some of the practitioners.  
Consequently a wide range of definitions of insight surfaced in the interviews, 
from the internalisation of dominant medical understandings of mental illness, 
through service users reaching an understanding of their condition and how to 
manage it, to a wider conception of accepting that ‘life is better’ when well and 
stable. The aim for practitioners was that service users ‘reframed’ their past 
experiences, which would help them to shift perspectives on their present and 
future.  A signifier of this for practitioners was service users beginning to talk 
openly with them about such experiences and how to make sense of them:  
He’s engaging in treatment.  And I don’t just mean the medication, he’s 
engaging in a way that he’s never engaged before. This is the first that he’s 
actively discussed his mental state and acknowledged that he was conscious of 
his actions before but felt a bit powerless to stop them really, because of the 
paranoia and confusion. (Care coordinator) 
 
Practitioners made a further connection between the development of insight, and 
increasing responsibility and autonomy.  Specifically, that the CTO gives the 
initial ‘push’ to service users to change their thinking, which in turn changes 
their behaviour.  Such a view places emphasis on the individual as the driver for 
change and therefore that it becomes: their responsibility to maintain their 
improvement, in a way (Psychiatrist).  In this sense, there was a shift in emphasis 
from stability to recovery; stability was talked about as a mutual enterprise, 
whereas the ‘next step’ of recovery was framed as premised more on service user 
action.  A more in-depth discussion of how practitioners interpreted insight, 
change and responsibility will be saved for Chapter Nine when discharge is 
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discussed.  It is enough to say at this point that insight and personal change were 
key factors in discharge decisions, along with associated dilemmas about where 
practitioners thought responsibility should lie at different stages of the CTO, and 
how much potential the CTO had to shift the balance of state/individual 
responsibility.  An interesting contrast can be made with the views of those 
service users who valued the CTO because of its potential to support their 
recovery.  All but one of the service users who discussed recovery in relation to 
the CTO, saw recovery as being developed through interdependence rather than 
independence.   
 
It should also be noted that not all practitioners made straightforward links 
between thought (insight) and behaviour change.  The aim of the CTO in 
promoting recovery was not necessarily related to the development of 
‘responsibilised’ thinking.  This psychiatrist was quite sceptical of such a 
cognitive-behavioural approach: It’s quite a soft argument as well to say that if 
you put someone on a CTO, then you will demonstrate to them how seriously 
you’re taking it and how important it is, and what the framework is, so you know, 
a switch will flick in their mind and they’ll realise that they need to take it, and 
then they will.  Instead, some practitioners felt recovery was indeed possible 
through the CTO, but was more likely to occur through external compulsion 
rather than through a process of internalisation.  The CTO would therefore be 
kept very much in the foreground as a framework to ensure progress despite the 
perspective of the service user in question: 
There are other patients who are still struggling with their insight but otherwise 
have made such a phenomenal progress on the CTO and this lady I'm thinking 
about, she was having admissions twice a year before the CTO.  In the four years 
since she's been out on the CTO, she's never had to be admitted to hospital. She's 
driving her car again, for the first time in her life she held a job, even though it 
was a voluntary job and she is able to care for her sick mother. (Psychiatrist) 
 
In such cases, perpetuating change was seen as possible only through the 
maintenance of compulsion.  
165 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
In this chapter and the last I have drawn out the main themes that underpin 
practitioner and service user thinking on CTOs.  In bringing to the surface how 
participants conceptualised CTOs, I have also touched upon some of the 
implications such thinking has for the use of CTOs.  In this concluding section, I 
firstly reflect on the findings presented in these two chapters, before considering 
what they mean for the following two chapters on everyday CTO practice.   
 
Neither service users nor practitioners approached CTOs as an abstract 
‘problem’; their views of the CTO and why, how and when it should or should 
not be used, were very much related to their prior experiences, beliefs and values.  
For service users, questions of vulnerability and strength, dependence and 
independence, (self) control and riskiness, and above all difference and 
‘normality’ were central to how they interpreted the CTO.  Those individuals 
who came to the CTO as a positive development in their life, felt the CTO met 
some self-perceived need that had previously not been met, relating variously to 
security, self-management, stability and change.  Conversely, ambivalence or 
more clear-cut resentment could ensue when service users felt the CTO enhanced 
the differences between them and professionals, deepened their sense of 
powerlessness and lack of control, and added to the barriers they had to surmount 
in reaching their goals.   
 
For practitioners, their perception of the CTO and what it could offer was 
coloured by their beliefs on ‘good’ practice, particularly within the context of 
Assertive Outreach, which was aligned with skilled, complex, relational work.  
Relatedly, their concerns about the potential negative implications of CTOs for 
service users revolved around the effects of coercive ‘surface’ practice on choice, 
autonomy, recovery and relationships.  Here we can see the tensions that some 
practitioners felt about working within the twin narratives of risk and recovery 
that exist in mental health.  However, at the same time it needs to be 
acknowledged that practitioners did not take a binary approach to CTOs.  They 
could see the potential gains CTOs could bring to practice, in particular that 
paradoxically the ‘surface’ nature of CTOs - based on rules and sanctions - might 
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in some cases encourage better relationships through providing space and clarity 
for engagement.  They could also see the potential benefits to service users and 
to wider society of the stability and security CTOs might bring.  Practitioners 
therefore engaged in a form of situated ethics, carefully weighing up benefits and 
harms when considering the consequences of CTOs for individual service users.  
For some practitioners this ethical balancing act was less problematic than for 
others, and it is here that we can see a difference in when and for whom 
practitioners felt CTOs should be used.  How practitioners dealt with their 
varying levels of ethical discomfort is in turn connected to how they formulated 
the purposes of the CTO.  
 
Through examining service user and practitioner perspectives on the purposes of 
the CTO together, we can see the ways that they mirror and diverge from each 
other.  The accounts presented here and in the last chapter highlight how CTOs 
have been conceptualised in two relatively distinct ways by both groups.  The 
first way relates to mutually aligned accounts of risk management and protection 
of various kinds.  Putting CTOs to these kinds of purposes is characterised by: a 
consideration of the present, the CTO having immediate effects, active use of the 
functions of the CTO, and not requiring the exercising of self-control by service 
users.  The second way refers to the use of CTOs as a vehicle for a staged 
process of maintenance, recovery and change.  This can be characterised by: a 
consideration of the future; the CTO as enabling longer-term effects; the 
psychological use of the CTO to shape behaviour through boundaries; and 
requirement for service users to display self-control either through internalisation 
or through external leverage.    Particularly within this latter way of thinking 
about CTOs there were some differences in emphases between service users and 
practitioners. Whilst service users considered maintenance in relation to staying 
out of hospital, practitioners focused on creating a foundation in the community.  
In turn, almost all of the service user accounts refer to recovery as a shared, 
interdependent endeavour between service users and services.  Practitioners gave 
more weight to the CTO developing service users’ autonomy and responsibility.  
It should be noted however that across both conceptualisations, the principle of 
reciprocity was referred to by practitioners as well as service users; there was a 
sense that the CTO should provide a quid pro quo of some kind.  The practitioner 
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data therefore does not straightforwardly support the exclusionary/inclusionary, 
risk/responsibilisation policy narrative for CTOs described in Chapter Four. 
Whilst present in practitioner accounts, it was undercut by, or coexisted with a 
narrative of care and a sense of contractual obligations, which was set within the 
context of the current service landscape.   
 
Practitioner views on the purpose of CTOs can therefore be differentiated from 
the dominant CTO policy narrative to some extent.  Practitioners broadly felt that 
CTOs were better than what had gone before, being more effective and fairer to 
service users than previous legal provisions. However, there were concerns about 
the policy discourse and rhetoric on CTOs, with there being a disjuncture 
between what practitioners believed CTOs were capable of - particularly in 
relation to risk management - as compared to policy theorisation.  Practitioners 
recognised the place of CTOs in risk management, but the purposes they saw as 
being most important were overwhelmingly weighted to the ‘best interests’ of 
service users.  Whilst recovery is certainly present as a concept in CTO policy 
reasoning, risk has taken precedence and recovery is not as foregrounded as it 
was for practitioners. Moreover, practitioners rejected the idea of CTOs as a form 
of resource management and were largely critical of the part they saw CTOs 
playing in a broader agenda of service cuts.  Indeed, at the same time it seems 
that there was a belief that CTOs could be used as a way of mitigating such 
short-falls in provision, particularly crisis support.  Practitioners talking about the 
active use of the recall function for protective as well as risk-orientated purposes 
can therefore be seen in some ways as in opposition to policy thinking, where 
lowering rates of hospitalisation is the headline expected outcome for CTOs.  
There is a potential disconnect here between how CTOs have been thought about 
at policy level and the logic of how they might be thought of - and therefore why 
and how they are used - on the ground.   
 
This brings us to the questions practitioner and service user conceptualisations of 
CTOs raise for their actual use, which is considered in the following chapters.  
The ethical debates practitioners engaged in about the CTO in conceptual terms 
also played out in CTO practice.  The concerns that practitioners raised about 
‘deep’ versus ‘surface’ practice, and the impact of coercive practices on service 
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users, manifested in how they thought and went about the everyday functions of 
the CTO, specifically the setting of conditions and the use of recall, as well as 
how they built relationships with service users within the framework of 
compulsion. Both the positive and negative attitudes service users held about the 
CTO strongly influenced how they understood what it meant for them in concrete 
terms.  In turn, such attitudes and understandings shaped service users various 
responses to the CTO and consequently the different ways that CTOs unfolded in 
practice.  As we will see however, the service user-practitioner relationship could 
be a significant mediating factor between service users’ attitude/understanding 
and subsequent response, especially if practitioner interactions with service users 
keyed into beliefs service users held about themselves, their situation and their 
goals for the future.  Policies such as CTOs that are based on control are often 
discussed in rather hegemonic terms, without taking into account the ways that 
individuals affected by them can respond to them or shape the path they take.  
However, the ways service users and practitioners act and interact through the 
course of the CTO are central to questions of CTO ‘value’, both in relation to 
ethics and effects.    The following two chapters take forward these points, and 
develop them with reference to everyday CTO practice.   
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Chapter Seven 
Putting CTOs into action:  
Service users’ experiences of their use 
 
In the previous two chapters I drew attention to how CTOs were conceptualised 
by service users and practitioners. In this chapter and the next I focus on the 
everyday practice of the CTO, and draw out the personal, interpersonal and 
systemic factors that shape that practice.  Again I have divided service user and 
practitioner stories into two complementary chapters in order to do justice to both 
perspectives.  As with the preceding chapters, both groups have distinct yet at 
times interconnecting accounts, which need to be taken on their own merits as 
whole narratives and which lead to their own respective conclusions.  Given the 
focus in these chapters primarily on the practice of CTOs, I interweave 
observational and documentary data with the interview data in order to give as 
rounded a representation as possible of the workings of the CTO.   
 
In this chapter, I examine service user experiences of the CTO process and 
components
26
, beginning with discharge onto the CTO, through navigation of 
CTO conditions, and finally the possibility of recall back into hospital.  In all 
three sections, I highlight the reflexive connections between service users’ 
overall beliefs about the CTO, their understanding of how the CTO works and 
their responses to it.  In doing so, I particularly draw attention to the mutable 
mediating influence of practitioner intervention on these beliefs, understandings 
and responses throughout the different elements of the CTO process.   Service 
user actions in response to the CTO were not straightforwardly or always 
channelled through the relationships they held with practitioners however, and I 
also explore the various ways service users demonstrate agency in relation to the 
CTO.  In doing so, I highlight the effect the CTO can have on the individual, but 
also the effect the individual can have on the CTO and the path it takes.  Before I 
begin this exploration of CTO practice, I give a contextual account of the service 
user-practitioner relationship, focusing on how service users constructed beliefs 
on professional expertise and motivation.  Both elements together are key to 
                                                 
26 The interview data included in this chapter therefore comes primarily from service user interviews.  I have 
included supplementary practitioner quotes when I have felt it necessary to illuminate a point.   
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whether a trusting relationship is able to be formed, which in turn plays a 
constitutive role in how service users make sense of the CTO.  At the same time, 
the advent of the CTO can affect this relationship, and I go on to explore what 
these effects might be.   
 
The service user-practitioner relationship 
 
In Chapter Five I drew attention to the strong relationship between service user 
beliefs around their identity and circumstances and their view on the purpose, or 
‘anti-purpose’ of the CTO for them.  I ended that chapter by talking about ‘cross-
purposes’ and the sense that service users could feel they were thinking along 
entirely different lines to practitioners in regards to the CTO.  In this section I 
carry on that discussion by examining how service users’ constructed 
professional knowledge and motivation coming into the CTO.  Alongside service 
users’ prior experiences and beliefs about self, their beliefs around professional 
intervention were also significant in how they approached the CTO, and I 
explore the ways perceptions of expertise feed into the development of trust.  
Relationships are not static however, and in the second part of this section I turn 
more directly to the CTO and consider how it might affect the relationship 
between service users and practitioners.   
 
What do they know?  Professional expertise and the making of trust 
 
Service users variably drew upon constructions of expertise and professional 
judgment when they considered the path their treatment had taken thus far.  
Much has been made of the breakdown of trust in authority in late modern 
society, where an important role has been played by profound changes to 
knowledge flow; information and associated beliefs can come from much more 
varied sources than previously possible.  However, the majority of participants, 
and in particular those who were older, could be said to inhabit a world which 
did not reflect this societal change.  Holding a belief in professional expertise 
could therefore involve taking a ‘leap of faith’ into the unknown, as with Irene 
whose understanding of her medication was filtered solely through professional 
explanation: and I’m told, so I presume it’s true, that they help to stabilise your 
171 
 
mood.  Trust is in part about making a choice to be dependent on another (Brown 
and Calnan, 2012), and underpinning these views on expert knowledge was the 
sense of how individuals ‘should’ respond in the face of an authoritative action 
when they have delegated their understanding of their situation to a professional.  
James summed this up when explaining why he adhered to the CTO: 
And the CTO, if you’re not compliant to it, you’re wasting people’s time. You’re 
abusing the system.  They’ve got you well, you’re on your meds, you’re on a 
CTO, you know it works and then, if you don’t do it, you end up back in hospital. 
It’s like-, you’re insulting their intelligence. They’re saying, ‘look, if you do this, 
we’ll get you better’, and if you don’t do it, you’re knocking yourself but you’re 
knocking the system as well. 
 
In this scenario, the individual is part of a larger system, in which they have to be 
responsive in the right way to guidance.  The expertise of professionals as 
portrayed in these accounts is also related to beliefs about professional 
motivation.  The thought that a professional must know what they are doing can 
be linked to the belief that they are acting benevolently.  Glenn for example felt 
that the CTO was a positive development because: the mental health are there to 
help. They're not there to ruin my life, they're just trying to make it better.  At the 
other end of the spectrum were participants like Craig, who had little belief in the 
knowledge or motives of professionals, as he says: I don't know what 
qualifications these people get, because they don't have a clue what they're 
doing.  I mean the brain is the most complicated thing on the planet which 
nobody has a clue how it works and they're just throwing drugs at you like 
they’re Smarties.   
 
Participants combined their view of professionals’ general expertise, with their 
beliefs about how much knowledge practitioners had specifically about them as 
individuals, in order to judge the ability of practitioners to manage their situation.  
The extent to which participants felt practitioners knew them, helped them to 
weigh up how much they trusted practitioners to predict, and do something 
about, what was going to happen to them.  James believed that when he relapsed, 
his care coordinator: just saw it coming, and that with the CTO it was a case of 
her and the psychiatrist thinking: ‘we’ve got James on a CTO; we know what 
we’ll do for James; we’ll get him well’ and that’s what it’s done.  In contrast, 
participants who believed that professionals had approached them in an 
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impersonal way had little faith in the power of professional prediction, as Sarah 
suggests when talking about her first experience of being placed on a CTO: 
because something's happened in the past, they just assume something’s going to 
happen in the future and you know there is prejudices, there is habits of 
behaviour among staff just as much as there is among patients.    
 
When practitioners acted in ways that participants did not agree with, those 
participants who viewed professional knowledge and motivation favourably 
appeared to differentiate individual practitioners from the mental health system, 
or in other words, give practitioners the ‘benefit of the doubt’.  Nevertheless at 
times it could be difficult for participants to make sense of painful experiences 
whilst at the same time hold on to an underlying trust in professionals, resulting 
in a kind of dissonance which participants could struggle to integrate.  James, 
who highly valued the input of professionals in his life and believed in their 
abilities and motivations, reflected back on when he was put on an injection for 
the first time following the CTO and how it initially affected his relationship 
with his care coordinator: At the time, there was a bit of negativity towards my 
nurse. There wasn’t a bond; there wasn’t a friendship. It was like, ‘no, you’re the 
nurse and you’re the injection and that hurts, I don’t like it and I’m tired of it’.  It 
seems that the care coordinator’s role in giving James the injection under the 
CTO created a professionalised distance and conflated her as an individual with 
the painful intervention she administered.   
 
The nature of the service user-practitioner relationship and the CTO 
 
From James’ account, we can see that the CTO may have some mediating role to 
play in the relationship between practitioners and service users.  Indeed, one of 
the questions that has most been asked about CTOs is in what ways, if any, they 
might affect the relationship between practitioners and service users.   For some 
participants, the CTO did not particularly affect their pre-existing feelings - both 
positive and negative - towards practitioners.  For others, as referred to in 
Chapter Five, the CTO appeared to erode the therapeutic compact they held with 
practitioners, by introducing a new focus for conflict and enhancing the 
differences in the views they held on treatment, support and future goals.  As has 
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been suggested in previous research (Van Dorn et al, 2006) alienation and 
estrangement could follow.  Statutory obligations under the CTO could encroach 
on the relationship and reinforce any distrust that already existed; for example 
Sheila felt strongly that the presence of the CTO meant her care coordinator was 
not on my side due to the role she took in supporting the continuation of the 
CTO.  For Irene, the compulsory nature of the CTO acted as a barrier to her 
forming the collaborative relationship with professionals that she wished to have:  
Psychologically, I like the feeling of working with a doctor more and agreeing 
with something, because that's what I've been used to with GPs in the past.  So I 
didn't like the order where I was being made to have injections when I didn't 
want them so...you know I didn't like that feeling that I wasn't in agreement with 
the doctor. 
 
Conversely, when service users generally accepted the CTO, it could signify a 
welcome shift in their relationship with practitioners.  The potential for 
protection and provision was referred to in Chapter Five by some participants as 
important drivers behind their acceptance of the CTO.  Taking this further, 
participants did not only view the CTO as a depersonalised safety net.  It was 
also the relational aspects of the CTO that made participants feel secure and 
‘taken care of’, as Glenn explains: If I become unwell with my mental health I'll 
get looked after won’t I. Everything will get sorted out. People will help me sort 
it out rather than me trying to do it myself and make a mess of it.  In addition, 
some participants felt the CTO could signal vulnerability and the need for 
attention:   
But the reason why the CTO is good is because the nurses and the social workers 
come to my home and they give me medication, they ask me a lot of questions.  
People are more concerned about you because they find you very fragile so you 
should be looked after, and I'm very happy because of that that they take interest 
in me. (Michael) 
 
Indeed, the relationship participants had with practitioners could be entirely 
conflated with the CTO, as Julie illustrates:  
Interviewer: So if you weren't on a Community Treatment Order what you think 
would happen?  
Julie: What would happen? I wouldn't be getting any help would I? I wouldn't be 
able talk to people. 
 
What this seems to suggest is that reciprocity did not necessarily manifest in 
CTOs in the form of tangible improvements to care, but instead as a potent 
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psychological mechanism.  As Michael goes on to state: the CTO makes me feel 
stronger and more important in the eyes of the doctors. 
 
Although the CTO had placed some participants at odds with practitioners, for 
others even when they were not happy about the CTO or their medication, they 
might still welcome the broader support practitioners provided.  It appeared that 
a significant element in keeping relationships and regular engagement working 
within the CTO framework was finding a point of agreement, however small.   
Practical help with day to day living could support participants to find a way 
through the CTO.  Andrew refused to attend outpatient appointments with his 
psychiatrist, who he intensely disliked as a figure of authority, but would still 
regularly meet his care coordinator and receive his injection, despite not agreeing 
with it.  As he says: well my care coordinator, he has contact with us by mobile 
and he tells me when my money’s due, when I’m going to get paid27. He looks 
into things for us, he’s trying to help.  For many of the participants, their care 
coordinator was valued as a person who they could talk to through difficult 
times, who was consistent and available, who would help them navigate various 
systems and who would advocate for them with other professionals.  As Brendon 
stated when asked if he would stay engaged with services if his CTO was ended:  
I think I would yes, because I feel like my care coordinator is a friend now, you 
know what I mean, whereas before I didn’t.   
 
Many of the service users’ accounts of interactions within the context of the CTO 
contained themes of professionals relating to them in ‘depth’ terms of 
relationship and personhood as well as ‘surface’ terms of compliance and risk.  
In this sense, whether practitioners were perceived as focusing on broader 
support (and ultimately shared goals) rather than solely on medication, and 
whether their mode of communication was seen as didactic or two-way, were the 
two central aspects which influenced service user’s views of both practitioners 
and CTOs.  Integrating surface and depth practice in regards to the CTO could be 
difficult for practitioners, as we will see in the next chapter.  Part of that 
                                                 
27 In Andrew’s case a corporate appointeeship was in place, which the care coordinator helped manage.  
This is when the Local Authority has control over an individual’s finances and budget, and is put in place 
when that individual is deemed not to have capacity to manage their money. 
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difficulty was in judging when and how to refer to CTOs in regular interaction 
with service users, and how to use the CTO as a tool in facilitating compliance 
through reminder and explanation.  The following sections on discharge onto the 
CTO, and the use of conditions and recall, will therefore explore service user 
understanding of the CTO as a legal intervention, and particularly in terms of the 
explanations given by professionals. 
 
Service users’ experiences of discharge onto the CTO 
 
This section highlights in particular how service users formed an initial 
understanding of the CTO and the legal framework within which it operates.  
Service users’ understanding of the CTO in legal terms, more specifically what it 
allowed them to do or not to do, constituted the foundation for how they engaged 
with its boundaries.  Understanding and involvement in decision-making go hand 
in hand; how much service users felt able to have a voice and be listened to in the 
early stages of the CTO also influenced their attitude towards, and subsequent 
engagement with the CTO.  This early involvement will be considered first, 
before I explore in more depth how practitioners’ could influence service users’ 
initial impressions of and responses to the CTO. 
 
Early understanding and involvement in the decision-making process 
 
The initial explanation given by professionals was the starting point for most of 
the service users when beginning the process of understanding the CTO.  
Participants gave varied accounts of how they were told, and how much they 
were told about the CTO when being prepared for discharge from hospital.  
Observations of hospital discharge meetings certainly reflected this variability, 
with a wide range of practice being observed.  For example, in Julie’s discharge 
meeting, which I attended, the paperwork was completed very quickly and Julie 
and her partner were invited in once the decision to use a CTO had been made.  
The psychiatrist addressed Julie three times about her conditions of discharge but 
did not explain what this term meant or ask if she understood.  The CTO was 
only directly mentioned at the end of the meeting and then only briefly, with: 
when you get discharged we will put you on something called a community 
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treatment order, being the sum of explanation given by the psychiatrist.  
Professionals using jargon could make understanding difficult as Irene describes:  
I would have liked it explained on a very ordinary level so that I could 
understand it.  In addition to explanations being clear, having the time to think 
and digest the information, and being able to ask questions were viewed as 
important aspects of being discharged onto the CTO with a well-informed 
understanding of it.   
 
Participant understanding in the early stages also affected how much they could 
take part in the initial decision-making, as Michael illustrates when asked how 
much involvement he had in the process of being placed on the CTO: I couldn’t 
say anything about it. I didn't know what it was initially, I didn’t know what it 
meant.  Participants described whether during such decision-making they felt 
involved or marginalised, listened to or ignored, and talked to or with by 
professionals.  Although practice guidance (Department of Health, 2015) on 
CTOs suggests service users should be collaborated with in making the initial 
decision even if they do not consent to the CTO, in reality it was more common 
for individuals to be informed but not involved.  In addition, it should be noted 
that although all individuals on a CTO are entitled to support from an 
Independent Mental Health Advocate (IMHA) who can help them understand 
and navigate decision-making points on the CTO, none of the service users in the 
study had used them.  Practitioners explained this in some cases as being down to 
inherent suspicion of any professional who was thought to be ‘part of the 
system’, or because the service user felt able to speak for themselves, but 
otherwise it appeared that service users were not always aware of this provision.  
Only one participant, Glenn, felt that he had played a relatively equal role along 
with professionals in the decision-making to use the CTO, as he states here when 
asked about the process of his discharge from hospital: 
Interviewer: Do you know why they started talking about the CTO at that early 
stage?  
Glenn: Because I wanted to…me and my solicitor and my funders wanted to 
know the full care package, and the pathway that we were going to be using, why 
it hadn't been set down clearly. If I was going to benefit from it, it had to be 
planned.  It was my decision. It wasn’t mine…obviously it can't be my decision 
but it was me that wanted to be on it 
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An important aspect of Glenn’s ability to play an active role was that he was able 
to have early and on-going involvement in the process of being discharged into 
the CTO.  However, and as has been reported in other research (Stroud, Doughty 
and Banks, 2013), case file analysis suggests the majority of participants were 
told very close to or at the point of discharge that they were going to be placed 
on a CTO, making it difficult for them to develop full understanding or be 
involved in decision-making.   
 
Given that when being discharged from hospital, individuals tend to focus on 
going home, the initial explanation of the CTO by practitioners could lack 
meaning for participants
28
.  As one practitioner pointed out to me after a 
discharge meeting: They’re getting off the ward so you could say, ‘you have to 
wear your underpants over you trousers’ and they would agree to it.  All 
participants reported being given leaflets on the CTO but these did not appear to 
be a particularly effective way for them to gain understanding of the CTO, as the 
majority reported not reading them. Graham describes: they gave me information 
but I just never read it.  I just said, ‘oh I’ll just sign here’ and take the CTO and 
do the CTO.  I never questioned it or anything.  Like Graham, the experience of 
‘just signing’ was common amongst participants, but this did not necessarily 
reflect a lack of interest in what the CTO would mean for them.  Participant 
understanding of the explanations given tended to reflect their feelings more 
generally in regards to compulsion and relatedly, how coercive they found it to 
be.  Michael’s understanding of the CTO was refracted through the extreme 
powerlessness he felt at the time in the face of authority, and so he believed that 
the implementation of the CTO was a judicial rather than clinical decision: It's a 
compulsory law order, its signed by the law courts of some sort and it's done by 
the law without my rights.   
 
Practitioners acknowledged that service users were not always as involved as 
they could or should be.  As one Manager describes: It’s been put on them 
without their full knowledge and you know it’s just kind of happened and now 
                                                 
28 This could create interesting situations in interviews, when participants would sometimes ask me about 
the detail of the CTO and be surprised at some aspects of my response, for example how long the CTO can 
last for.   
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they're stuck with it.  People think it’s been slapped on them and they don't know 
how or where and they weren’t part of it and it’s a bit of a concern to say the 
least.  Along with the speed and timing of decision-making, the robust nature of 
Assertive Outreach work could also preclude active involvement:  
They’re implemented in a slightly touchy feely way in CMHTs, they’re a bit 
more, ‘would you agree to go on a CTO?’  But I don't get that feeling here, it's 
like ‘you are going on one because we can’t get to see you when you go home, so 
you’re on one’. We are more bullish about it.  These are like rough and tough 
CTOs (laughs). (Care coordinator) 
 
The perceived nature of Assertive Outreach service users meant  practitioners 
often expected service users to be hostile to the CTO and not amenable to 
discussion: it's a difficult conversation to have with somebody because it's not 
something that we expect people to be in agreement with really, so it's more of a 
‘this is what’s going to happen’ (Care coordinator)   
 
Changes in understanding and practitioner intervention 
 
In this sense, a more in-depth discussion could be helpful both for the service 
user and for the progress of the CTO, particularly in mitigating coercion and 
encouraging acceptance (Canvin, Bartlett and Pinfold, 2002).  I mentioned earlier 
in the chapter that a question often asked about CTOs is how they might affect 
the therapeutic relationship between practitioners and service users.  A follow-on 
question is how the relationship service users have with practitioners affects their 
stance towards the CTO, and this is less straightforward to answer.  Although I 
have talked thus far about service users in terms of positive or 
ambivalent/negative attitudes towards the CTO, in some ways the CTO is best 
seen as a process rather than an event, and it is not always helpful to constitute 
individuals’ feelings about it in binary or ‘fixed’ form.  Whilst some service 
users appeared to maintain a negative or positive stance towards the CTO 
throughout, others did not.  Although those who were more positive about the 
CTO from the start tended to stay positive, some of the service users who had 
started from a negative viewpoint shifted over time to a positive perspective. As 
is discussed here this shift was often due to practitioner influence on service user 
understanding of the CTO, which in turn changed service user stance and their 
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subsequent ability to form purposive meaning for the CTO, as described in 
Chapter Five.   
 
Those participants who started out feeling negative about the CTO before 
changing their view reported feeling initially quite anxious about how restrictive 
the CTO would be.  For example, Patrick thought at first that it was quite a 
drastic thing you know, like house arrest.  As an AMHP described, the semantics 
of the name ‘community treatment order’ did not help the formation of punitive 
impressions:  
There is a problem with the naming of it for a kick-off, because a community 
treatment order actually sounds like it is a legal order, it's like a probation order 
you know?  So I think there's an immediate assumption by the patient that this is 
something that they have to do or be punished for.   
 
Turning points for participants whose view of the CTO had shifted from negative 
to positive, partly related to the CTO being ‘reframed’ in a more beneficial (and 
less restrictive) light, and in a way which chimed with their sense of self, identity 
and place in the world.  Irene illustrated how explanation in this broader sense, 
which went beyond legalistic description of what the CTO meant, could help 
participants understand it more:  I think if I had had it explained to me more in 
detail what was it about my life which they felt needed this intervention I 
could’ve accepted it more.  Professionals not having a deeper discussion with 
Irene about the CTO meant she felt unable to make sense out of the role it played 
in her life.   
 
In contrast to Irene’s experience, a significant event for Nick was a conversation 
with the community psychiatrist shortly following his discharge from hospital 
where it had been explained to him that the aim of the CTO was to keep him 
well, which was a different approach than the hospital psychiatrist had taken, 
which was to tell him the CTO was being used because he was considered, in 
Nick’s terms, a danger.  This discussion appeared to help his change of view:  I 
thought well I might as well just go to jail.  But then I had time to think about it 
and I thought, well, he’s explained why I’m on it and then all … everything just 
come to us, and you’re not going to get as bad as what you were.  Even though 
Nick felt he had behaved unacceptably in the past, he still found it difficult to be 
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described in such a way, and having the CTO explained in ‘softer’ terms helped 
him to accept it.   
 
The process of acceptance of the CTO was not only related to changes in 
understanding sparked through the terms professionals used when explaining the 
CTO.  How service users felt they had been treated by professionals during the 
decision-making process was also important to attitude change.  Sarah felt that 
she had been ‘talked to’ in a rather dictatorial, inflexible way by the hospital 
psychiatrist when placed on her first CTO: The doctor who put me on the CTO, 
I'm very wary of him because he didn't seem to take into account anything I said.  
He seemed to sit there and already have an idea of what he was going to do and 
he was going to do it regardless.  This CTO had been an especially coercive 
experience for her, because it also resulted in her being put on medication she 
had a particularly adverse reaction to:  the first time they put me on an injection 
with the CTO I begged them not to, I didn’t really want it at all, the side effects 
were really bad.  The way this initial decision was made -  informing her after 
the fact, not allowing her to have any input, and keeping her on medication 
which she hated due to the side-effects - affected Sarah’s ongoing view on the 
CTO.   
 
In contrast, when Sarah was placed on a CTO a second time, the initial 
discussion had been more open and she had felt: It was still out of my control but 
I was more agreeable to it.  A key difference had been not just discussion about 
the CTO but also about medication, where Sarah’s concerns were listened to and 
she was given different options.  As she said: There’s a very big difference 
between last time and this time.  I didn't really want the injection that time but I 
found that this one doesn't seem to have the side effects that the last one had so 
I'm quite happy.  It’s something to keep me out of hospital, that’s the main aim 
for the team and myself.  Through interviews with Sarah and her care 
coordinator, it was evident that the current CTO was based on a ‘mutuality of 
accounts’ (O’Neill, 1995) developed through ongoing explanation, discussion 
and reassurance about what the CTO would mean.  This interplay between 
contextual experiences and the way in which the CTO was explained and 
negotiated by practitioners in the present was a significant aspect of the pathway 
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a CTO might take.  Hence even though there were disagreements about diagnosis 
and treatment, a joint recovery-focused aim of creating stability for Sarah was 
emphasised, which made the CTO more acceptable to her.  Sarah was an 
interesting case to follow in that she had experienced two CTOs one after the 
other and could compare the approaches taken by professionals.  It is evident that 
an approach based on concordance, being informed and involved in decisions, in 
comparison to the earlier focus on compliance, made a difference to her stance.   
 
However, it should also be noted that for some service users, coming to an 
acceptance of CTOs was more driven by their own actions, and could be despite 
practitioners not because of them.  In this sense, becoming accepting of the CTO 
generally involved some movement to shape the CTO in a way which was 
coherent with participants understanding of it.  If we refer back to how 
participants made sense of the CTO in terms of its purpose in their life, their 
active engagement with the CTO could shape this meaning-making.  James 
illustrated this iterative process when explaining how he had come to accept the 
CTO:  
Interviewer: And that’s how the CTO was explained to you at the time?  
James: Well, not-, that’s how I explain it; that’s how I took it on; that’s how I 
understood it. I started formulating my own ideas about what a CTO meant and 
what it would do for you. 
Interviewer: Right. Okay. So to make it make sense to you. 
James: Yes. That’s how I got round it. 
 
The telling phrase there of ‘getting round’ the CTO denotes some activity on 
James’ part.  James had shaped the CTO by placing himself at the centre and 
taking ‘ownership’.  One particular observation of this was at James’ care review 
where the psychiatrist wondered whether the CTO was a security blanket for 
James, and James after a long pause, carefully responded: it’s like a ring 
(pointing to his finger).  I’ve made a promise and it was a choice for me to do 
that.  James did not see the CTO as being ‘done’ to him, and he demonstrated 
considerable agency in making the reality of the CTO fit with his conception of 
it, which revolved around him taking responsibility for his recovery as part of a 
trusting partnership with professionals.  
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The key issue for James had been feeling that he lacked control over his 
medication under the CTO.  As mentioned earlier in the chapter he particularly 
disliked it being administered by his care coordinator, which caused considerable 
feelings of dissonance for him.  In response to this he made a unilateral decision 
to have his medication given by his GP instead.  Here we can see that an element 
of the CTO which would be ‘taken for granted’ by practitioners as being inherent 
to how the CTO worked, was viewed very differently by James as being in 
opposition to how he saw the purpose of the CTO.  He explained: 
I felt that part of my Community Treatment Order and part of my injections were 
in conflict because I didn’t feel in control of my injections. I was being told 
you’ve got to have them. It felt like the responsibility had been taken out of my 
hands. It was in the hands of the nurses here and the doctors here and I thought, 
well, that’s not fair because my CTO says I’ve got to be responsible; I’ve got to 
be in charge and then, when I went up to the medical centre and they started 
doing it, I settled down a bit better. 
 
James’ creative resolution of the tension between his perception of the CTO and 
how it was practiced also highlights, as with Sarah, the importance of meaningful 
medication choice within the CTO framework to support positive outcomes.  For 
James, making this choice was a recovery-orientated step which supported him 
‘settling down’ and achieving stability.  In this sense, acceptance of the CTO 
entailed taking some control over the process. 
 
Understanding the CTO process: conditions  
 
The prior section explored service users’ initial understanding of the CTO, and 
how participation, practitioner intercession and service user action could 
influence such understanding, thus shifting some service users’ early negative 
views on the CTO.  This section moves on to consider service users’ 
understanding of the day to day mechanics of the CTO, specifically in relation to 
their understanding of CTO conditions.  I start with an overview of how service 
users understood (or misunderstood) their conditions with (or without) the help 
of practitioners.  I then explore how service users negotiated the most significant 
condition for many of them - the requirement to take medication.   
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Beliefs about conditions 
 
Some participants expressed significant ambiguity about what was expected of 
them under the CTO and either could not say what their conditions were, or held 
beliefs about their conditions which were not the case.  A broad view of what 
conditions entailed - particularly around drug and alcohol use - was relatively 
common among participants and seemed to reflect a belief that the CTO was not 
just focused on their engagement with services and medication but on other 
aspects of their life and behaviour as well.  Despite these beliefs, case file 
analysis demonstrated that although conditions might include that individuals see 
a dual diagnosis worker, none of the participants had specific conditions on 
abstinence or reduction in substance use as part of their current CTO.  Such 
ambiguity about expectations of behaviour under the CTO meant that service 
users could feel that they had to watch everything they did, giving the CTO a 
sense of pervasiveness, as with Ian who admitted: actually I don’t even have a 
clue what I’ve got to do but I do everything right in here, go for my medication, 
don’t sleep out, don’t take drugs, keep away from women (laughs).     
 
The perceived encroachment of the CTO into areas beyond its actual legal remit 
was not only illustrated by participants’ views about ‘lifestyle’ conditions.  When 
participants found the CTO coercive, it tended to manifest in a physical and 
literal sense for them in the belief that the CTO constrained their movements.  
Sheila for example held the belief that she would not be allowed to go on 
holiday, despite her care coordinator explaining this was not the case: They just 
said it would mean it was a community order programme and I would be able to 
do such and such and I wouldn't be able to go away, I wouldn't be able to leave 
the area.  As a logical follow-on, ‘escaping’ from the CTO could be viewed as 
quite a radical step, which Craig described here when asked what he understood 
by travel restrictions: Because you're breaking the CTO [by moving], and you're 
not technically allowed to break it doing anything.  But no one can stop you 
going to Scotland, but if you wanted to emigrate for real you break everything 
don't you.  
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It could be surmised from these accounts that coercive feelings towards the CTO 
might result in overly restrictive perceptions of how the CTO works.  However, 
it should be noted that that the influence of attitude on understanding of how the 
CTO works was also applicable to service users with more positive attitudes 
towards the CTO.   I mentioned earlier that for some service users, the CTO had 
become closely correlated with care to the extent that they believed they would 
no longer receive such care if the CTO was ended, despite reassurance from their 
care coordinator that this was not the case.  All CTOs contain a condition that 
service users have regular contact with practitioners, and for these service users, 
the ending of the CTO would also mean the demise of the obligations 
practitioners held under the CTO.  It appears then that regardless of whether the 
CTO was perceived positively or negatively, its power could lie as equally with 
the psychological impact it had on service users as much as how it affected their 
lives in actuality. 
 
As with the CTO as a whole, practitioners could at times reshape service users’ 
interpretation of the ‘workings’ of the CTO.  Revisiting the CTO at different 
points with service users could help develop shared viewpoints, particularly once 
service users were more stable.  Discussion of concrete aspects of the CTO, such 
as conditions, could provide practitioners with an ‘anchor’ around which to base 
explanation.  For some service users, practitioners were able to work with them 
to clarify CTO conditions.  Glenn for example, had been actively involved in 
working out what he would and would not have to do on the CTO:   
We sat down and did a lot of talking about it. Because you want this person to 
comply you see, so there could then be a split second where I disappear and I'm 
not taking my meds and I’ll go stop in somebody’s house say in London or 
something. I'll go live there. You've got to sit down with them and make sure it's 
a mutual understanding and agreement. 
 
For others, such as Shelia mentioned above in relation to travel restrictions or 
those service users who thought their care package would stop if the CTO ended, 
reassurance by practitioners about the actual nature of their conditions did not 
change their beliefs.  It may be that for those service users, their general beliefs 
about the role of the CTO in their life were so engrained that practitioner 
intervention could not make any difference to their specific beliefs about how the 
CTO worked.   
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Getting support from practitioners in order to clearly understand how the CTO 
worked was not always what participants experienced however.  This was 
particularly the case with conditions around drug and alcohol use, where service 
user ambiguity around such conditions could be reinforced by practitioners.  On 
the one hand, practitioners expressed the view that the conditions of the CTO had 
to be clearly understood, because it was unethical to expect an individual to 
adhere to boundaries otherwise.  Having the capacity to understand what the 
CTO means is not part of the criteria for its use in England.  Nevertheless if 
service users demonstrated little or no ability to understand conditions, the CTO 
was generally seen as not viable by practitioners. On the other hand not being 
entirely clear about conditions could be seen as part of making the CTO work for 
some practitioners, in terms of reinforcing the power of the CTO and mediating 
certain kinds of behaviour, as this AMHP describes:  
I suspect patients are not being told in very clear straightforward terms that 
while these are conditions, if you breach these conditions, it will actually have no 
effect in terms of you being recalled back into hospital.  If you explain that, then 
it weakens the order and it weakens the boundaries. 
 
Certainly, observation of interactions between practitioners and service users 
turned up examples of obfuscation by omission, as shown here in a home visit 
following the renewal of a CTO: 
Care coordinator: So this is about why you’re on a CTO, what happens when 
you’re on a CTO, what happens if you don’t keep to the conditions.  Though I 
have to say you don’t have many conditions. So can you tell me what they are? 
Stuart: Keep taking medication, not smoking cannabis, not drinking heavily and 
seeing you. 
Care coordinator: And do you know what happens when you don’t keep to them? 
 
The practitioner did not go on to explain to Stuart that his conditions did not 
make any reference to drug or alcohol use.  When I asked Stuart later in 
interview what his conditions were, he replied: no overly excessive alcohol 
drinking, no weed and that's about it.   In this sense, service user understanding 
and subsequent level of certainty about conditions and what would happen if they 
were broken, was dependent to a certain extent on how definite, clear and honest 
practitioners were about the process.   
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Medication and consent 
 
One condition that all participants were clear about was compliance with 
medication. As inferred in Chapter Five, there could be many complex and 
interlinking reasons why individuals did or did not adhere to medication, relating 
to both internal and external drivers.  For some participants however, internal 
drivers to take medication were not as important as the external factors which 
compelled them to adhere to medication regimes, regardless of how they felt 
about it.   External factors were not limited to ‘straightforward’ compulsion.  As 
has been suggested elsewhere (Monahan et al, 2001), compulsion under 
legislation is at one end of a spectrum of compliance from persuasion upwards, 
and communication of various kinds between practitioners and service users was 
influential in medication adherence.   
 
Nevertheless, participants’ held the view that: the very strict rule of being on a 
Section and a CTO is that you conform and comply with medication (Brendan).  
For all but one of the participants this meant medication being administered with 
a depot injection rather than taking oral medication of their own accord.  For a 
very few participants, such an imposition of control by professionals over 
medication administration was accepted, as they did not feel able to maintain 
medication adherence by themselves.  For example, Michael explained that when 
he was floridly psychotic, his mental state meant he had no choice over whether 
to take medication or not: when I came out of hospital the doctor confirmed I 
would be put on a CTO so I could take medication regularly, because I wasn’t 
able to take oral medication regularly, sometimes the voices wouldn’t give me a 
chance to take my medication.  However, oral medication was the preferable 
choice for most participants; being on the depot injection could bring up issues 
for many participants around privacy, dignity and a lack of control when 
medication is “‘given’ rather than ‘taken’” (Patel et al, 2011, 1486).   In this 
regard, having medication via injection was the condition that most encapsulated 
the loss of control the CTO can mean for individuals, as Sarah makes clear: 
I think it’s only the injections that make it more control, the fact that you're given 
an injection and the patient can't...because there's times in the past when I've hid 
the tablet under my tongue and spit it out afterwards, there's loads of times when 
I haven't taken medication.  It’s you know, it’s a fact that if someone doesn't want 
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to do something they'll try their damnedest not to do it.  So the injection is the 
only way that the staff know that the patients get the medication. 
 
This raises a broader point about the nature of consent in the use of CTO 
conditions.  Whilst in legal terms, individuals on a CTO can only be given 
treatment in the community if they consent to that treatment
29
, in practice this 
was much less clear-cut and could highlight the ambiguous nature of the term 
‘consent’.   Irene’s understanding of the medication condition for her CTO was 
expressed in highly coercive terms:   
I just realised I was being forced to take medication. I understood that part of it 
and they were going to come out and see me, and that I had no say in it. So I 
thought that wherever I was on injections I would be on a community treatment 
order, whereas if we mutually agreed on a different strategy that would mean i 
would be off the community treatment order. 
 
Irene did not appear to be aware of her rights under the CTO, specifically that 
medication could not be ‘forced’ on her in the community.  However, as will be 
discussed in more depth later, even when recall was not used, the threat of recall 
meant that such rights could mean little.  Subsequently, service users might feel 
they had very little choice over how they managed medication and that their 
preferred strategies for coping were removed from them.  Sarah had a very 
ambivalent attitude to medication and in the past had preferred not to be on it, 
accepting her on average yearly hospitalisations as the price to pay for being able 
to live medication free and lose weight and feel healthier.  She did not 
necessarily see medication as central to her remaining well, as she said: I think 
my distorted thinking turns itself round anyway.  Sarah did feel though that the 
CTO, and the threat of recall, meant she could no longer make choices about 
whether to accept her medication or not.  Being on a CTO might be preferable to 
a long admission in hospital, but one of the potential consequences of long-term 
compulsion in the community for individuals like Sarah was the continuing loss 
of self-efficacy over the path their treatment might take.   
 
Even so, although the psychiatrists observed in discussion with service users at 
reviews tended to be resistant to requests for changes to oral medication, they 
                                                 
29 The exception being that treatment in the community can occur without consent if the individual is 
deemed not to have capacity to make treatment decisions. 
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were more open to trialling reductions in medication, or trying different kinds of 
medication. Christine was given the choice to try Lithium for the first time by the 
hospital psychiatrist, and as it worked for her it was written into her conditions 
with her agreement.  This supported her belief that ongoing decisions about her 
medication were a joint endeavour: If it needs changing, we’ll cross that bridge 
when we come to it.  It appeared then to make a difference to the service user 
experience if practitioners elicited service users’ views on medication and make 
clear that some negotiation on medication conditions could be possible from the 
outset.  Moreover, as will be discussed in relation to recall, those participants 
who said they took medication only because they felt compelled to, also gave 
accounts of the greyness of compulsion in practice and the ways they acted at 
times against compulsion. 
 
Understanding the CTO process: recall  
 
Medication was the most tangible manifestation of coercion under the CTO.  
However, as has been referred to earlier, when participants talked about the CTO 
as a coercive force in their lives, it was in psychological as well as experiential 
terms.  Participants who were ambivalent or negative about the CTO were 
especially fearful of ‘quick and easy’ recalls to hospital even if they had not 
experienced recall whilst on the CTO
30
.  Holding a firm belief that they could be 
recalled at any time, but at the same time not knowing what would cause them to 
be recalled, caused participants considerable anxiety.  Hence, the coercive impact 
of the CTO was not necessarily related to the active use of compulsion, but about 
more incorporeal effects, specifically in relation to feelings of powerlessness and 
loss of control over what might occur.  In this section I thus explore service user 
beliefs about recall, and the emotions such beliefs could cause.  As I have 
suggested throughout this chapter, practitioners could play a part in mediating 
service user understanding, and so I then move onto a discussion of interaction in 
relation to recall.  As I have also inferred throughout, many service users did not 
passively allow practitioners to act upon them; they could be an active partner in 
coming to terms with the CTO, and at times took the lead in shaping the path the 
                                                 
30 Five of the eighteen service users in the study had experienced recall either during this or previous CTOs. 
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CTO would take.  Service users’ beliefs about the boundaries of the CTO and 
their responses to practitioner mediation of the CTO did not necessarily limit 
their attempts to negotiate the CTO on their own terms.  Returning full circle to 
the beginning of this chapter, whether service users pushed the boundaries of the 
CTO or not was related to their understanding of and trust in authority, and an 
associated sense of agency.  Accordingly, in the final part of this section (and this 
chapter) I outline how such actions materialised.   
 
Beliefs about recall 
 
If participants believed that they could be recalled at any time regardless of their 
mental state, then this would mean they also believed it could happen for no 
discernible reason.  Patrick’s belief that the recall process could be evoked at the 
whim of practitioners was grounded in his understanding that he could be taken 
back to hospital on ill-defined grounds: I don't really understand the CTO … I 
know if I do anything they think is wrong I'm straight back in there.  I can’t 
afford to take chances like that.  Such fear could also be dependent on previous 
experiences of hospitalisation, as illustrated by a conversation I had with a care 
coordinator about a recall he had just instigated:  
Care Coordinator: Well Bob has been picked up by the police 
Me: Was he at home? 
Care Coordinator: He must have just got the recall letter because he rang up 
sounding absolutely terrified saying he’d be in until 1pm, but no one was here to 
take his phone call 
Me: Why do you think he was so frightened? 
Care Coordinator: He’s been in hospital five or six years, he doesn’t want to go 
back in.  I don’t think he understands that it’s only recall for treatment.  I think 
he thinks he’ll be taken in for another five or six years.   
 
Extreme anxiety could lead to avoidance tactics; when recall did occur, service 
users who were particularly anxious sometimes absconded.  Craig disappeared 
for a number of days when he was issued with a recall and told practitioners he 
would: rather commit suicide than go back to hospital (case note).   
 
Conversely, participants who were more positive about the CTO expressed an 
optimistic view of the recall process, which related back to their underlying sense 
of trust in practitioners.  Gwen, who perhaps had the most ‘passive’ stance 
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towards the CTO out of all the participants, felt that with recall: You’d have to 
listen to them because they’re professionals.  So, I would be quite happy to go 
back again.  Similarly, Brendon held the belief that he would not be recalled 
unless it was deemed absolutely necessary: But I don’t really see any reasons 
why I would get recalled back to hospital so it’s hard to really tell you how I 
would feel…But if I was, there would have to be a good, solid, strong reason 
behind it.  For Brendon, the aim of the CTO was to keep him out of hospital and 
he trusted practitioners to keep to that aim, so the recall part of the CTO held the 
least personal relevance for him.  Brendon’s account highlights that the key 
mechanism of the CTO – recall - which gives the CTO its structure and which is 
aimed at ensuring behavioural compliance, may not be of particular importance 
to individuals who accept the CTO, and in their view, may not be the element 
that makes the CTO ‘work’ for them, dependent on what purpose they see the 
CTO holding.  As concluded in the previous two chapters, the very value of the 
CTO for practitioners and service users alike could lie in not putting it to use.   
 
However, as also discussed there, recall could also be seen by service users as 
one of the main benefits of the CTO in ensuring quick treatment.  Such 
participants tended to express the view that recall had a particular remit.  Recall 
is limited to a 72 hour period, and a common response in interviews with those 
participants was that they believed recall was intended to stabilise the situation 
before a quick discharge back into the community.  None of the participants who 
expressed this view considered that recall might lead to a longer stay in hospital 
through the CTO being revoked, as Glenn explains: it's not going to be forever is 
it. It's not as though I'm going to spend another three and a half years in 
hospital, it just remind you a bit...It's just to get everything sorted out and get 
back out again. Consequently, participants generally varied between those who 
thought they would only be recalled only if they started to become very 
psychotic, as with Stuart who said to be recalled he would have to: think the TV 
were watching me again or something, or saying something to the staff, like if I 
started talking psychobabbly bullshit, and those who believed that they would be 
recalled at any time if they did not ‘stick to the rules’. 
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Interaction and action in the recall process 
 
Similarly to conditions, such beliefs were mediated to a certain extent by 
practitioner description of when recall would happen, which could range from 
dichotomous to more nuanced explanations.  Observations of explanations of 
recall suggest that practitioners tended to try and manage service user anxiety 
with a mixture of levity and reassurance, as seen at Christine’s review:     
AMHP: So does the CTO make any difference to you? 
Christine: Oh yeah, I’d be much freer without it.  I wouldn’t be looking over my 
shoulder all the time. 
AMHP: Do you understand the CTO doesn’t make any difference to if you come 
back into hospital?  It’s only if your mental health deteriorates that you will have 
to come back in.  We can’t just come and go [clicks fingers], you’re in. 
Christine: Yeah, yeah…I’d just feel better if it was lifted  
Psychiatrist: Why is that Christine?  
Christine: Because I’ve always got that fear about someone banging on the door. 
 
This exchange was typical of other interactions I observed, where practitioners 
would reassure service users that the CTO should act like an insurance policy, in 
that recall would not be used unless needed.  It should be noted however that as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, practitioners themselves did not always 
have a clear handle on when to use recall or not.  Indeed the actual use of recall 
did not always match such explanations.  It can be imagined that incongruence 
between explanation and action is likely to fuel uncertainty and anxiety rather 
than assuage them.  Hence, service users’ responses to practitioner reassurance 
were variable, and as pointed out in the section above, pre-existing trust in 
practitioners and the system played a large part in how they approached recall.  
In Christine’s case, she had experienced recall before and so such reassurance 
did not change her fear of the possibility of recall.  At the other end of the 
spectrum from reassurance, in order to try and instigate compliance practitioners 
could use the threat of recall even if it were not likely to occur.  For example, 
Andrew rarely came to reviews with his psychiatrist but would meet with his 
care coordinator and take his medication.   At the review I observed, the 
psychiatrist pointed out: The other thing about your order is that you need to see 
a psychiatrist, and you haven’t seen me have you?  You’ve seen me once since 
you left hospital.  Now if you’re not keeping to your conditions, that means I 
would have to see if you have to be back in hospital.    
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Even though the belief that recall would happen if conditions were broken was 
common, the level of latitude participants displayed within that remit 
demonstrated subtle yet significant differences in the amount of power they felt 
they had in the process.  Service users could know which boundaries they might 
and might not push; in relation to drug/alcohol use, even when individuals 
erroneously thought that abstention was a condition of the CTO, it seemed 
unlikely to stop or limit their substance use.  But finding ways around the CTO 
could also occur in relation to medication.  As stated earlier participants 
understood medication conditions to be absolute, but they could also demonstrate 
some control over their medication intake.  In this sense, a tension between 
choice and control underpinned participant narratives on medication.  Simon 
described how even on the CTO he sometimes missed his appointments for 
medication, so that, the CTO doesn’t affect when I get my depot.  It just means 
that if I turn around and say ‘No I am not going to take it full stop’, then they can 
section us and give us it.  Conversely, the only way other participants felt they 
could take some control over medication was to force the hand of professionals, 
as in Graham’s account when he described how his medication regime was 
changed: 
Interviewer: So you got your medication changed recently? 
Graham: Yeah, I took myself off Risperidone and got recalled.   
Interviewer: Oh is that how it happened? 
Graham: Yes, I wanted a different tablet, different dose of medicine.   
 
In situations where medication was not being negotiated, acts like Graham’s 
where recall was manipulated to meet his medication needs can be seen as a way 
of regaining some proximal integrity.   
 
Moreover, service users at times ‘played the CTO game’ in order to meet other 
goals, with varying success.  This involved triggering recalls through non-
compliance as a way of getting access to hospital for respite in the absence of 
other alternatives, or as an escape from social pressures.  Whilst practitioners did 
not always respond as service users hoped to these actions, attempts to subvert 
the recall process could still undermine the efficacy of the CTO by creating 
uncertainty for practitioners about when recall was ‘truly’ needed.  It should be 
noted however that service users’ demonstrating agency was not necessarily 
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about taking action, but could also be about not taking action in order to regain 
some sense of control over their lives.  For some service users, protesting against 
the CTO was seen as hopeless, and passivity resulted from resignation.  For 
others, a passive response was a way of subverting practitioners’ expectations for 
the CTO.  A few participants described how they did everything they needed to 
for the CTO without complaint so as to not trigger use of recall, but without 
opening up to practitioners or engaging in any deep sense with what practitioners 
wanted regards internal change and motivation.  Surface compliance and ‘doing 
the right things’ whilst at the same time not losing sight of their own goal 
(discharge) was seen as a way of gaining control without losing integrity.  Sarah 
described this in relation to the first CTO she was placed on:   
No I was complying, although I really didn’t want to. I was very unhappy about 
that decision but I wasn't fighting it.  I know some people try to avoid the person 
coming to give them the medication and all sorts of things but I wasn't doing 
anything to avoid it.  So...because I was complying they saw no need to have the 
CTO, you know compulsory, so in the end they decided to take me off it.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that outright resistance in the face of recall was also 
the route taken by some service users.  As discussed earlier, negative attitudes 
towards the CTO could exacerbate poor relationships and distrust between 
service users and services/practitioners.  This was certainly the case for Craig, 
where the CTO prompted a breakdown in engagement with services.  As his care 
coordinator told me:  
It completed wrecked any trust he had in mental health services and his whole 
focus and his whole interaction with mental health services became about the 
CTO rather than him recovering, rather than him getting well and getting on 
with his life. It just became a personal crusade and a battle and I think that’s the 
same with a lot of clients really.   
 
Craig would avoid appointments and medication which in turn triggered recall, 
from which Craig would run away, thus causing a drawn-out process involving 
his family, mental health services and the police.  In Craig’s view, this was the 
only option he had in terms of engaging with the CTO.  Although Craig’s 
motivation in such actions was to manage his anxiety about hospital admission, a 
side-effect was that continued recalls followed by lengthy searches for him when 
he went missing could cause significant strain on services.  
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Dawson et al (2003, 253) suggest that the CTO has the capacity to “both advance 
and limit [an individual’s] freedom, in different respects and at different times in 
their lives”.  This complex and fluctuating interaction between compulsion - as 
characterised by the CTO - and freedom was certainly reflected in participant 
accounts.   The CTO is a compulsory measure, but how much room for 
manoeuvre participants believed they had within the CTO varied, both 
individually and in relation to different aspects of the CTO.   
Concluding thoughts 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed how CTOs are experienced and negotiated by 
service users.  Three main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The 
first conclusion relates to the nature of service users’ understanding of the CTO.  
Service users’ feelings and beliefs about the CTO in general filtered down to 
how they understood and experienced it in their daily lives.  Particularly if the 
view is taken that CTOs act as an ‘insurance policy’ - being present in the 
background but not used unless necessary - it can be argued, and indeed was by 
some practitioners, that CTOs have very little concrete effect on individuals.  
However, this disregards the central place of medication in service users lives.  
Furthermore, what these findings suggest is that coercion is not necessarily 
linked to the ‘concrete’ manifestations of compulsion. As demonstrated by some 
service users’ understanding of what their conditions entailed, and when and why 
recall would happen, the CTO has the potential for potent psychological effects, 
causing feelings of restriction, insecurity and anxiety.  At the same time, it would 
be wrong to say that the psychological implications of CTOs were necessarily 
correlated with negative beliefs about the CTO.  Attitude and understanding were 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and this was also true for those service 
users who had accepted the CTO as a signifier of care. 
 
The second conclusion relates to the practitioner-service user relationship as a 
mediating factor in the CTO.  Service users were not as involved as they could be 
with the initial stages of the CTO and this lack of involvement can influence their 
on-going attitude to the CTO.  For those service users who were actively 
involved in decision-making and where time was spent explaining the CTO in 
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terms that chimed with their sense of self, feelings of coercion could be 
mitigated.  Furthermore, it seems that when practitioners were willing to 
negotiate on aspects of the CTO, particularly regards medication, and work with 
service users to create a sense of mutual enterprise, the CTO could be ‘reframed’ 
in positive terms.  It seems that the earlier this relational work took place, the 
more likely it was to have an effect.  Earlier intervention about the CTO as a 
whole could help reshape its meaning, but reassurance further down the line 
about specific aspects such as conditions and recall could be more variable in its 
effects, particularly with service users who had engrained beliefs about the CTO 
as a whole.  It should also be acknowledged however that practitioners’ could 
reinforce coercion during the course of the CTO through what they did or did not 
tell service users about how conditions and recall worked, and how clear and 
honest they were.  It appeared then that what supports more positive CTO 
experiences is not necessarily direct mitigation of the CTO itself, but the 
relational context it resides within.   The practitioner-service user relationship did 
not only influence the CTO; there was a simultaneous process whereby the CTO 
could influence pre-existing dynamics between practitioners and service users.  
As noted particularly in relation to recall, beliefs on practitioner expertise, 
motivation and the consequent level of trust service users felt towards 
practitioners, could trickle down into how they understood the CTO.  
Conversely, the presence of the CTO could magnify such beliefs about 
practitioners, thus engraining relationships of trust or distrust.   
 
This leads us on to the final and third conclusion – the varying ways that service 
users displayed agency towards the CTO.  As referred to throughout this chapter, 
despite the powerlessness expressed by some service users, they could act on the 
CTO in a variety of ways in order to gain a sense of control, relating to either 
acceptance, rejection or subversion of the CTO and its ends and means.  As noted 
above, acceptance of the CTO involved mutual work on the part of service users 
and practitioners – a co-construction of a good relationship within compulsion 
and a shared narrative of the aims for the CTO.  However, active acceptance was 
not only about acting in response to practitioner instigation.  As described, it 
could also be a process very much led by the service user, as a way of making the 
practice of the CTO conform to what they saw as its purpose.  Alternatively, for 
196 
 
service users who actively resisted both any purpose for the CTO and how it was 
operationalised, it became a point of conflict characterised by cyclical power 
struggles, particularly regards adherence to CTO conditions and the use of recall.  
Subversion of the CTO can be seen as somewhere in between rejection and 
acceptance, in that it involved service users turning the CTO against itself in 
order to reach their own ends, which did not correlate with practitioner aims.  All 
three of these approaches have been described thus far in terms of action, but as 
stated in the chapter, service users also used more passive tactics relating to 
avoidance of deeper engagement in order to negotiate the CTO on their own 
terms as much as they felt they could.  This in itself could be seen as a form of 
subversion.  All three stances - acceptance, rejection and subversion - have 
implications for CTO practice and caused dilemmas for practitioners, both in 
terms of everyday CTO use and the shaping of discharge outcomes.  It is the 
practitioner perspective on the day to day use of CTOs I turn to now, where 
amongst other things these dilemmas will be discussed in more detail. 
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Chapter Eight 
Putting CTOs into action: 
Practitioners’ experiences of their use 
 
In drawing out service users’ experiences of the CTO in practice, the focus was 
very much on their individual journey though the CTO process, where I explored 
their responses, actions and interactions within each of its stages, and how these 
personal and relational elements might shape the path the CTO takes.  This 
chapter turns to practitioners’ experiences of CTO practice, and although I use 
the same structure – moving through discharge to the use of conditions and recall 
– the ground I cover is more varied.  The focus here is on how practitioners make 
use of the CTO, and the various factors that impinge on that use through the 
different phases of the CTO.  Hence, whilst I provide the ‘other side’ of the story 
to the last chapter by detailing how practitioners dealt with the ethical challenges 
of the CTO, and went about relational work within its bounds, I also weave in the 
influence of other contextual and systemic factors. These include the effects on 
CTO practice of: team dynamics, the relationship between inpatient and 
community services, the role of other agencies in the CTO process, and resource 
issues.  I also draw attention at various points to the roles different practitioners 
take in implementing the CTO, and how this affected the way they approached 
the CTO, specifically in relation to AMHP work and the differentiation between 
psychiatrists and other members of the team.   
 
In the first section I cover the discharge process and how decisions to impose a 
CTO are made.  There are various formal and informal actors involved in this 
decision-making and I elucidate how these actors engage with each other to come 
to the CTO.  In doing so, I also refer to the constraints and institutional 
framework practitioners operate within, and the potential implications of these 
for how the CTO is embarked upon and subsequently unfolds.  In the latter two 
sections of the chapter I explore how practitioners’ both interpret and use 
conditions and recall, with emphasis placed on how practitioners variably 
negotiate practical-ethical challenges and dilemmas throughout the CTO process.   
Although emphasis is again placed on practitioner action and interaction with 
other actors in context, I also highlight how the internal logic of the CTO may 
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encourage particular defensive patterns of practice which could be at odds with 
practitioners views on how it ‘should’ be used.  I end the chapter with a 
consideration of cases where the activation of the CTO might not be possible, 
which raises questions about its potential limitations.   
 
The practitioner perspective on discharge from hospital onto the CTO  
 
As highlighted in the last chapter, discharge onto the CTO could sometimes be 
experienced as a rushed and unplanned event by service users.  In an echo of 
practitioner concerns around CTOs being introduced as a form of resource 
management, practitioners expressed similar discomfort about how discharges 
were handled.  In one of the Trusts there were frequent disagreements about 
discharge decisions, with the community team often believing individuals needed 
more time in hospital whilst the inpatient team were keen to discharge.  This 
tension is not uncommon in mental health services when it comes to discharge 
more generally, especially with current pressures on beds, but similar to previous 
research (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013) the addition of the CTO sharpened 
the view that better planning was needed.  This section explores the process of 
discharge onto the CTO with these issues in mind.  Specifically I examine how 
decision-making on CTO discharge took place, and the interpersonal and 
systemic factors which influenced that decision-making.   
 
Discharge decisions onto the CTO are relatively complex, involving a number of 
actors, both formal and informal.  The formal decision-makers – the ones who 
sign off the CTO and decide its details – are the inpatient psychiatrist and the 
AMHP.  Therefore, I firstly give an account of AMHPs experiences of CTO 
discharge, focusing on the difficulties unplanned CTOs could engender for them.  
Whilst the inpatient psychiatrist and an AMHP formally decide on the CTO, the 
community team who oversee the everyday care of service users have an 
important informal role in directing decision-making.   Consequently, I follow on 
by exploring the role of team dynamics in shaping whether CTOs were 
advocated for or not by the community team.  In the final part of this section, I 
give an account of the interaction between community and inpatient services in 
shared decision-making on the CTO, the systemic factors that could cause 
199 
 
communication breakdowns and the potential outcomes when shared decision-
making did not occur.  I particularly pick up here a major theme developed in the 
last chapter on the implications of the CTO for practitioner-service user 
relationships. 
 
The role of AMHPs in discharge onto the CTO 
 
Rushed discharges often meant last minute CTOs, with little time given for 
planning.  As second decision-makers who have to agree the CTO with the 
inpatient psychiatrist, AMHPs could find last minute CTOs particularly difficult 
to manage.  The AMHPs spoken to felt there could often be an expectation that 
they ‘rubber-stamped’ CTOs as a matter of routine, particularly if they were 
called in to sign a CTO off on the day of discharge, as described here:  
Generally, things have got better but I still think the involvement of the AMHP is 
quite tokenistic. And I still think a lot of consultants have seen the involvement of 
the AMHP as just sort of a paper exercise, something to jump through.  I've 
heard lots of AMHPs complain about that as an issue, where they’ve been asked 
to attend on the day and the CTO is pretty much signed, sealed and delivered, 
bar their signature.  
 
In both Trusts, AMHPs had ‘pushed back’ against this practice, asking for time 
to hold a planning meeting and to speak to the individual, their family and the 
professionals involved in their care.  Generally it was recognised, as discussed in 
the last chapter, that starting service users out on a well-informed footing would 
help the progress of the CTO in the longer-term.  For AMHPs, refusing to attend 
last minute and ‘holding things up’ could be an uncomfortable position to be in 
however, especially if the service user was pushing for discharge as well.  More 
generally, whilst all the AMHPs emphasised their independence and the 
responsibility they had to consider the CTO ‘in the round’, none of them recalled 
ever disagreeing to a CTO.  The momentum of discharge was part of the reason 
why CTOs had a certain inevitability, but the broad legal criteria for CTOs also 
made them difficult to oppose:  
An AMHP goes in independently to look at a CTO, but often the criteria really to 
fit them, it can be applied to pretty much anyone and it's difficult because if 
you've got a weight of evidence from a number of people it's quite hard to be a 
lone professional and say, ‘well let’s take that risk’. (AMHP Lead)  
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This is a particularly important point to consider given that it has been suggested 
that social workers (as most AMHPs are) can act as a counter to the over-use of 
CTOs (George, 2011).  Where AMHPs saw their role as having importance was 
more in deciding the detail of the CTO, particularly the conditions that were 
placed on a CTO, which will be returned to later.  
 
The influence of team culture on discharge 
 
Whilst the AMHP and the inpatient psychiatrist were the formal decision-makers 
on the CTO, the community team played a key informal role, as they would be 
the ones making a CTO work once in place.  Team dynamics within community 
teams were thus an important factor in the decision on whether to put in place a 
CTO.  This was particularly in regards to the relationship between the 
community team psychiatrist and care coordinators.  In one of the Trusts, I 
conducted comparative interviews within an AOT in a different area of the Trust 
where the numbers of CTOs in operation were much lower, to see what had 
made the difference.  One clear factor was that the whole team, including the 
Manager and the psychiatrist, agreed that CTOs should only be used in very 
limited circumstances, which meant that they did not tend to advocate for CTOs 
and indeed would decline them, as the Manager explains here: almost any time 
any of our people are admitted on a section, the inpatient consultants are 
suggesting discharging them on a CTO. But 9 times out of 10 we’re saying no.  
This contrasted with the AOT where I was mostly based in that Trust, which had 
a large number of CTOs; the psychiatrist there was very keen on CTOs and 
would take the lead in arguing for them, which some of the care coordinators 
could at times find problematic, as this one told me: He loves them, he loves 
them. It's quite easy to recall. Plus it's protecting him just in case something goes 
wrong. Do you know what I mean? He's using it for protecting the public, 
protecting him and his professional practice.  
 
Conversely, in the other Trust where field work was carried out, the psychiatrist 
in that team was much less active in pursuing CTOs, which could also cause 
frustration for care coordinators who saw the need for them.  Consequently, those 
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care coordinators were more instrumental in asking for and securing CTOs, as 
the psychiatrist explained:  
My personal feeling is that some care coordinators are usually too risk averse in 
my view really about the CTO.  I must say very clearly I'm not a huge fan of 
CTOs anyway, I think they're too bureaucratic.  So I see care coordinators to be 
usually more cautious in pushing for CTOs, possibly for good reason, they know 
the patients more than I do. 
 
In this case, the care coordinators were more likely to take the view ‘better be 
safe than sorry’ than the psychiatrist.  Thus the decision to advocate for a CTO 
relied to a great extent on the dispositions, influence and interactions of the 
different actors involved.  As this latter case in particular demonstrates, the 
psychiatrist was not always at the forefront or the driver of such decision-
making.  Further, these team dynamics continued into how CTOs were used once 
they were in place, a point that will be picked up in the discussion of recall. 
 
Shared decision-making 
 
Shared decisions across inpatient and community services tended to be the norm, 
whereby the community team would lead in advocating for the CTO and the 
inpatient psychiatrist and AMHP would agree to it on that basis.  As noted above 
it was often the care coordinator – as the person who knew the service user the 
best in the community - who would make the initial suggestion for the CTO (or 
indeed argued against the CTO) and who carried the decision through different 
forums.  One care coordinator explained their role as being at the crux of 
decisions:   So, if the AMHP asks us, ‘no I don’t think they should be on a CTO’, 
if the psychiatrist asks us, ‘I don’t think they should be on a CTO’. And the 
likelihood is by me saying that they probably wouldn’t.   
 
The involvement of the community team was not always clear-cut however.  In 
both Trusts where the field work took place, a functional split between inpatient 
and community psychiatrists had been introduced recently following policy 
reform.  Consequently, instead of having a ‘patch’ psychiatrist who would 
oversee the care of individuals within a geographical area both in and out of 
hospital, responsibility was transferred from an inpatient psychiatrist to a 
community psychiatrist on discharge.  This could sometimes lead to breakdowns 
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in communication between inpatient and community teams and tensions in 
responsibility, with a lack of joint planning in discharge/CTO decisions.  As 
mentioned earlier, practitioners could feel that inpatient teams discharged service 
users onto CTOs without enough time to plan.  A widely held concern was that 
the outcome of such fast discharges on CTOs would be exacerbated revolving 
door scenarios, whereby the service user would quickly return to hospital on 
recall because they were not ready to be in the community.   
 
The two other main outcomes of fragmented decision-making observed in the 
field sites were: inpatient teams overseeing discharges without the community 
teams knowledge and without authorising a CTO when the community team had 
been advocating for a CTO; or the reverse situation where the inpatient 
psychiatrist made the CTO against the opinion of the community team.  In the 
latter case, one psychiatrist told me that he had refused to have a CTO transferred 
to him because he felt that it was unnecessary:  
We had one person, who was being discharged and inpatients wanted to put on a 
CTO.  I just didn’t see the need for it, the team didn’t think it necessary and we 
fed that back, but they still went ahead with the CTO.  There was no risk, no risk 
at all.  The CTO is to manage risk.  In the end I refused to take him on under a 
CTO and the inpatient consultant had to keep him on in the community for 6 
months.  As soon as he was handed over to me I discharged the CTO.  It’s funny 
because usually I’m all for CTOs, but this time I was really strongly against it.   
 
Discharge onto the CTO against the advice of the community team was not only 
disapproved of because it was seen as unnecessary; it was also challenging for 
practitioners because it could make post-discharge care difficult.  In the last 
chapter I discussed how the CTO could cause or exacerbate relationship 
breakdowns; not involving community practitioners who knew the service user 
well in the discharge decision could make such an outcome more likely.  This 
was because - as was mentioned in Chapter Six - one of the ethical ‘balancing 
acts’ practitioners carried out was whether the benefit of the CTO would 
outweigh damage to their relationship with individual service users, based on 
what they knew about how different service users responded to compulsion.  
Here it seems that process – whereby practitioners might recommend a CTO not 
be used – could be bypassed.  Indeed, one care coordinator talked to me about a 
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woman with whom she had worked for years, who had been placed on a CTO 
against the care coordinators advice, and the damage she felt it had caused:  
The recommendation from the consultant was she would go home on the CTO, 
and I said to them ‘I don't think she needs the CTO, I'm sure I'd be able to deal 
with it’ but I think because she was still very poorly…Well I knew she would 
accept medication off me, I knew she would.  I thought ‘oh god she's going to 
hate this, this is just going to throw such a spanner in the works’.  And it was 
horrendous - 'I don't want you in my house' - you know this was such a long 
relationship that had completely broken down.  The relationship just went 
completely and utterly downhill, and it was really difficult.  It was quite 
traumatic for me as well because it really did upset me.  It took every skill I had 
to get her to come round really, and she's only just warming and it’s been over a 
year.  I don't feel that we've got the same rapport at all, I think it's completely 
broken, we're just playing at being nice to each other, that's how it feels to me.   
 
It is worth noting here the emotional investment practitioners sometimes made in 
their work with service users, which meant relationship breakdowns such as this 
could be experienced as extremely difficult.  In a sense collaborative work on the 
CTO, with mutual goals agreed to, could therefore be for the benefit of 
practitioners as well as service users. In the last chapter, I observed that service 
user accounts of interactions with practitioners demonstrated that practitioners 
often attempted to build a therapeutic relationship with them within (and 
sometimes despite) compulsion.  I expand on how practitioners went about this 
in the next section on the use of CTO conditions. 
 
Practitioners’ use of conditions 
 
As with the initial decision to use the CTO, the legal criteria for imposing CTO 
conditions are broad, which means professionals have a great deal of latitude in 
deciding what conditions to include.  Despite this, it became evident during the 
field work that practitioners were typically careful about what conditions they 
included, and used their discretion within particular boundaries.  Similarly to 
findings elsewhere (Lepping and Malik, 2013, Smith, Branton and Cardno, 
2014), the three main conditions placed on service users in this study were 
variations on: adherence to medication, attendance at care reviews and consultant 
appointments, and allowing access to members of the care team.  Four out of the 
eighteen service users also had attendance at appointments with substance 
misuse/dual diagnosis workers included in their conditions, although as already 
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stated in the previous chapter none had abstention from drug/alcohol use as a 
condition.  The other condition that has been reported as sometimes used is to 
reside at a particular address, but this was also not present for any of the service 
users here.  There were three aspects to practitioners’ boundary-setting when 
they considered conditions: lawfulness, feasibility and ethicality, and these are 
discussed first.  As I note, formulating ‘ethical’ conditions also involves 
considerable work with service users in order to make the conditions acceptable, 
and I next consider the relational work practitioners do with service users within 
the remit of the CTO.  Such relational work has limits however, and I conclude 
this section by describing how practitioners handled medication compliance as 
part of the CTO.   
 
Lawfulness, feasibility and ethicality 
 
In regards to lawfulness, the AMHPs in particular had a view on human rights 
and possible challenges that could be made to conditions.  This caused some 
uncertainty about what conditions could and could not be included.  For example, 
even though residency can be and is used as a CTO condition, there was some 
debate and uncertainty about it in the field sites, even among AMHPs: I'm not 
sure how lawful they would be if you put that as a condition that you would 
reside at a particular residential home or...so I don't actually see how they could 
do that.  I'm not sure if the CQC would be keen on that.   Through talking to 
AMHPs and the AMHP Leads in the two Trusts, it seems that there had been a 
‘bedding in’ period where a greater range of conditions had been attached to 
CTOs, but this had changed over time:  
I think initially there was quite a lot of anxiety with it being a new piece of 
legislation.  There were teething problems with certainly a lot of inappropriate 
conditions that AMHPs were being asked to look at.  Which were almost if you 
had signed up to those you'd be looking at a breach of article 8 rights to be 
honest, a lot of them were really highly intrusive (AMHP Lead).   
 
Subsequently, as second decision-makers, whilst they rarely disagreed with the 
imposition of a CTO in itself, the majority of the AMHPs talked about 
sometimes having to play a mitigating role in countering the more ‘extreme’ 
conditions that might be suggested by inpatient psychiatrists.   
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In making those arguments, AMHPs relied more on questions of feasibility rather 
than legality however.  In Julie’s hospital discharge meeting, the psychiatrist was 
planning on including drug/alcohol abstention as a condition, at which point the 
AMHP intervened: there’s no point putting anything about drugs or alcohol, 
we’re just setting her up to fail and she’ll never get out of here otherwise.  This 
point about ‘setting individuals up to fail’ was a broadly held one; conditions 
which service users could not be expected to keep to might result in continuous 
breach of the CTO and subsequently risked repeated hospital admissions.  At the 
same time, including ‘unworkable’ conditions which admission to hospital would 
do little to rectify also risked rendering the CTO meaningless and ‘toothless’, as 
highlighted in Nick’s case notes:  
Nick is subject to a CTO which originally included a condition on abstention 
from illicit drug use, but this was removed by his psychiatrist due to the 
difficulties in enforcement and that recall to hospital could not occur as 
treatment for his illicit use cannot be provided on an acute inpatient bed.   
 
As seen here, the community psychiatrist could act in a similar mitigating way as 
AMHPs sometimes did, by modifying the conditions that the inpatient 
psychiatrist had initially put in place.  For two of the service users involved in 
this study, Nick and Simon, this had resulted in the community psychiatrist 
altering the conditions ‘after the fact’, thus tailoring the CTO as it progressed.   
 
Making CTOs feasible was closely connected to making them ethical – a kind of 
‘practical ethics’.  Conditions were separated into ‘hard’ conditions which are 
easily monitored and enforceable (such as seeing professionals and medication) 
and ‘soft’ conditions which are not (such as abstention from drug/alcohol use and 
attendance at talking therapy).  ‘Soft’ conditions were viewed as unusable not 
just because they were unenforceable, but also because of practitioners’ 
expressed beliefs about when and where individuals should be ‘allowed’ choices 
in how they lived their lives.  Such beliefs could be related to perceptions of 
social norms, in particular regard to personal autonomy
31
:  
I know that using cannabis is illegal but lots of people do it you know, and would 
the police be allowed to use the same power if you didn’t have a mental illness, 
                                                 
31 It is interesting however that there exists a contradiction between this ethical stance on ‘soft’ conditions 
and how, as discussed in the previous chapter, practitioners did not always correct service users’ beliefs 
about the existence of such conditions in order to try and manage what was perceived as errant behaviour. 
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say ‘right that’s it now, we’re sick of arresting you for smoking cannabis and 
we’re going to lock you away’?  They’re not allowed to do it, so why because 
you’ve got a mental illness? (Care coordinator) 
 
Similarly, practitioners broadly held the view that service users had a ‘right’ not 
to take part in talking therapies and forms of social rehabilitation in a way that 
did not hold true for medication.  Therapeutic and social activities consequently 
did not feature in CTO conditions in the field sites, as if the service user was 
amenable to such interventions then it was viewed outside the compulsory remit 
of the CTO, and if service users did not want to take part, practitioners did not 
feel comfortable or able to ‘make’ them.  Service user groups have raised 
concerns that CTOs could limit professional involvement with service users to 
medication and negate other forms of treatment.  It was certainly the case in the 
field sites that talking therapies for example could be hard to access; in four of 
the appeals I observed, practitioners were asked by panel members why talking 
therapy was not included in the broader care plan and were told that suitable 
therapy was not available for those service users.  However, it was also the case 
that practitioners responded to service user concerns around intervention, by 
limiting conditions to the ‘bare minimum’ of medication and access, as this care 
coordinator explains: it almost feels like maybe you’re giving people all these 
conditions to live, it just doesn’t feel very human.   
 
Even in relation to the ‘hard’ condition of allowing access to practitioners, there 
were a number of occasions where practitioners described negotiating how such 
access would be enacted, to allow for ethical acceptability for the practitioner 
and to try and respect service user preferences within the boundaries of 
compulsion.  A quote that sums this up is taken from a care coordinator 
discussing a particularly difficult case where she had struggled to form a good 
working relationship with the service user:   
There’s a requirement that we see him weekly but it’s not specific that he 
engages.  We've agreed in the care plan that if he doesn't turn up every second 
appointment, we can more assertively chase him.  He doesn't like to see 
professionals at his home so we agreed to meet him in a city centre cafe which 
was more agreeable to him, because we didn't think it would be ethical or a good 
way to engage him, to insist to use the CTO to see him in his own home. 
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The conditions of CTOs tend to be set out very definitively and briefly; what this 
example suggests is that there is a lot of ‘behind the scenes’ work in both making 
conditions feasible, and in making them acceptable, particularly in ensuring the 
care plan provides contextual guidance for the CTO.  As a psychiatrist noted, 
such an approach was not only about ethical practice, but also about making the 
whole CTO viable: that's the sort of things that need to be done to make the CTO 
work, redesign the conditions to fit that patient better somehow.   
 
Relational work within CTO conditions 
 
Reaching a point of ethical equilibrium on the CTO was therefore often 
correlated with being able to maintain some kind of working relationship with 
the service users who were on them.  As noted above, this might be achieved 
through flexibility and compromise on the specifics of access via the CTO.  
Practitioners also talked about a number of other ways they mitigated the 
potentially coercive effects of visits under the CTO conditions, which could be 
resented as intrusive by service users.  Practitioners described in a general sense 
how they drew on their personal attributes in order to make these visits a more 
affirmative experience.  A care coordinator explained how she had done this with 
Irene:  
Irene did allow me to visit, but it had to be very tentative. She didn't want me 
mentioning medication, she didn't want me mentioning illness and it was more 
about building relationships so...I gradually built up a relationship with her over 
maybe 6 months or so and it started to get easier.  It becomes more of an 
interpersonal thing rather than ‘I must comply, I must attend the reviews, I must 
do this’. Maybe when it becomes seeing me as a person it’s more, ‘Rebecca is 
coming, that's okay because I know her’, rather than an agent of the hospital is 
coming to check up on me and get me if I don't comply. 
 
The care coordinator’s focus on her relationship with Irene, rather than the 
expectations present in the CTO, and the taking of a slow, consistent approach, 
seemed to have enabled Irene to separate out the care coordinator from the 
compulsory framework the visits were occurring within.   
 
Alongside this general relationship-building, practitioners talked about trying to 
keep the CTO positive, by providing hope and being optimistic about change.  
Such an approach chimed with what service users reported in the last chapter on 
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how practitioners could ‘reframe’ the CTO.  This could take the form of 
therapeutic work, looking backwards and forwards to review where the 
individual had been and wanted to be, as this practitioner described: 
You can’t change the CTO but you can work through it. You can reflect back 
with them and get them to understand the reasons you've had to do that. It's 
about how you use the CTO in a bigger sense, it's not how you use it at a time of 
crisis.  When they're well you can start to introduce things like ‘what do you 
think happened there?’, ‘how could we change that in the future?’, so that there's 
a longer-term process to becoming well.  It's about putting things in place so it's 
not a forever sanction. (Care coordinator) 
 
As demonstrated here, the CTO could be used as a starting point for this kind of 
conversation.  In this sense, and as noted in Chapter Six, it was not simply or 
only the case that practitioners used relational means to ‘work around’ the CTO.  
As reported elsewhere (Romans et al, 2004), the strictures of the CTO could also 
encourage constructive engagement.   The necessity of regular visits as set out in 
CTO conditions had the potential to ‘kick-start’ relationships by providing a 
structure and boundaries to work within.  Michael’s care coordinator commented 
on how this had worked for him, who prior to the CTO had avoided contact with 
services:  
I think it’s given us the space to work with him, to see if we can overcome his 
resistance.  It's about building that relationship up where you can actually 
challenge in a gentle way, it doesn’t have to be confrontational.  The CTO can be 
a good starting point because the clarity and the consistency are there. 
 
More specifically, the conditions – and explaining why service users had to 
adhere to them - could give practitioners a ‘way in’ to conversations about risk, 
which they might otherwise struggle to have, thus supporting collaborative 
working on risk management:  
Stuart understands that the reason he’s on the CTO is because he’s considered to 
be a higher risk…with lots of our clients, obviously we talk about recovery and 
we talk about meeting their needs and maintaining their independence and that’s 
what you’d rather be talking to people about.  But the CTO it allows you to have 
more conversations about risk as well, about people’s offence, about their risk 
triggers. (Care coordinator) 
 
‘Routinised’ practice via the CTO in the form of conditions, could therefore 
encourage as well as discourage engagement with service users.  In this case, 
relational and risk focused work reinforced each other, rather than being in 
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opposition.  Whilst practitioners were sceptical about the CTO enabling effective 
monitoring of risk, it was still felt that using the CTO as a tool to get service 
users to talk more openly about the struggles they were having would help signal 
if difficulties were ahead. 
 
It was also the case that – as discussed in the previous chapter – some service 
users tried to maintain control over the CTO and their lives more broadly by 
choosing to restrict their relationship with practitioners as much as they were 
able, thus meaning that practitioners could not get beyond a superficial 
connection.  Ian’s care coordinator explained how this limited what meaningful 
contact he could have with Ian:  
Because he doesn't want to engage, he’s concordant in the very narrowest sense 
of the word.  He knows that he's adhering to the conditions of the CTO by having 
his depot and engaging, it's seen as though he is engaging with the staff, because 
he's seen them.  I don’t think we do much more than monitor him and make sure 
he takes medication, but I think that’s what he wants.  
 
A focus on monitoring and risk management in practitioner visits could therefore 
be shaped by the service user as well as by the CTO regime, and suggests that 
risk-focused practice is not always shaped from ‘above’ and in this sense is not 
clear-cut.  In contrast to the example of collaborative risk management given 
earlier, only being able to act in a monitoring and compliance role meant 
practitioners sometimes struggled to ‘read’ service users and find out what was 
really going on with them, ironically making effective risk management more 
difficult.   
 
Medication, compliance and risk management 
 
Medication compliance was more complex for practitioners to negotiate with 
service users than access and visits.  In the last chapter I described how 
medication could be the most significant ‘concrete’ coercive aspect of the CTO, 
and as such it could act as a stumbling block to service users engaging with 
practitioners but also alternatively as a ‘way in’ for practitioners if meaningful 
choices on medication were encouraged.  Care coordinators described how they 
sometimes used their role (specifically not being a psychiatrist) to distance 
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themselves from medication conditions in order to try to maintain progress with 
service users who were resentful at being compelled to take medication:   
I tried to step back away from the medical side of things so I could get in to see 
him and work with him around other areas.  When he raised issues with his 
medication I would be quite empathetic towards him and try and bridge some 
gaps that way.  But ultimately putting out that ‘the doctor chooses what 
medication you’re on, I can speak up for you but I can't change his mind per se’.   
 
In doing this, care coordinators seemed to be attempting to protect their 
engagement with service users by ensuring medication was not the focal point of 
their work, but also at times by positioning themselves as advocate and the 
psychiatrist as the ‘enforcer’:  
My personal feeling is that sometimes the doctors haven’t got as much to lose 
with regards to engagement so they can be a little bit more outspoken, and I kind 
of…I suppose I don't hide behind that because I support the doctor, but I feel as 
if I can let them take a bit of a lead and say ‘OK you can debate this with your 
doctor’.  
 
When care coordinators were successful in advocating for medication changes, it 
could signal to service users that they had been listened to and supported, thus 
bolstering the relationship, as this care coordinator explained in relation to a 
service user who had been angry with her about the imposition of the CTO:    
Recently she wanted a reduction of her depot.  In the past I've always agreed 
with her because it makes her feel tired so she hasn't got a lot of quality of life 
and I do understand that.  I've always advocated for her, so I thought, this will 
either go one way or the other.  If she does get a reduction and it doesn't go right 
we're going to be back where we started but I'm going to have to show her that I 
trust her, how she feels and what she's saying to me.  So I did, managed to talk 
the doctor into reducing it and she was quite grateful and so after that she's been 
alright.   
 
However, even if practitioners understood service users’ feelings about 
medication, worked with service users to find a dosage that was therapeutically 
viable, and distanced themselves from the medical aspect of care, as noted in the 
last chapter very few of them would consider what the majority of service users 
wanted, which was a move from injections to oral medication.  There have been 
a small number of studies (Lambert, Singh and Patel, 2009, Patel et al, 2011) 
carried out which suggest a strong correlation between CTOs and the use of 
injections for medication.  This seemed to be the case in the field sites; an 
experienced Managers’ Hearing Chair told me he had not seen any CTOs where 
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oral medication was stipulated, and as described in the last chapter all but one of 
the service users in the study were on depot injections whilst on the CTO, despite 
the majority stating a preference for oral medication.  Practitioners’ described a 
symbiotic relationship between the two; the CTO was viewed as difficult to 
implement in terms of monitoring of treatment adherence if an individual was on 
oral medication, therefore where possible the use of injections was written into 
the conditions.  If the use of injections was not possible the CTO as a whole 
might be questioned, as summed up by one care coordinator talking about a case 
where she advocated for the CTO not to be used, the only medication that works 
for him is in oral form, and they were talking about putting him onto a CTO this 
last time but I disagreed with that…we need to monitor their medication, how 
can we possibly do that?   
 
The pairing up of CTOs with depot injections can be seen as a ‘belt and braces’ 
approach to risk management.  If an individual is on oral medication, is being 
seen once weekly as part of their CTO, and deterioration is noted, then recall can 
be used.  However, because that individual is on oral medication, the issue 
seemed to be that the practitioner would not know if lack of compliance had led 
to the deterioration:   
Time tells if they've been compliant, because you might see a more rapid 
deterioration in their mental state if they're not taking them.  There’s still 
grounds to recall because you've seen the deterioration but it's not a definite 
given that it's because they're not being compliant, they might still be taking it. 
(Manager).   
 
On the other hand practitioners also talked about cases where they eventually 
found out that a service user had not been taking medication but had remained 
well for some time: Well he was stable though, he was fine. I mean he was taking 
them but when he felt like it. Not concordantly like every day as he should have 
done.  He had clearly broken his CTO though and I think they put him on a depot 
after recall.  It appeared then that the real concern was being able to use 
medication conditions to have certainty over medication compliance, rather than 
taking a ‘wait and see’ approach to mental state.  More generally, this relates to a 
difference between practitioners who were able to live with greyness compared 
to those who preferred clear rules of engagement.  In Chapter Six I explored 
practitioners’ general ethical stance towards the CTO as connected to how they 
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saw its purpose.  This can be summed up here as either a leaning towards it being 
ethical to ensure treatment by constraining choice or towards it being more 
correct to allow for some autonomy and wait for if/when adverse effects could be 
observed.  The next section will carry forward such ethical debates in discussion 
of the use of recall.   
 
Practitioners’ use of recall 
 
Recall is a process which whilst acknowledged by practitioners to appear as 
simple and clear in the guidance (NIMHE, 2008), could be confusing, time-
consuming, bureaucratic and unpredictable in practice, often involving skilled 
coordination and persistence.  In one of the teams under study, one care 
coordinator had six CTOs on his caseload and because those service users 
regularly refused their treatment, he often spent two days a week coordinating 
recalls back to hospital.  In this sense, care coordinators often undertook work 
which would usually be carried out by AMHPs when managing a MHA 
assessment, such as coordinating the Police and the ambulance when necessary, 
finding and booking a bed, delivering the recall notice and carrying out the recall 
itself.   
 
In the first part of this section I examine such practical challenges in more depth.  
As I have inferred throughout this chapter, practical and ethical difficulties in the 
use of CTOs were often entwined, and in the following part I discuss the ethical 
challenges recall could cause, specifically in relation to its variable value in 
making a positive difference for service users.  The value of the CTO was 
particularly questioned when service users got into ‘recall cycles’, whereby they 
were regularly brought back into hospital for treatment, and I discuss this next.  
As with conditions however, practitioners demonstrated a range of approaches to 
negotiating and allaying recall where possible.  These approaches are accounted 
for before I move onto the final part of this section - those cases where recall was 
seen as ineffective and/or damaging, and which highlight the potential 
boundaries of the CTO. 
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Practical challenges in recall – disjointed services 
 
Observations in both teams suggests that bed shortages could cause considerable 
difficulties in executing timely recalls; often recalls were issued but then not put 
into action until the following week when a bed became available.  More 
fundamentally, differences in the perceptions of the purpose of inpatient care 
could hinder the recall process.  Inpatient teams saw admissions as being for the 
provision of acute care rather than for preventative work, the latter being what 
recall is often aimed at.  In the absence of respite or ‘halfway’ services, this 
could cause problems, as this care coordinator explained: they don't want people 
on the ward if they're not acutely unwell because there's pressure on the ward, 
whereas with CTOs we’re getting them in to get them back on track, I think that 
you have to do a bit of pushing for it to happen.  Slow or ‘blocked’ recalls, and 
fast recall turnarounds could negate the protective purposes of the CTO in 
relation to dealing proactively with relapse and providing a ‘short-cut’ to 
inpatient care.   
 
The circumstances of the recall could also vary; the service user should be 
encouraged to make their own way to hospital as the ‘least restrictive’ option, but 
practitioners reported it was often necessary to involve the emergency services 
due to the potential for resistance and absconding.  A regular problem that arose 
in these circumstances was communicating with the police what their 
responsibilities were in picking people up and conveying them to hospital.  The 
police tend to deal with individuals with mental health difficulties in emergency 
situations, and there appeared to be a sense of bemusement as to why they would 
be compelling someone to go to hospital when their mental health might seem 
stable.  This could cause care coordinators a great deal of frustration, as these 
case notes for Sheila infer:  
Sheila stopped by police at 3am this morning driving. It is reported by the 
officers that they did not have any concerns regarding her mental health or 
presentation and accepted her explanation of visiting a friend close by.  I 
discussed with the operator that given the fact that the Police have been notified 
to bring her to hospital under recall on CTO it was a missed opportunity to pick 
her up.  
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As the CTO did not yet seem to be ‘bedded in’ in terms of all agencies 
understanding what it meant, practitioners could bend the truth; one practitioner 
described to me shortly after a recall that she had to be a bit funny with the 
police, telling them that the person was AWOL from a section 3, because it was 
easier for them to understand than explaining what the CTO entailed.   
 
Ethical challenges in recall – disjointed care 
 
As with practitioner talk on conditions, when practitioners discussed the 
difficulties they had had with recall, it became clear that the separation of 
practical and ethical difficulties could at times be a false divide.  A particular 
issue that was talked about where practical problems compounded ethical 
discomfort was the dislocation that could occur for service users when recalled, 
particularly with frequent recalls.  Lack of bed space meant that when service 
users were recalled, this could be to anywhere within the Trust, which created 
difficulties on discharge for service users in that they could be left far from home 
with little money and for practitioners who had to subsequently facilitate 
transport.  This points to a process which is system rather than person focused, 
and indeed, could be seen as rather unfair if the service user was discharged from 
recall within a few hours, or did not want - or as could be found out on 
assessment - need to be recalled in the first place.  More fundamentally, 
incongruence existed between what practitioners viewed as the theory of recall 
and its practice, and secondarily to that, the discontinuity of care and knowledge 
in the recall process.  In theory, recall was seen as an opportunity to find out 
what needed to happen to support that service user in the community, as this care 
coordinator describes: 
The theory, I think, was very much around your discharge from your local 
hospital bed into the community. If things go wrong and you're recalled, you'll be 
recalled to the hospital bed where you know the doctors, the nurses, people know 
you well and there's that assessment from those clinicians about how things are 
and also that helps with collaboration.  The reality is because you're not 
guaranteed to get a bed in the last ward you were in, and the reality is more, 
service users who have had frequent recalls, have been in pretty much every bed 
around the Trust.   
 
215 
 
It was deemed important by practitioners for inpatient staff to know the 
individual beyond their case file, in order to be able to conduct a well-founded 
assessment at recall and for the service user in return to feel able to discuss their 
circumstances more openly, as this AMHP states: It would be a safeguard 
almost, for them to comfortably explore some of the problems with the care plan, 
but they go to a different doctor on a ward they don't know and sometimes the 
recall is just give them the depot and send them back out, so I think it's more 
superficial.  As stated here, superficiality was not only related to the lack of pre-
existing relationships and knowledge in the recall process, but also with 
pressures inherent to inpatient services which meant they might discharge 
individuals prematurely from recall who may have benefited from a longer stay 
in hospital.  
 
Blurring boundaries through recall 
 
Such practice keyed into the unease practitioners expressed in Chapter Six about 
the CTO as a whole encouraging mechanistic and reductive practice.  Recall was 
really at the heart of these concerns, particularly in cases where individuals had 
got into ‘recall cycles’, similar to the ‘revolving door’ problem which CTOs 
were at least in part meant to alleviate.  In one of the field sites there were a 
small number of service users who were recalled to hospital on a monthly basis, 
as they always refused or avoided visits and their injection.  As noted in Chapter 
Four, one of the characteristics of CTOs across all countries where they are 
enacted is that none of them ‘cross the Rubicon’ (Dawson, 2005) of enforced 
treatment in a community setting – people are always brought back into hospital 
for enforced medication.  The cycling of a small group of individuals in and out 
of hospital on a monthly basis to receive their depot meant that the concept of 
‘crossing the Rubicon’ loses its potency, as the boundary between community 
and hospital became porous and enforced treatment in the community happened 
by proxy, as commented on by one AMHP: 
Obviously you can't make somebody have the treatment if they don’t want it in 
the community but then the alternative is in reality that they end up getting 
recalled and they are made to have it when they get recalled to hospital.  You’ve 
created a new version of revolving door, instead of them coming into hospital for 
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a couple of months and then going out for a year, it’s come in for a couple of 
hours or a couple of days and then out for a month. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, service users’ rights to consent to 
treatment could become meaningless in such circumstances. None of the 
practitioners interviewed felt comfortable with CTOs being used in this way; 
guidance states that recall is “not expected to be used regularly” (NIMHE, 2008, 
34) and repeat recalls particularly raised concern regards what the CTO was 
supposed to be used for.   The consequence of using recall in this way was not 
only related to ethical difficulties around enforced treatment, but also (and in an 
echo of the service user concerns described in the last chapter) that it may 
remove the ability of service users to self-manage and use their own strategies to 
cope: 
I think often people aren't given very much leeway, and people don’t have the 
choice like they may be used to have to actually say, ‘yes well I know actually in 
6 months after not taking my depot I'll become really unwell, but actually I feel 
so rubbish when I’m on that depot that I’d rather have 6 months where I'm 
enjoying my life and choose to take that risk’ (AMHP) 
 
Furthermore, as noted in the last chapter, regular recalls could signify the 
breakdown of relationships with service users, where active resistance could 
mean community care becomes an on-going conflict with recall the ‘battle 
ground’.  This care coordinator distinguished between service users thusly:  
It works very well with those people who have traditional respect for the law and 
authority and they’ve learnt they don’t take their medication, they get recalled, 
they think, ‘oh, I can’t be bothered with this hassle, I’ll just have it’.  However, 
there are others where it doesn’t work so well because they’ve got no respect for 
it.  They don’t believe it has any validity in their life.    
 
Some service users would resist the involvement of services whether a CTO was 
in place or not, but for others the CTO had become a point of contention and 
meant engagement became increasingly difficult.  As with Craig’s case described 
at the end of the previous chapter, not only relationship breakdowns, but also the 
significant strain on resources of such complex and constant recalls could cause 
significant difficulties for practitioners. 
 
Even so, recall could be seen as the ‘lesser of the two evils’ in other cases, 
particularly those where recall although consistent was straightforward and 
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where those service users would not have agreed to treatment in any 
circumstances.  Although being caught in a recall cycle was still recognised as 
disruptive to these service users, it was deemed better that it be used in this way 
especially if risk was a key concern.  One care coordinator talked to me about 
how he and the psychiatrist had managed what he called their shared moral 
ambiguity about such cases by testing it out at appeal:  
We were asking, ‘are we doing this the right way, is this the right thing to do?’  If 
the Tribunal said discharge them we would’ve had no problem because we’re 
becoming that cleft stick, you know, we’re morally muddled up and legally…But 
then the court said that you’re doing the right thing by keeping the CTO running, 
that’s fine.   
 
Gaining legal approval gave repeat recalls legitimacy, particularly in terms of 
proactively dealing with risk for service users who were deemed as being 
difficult to manage in the community.  Although most practitioners accepted this 
argument, at the same time some did not only feel service users’ right to choose 
was limited by the use of recall, but that their own discretion could also be 
restricted by it.  As discussed earlier, the imposition of a CTO could be seen as a 
defensive decision, and so could the active use of recall, as this care coordinator 
states: The CTO defines the actions that we will have to take.  There’s always 
emergencies come up.  But recall creates the emergency.  The very presence of 
recall as an option could make it difficult not to use.   
 
Similarly to the almost blanket use of injections in CTO conditions, the use of 
recall can thus be a way of managing uncertainty, as this care coordinator sums 
up: it's just a kind of, very quick, immediate response and a sort of definite 
response and this is just what we're doing.  Where practitioners were unsure 
about the nature of the situation and what they could do, recall provided a way to 
act.  One way this manifested was in the ‘Catch-22’ embedded in the recall 
process where individuals can be recalled without prior assessment.  This meant 
that if an individual cannot be seen, and the practitioner does not know their 
status, the response can be to recall them ‘just in case’, which could result in 
‘false positives’ and unnecessary admissions.  In one case, a woman had not been 
seen for some time as her care coordinator had left the team and there had been 
little follow-up with her since.  I noticed on the team board that she had been 
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recalled and one of the practitioners related to me what happened: they had 
started to try and contact her but she just doesn’t want anything to do with 
services.  So they had sent recall papers and all of a sudden we get a phone call, 
‘what does this letter mean?’  The practitioner went on to tell me the woman 
sounded fine so she’ll just be in and out.  The inpatient case notes stated that she 
had apparently not been compliant with her medication resulting in 
disengagement from the team.  However, given that the team had only contacted 
the woman twice in the preceding two months it seems that recall was more of a 
way of getting her back in the system rather than being due to non-compliance or 
her mental state. 
 
Negotiation and mitigation in the recall process 
 
Despite the potential for defensive practice, the use of recall was not always 
clear-cut.  I described at the beginning of the thesis the guidance on when recall 
should be used, but as demonstrated by the use of repeat recalls for breach of 
medication conditions, how such guidance is put into practice is highly variable.  
In Chapter Six, we saw that recall was central to many of the purposes 
practitioners saw the CTO fulfilling. Regardless of the practical and ethical 
difficulties that recall could raise, it was a broadly held view that recall could be 
a beneficial preventative intervention for a number of reasons related to 
protection, provision and risk management.  At the same time, some practitioners 
preferred to use the CTO in a more non-intrusive way, keeping recall to a 
minimum.  In this sense, as with the CTO as a whole, practitioners could broadly 
be separated into those who saw recall as only to be used when necessary, and 
those who felt it was a helpful tool which could be used more freely.  Within 
these categories practitioners displayed varying levels of flexibility about when 
and how recall was implemented.   
 
The majority of the psychiatrists interviewed had what can be described as a 
‘black and white’ view of recall, where early recall was seen as the best 
approach: Recall is something that you use when the adherence contract is 
broken.  And I think you do that within a week. I think the point is actually to do 
it early, otherwise what’s the point in the CTO?   There was a dual argument 
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here that firstly, for the CTO to have authority it had to be treated like an 
enforceable contract and secondly, that recall could be justified on the 
assumption that non-adherence to medication would always bring risk.  Other 
practitioners could be less sure, treating recall as a ‘grey area’.  A care 
coordinator who worked across Assertive Outreach and Forensic services 
actually thought his exposure to individuals classed as high risk meant he had a 
more relaxed approach to recall: it is about knowing individuals, knowing what 
the trigger factors are, knowing the risks that they pose, and looking at them 
realistically and saying ‘what's the point in recalling someone?’    
 
Such practitioners could express discomfort about the ‘contractual’ focus on 
compliance to conditions and whether injections had been missed, rather than 
individual circumstances, as this AMHP explains: Decisions to recall are made 
much more around ensuring ongoing medical treatment than ‘what is the current 
risk at this time?’  Moreover, some practitioners expressed the concern that using 
recall in this way could undermine the work they had done to maintain a 
relationship with service users within the CTO.  It was felt that a reactive 
approach to recall could further embed the superficial compliance that some 
service users demonstrated as described earlier, because it could lead service 
users to not be honest and open about what they were experiencing, particularly 
if they were anxious about the idea of recall.  Stuart’s care coordinator described 
such difficulties in relation to their relationship:   
I try to say to Stuart, the more open and honest he can be about what he’s 
experiencing, the less chance there is of him ending up back in hospital.  There’s 
no reason no matter what he experiences we can’t manage it, because he’ll never 
be in a more supported environment than where he is now.  But, at the same 
time, I think he’s scared that, if he says ‘the TV started talking to me again’ or 
‘I’ve started to see the dark shadows’ or, you know, ‘when I look back at the time 
when I was the Son of God, actually, I think I might be the Son of God again’, 
but he’s never going to say that to me because I think he’s terrified that the CTO 
allows us just to whip him straight back into hospital and he hated it on the 
ward. 
 
Consequently, and as with the decision to make the CTO in the first place, care 
coordinators, could play a significant mediating role in recall decisions.  
Psychiatrists filled in and signed off recall papers, but care coordinators were the 
ones who initially drew attention to whether a recall was needed.  Negotiation 
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and ‘steps to compulsion’ were used as a way of averting recall where possible.  
Such negotiation was not always feasible, in particular with those cases as 
described earlier where recall was a point of resistance for service users, as this 
care coordinator explained: there are some service users who may not want to 
have that conversation, it may just be about them saying, ‘I'm only going to have 
my treatment if you recall me to do it’. 
 
For those service users where it was felt there was a chance recall could be 
avoided, practitioners talked for example about giving service users a set number 
of chances to meet with them before recall was triggered.  They also described 
‘reminding’ service users of the CTO in order to achieve compliance: Kid, 
cajole, jest, bad jokes, whatever.  You never argue with anybody anyhow, that’s 
pointless.  With other people it might just be literally a blunt statement because 
you know that’s how they respond best (Care coordinator). A Managers’ Hearing 
Chair explained the various ways he saw recall being dealt with:   
What happens is they get extra support going in there to maintain or get them 
back on their medication or change their medication rather than the power of 
recall and it seems to be the threat of the power of recall, rather than the actual 
usage.  I mean over the past months I've chaired quite a lot and I can remember 
one actually being recalled although several have not complied with medication, 
but other methods have been tried rather than the power of recall actually being 
invoked. 
Even once the recall papers had been issued, hospitalisation was not necessarily 
the result.  A Mental Health Act Officer in one of the field sites told me they 
regularly saw paperwork for recalls which did not eventuate, where the recall 
notice was being used by practitioners only for leverage even though they are 
legally binding documents.  Such actions by practitioners could be seen as a way 
of maintaining good relationships and attempting to alleviate the anxiety of 
service users by being ‘true to their word’ regards their explanations of when 
recall would happen. It should be noted however that averting a recall did not 
necessarily result in lowered feelings of coercion. The leverage sometimes used 
could reinforce feelings of powerlessness, as seen here in an excerpt from 
Patrick’s case notes written by his care coordinator: 
Patrick was angry that the dose had been increased and refused to take the 
depot. I reminded him that he is under the Community Treatment Order and he 
will have to accept the increased dose. I told him that he is free to accept this 
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depot at home and if he doesn’t do that then he will be recalled to hospital and 
given this injection.  Patrick was very angry with that and said ‘just give me the 
injection’ and didn’t want to have any further discussions. I tried to reinforce 
that, even though my reaction might look punitive I am trying to act on his best 
interests and don’t want him to end up in hospital again. 
 
It may be that using the threat of recall to avoid recall could sharpen service 
users’ sense of being in a ‘no win’ situation, despite practitioners best intentions.  
As will be picked up in the next chapter, the potential for safeguards and 
‘protection’ from the CTO to deepen service users’ sense of disenfranchisement 
is a recurring theme.   
 
It should also be noted that the narrative of psychiatrists being quick to use 
recall, and care coordinators ethical discomfort with this meaning they try to 
avert recall, was not always the case.  As discussed earlier, team dynamics 
played a role in the initial decision to make the CTO and continued to play a role 
in how CTOs unfolded.  In the team where the psychiatrist was very keen on 
CTOs, recall was used actively, including repeat recalls.  In the team where the 
psychiatrist expressed reluctance about CTOs he was also cautious about using 
recall, which could cause frustration for many of the care coordinators.   The 
psychiatrist told me that:  
I would not be shaking the remit of the CTO over the patients head, 'you have to 
obey me otherwise I will recall you', that's not the way I see it at all. CTO or no 
CTO I think the care of the patient has to be provided in a respectful way.  We 
need to show some flexibility, we can't follow this rigidly – ‘once you breach 
conditions then that's it, you come to hospital immediately’. We have to remind 
the patient that ‘this is what you agreed on’, they might cooperate, or they might 
have a good reason for not doing it.   
 
His view was that the service user needed to be listened to, and an attempt made 
at a mutually agreeable solution before recall was triggered.  However the view 
in the rest of the team was that their professional judgement was being ignored, 
as this care coordinator explained:  We say, ‘we really need to get them in, let's 
recall’, and then you're met with a brick wall sometimes, and that's frustrating.  
Because when we say they need to be in, that means they really, really do need to 
be in.  Not yesterday, not tomorrow or next week, now.  Not being able to use 
recall proactively for protective and risk-related purposes could undercut the 
value of the CTO for practitioners.  However there were two particular kinds of 
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cases across the field sites where recall was unlikely to be considered by all 
practitioners.   
 
Distinguishing between ‘recallable’ and ‘non-recallable’ cases 
 
The first kind was those that can be described as ‘complex cases’, where the 
individual did not only have a primary diagnosis of psychosis but also of 
substance misuse and/or personality disorder.  In these particular cases the 
individual’s circumstances would often not ‘fit’ the CTO, making it difficult to 
actively use.  For example, it was seen by practitioners as pointless to recall 
someone with a diagnosis of personality disorder because:   
Our inpatient consultants don’t believe in personality disorders as such or, if 
they do believe in them, they don’t believe that an inpatient acute unit is the right 
place to treat someone with a personality disorder.  Because you can’t give 
someone a tablet and settle them down and send them back out again, it’s more 
long-term work. (Manager) 
 
Psychosis by itself can be monitored to a certain extent, whereas deciding 
whether an individual’s behaviour is caused by their psychosis or by substance 
misuse/personality disorder is a more difficult task.  Often practitioners would 
have to try and differentiate between the two when deciding on recall.  As the 
following Manager’s account of an appeal discussion suggests, recall was 
therefore not always used when significant risk was present; for recall to occur 
the risk also had to be related to a mental state that could be treated immediately 
with medication in hospital: 
The panel were concerned about the potential risk that client posed and whether 
management in the community with a CTO was the appropriate way or whether 
he should be actually back in hospital as an inpatient.  And the client, he's quite 
a complex client because he's got the paranoid personality behaviours as well.  I 
was trying to explain to them that the CTO is in place for the voices he hears in 
terms of compliance with medication.  But he's making threats against people 
and it's not linked to his voices, it’s his personality and we can’t recall him 
because of that really. The panel really struggled to get to grips with that. 
 
As seen here, the purpose of the CTO could be questioned if risk was not being 
seen as dealt with.  This questioning also arose in multi-agency working, with 
other agencies struggling to understand why an individual was not being recalled 
when behaving riskily and the team making the argument that risky behaviour 
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not caused by deterioration in mental health was outside the remit of the recall 
function.  In this sense, practitioners were making a similar argument to the one 
they made against the use of ‘soft’ conditions such as drug/alcohol abstention; 
that it was not the role of mental health services to ‘police’ behaviour that fell 
more into the social rather than the medical realm. A care coordinator recounted 
to me a meeting about Nick, where probation were pushing for recall due to a 
spike in Nick’s amphetamine use which caused aggressive behaviour, but the 
team had assessed his mental health as stable and so the psychiatrist had refused.  
Therefore, whilst risk was one strong criterion for recall, it was still carefully 
delineated as being in or outside the boundaries of the CTO.   
 
Practitioners also felt that for some individuals with a diagnosis of personality 
disorder, the CTO, and specifically the recall function, reinforced negative 
interactions with the team.  In one professionals meeting about a service user 
who had made threats against members of staff it was noted that the CTO had 
resulted in: an escalation in his behaviour towards our team.  The threatening 
behaviour is increasing, the threats to staff are becoming more significant.  He’s 
doing everything that he possibly can to sabotage the treatment that we’ve given 
him. Although the individual was breaching his conditions, recall was viewed as 
unfeasible because bringing him to the hospital site would increase the risk for 
staff.  Furthermore with the CTO in place law enforcement agencies were less 
likely to deal with such behaviour. Not only did the CTO mean other agencies 
placed pressure on mental health services to act in regards to risk, it could also 
mean they did not act themselves.  One practitioner said the CTO meant agencies 
such as the police felt they could wash their hands of difficult ‘borderline’ cases.  
In this case the care coordinator commented: Because of the CTO, the CPS didn’t 
charge him when he breached his harassment order against us.  Apparently I 
should understand as a healthcare professional that I’m fair game.  CTOs could 
thus shift the burden of responsibility for ‘risky’ individuals onto mental health 
teams and individual practitioners, rather than maintaining a shared responsibility 
across agencies; instead of managing risk the CTO could therefore exacerbate it.  
Such individuals could be seen as ‘impossible’ cases, with no resolution in sight, 
and with the CTO muddying what was already a complex and challenging 
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situation.  As this service user’s care coordinator said to me after the meeting: As 
a case study, he’s really fascinating, because he’s got us beaten so far. 
 
The second kind of case where recall would not usually be considered was where 
the service user was deemed to be attempting to use the recall function for their 
own purposes, which did not chime with the purposes of the team. As noted in 
the last chapter, individuals who used hospital admission as a coping strategy for 
various reasons would try and trigger recalls when they felt it necessary, for 
example by refusing their medication.  Simon was a good example of someone 
who had done this with varying success whilst on the CTO in order to escape 
social pressures such as difficulties with housing.  As Simon’s CTO went on, it 
became increasingly difficult for him to be recalled; in his case notes it was 
requested that practitioners no longer initiated recall unless absolutely necessary, 
and in an appeal report it was noted:  His social worker felt that the CTO was not 
necessary since if anything Simon was too demanding of support.  There was a 
potential dichotomy at work here; practitioners talked about recall in protective 
terms, and indeed as discussed in Chapter Six understood why service users 
might act in this way, as a natural response to the changes and subsequent 
limitations of services:   
I think he doesn’t like the CTO and he would like to be in control of it himself.  
He’d like to be able to say, ‘I need a break now’, when he's slightly unwell and 
had enough of dealing with living alone, and that's how he was managed 
previously.  But unfortunately we don't have respite care anymore... so the only 
way he can get respite is by becoming non-compliant, deteriorating and getting 
into hospital that way, where he feels safe. (Care coordinator)   
 
However that sense of protection and reciprocity could be limited when it came 
to service users’ self-perceived welfare needs, partly because it was felt that 
inpatient services were likely to immediately discharge a service user who was 
recalled for these reasons.  In such cases differentiating between when recall 
should or should not be used was also framed in terms of ‘breaking the cycle’ of 
dependence.  As was observed at Simon’s appeal, the care coordinator explained 
how they weighed up such decisions:   
I think if it was psychosis we’d be looking at recall, not voluntary admission, 
that’s what the CTO is for.  So you have to separate out the two things, his 
psychosis and his risks with that and his ability to cope and live independently.  
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We’ve been trying to treat him at home when he’s feeling like this, trying to 
break the cycle of him coming in when he feels that he can’t cope.   
 
As with personality disorder and substance misuse, recall in these cases was seen 
as only feasible for psychosis related behaviour.  Service user actions that 
reflected problems with well-being or emotional distress were not deemed as 
being liable for recall.  Again, this raises broader questions about what the limits 
of CTO usage might be, a point that will be returned to in the next chapter in 
relation to discharge decisions.   
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
For practitioners, these findings highlight how decisions are made, the factors 
that impinge on such decisions, and the ethical tensions inherent in the practice 
of CTOs.  As described at the discharge stage, the broad criteria for CTOs could 
make them difficult to challenge.  Similarly, once CTOs are in place they could 
hold a logic of their own, whereby the easily applicable nature of recall and the 
pressure to avoid costly mistakes could make it difficult not to use.  
Paradoxically, having room for discretion could narrow the choices practitioners 
might make, thus encouraging defensive practice.  Such practice did not 
automatically occur however - contextual factors played a significant mediating 
role.  Team dynamics did not always play out as would be expected; it could be 
assumed that the team psychiatrist would be an advocate for the CTO, driving its 
imposition and active use.  Whilst this was often the case, the psychiatrist could 
also hamper the CTO, thus leading care coordinators to question its purpose if 
they were not able to put it into action.  Similarly, the broader institutional 
relationships the CTO operated within – between inpatient and community 
services and between community services and other agencies – were influential 
on when and how the CTO was used.  In turn such institutional relationships 
were shaped by structural forces which have gradually shifted the focus and 
remit of services in general.  Hence, although in Chapter Six I noted that 
practitioners could see the CTO as a way of challenging these structural forces 
through providing access to services, in effect this was not always possible. 
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The potential for defensive practice was also mediated by how much 
practitioners were willing to live with uncertainty, which influenced both the 
approach to medication practitioners’ were willing to take under the CTO, and 
their use of recall.  This variation was connected to the ethical stance 
practitioners took towards the CTO, which can be categorised as either taking a 
‘hard and fast’ approach to activating the CTO to ensure treatment, or a more 
flexible approach to allow for some autonomy.  Practical-ethical beliefs on 
feasibility and autonomy meant that many practitioners engaged in sustained 
work to try and maintain a space where flexible and negotiated engagement 
could take place within the framework of compulsion.  Furthermore, practitioners 
held in tension views on how they believed CTOs ‘should’ work with how they 
do work, as can be seen particularly with concerns about the lack of care and 
continuity in the recall process, the use of repeat recalls and the blurring of 
boundaries on consent and compelled medication in the community, and more 
broadly the focus in recall on compliance rather than mental state.  Altogether, 
this points to an underpinning tension between what can be described as ‘surface’ 
practice where the CTO can be used routinely and superficially to maintain 
compliance and in turn manage a very particular kind of risk, or ‘depth’ practice 
where the use of the CTO is tailored to individual circumstance and to encourage 
meaningful interaction.   
 
I should note here that although it may seem the case, I am not trying to entirely 
argue that one kind of practice is more valid than the other.  How engagement 
plays out within the CTO is a mutual undertaking between practitioners and 
service users.  It therefore needs to be acknowledged that with some individuals 
‘surface’ practice was seen as all that could be managed, and indeed could be 
seen as an attempt to limit coercion, firstly by making it possible for such 
individuals to be in the community in the first place and secondly, by respecting 
their wishes for minimal involvement.  Equally, attempts to avert unnecessary 
compulsion such as using the threat of recall as leverage could lead to increased 
feelings of coercion.  Furthermore, routinised practice under the CTO framework 
should not automatically be seen as encouraging reductive and ‘surface’ 
interaction.  The structure of the CTO could also stimulate relationship-building 
through continuous contact and act as a jumping off point for in-depth 
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discussion.  Indeed, given that risk-oriented work is often critically aligned with 
proceduralised approaches (Webb, 2006), it is interesting to note here that risk 
management could be enhanced within a relational context.  Conversely a more 
stereotypical approach to risk in terms of monitoring and surveillance could be 
seen as hampering effective risk management.        
 
Indeed, it should be recognised that the CTO could exacerbate risk rather than 
control it, by aggravating service user behaviour, and by signalling to other 
agencies that they could take a step back in active risk management.  In this 
sense, there were particular individuals and circumstances where the CTO was 
deemed not ‘workable’.  For service users who were particularly resistant to the 
CTO, it could become an emotionally draining experience for practitioners, and 
could render the recall mechanism difficult to operate.  In a more fundamental 
sense, for particularly ‘complex cases’ the limitations of what practitioners felt 
was the responsibility of mental health services and the unintended consequences 
of activating recall, effectively nullified the CTO.  This chapter ended with a 
consideration of such cases, and I use this as a bridge to the next chapter where 
discharge dilemmas will be discussed.   
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Chapter Nine 
Discharge dilemmas: 
Deciding whether to continue or end a CTO 
 
The previous five chapters have traced the ‘story’ of CTOs from policy-level 
formation, through service user and practitioner conceptualisations and 
experiences of CTOs, the means by which CTOs are put into practice, and the 
factors that influence that process.  In this chapter, I focus on the potential ‘end’ 
of the CTO, specifically the dilemmas that arise in CTO discharge decisions.  A 
focus on the final stage of the CTO also acts as an end point to the previous 
chapters, following the suppositions I reached in those chapters to their 
conclusion.  As such, this chapter departs from the format I have taken so far of 
mirrored service user and practitioner chapters, in that I present both perspectives 
together.  Through data taken from observations and interviews, I draw out the 
power dynamics present in discharge decision-making forums, and the varying 
ways both practitioners and service users use accounts of change, stasis, risk, 
responsibility and relational knowledge to support their arguments for and 
against discharge.  These arguments bring to the surface deeper concerns 
regarding how change can be known and interpreted, in relation to proof, 
causality and judging the effectiveness of CTOs.   
 
In the initial two sections of this chapter I explore decision-making on CTO 
discharge as it happens at appeals.  I firstly provide some context on the appeals 
process and how it is experienced by service users, as an under-researched area 
of mental health practice in England.  The main finding here is the gap between 
the proclaimed aim of the appeal system to protect rights, and the experiences of 
service users.  I then move on to delineate the different factors that appeal panels 
consider and progress through when making their decision, starting with insight, 
then risk, contextual factors and timing.  Through this analysis I demonstrate that 
the decision-making pathway is heavily weighted towards upholding the CTO, 
due to the broad criteria for CTOs, the way arguments are framed by 
practitioners and the cumulative and interrelated consideration of such factors.   
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The following section considers decision-making at CTO reviews, where there is 
more room for debate, contestation and negotiation in discharge decisions.  I start 
this section with a discussion of the differing stances practitioners may take to 
uncertainty and risk in decision-making, before considering the role of the 
service user in discharge decisions and the forms of persuasion they may use to 
encourage discharge.  This leads on to a broader analysis of the dual roles of trust 
and evidence-gathering in ‘proving’ whether the CTO is ready to be lifted.  As I 
note at the end of this section, if service users ‘step outside’ this assigned role of 
responsibility post-discharge, then the result may be the formation of a ‘CTO 
cycle’; discharge from the CTO can be difficult to achieve, but taking that 
further, once having been on a CTO escaping entirely from legal forms of 
compulsion can be just as challenging.    
 
In the final section of this chapter, I argue that discharge decisions are not only 
influenced by judgements of risk based on proof.  Practitioners also balanced the 
potential positive and negative effects of the CTO for individual service users 
when considering discharge.  These were not ‘hard’ effects such as 
hospitalisation rates, but ‘soft’ effects related to the tipping points between 
dependency and responsibility, and therapeutic engagement and alienation as 
they play out in individual service users’ responses to the CTO.  Such responses 
also highlight the potential perverse consequences of CTOs, whereby discharge 
from the CTO can encourage the very attitudes and responses the CTO is 
supposed to stimulate.  Furthermore, not all service users wish to be removed 
from the CTO, and I end this chapter by noting the counter-intuitive responses 
compulsion can produce.  Compulsion and coercion are often closely linked; 
what I suggest is that coercive experiences can also be related to the removal of 
compulsion through proposed discharge of the CTO.   
 
CTO appeals 
 
In this section and the next, I explore the role of Tribunals and Managers’ 
Hearings in discharge decisions, as they essentially form the framework of legal 
oversight that the CTO operates within.  I start with an overview of service user 
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experiences of the appeal process, before considering how discharge decisions 
are made in appeals, and the factors that influence such decisions. 
 
Managers’ Hearings are the responsibility of the local Trust, and the three panel 
members that make up a Hearing panel are usually drawn from volunteers in the 
community.  Mental Health Tribunals are run as part of a national Tribunals 
service and the panel must include a medical and a legal member, as well as a lay 
representative.  Tribunals are more formal than Managers’ Hearings, in that they 
are classed as legal ‘courts’, hold greater powers and can lead to the formation of 
mental health case law.  However, in practice the role of Tribunals and 
Managers’ Hearings in relation to CTOs are very similar, in that both must 
decide whether the legal grounds for the CTO are applicable at that point in 
time
32
.  Individuals who are on CTOs can choose to appeal to both bodies.  An 
appeal can be made to a Managers’ Hearing at any time during the CTO, and an 
appeal to the Tribunal can be made once in each CTO time period.  There are 
also regular mandatory appeals.  A Managers’ Hearing has to be held each time a 
CTO is renewed.  A Tribunal has to be held within six months of the initial 
detention in hospital which led to the CTO, and then three years later, if the CTO 
is still in use.  This ‘two-track’ appeals system of mandatory and voluntary 
appeals means that Managers’ Hearings in particular are regular CTO events33, 
often not at the behest of the service user who is on the CTO.  This in turn means 
that attendance by service users at mandatory appeals is variable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 The process of both is very similar too; the panel members receive reports from the psychiatrist and care 
coordinator beforehand.  If it is a Tribunal, the medical member meets the service user prior to the appeal to 
gain their views as well.  During the appeal, the psychiatrist and care coordinator are questioned by the 
panel, and then the service user and their carer (if either is present) are asked their perspective.  If the service 
user has a solicitor present, the solicitor can then question the professionals and make representations to the 
panel on the service user’s behalf.  Attendees are asked to leave the room whilst the panel makes its 
decision, at which point they are called back in to hear the verdict.  At Managers’ Hearings I asked 
beforehand if I could stay in the room whilst the panel deliberated, and was allowed in all cases.  I did not 
do this at Tribunals, as they were much more formal events and my presence had already been carefully 
negotiated – I did not want to ‘push my luck’. 
33 Although it should be noted that in 2012 a practice direction was issued which stated that the mandatory 
CTO Tribunals could be ‘paper-only’ exercises (so attendance by involved parties is not necessary).  These 
‘paper’ appeals can be held if the service user is deemed by the psychiatrist to be consenting to the CTO, 
and is also deemed to have capacity to consent.   
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Experiences of appeals 
 
Little has been written about service users’ experiences of Managers’ Hearings 
and Tribunals in England, but the findings here reflect a report from the Care 
Quality Commission (2011b) on Tribunals which states that the process of 
attending them can be difficult for service users for a number of reasons.  The 
oversight of CTOs was generally felt by both practitioners and service users to be 
geared more to the needs of the system rather than the individual.  The formal, 
sometimes adversarial nature of appeals where the service user might feel 
‘outnumbered’; the difficulties the venue can bring, such as being hard to get to 
and often in the hospital where the service user would previously have been 
detained; and the timing of the meeting to suit the appeal schedule, can result in a 
process that may be insensitive to the individual who is at the centre of 
discussion.   The Chairs
34
 of Managers’ Hearings I interviewed described how 
they made every effort to make the appeal as comfortable and welcoming an 
environment as possible; for example not sitting behind a table, openly 
acknowledging how difficult the experience might be, encouraging the service 
user to take part, and ensuring the service user had representation.  Even so, 
despite these efforts such forums could be highly intimidating, as Brendon 
explains:  
When he [care coordinator] asked me to have a Tribunal I thought that they 
were all going to try and trick me and I thought that they were all going to try 
and make me look very little, all these men in suits, all these important men, and 
all these psychiatrists, so I agreed to have a Tribunal twice, but I never went to 
them.  And he says, ‘why aren’t you going to them?’  I said,’ I’m not going to 
them because you’re going to try and make me look that big’.  I said, ‘so you can 
all have a little discussion amongst yourselves’, I said, and … and that was it, 
you know what I mean. 
 
The content as well as the nature of the appeal could be off-putting for service 
users.  As discussed in the previous chapter, practitioners were keenly aware of 
the adverse effects CTOs could have on the practitioner-service user relationship.  
Similarly to findings reported elsewhere (Stroud, Doughty and Banks, 2013), 
practitioners described how such relationship difficulties could be intensified by 
                                                 
34 I only interviewed the Chairs of Managers’ Hearing panels, not the other panel members. By virtue of 
being appointed Chairs, they were the most experienced panel members and could talk in depth about CTO 
decision-making.  I did not interview Tribunal members as this was not feasible within the remit of the 
fieldwork. 
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the regular appeals that occurred under the CTO, where they had to present what 
was often ‘deficit’ based information, which could differ significantly to the 
more positive day to day communication they had with service users.  Whilst 
both panel members and practitioners took opportunities to encourage service 
users on progress made, the justification for maintaining the CTO relies on a 
narration of difficulties.  As a care coordinator explained:  
You’re writing a report pointing out why you feel they should be on it, which is 
often negative, so you can get [from the service user] ‘why are you writing that, 
that’s historical, does that need to go in, why are you saying that’? Having to go 
through that process does damage the relationship with your client.  In my 
experience, I often find that you spend a long time building up the relationship 
with the client, which could be just shattered by your report.  You go in this 
board room, very formal and you think ‘oh all that work I've done to engage’. 
 
For many of the service users interviewed, reading the reports written by 
professionals on their progress prior to the appeal, and listening to their lives 
being discussed with in detail with the focus on what has ‘gone wrong’ was 
understandably difficult. This became particularly evident to me through the 
observation of appeals.  Although service users have to be given the professional 
reports to read before the appeal, when they are given the reports can vary, 
especially as practitioners are often working to tight deadlines.  At Michael’s 
first (mandatory) appeal, he was given the reports to read just before the appeal 
happened.  I sat with him and the care coordinator whilst he read through them.  
When he read the psychiatrist’s report, he got visibly upset and said to his care 
coordinator: is that really what I’m like when I’m ill?  Later on he said: it just 
makes me want to cry.  He was evidently shaken by what he had read and told me 
it had made him feel more nervous about the appeal hearing.   
 
Abstract vs. concrete rights 
 
Accordingly, both Trusts reported low levels of participation at CTO Managers’ 
Hearings and Tribunals.  Nevertheless, service users explained that ‘opting out’ 
of CTO appeals was not only because they could be demanding and intrusive 
experiences.  Very few of the participants stated that they attended mandatory 
appeals or actively pursued appeals, and their reasons for this demonstrated the 
gap between the intention of the appeals system as protecting the rights of those 
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who are on CTOs and how it was viewed by participants.  Similarly to how 
service users might respond to practitioners’ attempts to alleviate coercion during 
the course of the CTO – for example by avoiding recall – appeals whilst 
supposed to be a safeguard, could heighten feelings of coercion.  For those 
participants who were unhappy to be on the CTO, they saw little point in 
appealing because they did not feel their view would be listened to and the only 
view that would be considered would be that of the psychiatrist.  As Patrick 
commented: When they renewed it I could’ve got a solicitor to fight against it but 
I didn’t.  I just left it because I thought, well, I’m fighting against higher powers 
here.  When participants did attend appeals, this could reinforce their feeling that 
they were not heard and had no rights in the process.  Sarah summed up this view 
when she said:  
You know the purpose of the judicial system is that one person can stand up 
against the many and have their voice heard and they could come out to be the 
one that's, not necessarily telling the truth, but the one where their situation is, 
they're right and the others are wrong.  It’s so everybody has rights but that isn't 
the way the system...it doesn't give the feeling that you've got any rights, the 
process.  It makes you feel quite useless, like they’re having a joke with you or 
something, like it’s a laugh, you know, the law’s for one person and not the 
other. 
 
Through the interviews and observations it became evident that the Chairs tried 
to take a ‘procedural justice’ approach, where the appeal process was presented 
as fair, transparent, impartial and respectful of the service user and their voice.  
As noted in Chapter One (Monahan et al, 1999) such an approach can mitigate 
disappointing outcomes for service users.  Indeed, one Chair told me how:  On 
occasions when we've had a contested hearing, patients have shook hands with 
me at the end of it and said ‘thank you very much’, even though it was not the 
result that they wanted.  I think the very fact that they’ve gone through this 
process and had the opportunity to express an opinion, was valued. 
However, attempts to ameliorate feelings of injustice could also go awry.  When 
the panel reached their decision at Ian’s Managers’ Hearing and called him back 
into the room the following exchange occurred, which illustrates both Ian’s 
feelings about the appeal, and how explanation by the panel can backfire: 
Ian: Come on then, shock us [said sarcastically] 
Chair: Ian, we do think the CTO is essential for the time being, it’s obviously 
benefitting you.  It’s pretty early days.  It does seem to be putting the structure in 
place that you need. 
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Ian: You just haven’t understood a word I said.  What benefit is it to us? I mean 
it would have been easier…I didn’t want to come here this morning.  It’s cheap 
talk again, it’s been a waste of time. 
Chair: Well you’ve stayed off drugs… 
Ian: I’m a 44 year old man, you don’t need to tell me what to do.  If I want to 
take drugs, I’ll take drugs.   
 
There was a paradox at play here in that service users did not always see the 
point of exercising their rights, but because of the automated nature of the 
appeals process they could feel compelled into doing so.  The safeguard thus 
becomes another requirement, which in turn could reinforce feelings of 
powerlessness and resentment of the CTO ‘adding insult to injury’.   
  
Participants who were happy to remain on the CTO also did not view appeals 
hearings as having a place in protecting their rights.  By nature of being content 
to remain on the CTO, these participants did not attempt to lodge an appeal 
against the CTO anyway.  However, they were still subject to the mandatory 
appeals, which they saw no reason to attend, as James explained:  I’m entitled to 
one but I don’t want to go.  I’ve actually turned down a lawyer. I looked to my 
care coordinator being there and the psychiatrist and thought that’s enough. 
They know me well enough. They’re there to make me better, make me well. 
That’s why I did that.   These findings suggest that Tribunals and Managers’ 
Hearings are not viewed as particularly valuable by participants.  Consequently, 
practitioners described feeling a tension between encouraging service users to 
exercise their right to appeal which was seen as good practice, whilst at the same 
time being aware that service users either saw appeal hearings as simply another 
cog in the mental health system (AMHP) or as inimical to their best interests.  Of 
course, the purpose of the appeals process is to provide a safeguard and uphold 
rights; to maintain that purpose does not necessarily mean it has to be viewed 
that way by those made subject to it.  Indeed and as can be expected, Chairs of 
Managers’ Hearings believed their role was of importance in ensuring that 
professionals did not overreach in the use of their statutory powers.  
Nevertheless, the Care Quality Commission’s (2013) latest findings suggest the 
numbers of successful appeals on CTOs are low, with 84% of Tribunals in 2010-
2012 upholding the CTO, compared to 65% of inpatient detentions being upheld 
over the same period.  There are significant dilemmas in the decision to 
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discharge from a CTO which may be implicated in the low rate of successful 
appeals, and which will be explored in this chapter.  At this point it is enough to 
say that perhaps a clearer argument can be made for discharge from detention in 
hospital, as it may be seen more obviously as a restriction of liberty.  When 
service users are in the community on CTOs, the potential restrictions it brings 
can seem less evident and subsequently the implications of upholding the CTO 
less serious.   
 
Influences on appeal discharge decisions  
 
It is unsurprising that individuals who want to come off the CTO and do not win 
their appeal are going to be disappointed with the outcome.  However, when 
individuals choose not to attend appeals because they believe that the CTO will 
always be upheld, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Chairs reported 
that service user attendance at appeals made a difference to their ability to make 
a well-informed decision.  Being able to see the whites of their eyes as a couple 
of Chairs stated, was deemed important to finding out what was really going on 
in a service user’s life.  One Chair described a decision they had made recently to 
uphold a CTO thusly:  
We had a case this week, where we had a split decision, I mean we were on the 
cusp of discharging the patient and the only reason we didn't discharge was 
because the patient wasn't there.  As it happened he was represented but just 
having to rely on the solicitor wasn't sufficiently strong.  Perhaps you would ask 
more searching questions if they were present about whether the duty of recall, 
which is the key one, is really necessary in their situation.  We would have been 
able to probe a little bit deeper…I mean we'd get a feel of his body language and 
all those sort of issues 
 
Although panels were heavily inclined towards professional (and particularly 
psychiatrists’) reports, sharp incongruences between professional accounts of a 
service user’s state and the presentation of the service user could at times tip the 
balance to a discharge decision.  Moreover, whilst service users might not win an 
appeal, if present they could use the process to leverage changes to their care and 
medication, or ensure their care plan was being met.  Panels could act as 
influential arbiters through the making of recommendations, as happened with 
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Irene’s case where the written decision by the panel including the following, 
which was subsequently acted upon by her care team: 
Irene did express the view that she does not like depot injections due to the 
indignity of these and the discomfort they cause her, she would much rather be 
on oral medication.  The psychiatrist and care coordinator both said that they 
were worried that currently Irene has insufficient insight into her condition for 
this to happen but Irene was very anxious about this matter and we would 
therefore encourage insofar as we can that the possibility of moving onto oral 
medication is considered as soon as possible. 
 
Of course, being present did not always work in the service user’s favour.  For 
example, at Sheila’s appeal, the Chair asked if she had anything she wanted to 
add near the end of the Tribunal, and she replied: Yes, I was born telepathic, a 
disclosure which certainly did not help her case for discharge.   
 
Seeing the interaction between professionals and service users could also help 
the panel in clarifying how ‘meaningful’ the CTO was.  It seemed that panel 
members particularly valued CTOs that they saw as making a difference to a 
service user’s life beyond risk management, as this Chair makes clear: 
My first question always is, to both the consultant and the care coordinator, 
‘how well do you know this patient, how often do you see them?’  And you can 
actually watch body language and see the empathy between parties.  I think 
that's important particularly when you've got a care coordinator who's going out 
and visiting patients, that they’re giving them support to stick to their conditions 
and to be leading the best life that they can.  You know, when people are getting 
support as well as monitoring. 
 
Indeed, when practitioners did not appear to know service users well, it could 
influence panel members’ views on the validity of their evidence.  For instance in 
Michael’s Managers’ Hearing (observed), the Chair expressed dismay that the 
psychiatrist had only met Michael once, despite the psychiatrist explaining the 
report was based on discussions with the care coordinator, case notes and 
records.  In their ensuing decision-making, the panel had a lengthy discussion 
about whether to discharge or not, with the Chair saying: I was a bit shocked at 
how long he’d been in the community and not having a review for almost four 
months.  And this doctor has only seen him the once.  It’s not clear from this 
report at all that there’d only been one meeting. 
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How panels accounted for professional expertise and ‘expert truths’ and how 
much they felt able and willing to question these truths was central to decision-
making.  The ways professionals displayed knowledge of the service user was 
one important factor in such decision-making; the following will describe the 
factors that appeared to influence the views of panel members, and how 
professionals presented such factors.   
 
Insight  
 
The main question that Managers’ Hearings and Tribunals considered when 
deciding to discharge a CTO was whether the power of recall was still believed 
to be necessary.  This in turn was based on probabilistic beliefs around whether 
the individual being considered would maintain contact with services and take 
medication if the CTO was not in place.  In other words, the possibility of being 
discharged from the CTO was increased if the panel was convinced the service 
user would keep to their treatment plan – a kind of ‘future contract’35.  
Accordingly, and in line with the practitioner decision-making described here 
and in previous research (Dawson and Mullen, 2008), a key factor that panels 
appeared to base their decision on was the perceived presence or not of insight in 
the service user.  As this Chair points out:  Insight is the biggest thing. If you feel 
the patient has insight into their condition, then they are more likely to continue 
the medication and obviously the power of recall is tied to the insight into the 
condition.  Chairs ranged in their perspectives on insight, with some being more 
critical of the concept than others:  
The concept of insight is something that we're been taught well. I've been advised 
to challenge, in other words, insight means agreeing with your doctor [laughs] 
therefore if you disagree with your doctor clearly you lack insight and if you lack 
insight you clearly need to be medicated.  So I think it’s something that I haven't 
thought about before I was advised in this respect but I do think one needs to 
bear that in mind. 
 
However in practice, the task of challenging and analysing what practitioners 
meant by insight could be difficult for panels to do, especially with limited 
information.   For example, in Graham’s case notes there appeared a pattern of 
                                                 
35 As will be discussed later, this meant that even if a CTO was discharged, its influence over both future 
treatment and behaviour was likely to continue 
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him not wanting social support, and repeated failed requests for medication 
change.  He had also undergone a recent change of team which he had found 
stressful.  However, these factors contributing to why he might not want to 
engage with services were not dealt with at appeal, with the decision being based 
on his non-compliance with medication and associated lack of insight after being 
discharged from a previous CTO, when in fact there was no record of him being 
on a CTO previously.    
 
As touched upon in Chapter Six, the gaining or recovery of insight through the 
CTO acts as shorthand for a process of internal change, but this could be difficult 
to qualify.  Practitioners sometimes talked in appeals about service users paying 
lip service to the CTO, or saying the right things, hence differentiating between 
surface and ‘true’ change.  One signifier of insight that panels relied on was if 
and how much the service user had actively sought help when necessary, for 
example requesting voluntary admissions.  In these cases, service users were 
seen to be taking responsibility for their treatment and acknowledging that they 
required support, hence the need for the psychiatrist to retain power of recall 
could be questioned.  Indeed, as with practitioner accounts in Chapter Six, panel 
conceptions of insight were closely aligned with ideas of responsibility.  At a 
previous Managers’ Hearing where Sheila had been discharged, the reason the 
panel gave was:  
The panel were impressed with the patient’s insightful presentation.  The key 
element in reaching the decision to discharge is that her freedom is limited by the 
MHA.  She is keen to take personal responsibility and there seems to be an 
acceptance by the team that she needs to be given an opportunity for self-
reliance. 
 
Conversely, when a service user was deemed unable to gain insight, the CTO 
could be seen as supporting them to maintain a semblance of ‘normality’ and 
responsibility regardless, as this Chair explains: 
There is a lady I saw who came with her husband and the comment in the 
psychiatrist's report was that this was one of the most insightless patients he'd 
ever met and to me that speaks volumes.  The CTO was continuing to be extended 
and I think she was in her second year.  And it does seem an awful long time but 
then you think well she could live a reasonably productive life, she had a small 
part-time job, her kids had a good relationship with her, she's got a husband and 
you think, wow, if the CTO can facilitate that, she was contributing economically 
to the household and to the workforce, you think what a success story that is. 
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Risk 
 
In this sense, even if a service user was believed to be ‘low risk’ they would still 
be unlikely to win an appeal if they demonstrated little insight.  At Craig’s 
Tribunal, the judgement in favour of the CTO noted that there was a lack of 
evidence regards threats to his safety or others, but because Craig lacked insight, 
there did remain a risk to his mental health deteriorating if the CTO was lifted.  
This suggests that panels accepted practitioners’ broad interpretations of ‘health 
and safety’ as a basis for their decisions.   There were individuals who clearly 
presented a serious risk of harm to self and/or others, and where the renewal of 
the CTO was a relatively straightforward decision on that basis.  On the whole 
however, whilst concerns about the seriousness of the implications if a service 
user did not maintain engagement were certainly present, they appeared to be 
secondary concerns.  Nevertheless, risk figured as a constant factor in 
practitioner testimony, even if it was not entirely applicable to the case in 
question.   
 
Indeed, in many cases there appeared to be a risk ‘shorthand’ whereby risk was 
talked about in a vague sense without delineating what it actually meant for that 
individual.  As noted in Chapter Six, risk was conceptualised by practitioners in a 
number of ways, including ‘nuisance’ or socially problematic behaviour.  
Alongside broad discussion of the nature of risk, the history of risk was also 
accounted for by practitioners in various ways.  There could be a lack of 
differentiation between predictive risk based on probability and ‘proven’ hazards, 
including events that had already occurred, as shown in the following exchange 
about Sheila:   
Chair: Would there be a risk to her safety?  
Psychiatrist: Yes because when she is a psychotic state she is more vulnerable 
and at risk of being harmed by others.  
Chair: Do you consider this a potential risk?  
Psychiatrist: Yes  
Second panel member: But there’s no history of her being harmed in this way?  
Psychiatrist: No, but she’s put herself in danger.  
Second panel member: So it’s not an actual risk as there’s no evidence of this 
happening in the past.  
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Furthermore, there was at times a ‘stickiness’ to risk narratives, whereby ‘one-
off’ or long-ago incidents would still be referenced by practitioners in their 
arguments for the CTO.  With Gwen, the psychiatrist put the following in his 
appeal report: As she has a history of lacking insight when becoming unwell with 
associated risks of the illness which include taking overdoses and aggression 
towards her mother, it is necessary that I should be able to exercise the power of 
recall.  In the appeal it became evident that Gwen, now a woman in her forties, 
had taken an overdose in her late teens, and had pushed her mother once during 
an argument some five years earlier.  There is a marked disparity between the 
psychiatrist’s written presentation of these events in order to justify renewal of 
the CTO based on risk, and the reality of what and when had actually occurred.  
 
Contextual factors 
 
Out of all the cases I observed at appeals, Gwen’s appeared to be the strongest 
for discharge from the CTO, in that she had been stable for three years with no 
recalls or admissions, had no issue with her medication or the team, and there 
appeared to be little evidence of risk to her or others.  However, her case 
highlighted how important contextual factors could be in decision-making, 
specifically here the influence of family.  Gwen’s parents attended the appeal and 
argued strongly for the CTO to continue, as her mother said in the appeal:  It took 
us three years to get help for Gwen and we feel the CTO is there to help provide 
a safety net for her.  The CTO is a comfort factor, it reassures us.  Whilst 
Gwen’s parents were vocal during the meeting, Gwen said little and displayed a 
‘passive’ attitude to the CTO.   In the panel discussion, the panel decided to 
extend the CTO for a further year, and it was evident the views of the parents 
were integral to that decision: 
Second panel member: If she has sufficient insight you could argue she doesn’t 
need the power of recall in order to take medication. 
Third panel member: I think she’s functioning fairly well but it would appear 
that she’s getting an awful lot of support from family and from services to a 
lesser extent actually.  But we need to renew to keep that all in place.   
Chair: But it would be in place anyway. 
Third panel member: Yes but the parents would see it as a disaster.  At the 
moment they desperately need the term ‘CTO’ to feel supported. 
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It appears that although it was doubtful that Gwen met the legal criteria for the 
CTO, even being as broad as they are, the symbolic value the CTO held for her 
parents was influential in the panel’s final decision to uphold the CTO.     
 
The CTO in this case also represented stability, in that the panel recognised the 
need for Gwen’s support system to be maintained.  In a wider sense, the stability 
or not of the service user’s life circumstances was significant in appeal 
discussions.  It appears that it was not only service user’s ‘internal’ stability (via 
insight) that was deemed important, but also ‘external’ stability in terms of their 
housing, occupations and relationships.  Many of the service users lived 
precarious lives, where constant change was a given, and consequently 
practitioners often justified continuation of the CTO on the basis of ‘life 
stressors’.  As this Chair answered in response to a question about the kinds of 
arguments that practitioners made for CTOs: 
Well, a likely change in the person’s placement, moving from a hostel to 
independent living...Some sort of change in their circumstances that would cause 
them stress.  Because I think the psychiatrists are very aware of stress factors 
that could cause a relapse, so it could be any sort of stress, a death or...you know 
anything in their personal circumstances that has changed, and you know that 
can cause a quick dip in their mental health and that’s really what the 
psychiatrists are looking at. 
 
Timing 
 
On this logic, if a service user was deemed to have insight and be low risk, but 
was going through a period of change such as a housing move, then the CTO 
could be successfully justified as an anchor during that process.  Further, if such 
instability in circumstances was relatively continuous, then an argument could be 
made for on-going CTOs.  This bring us to the final factor that influenced 
decision-making, that of timing.  As noted at the beginning of the chapter, CTOs 
are open-ended in that they can be renewed without limit and some Chairs 
reported that they were more cautious about renewal the longer the CTO:   
It gets more difficult because obviously they are on the mend in terms of progress 
they are making. So I think funnily enough it brings a bigger challenge to the 
hospital managers to decide at what point they will not support the renewal.  I've 
certainly had instances where I feel the clinician is being too risk averse and we 
have to really intervene to stop that, because otherwise it can go on forever. 
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But there could be a tension between this stance and practitioner views on 
making the CTO work.  As discussed in Chapter Six, many practitioners took the 
view that for the CTO to be effective, it had to be in place for a significant 
amount of time.  Hence even in cases where the CTO had been in place for some 
time, with adherence and stability achieved say for a year or more, and no recent 
‘risk events’, practitioners would argue that the CTO should be retained in order 
to maintain progress:  
And I’ve said in CTO tribunals, ‘if it ain't broke, don't fix it’.  The patient has to 
be on the CTO for a while before the full benefit can be achieved, so lots of times 
even though the patient is engaging very well, they are saying all the right things, 
they are happy to take the treatment, they are happy to see us, we are still going 
for a renewal. Because it has only been a year and it is too short a period for us 
to say whether they will be able to stick to that.   
 
Panels often seemed to accept this argument, with the following comment in a 
panel discussion being typical: I think it’s quite a difficult one. If there had been 
two or three months more of progress then I’d think more about whether to 
renew or not.  But it’s just a bit early now.  Whilst in theory panels needed to 
consider whether the legal criteria for the CTO were still valid at that particular 
point in time, in practice it seemed that they often agreed with maintaining the 
status quo for the foreseeable future if it was seen to be ‘working’.  Conversely, 
as highlighted throughout this section, if there was evidence of any (broadly 
interpreted) difficulties in relation to insight, risk or contextual factors despite the 
presence of the CTO, this too could justify continuation, as practitioners argued 
that the CTO provided a framework to manage such issues over time.  For 
example as discussed in the last chapter, in cases where there might be repeat 
recalls and where practitioners were unsure about the CTO because it was not 
working in the way they would like, appeal panels were sympathetic to extending 
the CTO as a form of case management.  Similarly to AMHPs when making the 
decision to impose the CTO, the decision by appeal panels to maintain the CTO 
could thus have a certain inevitability.   
 
To summarise, what we can see is that the CTO may become a ‘lobster pot’ - 
easy to get into but difficult to get out of - because convincing arguments can be 
made for its continuation both when it is deemed to be a success or a failure.  
Table Seven below, which compares practitioner perspectives on when to extend 
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the CTO, illustrates this point.  However, the table also shows that practitioners 
could hold similar views when it came to the appropriateness of discharge, thus 
demonstrating the difficulties in reaching clarity on discharge decisions.  This 
section has described appeal decision-making, where due to the function of 
appeals, practitioners are almost always making a strong argument for the CTO 
to continue.  The following two sections will examine the variety of participant 
perspectives on discharge and how they play out in the CTO review process. 
 
Table 7: Practitioner perspectives on when to discharge or extend the CTO 
‘Success’ ‘Failure’ 
Argument 
for 
extending 
the CTO 
If we think that patient has 
clearly achieved that level of 
being well and complying 
then we'll just go for renewal 
of the CTO, because from my 
point of view it is better to 
have them on the CTO for 
another period of 6 months or 
a year rather than putting all 
that kind of improvement 
down the drain and start the 
process from scratch all over 
again. So I will take a 
cautious view of discharging 
someone from a CTO.   
With some of them it hasn’t 
worked in that sense, if they’re not 
making any progress.  All it’s 
done is enabled us to get them 
back into hospital quicker when 
there’s any sign of relapse or the 
risks are increased due to non-
compliance.  So, it’s reduced the 
risks and it’s probably reduced 
the length they stay in hospital.  
They haven’t engaged with us any 
better but it’s still worth keeping 
the CTO on rather than the 
alternative of having to section 
them every few months. 
Argument 
for 
discharging 
the CTO 
Where we have taken them off 
the CTO, it’s because all the 
evidence is that they’re 
complying, they’re moving 
forward.  I hate the word 
insight, I don’t actually think 
there’s such a thing, but 
they’re displaying something 
that people would call 
insight.  So, therefore the 
moral, legal and ethical 
realities are that that person 
shouldn’t be on a CTO.   
It wouldn't work if a patient 
breaks their agreement from day 
one.  I can think of one patient 
who has no insight and he has no 
regard for the conditions of the 
CTO. So that puts a person in a 
dilemma somehow because we 
kept bringing him here, recalling 
him every time he needed to have 
his injection. And again it 
becomes time consuming and you 
have to ask whether it’s the best 
way to manage him or we can 
manage him in a different way, 
whether he needs to be on it if he's 
at that level of uncooperation and 
lack of insight that it’s not worth 
it. 
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Negotiating discharge  
 
On the basis of the above table, we can see that there are two kinds of CTO 
discharge scenarios that practitioners have to deal with:  
 Those individuals who were resistant to the CTO and whether to maintain 
the CTO as the framework being necessary to contain such difficulties, or to 
take a risk and discharge on the basis that support and treatment could be 
provided more effectively in a different way;  
 Those individuals who were adhering to the CTO and whether to maintain 
the CTO because it was believed that the individual would not maintain 
progress without it; or to take a risk and discharge on the basis that the 
individual has a moral right to that opportunity.   
 
CTO reviews, where the decision to extend or discharge was made, brought to 
the surface such dilemmas through debates between different practitioners, and 
practitioners and service users.  In this section I explore how such dilemmas 
manifested in reviews, beginning with a description of practitioners differing 
attitudes to risk, and the effect on service users of these attitudes.  I then look at 
how practitioners worked out whether discharge from the CTO should happen or 
not in reviews, specifically in relation to the influence of service user testimony.  
I end the section with a discussion of the difficulties of escaping the CTO for 
service users, even post-discharge.   
 
Reviews typically occurred in the weeks before the CTO was up for renewal.  
They were more informal arenas than appeals, and usually included the care 
coordinator, the psychiatrist, the AMHP who had seconded the initial CTO 
decision, and the service user.  Family members could also attend, although this 
did not happen for any of the reviews that I observed.  Reviews tended to be 
more discursive environments than appeals.  At appeals, the main participants 
aside from the panel have already ‘made up their minds’ so to speak.  In reviews, 
there was more room for persuasion and negotiation.  Whilst none of the service 
user participants was discharged at appeal, 6 out of 18 were discharged at the 
review stage during the fieldwork period.  It should be noted that the pattern of 
discharge followed the team dynamics presented in the last chapter.  For example 
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in the team where the psychiatrist was not a proponent of CTOs, 5 out of 10 of 
the service users included in the study were discharged.  He always used current 
engagement as a basis for his decision, that is if the service user was engaging in 
the here and now.  In the team where the psychiatrist was an advocate for CTOs, 
1 out of 8 of the service users included in the study was discharged (and only 
after much persuasion from the care coordinator).  He always used potential 
future engagement as a basis for his decision, that is forecasting what the service 
user would do post-discharge, hence making the possibility of discharge much 
more difficult.   
 
Risk-taking or risk-making 
 
Where practitioners differed in their views then, in an echo of previous research 
(Mullen, Dawson and Gibbs, 2006), it was around how best to manage the 
uncertainty and risk inherent in the discharge decision.  In Christine’s case, the 
psychiatrist felt it was time for the CTO to be discharged whereas the AMHP felt 
strongly that it should be maintained due to her knowledge of Christine’s history.  
The care coordinator (who remained neutral during the review) commented 
afterwards:  
Thing is, I know Jenny [the AMHP] has known Christine for a long time, but you 
can get things wrong sometimes.  And with Christine, she has to have a chance.  
We can always bring her in under the Mental Health Act if needs be.  Is it really 
worth it in the balance if she feels unhappy about it?  I mean who is it for, her or 
us?  At the end of the day, it’s Dr Stokes’ decision.  Though Jenny probably 
won’t like it.   
 
The care coordinator illustrates the role of positive risk taking in CTO decisions, 
whereby defensive decision-making can be challenged and where the potential 
for individual change would be respected.  Practitioners talked about the need for 
hope and proving their trustworthiness to service users by not ‘shifting the 
goalposts’ on when discharge would happen.  This psychiatrist explained that 
preparation for discharge should start from the beginning of the CTO: So being 
clear from the start about what would constitute success of the CTO, and for how 
long that CTO would have to be successful, or what other conditions would have 
to be met for you to consider removing it.  They need a little bit of hope, if they’re 
not happy about it. 
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This was not the case for all service users however.   For service user participants 
where professionals had not got to the stage of discussing discharge as a 
possibility with them, it could seem like a far-off prospect.  This meant some 
participants described holding a rather fatalistic attitude to discharge from the 
CTO, with for example Andrew stating:  It’s just down to time to elapse, time to 
run its course, that’s what I have to do with the CTO, keep out of trouble and all 
that.  This in turn could engender a sense that the CTO was ‘never-ending’, as 
illustrated by Michael, who expressed uncertainty about when the CTO could 
end:  I'm not sure how long a CTO can last for, if it’s a lifetime event for instance 
or if the CTO is just like a six month investigation into a person who is not well.  
Trying to ‘read’ professional intentions could be difficult, particularly when 
professionals were uncertain themselves, or differed in their views.  Sheila 
described in a frustrated tone how she had tried and failed to get a clear answer 
from her psychiatrist:  I did ask him point blank, I said ‘how many more years do 
you think I will have to be under the Mental Health Act?’ and he said ‘about 
another two years’.  Well two years is nearly up with but I bet if I asked him he'd 
say something different.  You never know where you are with them you see.  As 
can be imagined, holding any hope or optimism about coming off the CTO could 
be difficult in such circumstances, as Patrick illustrated when asked what would 
have to happen for him to be discharged, and he answered: I don't know, a 
miracle. 
 
Evidence and Trust 
 
Despite this, it was interesting to observe the differences between how service 
users were positioned (and positioned themselves) in discharge discussions, as 
compared to when they were first placed on the CTO.    As described in Chapter 
Seven, very few participants reported being meaningfully involved in discussions 
when they were placed on the CTO.  However, being discharged from the CTO 
was a different matter, with service users taking centre stage in discussions about 
whether to continue the CTO or not.  Because discharging an individual from a 
CTO was seen as taking a risk, the ability of participants to persuade 
professionals of their intentions was an important factor in the process, as 
Graham illustrates when asked how he had been discharged: 
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He [the psychiatrist] just says ‘I don’t know whether to take you off it’, but I just 
said ‘I’m ready to volunteer now.  I’ve been on medication a long time, different 
ones, and this one works, so it’s medication I need.  They’ll [his family] make 
sure I take it anyway’.  So he said ‘I’m not going to extend the Order’.  For him 
to do that, he would have kept me on it if I’d said no to medication.   
 
Invoking the dual elements of evidence and trust were necessary for service users 
to secure discharge.  Trust has been referred to previously in these findings in 
relation to service user trust in services and practitioners, yet trust in service 
users also figured in practitioner decision-making, particularly on discharge.  The 
presence of the CTO may make it difficult for practitioners to judge whether an 
individual’s actions are representative of internal or external drivers and 
therefore likely to be consistent over time, or only responsive to compulsion.  For 
the majority of participants therefore, they had to persuade the psychiatrist of 
their intentions to work collaboratively and honestly with the team, as Irene 
describes:  if there were any changes in the way I was feeling, I would definitely 
tell him, and as long as he was happy about that he was happy to take me off the 
treatment order. 
 
Observation of CTO reviews illustrated the different ways service users went 
about this persuasion, including: contrasting the past and present, appeals to the 
strength of relationships with practitioners, presentation of coping strategies, and 
dealing with practitioner doubt.  The following exchange in Christine’s review 
illustrates all of these elements of persuasion: 
Psychiatrist: Have you had any issues with taking your meds?  
Christine:  No, I know they keep me well  
Psychiatrist: So do you think the CTO…without it you’d take your meds?  
Christine:  Yeah…  
Psychiatrist: That wasn’t a strong yes [smiling]  
Christine: It is a strong yes [emphatically].  This is the wellest I’ve been in the 
last 5, 6, 7 years.  
Psychiatrist: And contact with the team, is it because of the CTO you do it?  
Christine:  No, it’s helpful.  I get on with Naomi [care coordinator] and if she’s 
not there I can always ring Martha [the team secretary]. 
Psychiatrist:  If we took you off the CTO would you still ask for help if you 
needed it? 
Christine: Yes, because I’d phone the ward if I was feeling unwell  
AMHP:  But you haven’t done that in the past have you Christine?  
Christine: Yes, but I’m weller now 
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In Christine’s case, even though the AMHP was strongly against discharging her 
from the CTO, the psychiatrist was sufficiently satisfied with Christine’s 
responses to discharge her, as he concludes in the review:  
I think if being freer would be helpful for you, and you could feel more in control 
of your treatment, I would support the move to remove the section.  But if I think 
the CTO was making you have contact and take medication then it would be 
different.  But you’ve said it’s your wish to take medication so I’m quite happy to 
take you off the section. 
 
The development of a reciprocal relationship seemed particularly important to 
practitioners in deciding to discharge, where care coordinators in particular 
‘knew’ the service user would accept their involvement, as happened in Irene’s 
case: She didn’t want to take medication, but she knew I thought she needed it, 
and she was probably likely to take it because at that point she had built up 
enough trust with me, trust in my judgement.   Sometimes, as described in the last 
chapter, practitioners did not feel they could get a sense of what was going on 
‘under the surface’ with a service user, either because of a lack of relationship or 
because the service user was not ‘enacting’ enthusiastic compliance and instead 
doing the ‘bare minimum’.  As also noted in Chapter Seven, such behaviour from 
service users could be deliberate as a way of retaining some control whilst 
simultaneously doing what they needed to do in order to secure discharge.  
However acting in this way could also make discharge decisions less certain, as 
the following example demonstrates: 
I had one case, where I didn't know him that well, he was on a CTO and I did 
think ‘now then, I'm not sure if he's going to comply or not’.  And he really was a 
man of very few words so I wasn't sure what was happening.  You wouldn't get 
anything from him. and you could never get underneath to see, well is he 
masking stuff or is he just very blunted, or is he getting on fine and he just 
doesn't want us knocking on his door every fortnight?  And I thought ‘I think 
we’ll get this renewed’ and we did renew it and I thought ‘do you know what, I 
think there really wasn't a need for that but it’s done now’.  And then it was 
coming up to lapse, we let it, and it was fine in the end, but it was because I 
didn't have a feeling either way of what would happen.  (Care coordinator) 
 
Practitioners also talked about ‘testing out’ service users’ trustworthiness by 
progressively lessening the level of intervention whilst still on the CTO and 
gauging the service user response to increased freedom before deciding on 
discharge.  This could take the form of ‘bargaining’ with service users about 
expectations.  For example in an observation of a home visit, a care coordinator 
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told the service user: make the right changes in your life then when the next 
review comes up we'll look at it seriously about whether we need this CTO or 
not.  More often, the ‘testing out’ was in relation to moving from injections to 
oral medication
36
.  The CTO in such cases could be seen as a way of meeting 
service user goals within a controlled environment, as this care coordinator 
commented in relation to an upcoming Tribunal:  
I’m thinking of changing my view to the tribunal to say we could try a phased 
self-medication with his current medication, to show we’re using the CTO in a 
positive way, to try and reach his goals.  We might not have shared goals about 
what’s wrong with him, but we can have shared goals for plans for the future 
 
Certainly, some participants described meeting their own desired outcomes 
through the CTO as well as those of professionals.  Referring back to Chapter 
Five, service users could see discharge as a step towards recovery and 
‘normality’.  In particular James was very clear about when he would feel ready 
for discharge:  So I’d want a stable relationship, financially better off which 
would be a job or just, well, money, and then still be compliant and then I could 
say to them, ‘look, I’ve got this, this, this, can I come off it?’  I’d hope they could 
respect that.  From James’ perspective, making such progress should signal to 
the professionals who worked with him that he was prepared for discharge.  In 
this sense, service users had to do more than ‘talk the talk’ in terms of persuading 
practitioners of their readiness for discharge.   
 
CTO cycles  
 
Such enactments of responsibility did not necessarily end when the CTO ended.  
As noted earlier, the ‘threat’ of future compulsion could act as a way of binding 
service users to standards of behaviour in the future, even when they were no 
longer on the CTO.  Although Irene believed her relationship with the team and 
in particular her care coordinator was much improved due to the lifting of the 
CTO, she also described taking her medication under some pressure: They said if 
I get unwell, I’d end up put back on the Community Treatment Order, so I 
decided to take it.  Irene’s care coordinator explained to me that she had tried to 
                                                 
36 Although it was more likely that service users would be moved onto oral medication at the same time or 
shortly after discharge from the CTO.   
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talk about the CTO discharge in positive terms with Irene, as a chance for them 
to work together, but that the psychiatrist had taken the opposite tack at the 
discharge meeting: he said to her ‘this doesn’t change anything, you need to keep 
taking your meds, because I hate to say it but if you don’t the whole thing will 
start again and you’ll be on the CTO for a very, very long time’.   
 
This meant that when service users did relapse they could become caught in CTO 
cycles, whereby relapse once the CTO ended was seen by practitioners as a result 
of coming off the CTO and ‘proof’ that it worked.  An AMHP remarked that: 
Very often it is that, ‘well I told you so’, and that fits in with the risk-averse 
culture and way of working, because it might have had bugger all to do with the 
CTO the fact they've relapsed and they've come back in, but then that massive 
unscientific link is made, ‘it’s because we've taken them off the CTO that this has 
happened’.  It’s quite a useful leap of faith for a consultant to make if he wants to 
put them back on the CTO without any questions for a long time again. 
 
Consequently, once an individual had been placed on a CTO it could colour any 
further treatment and intervention; if an individual was placed on a CTO more 
than once, it could become increasingly difficult to be discharged from it.  
Patrick had been on the CTO for over two years without a relapse by that point, 
the longest time he had been well for a number of years, and felt he had done 
everything that could be asked of him: I don’t know what they want.  I don’t 
know what they expect.  Two years. I would’ve thought that after two years they 
would’ve discharged me.  Ironically Patrick did experience a serious and lengthy 
relapse shortly after this interview whilst still on the CTO, and was re-
hospitalised and eventually released back onto a CTO which his care coordinator 
stated would be for the foreseeable future.  The CTO therefore could act as an 
encompassing form of compulsion, facilitating movement between levels of 
compulsion, but making it difficult for individuals to be entirely free of it.    In 
this regard being taken off the CTO could also be seen in resigned terms, as 
Patrick stated: it’s just swings and roundabouts.  
 
Discharge dilemmas and balancing acts 
 
For practitioners, discharge dilemmas were not only related to making 
judgements based on service user presentation and their trust in the service user.  
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They also talked in a more direct sense about balancing the potential positive and 
negative consequences of maintaining or discharging the CTO dependent on the 
individual in question.    In this sense, the ethical balancing acts that practitioners 
maintained, as highlighted particularly in the last chapter, carried on into 
decisions to discharge.  The two balancing acts that practitioners considered at 
this point can be related to firstly weighing up dependency and responsibility, 
and secondly weighing up engagement and alienation.   
 
Dependency vs. responsibility 
 
As has been discussed in this and previous chapters, the rationale that CTOs 
could foster a sense of responsibility was widely held by practitioners.  The 
provision of boundaries and ‘contractual’ obligations via the CTO could be seen 
as a way of generating behaviour change through sanctions (recall) and 
incentives (staying out of hospital) over time. An ideal scenario was if such 
behaviour change led to stability, recovery and eventual attitude change, with the 
service user not only adhering to desired ways of interacting and being, but 
actively pursuing self-care and adherence.  Nevertheless, practitioners generally 
held the view that some individuals would never reach this final stage.  For 
service users who had been in the system for a long time and who were deemed 
institutionalised, the very reason the CTO was perceived to be effective was 
because of their conditioned attitude to authority, and it was difficult to see how 
the CTO would be removed in such cases: 
The moment we take them off the CTO, they've stopped being compliant again. I 
suppose that's just about boundaries and the way people respond to them isn't it? 
Some people just do really well with boundaries in place, and the moment they 
don't have them anymore they just don't know how to function ultimately.  And 
that's probably true of a few clients within Assertive Outreach, who have spent 
long periods of time in either secure environments, prison environments, they 
just become accustomed to having those boundaries in place and having to deal 
with them. (Care coordinator) 
 
There was an acceptance here of the need for dependency in some cases.  At the 
same time however, some practitioners had concerns that a ‘tipping point’ might 
be reached on lengthy CTOs, whereby they would foster a sense of dependency 
and undermine self-efficacy.  In this way, the CTO could be framed as a 
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continuation of institutionalisation - what one practitioner called a virtual 
asylum. Practitioners wondered about the fairness of on-going community 
compulsion simply because it was less restrictive than detainment in hospital, as 
this AMHP points out: 
The temptation would be just to keep something that’s keeping the person stable 
in place ad infinitum and  gloss over the fact that it is actually still a section of 
the Mental Health Act and having some impact on their liberty. There’s not that 
many people who would have been on section three for the same length of time. 
 
Such potential ‘soft’ negative outcomes of CTOs have typically been neglected 
in research and policy discussions (O’Reilly et al, 2006), but a number of 
practitioners expressed the view that:  There is a big risk in taking away 
somebody's autonomy and how that makes you feel as a person and how that 
affects your long term development.  The decision to remove a CTO is usually 
seen as taking a risk, whereas in this light, keeping the CTO on is viewed as the 
potentially harmful option, albeit in a more nebulous way.   
 
Furthermore, it was felt by some practitioners that the CTO could discourage 
accountability and unfairly shift responsibility onto practitioners, as one care 
coordinator talked about in reference to a service user where criminal charges of 
assault had been dropped because he was on a CTO
37
:   
So now he takes no personal responsibility for his actions because he knows that 
we’ll monitor him, we’ll make decisions for him and if anything goes wrong 
again, it’s not his fault.  So, for me, him not being on a CTO and having some 
responsibility might be better, a CTO makes it my responsibility.  
 
Indeed, removing the CTO could encourage the ‘responsibilised’ response it was 
hoped that the CTO would elicit, as this psychiatrist explains:  
There have been times where the patient was under the CTO and engagement 
had been a problem.  With one we decided to give him a try to see how he’d cope 
without the CTO because he’d been on it for three years, and actually 
engagement has improved, the patient is taking more responsibility for his 
problems.  We must have done at least ten recalls for him in those three years for 
his depot, but now he's off the CTO for a few months, and he's been happy to 
have his depot without any problems.  He knows he’s not obliged to engage with 
                                                 
37 This connects to a point made in the previous chapter about the CTO shifting responsibility from a range 
of agencies onto mental health services. In this particular case: This decision [not to prosecute] was based 
mainly on the fact that Stuart is at present being adequately supervised/monitored on his CTO and CPS felt 
that if the matter went before court that the court was not likely to impose anything more effective. (email 
from police in case notes) 
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the team so he’s happy to see us, and he’s more involved in his own care.   
 
This was particularly the desired outcome of removing the CTO when service 
users were believed to be subverting the CTO for their own purposes.  In the last 
chapter I noted that where service users had absorbed the CTO into their coping 
strategies, the CTO could be deemed firstly as meaningless as the recall function 
became undermined, and secondly as reinforcing dependency through the 
engraining of patterns of behaviour.  Other service user responses to the CTO 
could also influence discharge decisions, as described next. 
 
Engagement vs. alienation 
 
Some practitioners held the view that in cases where individuals on CTOs were 
resentful of them, continuous CTOs would negate any therapeutic work that 
could be done:  I always try and get them off the CTO within 12 months. As a 
therapy move, because you can only work against somebody's liberties so long 
before you alienate yourself from them because you keep on renewing it.  As 
with the effect of the CTO on service user autonomy, a ‘tipping point’ could be 
reached.  In the last chapter I discussed how the contact the CTO ensured could 
support the building of an initial relationship with service users, but in the 
longer-term the CTO could get in the way of sustaining such relationships.  
Alternatively where service users resented the CTO from the beginning, it could 
damage any pre-existing positive relationships between practitioners and service 
users, or worsen an already difficult relationship.  For those service users, there 
was little overlapping of their position with that of professionals, as they rejected 
any purposive meaning for the use of CTOs and consequently the institutional 
means it entailed.   
 
As noted in the last two chapters, the challenges caused by this kind of response 
were not only limited to damage to the therapeutic relationship.   In particularly 
complex cases where personality disorder and/or substance misuse were present 
alongside psychosis, the CTO could not only be ineffectual in managing the 
variable risks that arose, but could also exacerbate conflict and consequently risk.  
The CTO might be kept on in such cases as an overt practice of defensive 
decision-making, as a care coordinator commented in a CTO review on such a 
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case: I’m just thinking about the unknown.  To take it off now with the increased 
risks, we’ll be hung out to dry.  In this sense it is ironic that whilst it might 
heighten risky behaviour, the CTO could be kept on solely in order to give the 
impression risk was being managed.   
 
More broadly, individuals who were actively resistant to the CTO could undergo 
significant ‘battles’ with practitioners to regain a sense of control, either through 
working within the system, by using every appeal possibility to challenge the 
CTO, or working outside the system, by acting like the CTO did not exist 
(avoiding appointments and disregarding notices of recall to hospital).   In 
Craig’s case, he used both routes in acting against the CTO, and the problems the 
CTO caused between him and his care coordinator led to the decision to remove 
it:  
I’d say the biggest factor to take Craig off the CTO…when I visited him, he sat 
with a notebook and a pen while we were having a conversation and I thought I 
can’t-, how on earth do you work with someone when they’re sat with a notebook 
and a pen recording every element of your conversation ready for the next 
tribunal…you can’t work with someone like that, can you? It’s impossible…so 
that for me was the-, this is nuts…he’s got to come off it. 
 
During follow-up interviews with service users post-discharge it became clear 
that despite the continuing presence of leverage and the potential ‘threat’ of a 
further CTO, removing the CTO could be a step towards repairing the service 
user-practitioner relationship and enabling more effective support.    Rebuilding a 
mutual sense of trust and moving the relationship away from a ‘surface’ focus on 
monitoring and compliance, necessitated practitioners disassociating themselves 
from the CTO.  For Craig having a ‘fresh start’ without the CTO meant for him 
that: we’ve turned it around pointing in the right direction for once, towards a 
place where he felt he could work together with his care coordinator.    Irene, 
when talking about the post-CTO changes to her relationship with her care 
coordinator said:  We’ve got a lot closer now.  I'm more free, I've got more 
choice now.  I feel she helps me more now.  Because they know I want help now.  
The CTO is designed to encourage individuals into engaging with practitioners, 
but what these participants’ experiences suggest is that feeling compelled into 
accepting help can sometimes undermine more meaningful engagement. 
Moreover, in Irene’s view, having to accept support meant that practitioners 
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‘had’ to provide it; being taken off the CTO for Irene represented more freedom 
on both sides of the relationship, and in turn she felt more valued by her care 
coordinator.   In a mirror image to how practitioners worked with service users to 
create shared meanings for the CTO, discharging the CTO could act as a way for 
practitioners and resistant service users to find a ‘mutual account’ within which 
they could work together.   
 
Similarly, and as noted earlier, the majority of participants who were accepting 
of the CTO still looked forward to a future without it, as having the CTO 
removed signified they were able to thrive without the legal structure the CTO 
provided.  Whilst practitioners may see maintaining the CTO as supporting 
individual stability and (potentially) change, being ‘stuck’ on the CTO could 
negate a sense of any forward momentum for service users in the longer term.  
However a significant minority of service users who were happy to be on the 
CTO wanted it to be a long-term presence in their lives, which could bring its 
own set of challenges for practitioners.  As discussed in previous chapters, 
service users could closely align their sense of self and what they subsequently 
felt they needed in terms of support and external authority with the CTO.  For 
these service users who appreciated the boundaries the CTO provided, the idea of 
the CTO being removed could generate similar feelings associated with coercion 
that the participants who were resentful of the CTO described, such as not having 
their view respected, anxiety and a lack of control.  Nick expressed considerable 
anxiety about the thought of being discharged:  I’d like to stay on it for the rest of 
my life, if I could.  I wish they’d done this years ago to us.  Maybe things 
wouldn’t have turned out the way they have turned out.  In such cases, a pattern 
of uncertainty surfaced in practitioner discussion of individuals, in terms of how 
and if to bring about CTO discharge.   On one hand, practitioners often thought 
the service user was more than ready to be taken off the CTO, on the other they 
were aware of the distress such a decision would cause and recognised that the 
CTO offered meaningful security to the service user.  This psychiatrist talked 
about the difficulties these situations could bring:  
There are cases where the CTO has to be continued at the insistence of the 
patients themselves.  Very surprising.  There is one particular patient, she is so 
adamant to remain on the CTO, so that makes the decision-making very difficult.  
Myself and the other people involved really strongly feel the CTO has run its 
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course and she could function extremely well and engagement is not an issue.  
But I think it would be unwise to go against the express wishes of the patient.  It 
would definitely affect the therapeutic relationship, we'd definitely be blamed if it 
goes wrong.  It’s going to be quite a battle to convince her really. 
 
As one AMHP commented, if it were an inpatient section, there could be gradual 
discharge from hospital to acclimatise the individual, but you can’t do a gradual 
discharge for a CTO.  The service user in this kind of situation thus has a 
substantial amount of control over discharge decision-making.  ‘Never-ending’ 
CTOs are usually presented (and indeed have been in this chapter) as generated 
by the nature of the CTO framework and by practitioners, but in these cases it is 
the service user who drives sustained compulsion.  This highlights both the 
variety of responses the CTO can provoke, and the complexity of discharge 
decision-making in relation to such responses.   
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
In this the final findings chapter, I have examined the two main routes to 
discharge from the CTO – appeals and reviews, interpreting how and why 
decisions to uphold or end the CTO are made.  This chapter has carried on a 
number of the themes developed in the previous chapters to their conclusion and 
I summarise these themes here.   
 
As with the decision to apply the CTO in the first place, and to use the CTO once 
in place, the decision by appeal panels to uphold the CTO could follow a 
compelling logic.  As noted near the beginning of the chapter, the rate of 
successful discharges at appeal from the CTO is low – 16 % compared to 35% 
for discharge from inpatient detentions.  Through examining the factors that 
shaped panel decision-making we can potentially see why this might be the case.  
The legal criteria for CTOs are broad, and as shown here also broadly 
interpreted.  In deciding whether the power of recall is still necessary – the key 
question for CTO continuation or discharge – panels drew on extra-legal and 
underpinning concepts.  Indeed, panels rarely considered whether recall is 
necessary in the present, instead taking a future oriented view on whether recall 
will be necessary for the foreseeable future.  In doing so, they made similar 
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connections to practitioners between the development of insight, internal change, 
treatment adherence and service users taking responsibility for their lives and 
their actions.   Whilst panel members might have a critical awareness of concepts 
such as insight, it was also difficult for them to ‘step outside’ the prevailing 
discourses in mental health as filtered through professional explanations and 
consider alternative ways of thinking about the paths service users had taken to 
that point.   
 
Risk – as defined in terms of the health and safety of others – was generally a 
secondary concern for panels, but was also presented in a way that made it 
difficult for panels to critically engage with.  Practitioners took their wide-
ranging conceptions of risk into the appeal, both in terms of the presumed nature 
and history of the risk in question, meaning it became rather a mutable concept to 
pin down. Insight and risk were not the only factors panels took into account 
however.  In this sense they went beyond the legal criteria in making their 
decision through a consideration of context, specifically the views of family, the 
presence or not of life stressors and the timing of discharge.  In order for panels 
to weigh up legal criteria they can be expected to a certain extent to draw on 
context to reach a full understanding of an individual’s situation.  Nevertheless, 
an evaluation of such factors alongside the already broad approach taken to the 
legal criteria could significantly weight the decision against discharge of the 
CTO.  It seemed that it could be successfully argued that it was never the right 
time for the CTO to end, regardless of whether service users were deemed to 
have made a ‘success’ of the CTO or not – discharging the CTO is always 
framed as taking a risk. CTOs have sometimes been compared metaphorically to 
a ‘lobster pot’ in that they are easy to get into, but difficult to get out of, and 
these findings provide some insight as to why that might be.     
 
Given the difficulties in being discharged from a CTO, the appeals process was 
viewed with some scepticism and indeed anger by those service users who 
wished to be discharged.  This highlights a further ongoing theme – that the 
strategies used in order to mitigate the coercive effects of the CTO may instead 
make both feelings of coercion worse and further undermine relationships with 
service providers.    In the previous chapter, we saw how this could happen in 
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relation to practitioners’ attempts to avoid recall.  Here, the oversight system that 
is intended to ensure service user rights are safeguarded could have the 
unintended consequence – often despite the use of a procedural justice approach - 
of reinforcing to service users that their rights are not considered important.  
Such feelings could lead to service users’ not attending appeals, which ironically 
could at times be the factor that would lead panels to uphold the CTO.  The 
relational aspect of CTO practice came to the fore here, with panel Chairs 
stressing the importance of seeing service users and assessing their interaction 
with practitioners for themselves.   
 
The responses of service users were also of importance in the review process.  
Given that CTO reviews allow for contestation and shifts in decision-making, 
how service users presented their progress took a more significant role than it 
had at other decision-making points in the CTO process.  In order to overcome 
practitioner qualms about risk-taking and alleviate their sense of uncertainty, 
service users who had managed the CTO well then had to persuade practitioners 
that they would continue to engage with services and to make progress in their 
lives.  To do this, service users called on evidence of their progress and the trust 
that they had built up with practitioners.  Where practitioners believed they really 
knew and trusted the individual in question and witnessed adherence through 
different phases of the CTO, a decision to discharge was more likely.  In turn, 
practitioners were more likely to elicit such a response from service users if they 
were clear and honest about when and why the CTO would end.  Hence the 
agency service users displayed in acting on CTOs, together with the mediating 
influence of the service user-practitioner relationship on the CTO, continued to 
be present in its final stage as they had throughout.  At the same time it needs to 
be recognised that a reliance by practitioners on particular kinds of proof and 
conceptualisations of causality could make it difficult for service users to entirely 
escape the CTO.  Whilst individuals who have been within the mental health 
system for a long time tend to be consistently subjected to various kinds of 
formal and informal leverage, the very fact that a CTO had been in place could 
frame future service user actions and service responses in a way which meant the 
CTO could not entirely be escaped.   
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For service users who had not adhered to the CTO, practitioners also had to 
decide whether to take a risk in discharging.  Such dilemmas were framed in 
ethical terms, and continued the balancing acts practitioners had taken during the 
course of the CTO about whether the CTO could be deemed morally right and 
relatedly the effect it had both on individual service users and their actions 
towards the CTO.  In this sense the practical and the ethical remained entwined; 
practitioners expressed qualms about the impact on service users of reaching a 
‘tipping point’ in dependency and engagement, but also about the responses such 
effects could engender and the difficulties they might bring for service provision 
and practice.  Given the nature of such cases, deciding to take this risk was not 
based on active persuasion on the part of service users, but instead whether 
maintaining the CTO was worth the ethical discomfort and associated difficulties 
it had brought or exacerbated.  I mentioned earlier the unintended consequences 
of attempts to mitigate coercion within the CTO.  Here we can see the 
unintended consequences of the CTO as a whole in terms of the outcomes it 
might produce, and indeed how removing the CTO could elicit the outcomes it 
was hoped that the CTO would bring in relation to relationship-building and 
inculcating responsibility.  Conversely, I hope I have made clear throughout 
these findings that not all service users struggled against the CTO, and that a 
range of responses were presented by service users, from passive resentment and 
active resistance, through subversion to passive acceptance and active 
engagement.  Indeed, passivity and activity do not necessarily correlate with a 
sense of agency, and different responses might surface at different stages of the 
CTO, dependent on the individual’s frame of mind and circumstances at that 
point in time.  Service users who had valued the CTO for various reasons and 
worked within it in various ways could also push for discharge as a way of 
moving forward.  Alternatively, those service users who felt strongly that the 
CTO met a need for them that could not be met in other ways might experience 
anxiety and disenfranchisement about the idea of being ‘forced off’ the CTO.   In 
sum, the CTO may be least effective for those for whom it is supposed to work - 
those who resist compulsion - and in a sense too effective for those where it is 
not deemed necessary - those who are willing to engage.     
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Chapter Ten 
The ties that bind? 
An analysis of compulsion in the community 
 
In this thesis I have endeavoured to get underneath the surface of CTO practice – 
how and why it manifests itself in particular ways, what drives these 
manifestations, and the implications for service users and practitioners who are 
invested in them.  In doing so, I hope to have made a distinctive contribution by 
building on the existing body of CTO research and more fundamentally by 
theorising CTOs in relation to particular accounts of power and change: by 
exposing the ‘ins and outs’ of CTO practice; how it keys into both service users’ 
and practitioners’ ethical beliefs and sense of self; how it influences and is 
influenced by the therapeutic relationship; and how it may result in mixed and 
unexpected responses and consequences.  Accordingly, in this discussion chapter 
I draw together the findings I have developed in reference to the four sets of 
research questions outlined in Chapter Two, which are premised on a combined 
critical realist-governmentality framework.  To recap, those questions 
respectively relate to: 
 
 How and why CTOs came to be seen as necessary and why they came to 
exist in the form that they did. 
 The motivations of practitioners and service users in relation to CTOs:  
what purposes they do or do not see CTOs meeting; how these purposes 
align or not with policy-level conceptualisations; and for practitioners in 
particular how they formulate CTO practice based on these purposes. 
 The workings of the CTO: how the techniques incorporated within the 
CTO regulate behaviour; the ways programme participants act on the 
central components of the CTO; and the contextual factors which impinge 
on this process. 
 The transformative powers of the CTO; what their consequences are and 
how these consequences relate to policy/practice theory and purpose; if 
and how they bring about individual change; and in what ways they might 
be implicated in forms of conduct and counter-conduct.   
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On a final note before moving on to the discussion of the findings, I have not 
included a summarising section in this chapter.  Instead, the next and final 
chapter draws together the different aspects of what I say here and assesses its 
implications for policy, practice, research and theory. 
CTO policy: theory and development 
 
In Chapter Four I presented the findings of a policy review of CTOs, which set 
out to answer how and why CTOs came to exist as they did in the English mental 
health system.  I placed CTOs within the context of broad international trends 
and policy drivers, in particular describing how deinstitutionalisation and the 
associated rise of community care created new political problems to be solved.  
The creation of a ‘residuum’ of individuals with severe mental health difficulties 
in public spaces led to widespread concerns in regards to public safety and a 
related emphasis on risk management. In this sense, CTOs were presented as a 
solution by way of strengthening the surveillance and (primarily medical) control 
of risky individuals in the community.   I argued that risk management was not 
the only policy driver however; a concern with risk can be seen as the mirror to 
an agenda which encourages the individual to be prudential in managing their 
own lives.  The recovery agenda as it has played out in mental health policy has 
been largely defined in ways which individualise social problems.  Bringing 
‘irregular citizens’ (Zedner, 2010) through recovery and back into the fold thus 
requires that strong boundaries are put in place in order to overcome internal 
constraints, so that individuals are able to develop the discipline to comply, 
maintain stability and eventually operate in the community with a sense of self-
efficacy.  From this perspective, CTOs can be seen as a typical governmental 
practice which is aimed at influencing what individuals may become; the 
limitation of freedom through control in the short term encourages individuals’ 
capacity for freedom in the longer term.    
 
The underpinning premise for both the risk and recovery drivers for CTOs 
therefore is that the problem and the solution are located within the individual.  
There are connections here with a broader narrative which describes an 
intensification in recent decades of a behaviourist trend in social policy and an 
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associated turn to ‘coercive support’ across a range of welfare domains, which is 
aimed at ensuring individual responsibility (Rodger, 2008, Flint, 2009).  In these 
terms, it is the individual’s refusal to comply with medication and services which 
leads to their riskiness and/or lack of recovery.  There is little acknowledgement 
in this explanatory framework of the complex reasons why individuals might be 
non-compliant, or the societal and institutional factors which mediate risk and 
pathways to recovery.  Indeed in a very corporeal sense, it was a ‘thin’ 
biomedical model which was called upon in the policy development of CTOs; 
non-compliance is due to a lack of insight framed as a neurological deficit, and 
subsequently the prevalent mediating factor for risk and recovery is medication 
adherence, which will enable self-regulation.  The CTO is supposed to act as a 
contractual device between the individual and services, to enforce treatment and 
engagement in the face of non-compliance, thus triggering this transformative 
process.  Here I linked the intended ‘work’ of CTOs back to the ‘dividing 
practices’ which are present in governmentality.  To recap, individuals are either 
divided in themselves by being encouraged to cut off aspects of the self which do 
not contribute to autonomy and responsibility, or divided from others if they are 
unable to do so.  In this way, CTOs contain both inclusionary and exclusionary 
facets as exemplified through conditions and recall, which provide both an 
incentive to comply and a sanction if compliance is not met, allowing for 
reformation but also control.     
 
An important dimension of a governmental analysis is linking the rationalities 
behind governmental practices to who is made visible to be governed.  In other 
words: who are these ‘irregular citizens’ that require reformation or control 
through the CTO?  I posited that the ‘revolving door patient’ - someone who 
cycles rapidly and repeatedly between hospital and the community - categorised 
who would be made subject to CTOs.  Although CTOs were to be aimed at a 
group of ‘revolving door patients’, the Government would not define in 
legislation or guidance how this category was to be categorised for the purpose 
of the CTO.  Instead, psychiatric expertise was to be relied upon through the 
operation of professional discretion to decide who would belong to this group 
and therefore be made subject to the CTO.  CTOs could then be applied to a 
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broad range of individuals in a preventative as well as a reactive way, based on 
prediction of aberrant behaviour patterns before they have occurred.   
In addition, aiming CTOs at ‘revolving door patients’ coheres with some policy 
drivers more than others.  Keeping individuals out of hospital fits well with the 
particular vision of recovery through CTOs I have described here, whereby 
individuals are shifted out of the ‘revolving door’ pattern and take on 
responsibility for maintaining progress in the community.  Further, if recovery 
through the CTO is posited as encouraging the autonomy of individuals in the 
community then it can also be understood to lower dependence on services.  This 
suggests that the development of CTOs for ‘revolving door patients’ was also 
partly resource-driven, particularly within the context of the continuing roll-back 
of inpatient services.  However, if we also consider risk as a key policy driver, 
aiming CTOs at ‘revolving door patients’ does not necessarily correlate.  As I 
mentioned earlier there is a necessity for an exclusionary component to CTOs, 
for when control of an individual in the community is not possible.  For CTOs 
that ‘safety valve’ is recall to hospital, which does not straightforwardly fit with 
the aim of lowering hospitalisation rates through stopping the ‘revolving door’38.  
In this way, we can see potential breaks and tensions between policy rationalities 
and CTO practices in terms of who CTOs are aimed at and how they are intended 
to work.   
 
Of course, the various competing claims on policy development make it unlikely 
that programme rationalities follow a straightforward path.  In the latter half of 
this chapter I moved from a governmental consideration of how CTOs were 
thought into being and who was to be made subject to them, to a consideration of 
the pragmatic and ‘messy’ process that generated their eventual form in England.  
Although I have talked thus far broadly in terms of international trends, policy 
drivers for CTOs still differed in emphasis from country to country.  The 
reciprocity principle - whereby CTOs were seen in some countries as a way of 
ensuring good quality care, thus in a sense balancing out the focus on the 
individual - was deliberately not part of the policy reasoning or criteria for CTOs 
in England.  The Government reinforced the individualised focus of the CTO by 
                                                 
38
 Indeed these tensions in policy drivers may help to explain at least in part why the OCTET study found 
no evidence of a reduction in hospitalisation rates for those individuals on CTOs.   
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asserting that it was intended to be a one-sided contract, there to ensure treatment 
compliance but not to ‘bind’ services to a level of care.  Furthermore, risk and 
recovery, although described here as dual policy drivers for the CTO were not 
‘sold’ as such in England.  Risk had a far higher profile than recovery in the 
national policy debate for CTOs, reflecting the audience – the public – who 
policy-makers were largely addressing in an attempt to allay political as well as 
actual risks.   
 
CTOs in England thus have a particular ‘flavour’ and I explained the generative 
processes which formed a distinctive CTO regime in England with reference to 
historical precedents and knowledge flow from other CTO regimes via policy 
transfer.  Regarding the history behind CTOs in England, I described how they 
did not suddenly appear as a policy prescription, but could be seen as a gradual 
evolution of national policy, particularly from the late 1980s onwards.  This 
history was integral to the development of the more defined, dependable and 
‘tougher’ provision of the CTO, which coincided with an authoritarian shift in 
policy-making more generally.  In conjunction, policy-makers learnt from other 
countries how CTOs were practiced elsewhere and how they could be adapted to 
fit the English system.  I explained how particular kinds of international and 
‘local’ research expertise were combined and drawn upon at the expense of 
others to justify CTOs, under the guise of the then recent enthusiasm for 
evidence-based policy.  Further, I noted how CTOs were framed in policy 
debates against the backdrop of their use elsewhere, thus positioning the English 
version as timely and reasonable but also carefully circumscribed.   
 
The rhetorical and ‘political’ case made for CTOs was necessary because of the 
mobilisation in England of a significant opposition to CTOs in particular and the 
2007 Mental Health Act in general.  Indeed, whilst I noted that the English CTO 
regime was in line with extant cultural and institutional traditions in national 
mental health policy - in that it was much broader in application than in many 
other countries - its final form in England reflected to a certain extent concerns 
about the rights of service users.  Specifically I mentioned that an earlier version 
would have included enforced treatment in the community which in light of 
protests, and being a line which had not been crossed in other CTO regimes, was 
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eventually discarded from policy deliberations.  It is noteworthy that this earlier 
version seems to be more in keeping with aiming CTOs at ‘revolving door’ 
service users for both risk-oriented and recovery purposes, thus suggesting that 
the programmatic ‘logic’ of CTOs was shaped to a certain extent by the political 
struggles that took place over their introduction.  However, despite the 
compromises made in the final form CTOs took, the threshold for their use in 
England is still low.  If we combine the loose definition of the target ‘revolving 
door’ group for CTOs with the broad criteria for their imposition and more 
importantly activation once in place, there are implications for ‘net-widening’ in 
terms of numbers placed on CTOs but also effects once on a CTO.  Making 
CTOs easy to activate means risk management potentially continuing to take 
precedence over recovery in CTO practice as well as policy theory. At the same 
time, the amount of discretion afforded practitioners via this framework means 
there is significant room for the evolution of CTOs in practice, which may not be 
solely ‘defensive’ in nature. 
 
There are particular threads of argument I have begun to pick out in this section 
which I will develop for the ensuing discussion on the empirical findings.  To 
begin with however, if we take Chapter Four as discrete from the later empirical 
chapters, it provides a good standalone example of the bringing together of 
governmental and causal analyses in relation to the first set of research questions 
I set out to answer on CTO policy development.  From a governmental 
perspective, the formation of policy problems and solutions can be seen in an 
inevitable way.  Foucault argued that programmes of government include the 
seeds of their failure, which inevitably leads to on-going strategies and mutations 
in forms of government (Lemke, 2000), and we can see how that plays out with 
the evolution of CTOs.  The unintended effects of deinstitutionalisation can be 
seen as a starting point for programmes such as CTOs, which in turn are based on 
specific ways of thinking about the ensuing problems to be solved.  A particular 
assemblage of behavioural and biomedical rationalities was thus called upon in 
the creation of CTOs.  Equally, pinpointing how those problems were to be 
thought about does not mean that they only exist in the realm of discourse; the 
management of individuals with severe mental difficulties in the community 
raised long-standing issues that needed to be dealt with, and from a political 
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perspective seen to be dealt with, hence why CTOs came to be embedded in 
policy regimes.  In turn, moving from broad rationalities and rationales to the 
level of policy detail, again we can see how CTOs were constituted through the 
illumination of a particular group to be targeted – those classed as ‘revolving 
door’ - and through drawing down on particular forms of knowledge.  However, 
an analysis of the CTO policy journey must also take account of the ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors which brought about their eventual ‘local’ formation; in other 
words why they came to be as they are in one particular place.  Dean (2010, 251) 
argues that a governmental analysis does not and indeed should not “amount to a 
study of politics or power relations in general”.  It is my view however that 
taking account of institutional and cultural legacies, the role of political ideas, 
actors and agendas, and the pragmatism and rhetoric inherent to political 
reasoning, is required to fully understand the conception of policy programmes 
such as CTOs, and how they go on to play out in practice.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that for a governmental analysis, such work is necessary if we wish to 
present the ‘inconvenient facts’ about discontinuities between explicit 
governmental rationalities and their strategic effects (Dean, 2010).  In this way 
governmental and causal analyses are interwoven and mutually dependent.  As 
Lemke (2000, 9) suggests, struggles and compromise are integral to 
governmental programmes, “actively contributing to...‘fissures’ and 
‘incoherencies’ inside them”.   
 
This brings us to what this section offers for the following discussion of the latter 
three sets of research questions, as addressed through the empirical findings.  
Here, I have suggested that the risk management and responsibilised version of 
recovery for which CTOs are intended to work, carries tensions which are not 
easily reconciled and which can be seen to shape the framework for CTO 
practice.  Through examining ‘ground-level’ rationalities and ensuing practices 
we can see how these tensions are realised.  Connectedly and as I noted earlier, 
because programmes like CTOs are based on ‘thin’ assumptions about drivers for 
behaviours, they can also contain simplistic expectations about the responses of 
the ‘target’ group and subsequently what the programme outcomes will be.  
Looking ahead to the empirical findings, it seems that both the multifaceted 
motivations and challenges service users bring to CTOs, coupled with the 
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complex ways they interact with CTOs, mean such expectations are not always 
fulfilled.  Policy interventions framed as ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’ 
(Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung, 1998) do not account for such context or 
the reflexive work it instigates.  Together, these conclusions provide the starting 
point for an analysis of how and why CTOs are practiced and with what 
consequences, which I turn to now. 
Ground-level conceptualisations of CTOs 
 
In order to make sense of CTO practice, the theories of those directly affected by 
the CTO should be accounted for, as these conceptualisations act as a ‘bridge’ 
between policy-level thinking and practice.  This section therefore primarily 
draws on findings from Chapters Five and Six, but also makes reference to the 
other findings chapters.  I revisit the gaps and continuities that exist between 
participants’ thinking on CTOs and policy, and what that might mean for CTO 
practice.  In conjunction I explore what forms of thought are drawn upon in the 
formulation of CTOs, particularly with reference to practitioner explanations for 
how CTOs might work.   
 
I noted in Chapter Six that practitioners saw a need for CTOs, and that they felt 
the CTO filled a gap in mental health practice. In this sense, practitioners were 
aligned both with the policy narrative on CTOs and prior research on practitioner 
attitudes towards the CTO (Manning et al, 2011). Specifically, CTOs were 
viewed as giving practitioners more control and certainty regards the oversight of 
particular individuals in the community. It is noteworthy that practitioners did 
not only welcome CTOs for practice-oriented reasons, but also thought that 
CTOs represented a ‘better deal’ for service users too, in that CTOs were more 
transparent and structured than previous legislative provision, particularly 
Section 17 leave.  Indeed, this latter belief points to one particular difference 
between policy and practice-level theory on CTOs.  As I discussed earlier, a 
consequence of aiming CTOs at a distinctive policy derived version of recovery 
might be lowered dependence on services and therefore a reduced requirement 
for resources, particularly inpatient services. Although such a justification of 
resource management through CTOs did not play a prominent part in policy 
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debates, it was clear that practitioners felt that it was an underlying driver for 
CTOs, particularly in the context of on-going service change and rationalisation.  
CTOs were therefore understood by many practitioners as an economically 
driven programme, aimed at maintenance through the enforced provision of 
medically-focused ‘bare minimum’ support.  What is interesting is that despite 
this, in a paradoxical sense practitioners felt that CTOs could be turned to service 
users’ advantage through giving them access to resources via the obligations they 
held under the CTO.  It seems therefore that an element of practitioner reasoning 
for the CTO was that they framed it in a reciprocal way as a ‘true39’ contract, 
rather than the relatively one-sided version that had been argued for in policy 
formulations.   
 
In broader terms, this points to a practice-level purpose for CTOs that was 
entirely missing from the policy agenda - that of giving service users’ protection 
of various kinds.  Protection was a strong motivator for some practitioners, either 
through seeing the CTO as an intervention which would mean more coercive 
methods could be avoided, or through ensuring relapse was dealt with through 
access to inpatient services in a timely and preventative manner.   This way of 
thinking brings back in a category which is missing from the dual 
risk/responsibility narrative for CTOs - that of dependency - which does not align 
easily with “contemporary practices of government…which have come to rely on 
the agency of the governed themselves” (Dean, 2010, 82).  It is worth quoting 
here from a practitioner, who commented in a team meeting: What’s wrong with 
just caring for people when they’re unwell?  Everyone seems obsessed with 
moving people on, why can’t we just accept that some people aren’t going to 
move on, and need our support?  Some service users also valued the CTO in 
similar terms, as a signifier of care.  Indeed, as I pointed out in Chapter Nine, it 
could be that the CTO had become such an emblem of enduring and reliable 
support that service users might feel they are being coerced into having it 
removed.  For those individuals, compulsion did not equate to coercion; instead 
the opposite – potential freedom from the CTO - was experienced as coercive.  It 
has been argued that that the use of control mechanisms to direct behaviour 
                                                 
39
 Here I am referring to the principles of contract law, whereby the terms of a contract should be fair to all 
parties in order to be acceptable and implementable.   
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undermines a sense of care (Brown and Calnan, 2012, Pilgrim, 2007).  In a 
perhaps counter-intuitive way, it seems that with CTOs perceptions of care and 
control can at times reinforce each other.  As Flint (2009) suggests, the public 
positioning of policy programmes aimed at behavioural change as premised on 
coercion can hide the provision of enhanced support such programmes may 
provide to the individuals made subject to them, particularly when more 
universal provision is becoming increasingly restricted.   
 
Furthermore, given the long-standing arguments that mental health services are 
focused on an instrumentalist process of risk minimisation (Vassilev and Pilgrim, 
2007, Szmuckler and Rose, 2013), it is worth pointing out that protection was as 
important, if  not more so, for many practitioners than risk management.  Of 
course, as I described in Chapter Five not all service users saw CTOs in a 
straightforwardly positive way, and for some, the CTO magnified their sense of 
lacking control over their lives and the treatment they received.  As I will come 
to in the next section, practitioner assumptions about allaying coercive 
components of the CTO with ‘kinder’ coercion could sometimes have the 
opposite to intended effect, and the same could be said for the CTO as a whole, 
with some service users preferring the ‘short, sharp shock’ of intermittent 
compulsion rather than the sense of ‘never-ending’ compulsion of the CTO.  In 
this light, using the CTO for protective purposes is aligned with paternalistic 
rather than autonomy premised best interests (Peay, 2005).  Accordingly, 
protection - ostensibly more ‘needs-focused’ and typified by practitioners 
believing they are acting in the best interests of service users even if against their 
wishes - can be as central to the defence of restricting autonomy as risk 
management, yet a preoccupation with risk in mental health discourse means that 
this aspect of control can arguably be overlooked.  Taking this perspective calls 
into question the ways that risk can be presented as the dominant framework in 
mental health, moving beyond what Rose (2000, 333) describes in discursive 
terms as “community protection through the identification of riskiness of 
individuals, actions, forms of life and territories”.  
 
This is not to say that risk did not figure in practitioner views on the purpose of 
the CTO.  There was ambivalence towards the risk management orientation of 
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CTOs in policy-making, with acceptance by most practitioners of the broad 
premise if not the spirit of such reasoning.  Given practitioners’ close 
involvement with the everyday reality of service users’ lives, there was little 
support for the idea that risk ‘events’ could be understood or managed in the 
simplistic way presented in CTO policy debates, with emphasis rather placed on 
the compound elements which made such events unpredictable.  Nevertheless, by 
ensuring medication compliance, practitioners felt that CTOs helped to manage 
certain kinds of risk for certain kinds of individuals, and therefore were better 
present in such cases than not.  Campbell and Davidson (2009) note the deep-
seated personal and emotional responses practitioners might have to service 
users, including fear, which can influence the use of compulsory intervention.  
The emotional toll of working with individuals in the community deemed as high 
risk due to a history of violence cannot be underestimated, and defensive practice 
was not simply about ‘back-covering’ – CTOs could give practitioners 
psychological ballast in feeling they were controlling what risks they could.  At 
the same time, and akin with protection, it should be acknowledged that some 
service users also saw themselves in terms of risk.  ‘Taking on’ a risk identity has 
particular implications for governmental self-work, which I turn to later.  For 
now it is enough to note that coming to a mutually aligned understanding of risk 
meant risk management played out through CTO practice in perhaps unexpected 
ways, a point I return to in the next section.   
 
Before doing so, it is worth highlighting that the tensions in CTO policy 
formulations between risk and recovery were also present in practitioner 
conceptualisations of CTOs.  Whilst practitioners did not take a straightforward 
view of CTOs or their purposes, more often than not referring to more than one, 
a general difference could still be drawn between those who referred to CTOs 
meeting risk and protective purposes, and those who saw them more as a vehicle 
for recovery.  Accordingly, recovery could not only be in tension with risk 
management, but also with the protective notions of care and dependence 
discussed earlier.  It could be difficult for practitioners to reconcile these 
different theorisations for CTOs, and how they went about this appeared to be 
premised on the ‘web of beliefs’ (Bevir, 2010) they held about practice and what 
it is to be a ‘good’ practitioner (Evans, 2012).  Such difficulties were at the heart 
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of the ethical dilemmas and balancing acts many of them experienced in CTO 
practice.  For those practitioners who saw their work as based more on a 
recovery model, the CTO should be used only when necessary and then only in a 
‘light-touch’ way in order to both counter potential coercion and to discourage 
dependency.  In recovery terms then, the imposition of the CTO would be seen 
ironically as only worthwhile if it was not activated once in place, providing an 
‘invisible’ guide for service users.  It is with recovery that we can see 
practitioners perhaps most aligned with policy-level drivers for CTOs, theorising 
CTOs as providing a foundation for maintenance, subsequent behavioural change 
and even service user ‘enlightenment’ on the best way forward, leading to 
autonomy and responsibility in the community.   
 
In this sense, and similar to what has been reported elsewhere (O’Hare et al, 
2013) the notion of recovery was viewed by practitioners as being most relevant 
when service users were deemed ‘ready’ to recover.  The concept of insight can 
be seen therefore as one particularly significant manifestation of expert 
knowledge that practitioners - and as seen in CTO appeals, decision-makers more 
broadly - drew upon in formulating CTO practice.  As I discussed in Chapter 
One, insight is a difficult concept to pin down, containing “a multiplicity of 
meanings within, and across, discourses” (Diesfeld and Sjostrom, 2006, 90).  
Nevertheless, presented as a scientifically derived, ‘objective’ state, insight is a 
central facet of how CTOs are theorised as a way of inculcating particular norms 
and ways of being.  Used clinically to direct when CTOs are needed, and to 
decide if they are ‘working’ in recovery-oriented terms, insight thus provides a 
significant foundation for the ‘conduct of conduct’ through the CTO.   In 
contrast, service user understanding of responsibility through the CTO was 
integrated with their description of recovery as a precarious journey, reliant on 
the care and aid of others.  Such a view suggests a broader conception of 
recovery, more aligned with its original user-led formulation than the 
individualised form discussed thus far, which also accounts for shared and cross-
cutting responsibilities.   As Trnka and Trundle (2014, 139) point out the notion 
of responsibilisation does not account for the fact that “descriptions of the self-
managing individual frequently reveal a subject entangled within widespread 
ties…and duties to others”.  This latter approach provides something of a 
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counterpoint to the idea that CTOs must stimulate autonomous action.  Indeed, 
whilst practitioners used insight as a core concept for CTO decision-making, this 
was not necessarily reflected in their day to day practice with service users.  The 
invocation of insight could act to distance practitioners from service users and 
hamper the development of such mutual goal-setting. What we have here then is 
a rather complex interplay between the strong influence of insight on CTO 
formulations and ensuing decisions, and the everyday reality of CTO practice 
where obligations were negotiated when possible and practitioners often 
attempted to shape CTOs to ‘fit’ service user beliefs and goals.  In this way, 
CTOs are a good example of a “responsibilisation program that…devolves some 
forms of decision-making onto patients and yet also encounters significant 
counter-pressures through the persistence of pre-existing networks of 
responsibility and care” (Trnka and Trundle, 2014, 148).   
 
In excavating the conceptualisations of CTOs present in the field, we can see 
that, as with the discussion on policy development, governmental and realist 
analyses are closely connected to each other.   From a realist perspective the 
conceptualisations of CTOs outlined here hold both similarities and important 
differences to the policy agenda for CTOs, which as will be shown influence the 
ways that CTOs work.  Most significantly, I have drawn attention to the abiding 
tensions between risk and recovery which are translated from CTO policy to 
practice, and filtered through practitioners’ ethical standpoints.  At the same 
time, a third driver – that of protection and care – surfaced in practitioner and 
service user accounts, which had not been accounted for, and indeed can be seen 
in opposition to policy-level reasoning on CTOs.  Delineating these over-lapping 
or contradictory practice-level drivers tell us both what is hoped and/or planned 
for in the use of CTOs and points to the problems that might arise in meeting 
such goals, thus giving a foundation for CTO outcomes to be interpreted further 
down the line both in relation to policy and ground-level expectations.   
Additionally, finding out where practitioners and service users stand in relation 
to CTOs is a necessary starting point from which to understand why it is CTOs 
might unfold in particular ways.  As Pawson and Manzano-Santaella (2012, 180) 
comment, “outcome patterns come to be as they are because of the collective, 
constrained choices of all stakeholders”.   
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From a governmental perspective, the discussion undertaken here has also 
highlighted the various forms of thought that underpin the intended purposes of 
the CTO.  It seems that practitioners formulated various theories on how CTOs 
might work dependent on the ‘ends’ they were aiming towards.  The most 
explicit formulation I have presented is the consideration given to insight as a 
foundation for maintenance and recovery, which by its nature predicates 
recovery as an individualised process.  At the same time, presenting government 
as a rational and thoughtful activity (Dean, 2010) is not entirely straightforward.   
Practitioner theories on how CTOs might work are ‘muddied’ to a certain extent 
by what they know about the circumstances of individual service users – for 
example in the emphasis on dependence and protection which does not align with 
typical governmental logic, or the ambivalent way practitioners considered risk.  
As Broadhurst et al (2010, 1059, emphasis in original) posit in a discussion of the 
informal logics of risk, “Risk management is embedded in social relations and 
the worker’s strategies are contingent or case-specific…Here, we see a 
multiplicity of rationalities operating, to do with not just instrumental, but also 
moral concerns”.  I would add that for practitioners in relation to CTOs this 
meant moral concerns relating not just to the individual in question, but to the 
community that individual is embedded within.  Relatedly, the interaction 
undertaken in the operation of CTOs further cross-cuts and sometimes under-cuts 
“the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organise and reorganise 
institutional spaces, their routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of 
actors in specific ways” (Dean, 2010, 43).  Through elucidating both practitioner 
and service user purposes (or in the case of the latter sometimes anti-purposes) it 
is possible to see the ways that mutual work on the CTO can be undertaken, and 
indeed when it is difficult to do so.  Here is where there is space for situated 
ethics and associated ‘balancing acts’ to be considered, which align somewhat 
with Barnett et al’s (2008, 632) argument that “rationalities which govern 
strategic interactions are not [solely] the pre-existing properties of the different 
actors involved, but are an emergent dimension of ongoing interaction itself”.  In 
this way the process of subjectification via governmental means is complicated 
by how people are ‘made up’ from below via communicative action and the 
application of lay normativity as well as from above via discourse (Hacking, 
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2004, Sayer, 2005).  On that note, I move onto the central aspect of the empirical 
work – the ways that CTOs work in practice.   
CTO practice: agency, interaction and context 
 
The heart of my analysis derives from understanding CTO practice and I relate 
here how my findings illuminate the workings of the CTO.  As with the prior 
section, much of what I draw on is loosely aligned with particular chapters – 
Seven and Eight – but I also refer to other parts of the findings.  Pawson and 
Tilley (2004, 8) warn that “context should not be confused with locality.  
Depending on the nature of the intervention, what is …significant may not only 
relate to place but also to systems of interpersonal and social relationships”.  
Therefore, what is deemed contextually salient refers both to the personal and 
micro-social experiences of those individuals made subject to a policy 
programme as well as the systemic factors that mediate their experiences. As I 
have explored at various points in this thesis, individual responses to the CTO are 
influenced by complex interactions between beliefs about self and identity, and 
past and present experiences of services, medication, and relationships with 
professionals.  To add an additional layer of complexity, such an analysis should 
not only be limited to those on the receiving end of CTOs, but also the 
practitioners who implement them, taking into account practice beliefs and 
ethical standpoints.  I therefore examine the roles of agency and interaction in 
generating CTO mechanisms alongside the broader institutional, cultural and 
systemic factors that impinge on the use of CTOs.  I also consider how the work 
carried out through the CTO does or does not regulate behaviour in particular 
ways, drawing attention to service user responses to those techniques.   
 
An obvious incongruity of policy programmes such as CTOs is that even though 
they are based on compulsion, for certain purposes to be met (particularly related 
to maintenance and recovery) they depend at least partly on the self-directed 
choices and actions of the subjects of intervention (Dean, 2010).  Consequently, 
an important facet of understanding the ways that the CTO might or might not 
work is to explore how individuals become ‘invested’ in the CTO.  As I 
described in Chapter Seven, a catalyst for this investment is the way that CTOs 
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are talked about with service users by practitioners, and how much involvement 
service users feel they have in directing the CTO process. It seems from the 
findings that there were two related aspects to this interactional activity.  Firstly, 
when and how service users are informed about the CTO and involved in its 
implementation, and secondly how the CTO is framed in various ways which 
might fit with the underlying beliefs service users hold about their lives in the 
past, present and future.  It appears that where early ‘groundwork’ was 
undertaken with service users, and careful negotiation took place - particularly on 
medication under the CTO – coercion was more likely to be alleviated.  In 
addition, if sensitive explanation of the CTO was given by practitioners based on 
prior knowledge of the service user and their self-beliefs, then service users were 
more able to accept its imposition and operate within its bounds.  Such findings 
reflect the body of research (see Newton-Howes, 2010) on how the experience of 
coercion can be alleviated by positive interactive processes, although as I note 
later in relation to the active use of CTOs, this was not always the case and 
indeed could result in the opposite outcome.  Practitioners broadly held the view 
that with a small group of service users, their beliefs on mental health and how 
best to manage it would always place them at odds with mental health services, 
regardless of such relational effort.  Even so, it did seem that with skilled work, 
practitioners and service users could construct a mutually conducive narrative of 
how the CTO might meet shared goals. In this sense, the connection practitioners 
and service users did or did not make with each other within the context of the 
CTO was a central generative driver of why the CTO manifested in the way that 
it did.   
 
At the same time, as was outlined in Chapter Eight, this important early work 
could be constrained by institutional and cultural factors.  Specifically, the 
tensions that exist between inpatient and community services due to resource 
constraints, fragmented communication and differing beliefs on the role of 
inpatient care, made it difficult at times for CTOs to be planned and carried out 
in a way that was conducive to mitigation of coercion. It seems that individuals 
could be discharged onto CTOs before they were deemed to be ready, raising 
concerns about how they would manage in the community and making it more 
likely that they would be recalled back to hospital quickly.  As I also noted, in 
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cases where the CTO was deemed inappropriate by community practitioners and 
yet was still imposed, it could have a damaging knock-on effect on the ongoing 
relationship they held with service users and consequently on the provision of 
services to those individuals.  AMHPs acted as gatekeepers to a certain extent, by 
ensuring that the initial process was carried out thoroughly and that the CTO was 
reasonable and ethical in its scope.  However, I pointed out that none of the 
AMHPs recollected ever disagreeing to a CTO, and indeed suggested they would 
find it hard to do so given the wide remit of the legal criteria and the pressures 
inherent to group decision-making.  This illustrates a broader theme regarding 
the implicit logic of the CTO and the difficulties practitioners sometimes faced in 
contesting such logic, even when they felt the CTO should not be imposed in a 
particular case, or should be used differently than it was being used once in 
place, for example in the activation of recall.  Evans and Harris (2004) make the 
point that an increase in rules and bureaucracy can ironically lead to more space 
becoming available for practitioners to operate with discretion.  My findings 
demonstrate that in a mirror of this, the breadth of latitude present in CTO 
criteria and operation meant practitioners could feel their range of choices 
became restricted and consequently their ability to act with discretion limited, 
especially in the face of external pressures for defensive decision-making.  Dean 
(2010) suggests that the technical means by which governmental rationalities are 
put into action can limit the ends that can be achieved, and with CTOs it seems 
they could take on a momentum of their own which was in some ways distinct to 
the motivations and ethical beliefs of the actors involved in their use. 
 
The evolution of CTO practice in particular directions – the most obvious 
example being the creation of recall ‘cycles’ – also highlights the relationship 
that runs throughout the findings between what can be constituted as ‘surface’ 
and ‘depth’ practice40.  These two concepts emerged from the findings and 
seemed to cohere with practitioners’ concerns around what practice ‘should’ be 
like, and what was possible under the CTO in relation to risk, recovery or 
protection.  Surface practice related to the potential deskilling influence 
                                                 
40 I became aware after deploying these two concepts in my analysis that David Howe (1992, 1996) had 
coined and used them in a similar way, which illustrates that such tensions are a relatively longstanding 
concern in social work.   
277 
 
practitioners felt CTOs could have for the relational work they believed was 
central to Assertive Outreach, where particular skills and approaches had been 
developed to engage with individuals.  CTO practice in this light is arguably 
mechanistic, reductive, and control-oriented, involving fast and definite 
responses to infractions of the CTO ‘contract’.  As with when the CTO was first 
imposed, institutional factors could undermine the intended purposes of CTOs 
for practitioners and act to further alienate service users.  This could particularly 
be seen in the way recalls were sometimes handled as quick ‘turnarounds’ with 
little time given for exploration of the issues at hand, thus not offering much in 
the way of protection, or thinking ahead to how the CTO might work better to 
achieve maintenance and recovery.  Cultural practices within teams, for example 
the differing stances practitioners might take to the CTO could also act to shape 
CTO practice. This could be seen in the way that some decision-makers 
maintained focus on adherence to medication when considering recall rather than 
keeping an uncertain watch on the secondary outcomes that might or might not 
arise from breach of the CTO.  Conversely, as explored in some depth in Chapter 
Eight, many practitioners tried to alleviate the effects of the CTO and encourage 
a recovery-oriented approach via negotiation on treatment ‘sticking points’ and 
using ‘steps to compulsion’ instead of acting immediately when conditions were 
not adhered to.   
 
Even so, and in some ways I think more interestingly, the kinds of CTO practice 
I witnessed were not always straightforwardly ‘superficial’ or ‘deep’ in 
application or effect.   Surface and depth practice cannot only be characterised by 
a tension between external mandates on practice and practitioners’ preferred 
ways of working.  Instead, the way it manifested here was in a less hierarchical 
and more interactional way.  Surface and depth practice was influenced by 
surface and depth responses, and it was the case that superficial engagement via 
the CTO could be a way for both service users to maintain some sense of control, 
and practitioners to lessen coercion by maintaining a minimal presence.  
Alternatively, attempts to mitigate the CTO framework by demonstrating 
flexibility and working with service users could exacerbate coercive experiences 
by sharpening service users’ sense of the compulsion they were under, as 
illustrated in Chapter Eight with the circumvention of recall by practitioners and 
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in Chapter Nine with the operation of procedural justice in the appeal process.  
Furthermore, the structure and routine the CTO framework offers can enable as 
well as constrain deeper levels of engagement.  The use of conditions, 
particularly in ensuring regular contact, could help to build trust and acceptance 
of support where previously it had not been possible.  Having a contract to work 
to could also clarify the boundaries of intervention for service users and give 
practitioners a starting point for ‘difficult’ and reflective conversations, for 
example on risk.  Boardman and Roberts (2014) note that there has been little 
attention paid in mental health research or practice to service users’ views on risk 
and risk management, and they comment that risk planning and assessment is 
often carried out without the service user’s knowledge or involvement.  They 
conclude that there is a need for joint safety planning between practitioners and 
service users.  Whilst CTOs have been criticised for being ostensibly another 
‘top-down’ tool for risk management (Lawton-Smith, Dawson and Burns, 2008) 
it appears that they can act to make concerns around risk explicit and become a 
cooperative and co-constructed risk management endeavour, embedded within 
relational work.  
 
Indeed, it seems that this relational work was important for effective risk 
management within the CTO.  Building trust can help mitigate risk concerns by 
curtailing hazardous events through increased access, disclosure and cooperation 
by service users.  The interplay between a lack of trust in practitioners and the 
fear that the CTO brought for those service users who viewed it coercively could 
result in an unwillingness to disclose sensitive information, thus making it more 
challenging for practitioners to pre-empt difficulties.   In more complex cases, 
particularly where signifiers of risk such as a forensic history, substance misuse 
and a diagnosis of personality disorder were present, it seems that the CTO had 
the potential to stimulate risk.   A complex combination of the negative response 
of the service user to additional control, a lack of ability to use recall as a 
safeguard in such cases, a reluctance on the part of practitioners to manage 
‘social’ causes of risky behaviour, and the CTO giving other agencies the 
opportunity to divest their responsibilities, meant that contrary to policy 
formulations, a possible perverse consequence of the CTO was further 
entrenchment of what might be deemed the ‘riskiest’ of cases.  It seems therefore 
279 
 
that considering the CTO as a standalone risk management tool is not enough.  
Szmukler and Rose (2013) argue that risk management is used as an all-
encompassing approach in mental health services.  I am arguing that the limits 
the CTO can be put to and the delineation of different kinds of risks by 
practitioners suggests that this might not always be the case.   
 
Whilst I have talked thus far primarily in terms of the role of interactional, 
institutional and cultural factors in the constitution of various CTO mechanisms, 
I have also made inferences to the agency of service users in why CTOs play out 
as they do.  A key factor that influences individual response to the CTO is how 
medication is managed and negotiated.  Through observing decision-making on 
how CTOs were enacted, it appeared that practitioners believed that putting 
service users on an injection as part of their conditions was central to making the 
CTO ‘work’.  However as the findings suggest, for service users, actively 
accepting the CTO and making it ‘work’ in their terms could depend on 
medication choices remaining broad and practitioners acting in concordance with 
them in working toward wider goals, instead of expecting compliance.  Hence, 
service users did not only act in response to practitioner mediation, but also on 
their own terms within the constraints placed upon them.  Similarly to Canvin, 
Bartlett and Pinfold (2002) in their analysis of supervised discharge, I noted a 
range of responses to CTOs, including various forms of acceptance, resistance 
and subversion, both passive and active.  I will talk further about service user 
responses to CTO ‘ends’ and ‘means’ in the next section, as the potential ‘soft’ 
outcomes of a programme aimed at attitudinal and behavioural change and also 
as forms of conduct and counter-conduct.  An interesting point I want to focus on 
here is that particularly ‘down-stream’ of the initial decision, service user 
responses to the CTO were less easily amenable to practitioner intercession.  In 
this way, we can see not only the effect the individual can have on the path the 
CTO might take, but also the effect the CTO has on the individual as a 
governmental programme acting to regulate conduct.  Accordingly, this is where 
an ethical consideration of power through the CTO is brought back into the 
discussion, which moves beyond understanding what it takes to get service users 
‘on side’ in order to achieve the various purposes of the CTO and instead 
considers how they are worked upon through the CTO.   
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More specifically, I highlighted in Chapters Five and Seven the various 
connections that can be made between service users’ conceptions of self coming 
into the CTO and how they responded to it as an intervention in their life.  As I 
noted, the view of those practitioners who saw the CTO as a helpful tool for a 
broad range of individuals tended to be that the CTO did not hold much in the 
way of concrete implications and therefore as an ‘insurance policy’ should not 
affect service users adversely.  However, this does not account for the potent 
psychological responses service users could have to the CTO as premised on the 
way it keyed into their sense of identity.  In this sense, feelings of stigma were 
not related to the CTO being a visible ‘badge’ of difference, but instead to how it 
was perceived to limit what was possible and hoped for in life.  Zedner (2010) 
talks about the way that ‘irregular citizens’ – those who are deemed outsiders 
because they do not fit with societal expectations – can be placed under 
conditional citizenship which requires them to adhere to contractual requirements 
in order to become included in society on equal terms.  It seems that much of the 
resentment some service users felt towards CTOs related to feeling that it 
magnified their pre-existing sense of being ‘outsiders’, and acted to further 
exclude them in some way.  Here we can see a reflection on self and self in 
relation to others as an articulation of belonging.  Such feelings translated into 
how the CTO framework was interpreted, and the most obvious indicator of this 
was the way that the CTO was perceived to pervade various aspects of life even 
if it was not the case.  CTOs then can be experienced in ways that overstep the 
boundary of a discrete intervention, which in turn reinforced distrust in mental 
health services in general, and the actions and motivations of practitioners in 
particular.  As I noted in Chapter Seven, this process of internalisation of CTO 
‘messages’ and binding them to pre-existing notions of self did not only apply to 
those service users who saw the CTO in a negative light.  Returning to a point 
made earlier in this chapter on how it is that policy is thought to shape thought 
and behaviour, ‘thin’ theorisations of change through policy programmes do not 
account for the individual – their history, hopes and self-conceptions.  Thus, the 
CTO cannot be understood as transformative in and of itself, but instead as in 
conjunction with ethical ‘self-work’.  The CTO could play into beliefs on 
vulnerability and fragility, but also could trigger ambivalence through 
underscoring tensions between where individuals saw themselves in the present 
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versus where they wanted to be in the future, and accordingly between what they 
might need but also want in terms of service involvement. What I have discussed 
here is the various thoughts individuals had in relation to CTOs, but part of 
exploring how conduct is managed or not is the ways these thoughts are 
translated into action, and this is where service users beliefs about the CTO in 
relation to self coincided with responses to the authority held over them.  Various 
forms of conduct and counter-conduct can be seen through the CTO, and I 
describe them in the next section which explores the final and fourth set of 
research questions I posed.     
CTO ‘ends’: consequences, change and identity work 
 
In this final section, I attempt to pull together the arguments I have made thus far 
and apply them to the ‘ends’ of CTOs.  I hope I have managed to demonstrate the 
many and complex ways CTOs can play out dependent on different contextual 
factors.  Accordingly, there is no straightforward account I can give about what 
the implications of CTOs might be.  Instead, what I discuss here is the range of 
consequences we can garner from CTO use and how they might unfold in 
unexpected and sometimes unintended ways.  In order to develop a pluralistic 
understanding of CTO practice, I also draw attention to the ways these 
consequences are thought about by practitioners, and put to use in discharge 
decisions.  I begin this section in a continuation of the previous one, by reflecting 
on the change-oriented nature of CTOs and how service users responded to this 
mandate with forms of conduct and counter-conduct.   
 
I argue that the findings demonstrate diverse connections between ‘practices of 
the self’, conduct and counter-conduct in the face of compulsion.  I take a 
different approach to that taken thus far in this chapter by grounding my 
argument in a reflection on six specific cases.  Service users’ conception of 
identity, sense of self and self in ethical relation to others led to complex, 
ambiguous and perhaps unexpected responses to compulsion which are not 
always easily categorised into binary forms of compliance and resistance to the 
CTO.  If we revisit Foucault’s (1997) dimensions of ethical self-work, we can 
see that they relate to: external impetus for change, the means by which we act 
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upon ourselves to bring about such change, and the end person we seek to 
become through these means.  In formulating forms of conduct and counter-
conduct, the CTO acts as the external stimulus, and the task here is to delineate 
how the means and ends service users have conceived for themselves relate to 
the means and ends of the CTO.  I have discussed throughout the thesis how 
service users can be placed along a spectrum from acceptance to resistance, and 
the cases I refer to take different points on this spectrum. 
 
Acceptance of CTO means and ends: the contrasting cases of Nick and James 
 
Nick and James can be described as the two service users who whole-heartedly 
accepted the CTO the most out of all the individuals followed and both expressed 
strong respect for the authority of the professionals who worked with them.  
Neither of them had experienced recall, as they had adhered to the CTO and 
practitioners saw the role of the CTO in their cases being for boundary-setting 
rather than active intervention.  In a superficial sense, they both can be seen as 
CTO ‘success’ stories, particularly regarding behaviour change.  However, there 
are interesting contrasts that can be drawn between them which are not quite as 
clear-cut, beginning with how the CTO related to the changes they wanted to see 
in themselves.  Nick and James aligned themselves with different aspects of the 
CTO agenda, each corresponding to how they saw themselves and their 
relationships to others.  I mentioned earlier about how some service users self-
conception was refracted through a ‘risk’ identity and Nick was one of those 
individuals who expressed extreme anxiety about what he thought he was 
capable of in relation to harming others, particularly those who he was close to.  
The CTO for him was a way of externalising the control he did not feel able to 
exert over himself and therefore he accepted one particular ‘end’ of the CTO – 
risk management – as it related to the kind of individual he wanted to become.  
As such, Nick was also one of the individuals who did not want to be discharged 
from the CTO, and talked about it as being necessary for the safety of others as 
well as his continuing and relative autonomy in the community.  James 
conversely, had taken on board the messages about responsibility inculcated in 
the CTO.  He saw himself very much in relation to the broader mental health 
system and network of support he received from practitioners, family and 
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friends.  In this sense he felt it his ‘duty’ and responsibility to use the CTO to 
recover and live what he viewed as a productive and independent life.  James did 
not see the CTO as a permanent proposition, but trusted that the changes he was 
making in his life would demonstrate to practitioners that he was ready to move 
on from the CTO when ready.   
 
Nick’s compliance to the CTO and insistent dependence on its continuation can 
however also be seen as a form of resistance to practitioners’ attempts to ‘move 
people on’ to independence.  James, although he spoke in a particular way about 
authority, took some control from his treating team by making his own 
autonomous decision on how and where he should receive medication, and thus 
acted on his own volition to make the CTO process fit his perception of what it 
should be.  In making this choice, James also reduced his treating team’s ability 
to monitor his medication and consequently created some ‘space’ for himself 
within compulsion.  Although Nick and James orientated themselves respectively 
to the risk and recovery aims of the CTO, they were therefore not entirely 
‘exemplars’ of conduct.  In this sense Nick and James encapsulated the tensions 
that can exist between differing policy ends.   
 
Resistance to CTO means but acceptance of ends: Irene 
 
Irene held much resentment about being under the CTO, related to a sense of 
what ‘normality’ should be for her and the anxiety the CTO caused as a 
framework for potential intervention at any time.  However, much of her 
resentment was ironically yet strongly related to her acceptance of the potential 
ends of the CTO.  By forcing her to engage, she felt the CTO had taken away her 
ability to engage on her own terms, which was very important to her.  For Irene, 
the CTO reinforced barriers between her and professionals, blocking the ability 
for relational work and meaningful engagement whilst at the same time 
magnifying an adversarial focus on the negation of her rights.  Irene wanted to be 
able to collaborate with professionals, a view which reflected her belief on what 
the service user-practitioner relationship should be.  In this sense, Irene believed 
in the potential ‘first-level’ aim of the CTO – consistent engagement with 
services – whilst at the same time disliking the CTO as the means to get there.  
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Whilst the CTO ensured superficial compliance on Irene’s part, it was only when 
it was lifted that she and her care coordinator felt she was able to fully engage 
with treatment and support.  Consequently it can be argued that in cases like 
Irene’s, where the ‘norms’ the CTO is supposed to be inculcating are accepted 
but the use of the CTO in itself is not,  coming off the CTO might encourage the 
responsibilised response that its use is supposed to facilitate.   
 
Resistance to CTO ends but acceptance of means: Simon 
 
Resistance to CTO ends but acceptance of its means meant in Simon’s case, 
‘playing the CTO game’ for his own ends, which did not cohere with the CTO 
drivers of risk or recovery.  Simon regularly attempted (and at least initially 
succeeded) in triggering recall by refusing his medication and avoiding contact 
with services.  He explained this as a way for him to get admission to hospital, 
which he saw as a significant safety net when he needed respite, or was 
experiencing various pressures in the community that he wanted ‘time out’ from.  
Simon had developed a pattern over the years of seeking admission to a respite 
facility as a coping strategy, but with the closure of this service and increasingly 
limited access to beds in acute services, his coping strategy had been disrupted.  
In one sense placing Simon on the CTO had further removed his ability to decide 
when he needed additional help.  However, by subverting the key component of 
the CTO, Simon had found a way of meeting his self-prescribed needs and 
retaining some kind of agency.  Simon’s care coordinator was sympathetic to 
Simon seeking to maintain his much-needed dependency on services in this way, 
understanding it as a protective factor, but at the same time his actions did not fit 
with the mandated use of recall, or the constraints on recall that existed within 
the service.  Simon had effectively undermined the use of the CTO by making it 
difficult for practitioners to decide when they thought he ‘needed’ recall and 
consequently his CTO was eventually discharged. 
 
Resistance to CTO ends and means: the contrasting cases of Andrew and Craig 
 
At the furthest end of the spectrum were those individuals who rejected both the 
CTO and what it stood for.  Resistance to CTO ends and means meant a 
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complete rejection of the ‘service user role’, and Andrew and Craig provide 
interesting insights into how this might play out.  Neither Andrew nor Craig felt 
the CTO had any place in their lives – they resented both the compulsion it 
placed them under, and the sense that it was aimed at shaping their attitude and 
behaviour, when they wanted to be ‘left alone’ by services.  They articulated this 
resistance in different ways however.  Andrew would continue to have 
occasional meetings with his care coordinator, but avoided medication where 
possible and refused to meet his psychiatrist.  Craig also avoided appointments, 
but would in addition resist recall by disappearing for days at a time when it was 
instigated, and regularly fight the CTO legally through the appeals system, thus 
in a way using the system against itself. A combination of Andrew’s forensic 
history and because of his tendency to acquiesce to recall - being one of the 
individuals where medication could be ensured through a monthly ‘recall cycle’ - 
meant that his treating team had decided the CTO on balance was worth 
maintaining even though it had a significant negative effect on him personally.  
In contrast, although it was felt unlikely Craig would consistently engage with 
services once the CTO was lifted, he was deemed to pose little risk.  This, along 
with the additional problems the CTO was causing both practically and ethically 
meant that on balance the decision was made to stop his CTO.    
 
These cases have illustrated both the non-binary forms conduct and counter-
conduct can take to governmental programmes, as well as a different approach to 
the study of CTO ‘outcomes’.  As I discussed in Chapter Two, conduct and 
counter-conduct are two sides of the same coin and mutually constitutive – 
neither involves ‘stepping outside’ of existing power structures, but instead 
responding to disciplinary power in different ways, as related to both individual 
and social means and ends.  Removing this ‘either/or’ distinction from 
discussions of power and resistance means that such responses can be seen in a 
more variegated sense, which does not look ‘beyond government’ (Rose, 1999, 
281) but at how individual action plays out within the strategies and techniques 
of government (Death, 2010).  As Death (2010, 236, emphasis in original) 
comments, forms of conduct “have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well 
as and at the same time as, undermining and challenging dominant forms 
of…governance”.  With CTOs, it is possible to see where conduct and counter-
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conduct contain continuity and movement between them: with Nick who 
although compliant in every sense to the CTO highlights the challenges 
practitioners might face when individuals resist the lifting of compulsion; Irene, 
whose personal ‘ends’ aligned with those of the CTO even if she resented the 
CTO in itself; Simon who took the means of the CTO to achieve his own ends; 
and even with Craig, who used the oversight system integral to the CTO as a 
form of resistance to the CTO.     
 
Moving to how we might think about CTO outcomes, these six cases, along with 
examples I have given at other points in this chapter, also point to the way that 
complex responses can lead to complex and sometimes perverse consequences.  
Furthermore, I have highlighted how these consequences can be weighed up by 
practitioners in different ways dependent on the individual and their 
circumstances, thus leading to differentiated decisions on when the CTO might 
be continued or not.  For example in Irene’s case it was recognised that the 
unintended consequence of the CTO was to further alienate her from the 
therapeutic relationship, and the consequence of removing it was to increase her 
sense of having some kind of responsibility for her treatment in partnership with 
practitioners, thus furthering her engagement with services.  Or as in Simon’s 
case, his subversion of the recall function meant that the CTO was rendered 
useless and thus deemed pointless by practitioners to carry on.  A similar story 
can be told, as noted earlier, about those individuals believed to be high risk, 
where the very presence of the CTO could further exacerbate ‘risky’ behaviour, 
inverting the intended purpose of the CTO as a way of managing risk in the 
community.   
 
Hence, although the underlying premise of recall is to compel individuals to 
behave in a certain way, such compulsion can work least well for many of those 
who are deemed to need the CTO most.  Mechanisms thus can help to explain a 
policy programme’s failure as well as its success, or indeed as with the persistent 
use of recall, potentially a mixture of both.  During the fieldwork there was 
substantial variation in how different participants, across both practitioner and 
service user groups, perceived outcomes.  However, CTOs were more often than 
not viewed in terms of success and failure by practitioners.  For those individuals 
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like Andrew whose resistance to the CTO regularly triggered recall, practitioners 
might think of it as a ‘failed CTO’ because it has exacerbated rather than 
mitigated the ‘revolving door’ cycle, leaving individuals with less stability in the 
community, damaging the therapeutic relationship and costing time and 
resources.  Certainly, although beyond the scope of this thesis, the regular use of 
recall raises questions about ‘knock-on’ effects on revocation of CTOs and 
therefore hospitalisation rates.  An alternative view was if repeat recalls means 
service users are regularly taking medication and subsequently staying relatively 
well, then the CTO is working in lowering their risk to others and ensuring they 
are protected from the worst of relapse. By thinking about the implications of 
policy in this way, we are able to both elucidate the variety of outcomes that can 
occur through context-mechanism interactions, but also consider outcomes in 
more multifaceted and partial terms, taking into account the ethical balancing 
acts practitioners may face when weighing them up.   
 
In a broader sense, the use of repeat recalls is in keeping with other ‘cycles’ 
highlighted in the thesis, such as the increased likelihood of further CTOs once 
used due to practitioner notions of causality, and the continuation of the CTO 
whether it is thought to be effective or not.   Returning to the concept of the 
‘revolving door patient’, whilst the CTO is supposed to be aimed at this group, it 
seems that a more wide-reaching consequence of its use than discussed thus far is 
that it may instead replace or supplement the revolving door with other forms of 
institutionalisation, potentially perpetuating what one practitioner called a virtual 
asylum.  Such a theorisation moves beyond simply comparing hospitalisation to 
community compulsion, by complicating what may be considered the ‘least 
restrictive’ approach.  It also highlights a second strand of practitioner decision-
making considered in this thesis alongside ethical balancing acts, and that is how 
different kinds of knowledge are weighed up.  In this sense, it is not just a case of 
practical-moral concerns about the consequences of the CTO, but also how 
practitioners consider and think about change, both internal and external, when 
making decisions about the CTO.   
 
In Chapter Nine, I explored this in relation to both practitioners and appeal panel 
members. The appeals process is one that has rarely been explored in England, 
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certainly not in relation to CTOs thus far, and yet the significant difference 
between rates of discharge from inpatient care as compared to CTOs implies an 
interesting story.  CTOs can be seen as ‘lobster pots’, in that they are easy to get 
into but difficult to get out of, and it is with appeals that we can see most clearly 
why that might be the case.  As with practitioners a loose interpretation of insight 
seemed to underpin panel decisions. Similarly to Diesfeld and Sjostrom’s (2006, 
93) study of Australian Tribunal decisions, it appeared that a lack of insight was 
perceived as a cause of non-compliance, and at the same time non-compliance 
was seen as evidence of lack of insight, making it difficult for the presence of 
insight to be ‘proven’.  Insight therefore was the primary factor for such 
decision-making, being conflated with ideas of capacity and vulnerability in 
relation to ‘health and safety’, with risk a secondary concern.   
 
Although I have argued in this chapter that a concern with risk to others is 
perhaps not necessarily the extensive framework for CTOs it has been presented 
as elsewhere (Glover-Thomas, 2011, Szmukler and Rose, 2013), the appeals 
process in particular highlighted the broad meaning that risk could carry, along 
with its ‘stickiness’ as a prevailing aspect of the stories told about service users 
by practitioners.  As Glover-Thomas (2011) suggests – and similarly to insight - 
risk can be put to use as a fluid concept in argumentation, which makes it 
difficult to counter.  Whilst insight and risk can be expected to be prominent in 
appeal decision-making, the influence of significant others and timing – in terms 
of both disruptive events in the service user’s life and the length of the CTO – 
also played important parts.  This meant that even if arguments based on insight 
and risk were on metaphorically shaky ground, the decision could still be made 
to continue the CTO.  The flexible use of these concepts, coupled with their 
cumulative effect, demonstrates the challenges inherent in reaching a discharge 
decision.  It is with the review process that we see where discharge from the 
CTO can be made possible, as a more negotiated space for contestation.  What I 
pick out here is the ways that practitioners and service users worked together to 
come to decisions.  Practitioners took different approaches and had different 
comfort levels when managing uncertainty, but central to the decision to 
discharge was the evidence the service user presented – how convincing they 
were that ‘true’ change had been achieved – combined with the trust practitioners 
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held in them.  As Ramsay (2009) states, the ability to reassure is necessary for 
individuals to move out from compulsory frameworks.  In this sense, I turned 
from the more common way trust is considered – service users’ trust in 
practitioners and services – to the ways that trust plays out in practitioner 
decisions. Brown and Calnan (2012) in their study of trust in mental health 
services argue that a false dichotomy between rationality and irrationality 
underpins current thinking on decision-making, and that choosing to trust is a 
necessary and effective way of managing uncertainty.   Trust is a difficult 
concept to pin down and Brown and Calnan (2012) separate it from notions of 
familiarity and confidence; describing the conditions in which it becomes 
relevant, such as where an individual is vulnerable amidst uncertainty, leading to 
an interaction of dependence with choice; and defining the process of trust 
formation as active and relational.  For practitioners, being dependent on service 
users’ presented narratives meant to a certain extent taking a ‘leap of faith’.  In 
this way I have illuminated how ‘formal’ logic and intuitive sense can become 
entwined in such decision-making, thus demonstrating how a decision in favour 
of CTO discharge might be reached.  More broadly, having excavated the 
different ways CTO ‘ends’ can be thought about, I turn in the next chapter to a 
conclusion on CTO practice as a whole. 
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Conclusions for policy, practice, research and theory 
 
In this concluding chapter, I sum up the implications of the discussion in the 
previous chapter for CTO policy, practice, research and theory.  I start by giving 
an overview of current policy trends in relation to CTOs, before outlining the 
messages that the discussion in the previous chapter holds for CTO policy and 
practice.  In the latter half of the chapter I consider the research agenda for 
CTOs, firstly by surveying the strengths and limitations of the methodological 
approach I have taken, before considering what such an agenda might look like.  
I end the chapter by reflecting on what can be said about the complementary 
relationship that I have developed between critical realism and governmentality, 
and what this relationship has brought to the conclusions I have come to on CTO 
practice. 
Implications for policy and practice 
 
It appears that CTOs are now an embedded and apparently durable feature of 
English mental health policy and practice.  Despite the increased volume in calls 
for their dissolution that followed the publication of the OCTET study, which 
showed no difference in hospitalisation rates for CTO cases (Burns and 
Molodynski, 2014, Rugkasa, Dawson and Burns, 2014), and concerns raised in 
parliament about them (HC Health Committee, July 2013, HC 584), there has 
been no discernible downwards trend in the use of CTOs or any sign that their 
presence is being reconsidered at policy-level. Indeed, despite the initial 
projections of cost-savings expected through CTOs bringing lowered rates of 
hospitalisation (Department of Health, 2007), the figures continue to show a 
steady rise in both community and hospital based compulsion.  The rate of 
people made subject to the Mental Health Act has increased from 34% per 
100,000 population to 44 % since the introduction of CTOs in 2008, with CTOs 
making up 7% of the rise and compulsory detentions 3% (Health and Social Care 
Information Centre, 2014). Further, the agenda of both the previous Coalition 
and the current Conservative Government has moved on to broader and 
preventative mental health concerns, with little in the way of notable policy 
activity on CTOs.  For example, the recently revised Mental Health Act Code of 
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Practice (Department of Health, 2015) contains only marginally different 
guidance on the use of CTOs as compared to the version it replaced (Department 
of Health, 2008).  At the same time however, the continuing difficulties 
regarding bed shortages, the recent changes to commissioning and provision 
following the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and the ongoing disparity 
between health and mental health funding despite the pledge of ‘parity of esteem’ 
(Department of Health 2014), will continue to influence the use of CTOs and 
compulsion more broadly.  In this sense, it is important to keep track of how 
CTOs are being used within the wider policy and practice context, as it can be 
imagined that further pressures on services are likely to make it harder for 
practitioners to use CTOs in the more individually tailored ways that I have 
highlighted as possible in this thesis. Nevertheless, we can still consider the 
messages the conclusions reached in the previous chapter hold for CTO policy 
and more significantly practice.  In doing so, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
the approach I have taken makes it difficult to give a straightforward and indeed 
non-contradictory narrative on what can be said about CTO practice.  Indeed, as 
Peattie (2001, 260) warns, “it is simply that the very value of the case study, the 
contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum up 
in large and mutually exclusive concepts”.  Consequently, these messages should 
be considered as starting points for discussion and debate rather than final 
proclamations on CTO practice, taking into account both the aforementioned 
constraints on practice I have explored in the thesis, alongside the diversity of 
situations, needs, perspectives and responses of practitioners and those 
individuals made subject to the CTO.   
 
The interplay between (and within) policy, practitioner and service user ‘ends’ 
 
CTOs cannot be seen as premised on a single policy aim, but instead on the 
interplay of different goals – namely risk, recovery and resources - which can 
both support and be in tension with each other.  These goals have been modified 
and mediated by practitioners in line with their own priorities, and also added to 
with protection/reciprocity appearing as drivers in practitioner accounts.  In turn, 
service users hold their own purposes and anti-purposes for CTOs, which interact 
in various ways with policy/practitioner expectations, and disrupt the ‘thin’ 
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theorisation of thought and behaviour that CTOs are based on.  The challenges 
these different configurations bring for CTO ‘ends’ are many.  From a policy 
perspective, the tensions present in policy formulations have been translated to 
practice, and although my findings suggest many practitioners tried to uphold 
recovery as an end result, there are strong constraining factors, including the very 
nature of the CTO framework which counteracts this agenda.  I am not 
suggesting recovery as an aim is necessarily preferable to the other highlighted 
purposes in all circumstances. Indeed, all three goals of risk management, 
recovery and protection were important for different service users; the 
individualised version of recovery that dominates in policy/practice did not fit 
with many service users’ conceptions of what recovery is; and considerations of 
risk and protection had their place – albeit within their own sets of constraints – 
as part of the practice of CTOs, particularly considering the relational risk 
management that occurred.  However, given the recent commentary following 
the OCTET study that suggests CTOs should be reconsidered because they have 
proven ineffective for ‘revolving door’ and recovery purposes, there is 
potentially a misalignment between policy/practice and the way that CTOs have 
been judged thus far from a research/commentary perspective, which may prove 
significant for future policy-level deliberations and justifications for CTOs.  
From the perspective of practitioners, the challenges are related to firstly 
balancing and prioritising competing goals for individuals service users at 
different points in the CTO and secondly demonstrating awareness and 
sensitivity towards the role service users see CTOs playing in their lives, so they 
can where possible, orientate CTOs to a shared purpose for service users’ 
treatment and support.  In this way it seems more likely that outcomes will be 
reached that are acceptable and meaningful to both practitioners and service 
users. 
 
The role of relationship in mediating coercion under the CTO 
 
A large part of managing this challenge for practitioners is mediating the 
potentially coercive effects of CTOs for those service users who are not 
enamoured with their use.  Spending time early on explaining and discussing the 
CTO with service users in a way that was relevant to them as an individual made 
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a significant difference to shifting the view of many service users and alleviating 
potential difficulties further down the line. In addition, practitioners talking about 
the aim of the CTO from the beginning, and developing with service users a clear 
idea of what success would look like for them instead of reinforcing a sense of 
being ‘in limbo’ on the CTO, could help mitigate feelings of hopelessness and 
uncertainty.  Whilst the conditions of CTOs are automatically documented as 
part of the process, it may also be helpful, perhaps as part of the care plan, for 
practitioners to document what the CTO is being used for with that particular 
service user, which can be revisited as a guide throughout the process.  Whilst 
these may seem obvious points, it appeared that this kind of practice was 
variable.  It also should be acknowledged that with some service users, such an 
approach was not possible due to engrained mistrust in services and practitioners, 
which meant their view of the CTO would always be negative.  In these cases 
however, ‘working round’ the CTO by adapting it to the service user, negotiating 
and arbitrating medication, and focusing on wider emotional, social and practical 
needs could support the continuation of helpful collaborative work.  In addition, 
whilst service user beliefs about the CTO were more fixed and less amenable to 
external influence once it was in place and active, practitioners being honest and 
clear about how the CTO would work for individual service users at particular 
points could at times help to alleviate anxiety about its use. In a broader sense, it 
seems that an important ‘bridge’ that could be built is for practitioners to 
understand, accept and acknowledge this anxiety as connected to service users’ 
felt stigma and coercion, their sense of self and their hopes and fears, rather than 
invalidate it because there were no concrete adverse implications of the CTO. 
 
The discussion also points to where the received wisdom on mitigating coercion 
may not always hold true.  Using the CTO to protect from ‘harsher’ compulsion 
may have its place for some individuals, but simply comparing community 
compulsion favourably to hospitalisation is not always enough.  For some service 
users, what feels like the unending presence of the CTO combined with not being 
able to make a choice on how they live in the community and ‘take a chance’ on 
being admitted, meant that this favourable comparison did not always stand.  
More specifically, attempts to circumvent or soften the functions of the CTO 
could have the effect of enhancing service users’ sense of coercion.  There is no 
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easy answer to this, and as I pointed out in the discussion of ‘surface’ and ‘depth’ 
practice, practitioners might draw on approaches from both ‘types’ of practice in 
ways that are adapted to the individual service user they are working with, 
without assumptions being made about one approach necessarily being ‘better’ 
than the other.  Further, it seemed important for care coordinators in particular to 
know when the CTO was a hindrance more than a help, and be given the 
opportunity by other professionals to ‘let go’ of control via rescinding the CTO 
in those cases in order to bring about a more sustainable relationship.   
 
The role of institutional and cultural factors 
 
The work practitioners carried out with service users cannot be seen in isolation - 
institutional and cultural factors were significant in shaping CTO processes and 
outcomes.  There has been significant differences between rates and patterns of 
CTO use in different parts of the country (HC Health Committee, July 2013, HC 
584), and whilst the institutional pressures in both field sites were relatively 
similar as connected to national policy and service trends, the team-level cultural 
influences appeared to contribute more to differences in use.  Whilst I noted in 
Chapter Three that professional background did not seem to directly influence 
practitioner perspectives and practice on CTOs, organisational roles, such as that 
of care coordinator or AMHP, did make a difference.  It was these professional 
roles that could lead to team-level tensions on CTO use, most evidently between 
psychiatrists and care coordinators, and psychiatrists and AMHPs.  In addition, 
group decision-making on CTOs demonstrates that given the wide parameters of 
their criteria they can be difficult for practitioners to challenge, unless there was 
a team mandate to do so.  As I have highlighted, it is ironic that the room for 
manoeuvre that practitioners have with CTOs means that they can feel that their 
options in decision-making are limited to agreement on the imposition and active 
use of CTOs.  In their post-legislative scrutiny of the 2007 Mental Health Act, 
the Health Committee stated that they were “surprised by the extent of variation 
between clinicians” when using CTOs and that this should not “be permitted to 
continue without serious professional challenge” (HC Health Committee, July 
2013, HC 584, para 92).  In my view it should not be surprising given how CTOs 
have been set up to begin with that this variation has occurred.  However, it is 
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difficult to say what ‘serious professional challenge’ might mean.  It seems in the 
comparative team where CTOs were actively questioned and challenged there 
had been open discussion about them, which had meant the team coming to a 
general agreement on how they would be used irrespective of organisational role.  
Indeed, in the teams where I was embedded for the majority of the time, it was 
through the research process, particularly during my dissemination of findings, 
that practitioners began to talk together and reflectively about what they believed 
the CTO meant, and were sometimes surprised at the differing views that 
emerged on their use.  Busy team environments are not always conducive to 
collective dialogue on the underpinning reasoning for interventions, but perhaps 
this says something about the potential usefulness of such forums for incubating 
a shared understanding of CTOs.    
 
In a broader sense, inter-agency communication on the role and remit of the CTO 
is also of importance.  As I described, criminal justice agencies such as the police 
and probation could see the CTO as almost akin or as a substitute to any 
involvement they might have with a service user, which could leave mental 
health practitioners sometimes feeling that they had been left without support and 
under pressure to ‘do something’ even if they justifiably did not regard it as 
entirely their responsibility in complex and high-risk cases.  Although the 
pressures on inpatient services are qualitatively different, similar issues regards 
differing expectations of the CTO between inpatient and community services 
could adversely affect its functioning and the continuity of care within its 
bounds.  These are long-standing issues in mental health, not only applicable to 
CTOs and unlikely to be resolved soon.  However it seems important to 
acknowledge the significant role they play, particularly in contributing to the 
perverse outcomes that can result from CTOs.   
 
Balancing the varying consequences of CTOs 
 
Here is where we turn to those outcomes, specifically in this context in relation 
to how decisions on CTOs are reached, taking into account their consequences.  
The part intangible factors play in CTO decisions needs to be considered, in 
particular the roles that ideas and forms of knowledge take.  I have explored the 
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theories that underpin CTO use at both policy and practice level.  In particular I 
have noted the central place a consideration of insight takes in CTO decision-
making and how it is put to use in a flexible way.  It seems that practitioners who 
retained some critical distance from the concept of insight in mental health 
practice were able to come to an understanding of service user actions and 
motivations which meant they were more likely to demonstrate an adaptable and 
situational response to both the use of the CTO and when it should be 
discharged.  Practitioners’ consideration of insight can be seen to be working 
with, as well as against relational knowledge in decision-making however, 
specifically when deciding whether to trust service user accounts of change.  
More broadly, the connections between the ethical frameworks that practitioners 
espoused about the nature of practice and the way they responded to uncertainty 
and enacted risk-taking should also be highlighted.  Practitioners beliefs about 
practice played out in terms of the parameters of control they were prepared to 
work within.  In this sense, I have highlighted throughout the practical-ethical 
nature of practice and how practitioners navigate between what they think is 
ideal, what is possible, and indeed what is necessary when using CTOs.  Indeed, 
taking account of the reactions of service users to the CTO and the subsequent 
effects that arose in terms of patterns of CTO active use, levels of engagement 
and behaviour more generally was a skilled endeavour which meant looking 
beyond what ‘types’ of service users CTOs ‘should’ be used for.  Instead, it 
involved practitioners sorting through a constellation of factors, both evidential 
and ethical, and making decisions on that basis in relation to implications for the 
individual in question, as well as the community they live within.  Emphasis is 
typically placed on the longevity of CTOs and the difficulty in bringing them to 
an end.  Whilst my findings and discussion have supported this conclusion to a 
large extent, in illuminating why this might be the case, and more significantly 
when practitioners do feel able to discharge CTOs, it is possible to see a starting 
point for thinking and acting critically in relation to CTO cycles, specifically 
‘perpetual’ CTOs and continuous re-imposition of CTOs.   
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Implications for research 
 
I now consider what the conclusions reached about CTO policy and practice 
mean for CTO research, by sketching out a future research agenda.  In order to 
give a full account of future directions for CTO research it is necessary first to 
outline what I see as the strengths and limitations of the approach I have taken.  
As I noted in Chapter Two, creating an account of causality from a realist 
perspective is essentially explanatory and based on generative power, but does 
not claim to be the final or full account of phenomena.  Still, much can be learnt 
from honestly and critically reflecting on decisions made at different stages of 
the research and I explore here the elements of the research which contributed to 
the achievement of my research aims, and the shortcomings of the research 
process which have limited what I can say about CTOs. 
 
Strengths and limitations of the research 
 
Taking a case-based approach within an ethnographic framework meant I was 
able to gain sustained access to the field, which in turn enabled an analysis of 
CTOs over time and as key events occurred.  Analysing CTOs at different 
‘levels’, such as at an individual case level, within the team, within the Trust, and 
within policy context also gave depth to the data I gathered, which means I 
gained a good understanding of individual, interpersonal and contextual factors 
in the use of CTOs.   Finally, drawing on different constituent groupings 
(practitioners, strategic leads, service users) and kinds of data (documents, 
interviews, observations) enabled a view of CTOs ‘in the round’, taking account 
of varying perspectives and sources to highlight different aspects of CTO use.  If 
we take Hammersley’s (1992) conceptualisation of truth in research, taken from 
his ‘subtle realist’ approach to ethnography, it is possible to see how both the 
depth and breadth of data elicited in the thesis may have developed a sense of 
plausibility. Hammersley equates truth with internal validity - as he points out, 
stating a knowledge claim is valid is more palatable in the social sciences than 
stating it may be true.  From a critical realist perspective however, truth can be 
theorised in terms of corresponding to reality, and more specifically as a 
“selective representation rather than a reproduction of reality” (Hammersley, 
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1992, 69).  As reality cannot reliably be known, judging research as being true 
depends on the evidence that the researcher supplies to support their claims.  
Through incorporating a range of methods in a longitudinal and intensive 
research design, and in being careful to present a variety of views and 
experiences, I hope to have created a sense of verisimilitude. 
 
Hammersley (1992) suggests that alongside truth, an assessment of research in 
realist terms must also consider relevance.  Taking relevance into account allows 
for an alternative perspective on generalisability, by foregrounding the 
transferability of research findings.  As Shaw and Gould (2001, 195) suggest, in 
doing so, it is recognised that “all situations are different to some extent” and that 
logical comparison between contexts based on ‘thick description’ is consequently 
of more value for ‘real world’ practice settings.  This perspective thus supposes 
that the application of theory is implicitly mid-range in nature (Merton, 1957), 
because it “makes no pretence of being able to explain all social phenomena, and 
is not founded upon any form of extreme reductionism” (Hestrom and Ylikoski, 
2010, 61).  As Flyvbjerg (2006) notes, there are inherent difficulties in the 
premise that predictive theory can exist in social science.  Indeed, an argument I 
have made throughout this thesis is that the perceived generalisability of 
particular kinds of research findings for CTOs can be problematic, which in turn 
led to the approach I took to examining the generative process of CTO practice.  
Going further, Flyvbjerg (2006, 221) makes the argument that “context-
dependent knowledge” allows for ‘deep’ experiential learning in a way that 
“rules-based” knowledge does not.  Transferability of research findings can be 
seen as applying inside and across practice settings.  In relation to the former, as 
I mentioned earlier, discussion of the research findings with practitioners in the 
field sites gave them an ‘external’ perspective on their work, which I was 
informed had supported reflection on how they went about CTO practice.  
Engaging practitioners in reflexive dialogue on research findings brings helpful 
understanding for the researcher, but also can lead practitioners to engage in a 
collaborative “hermeneutics of mutual curiosity” (Kjorstad, 2008, 157).  
Regarding transferability outside of the field sites, some of the ‘lessons learned’ 
through this thesis build on broader themes and theories in research for practice 
which can be applied across settings – for example about ways of working within 
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compulsion.  At the same time, it should be acknowledged that research findings 
often have more of an indirect and cumulative influence than a direct impact on 
policy and practice (Cousins and Shulha, 2006).  This calls for a modest and 
honest acknowledgment of what policy and practice-oriented research is capable 
of achieving, without taking a nihilistic view of such research (Shaw and Gould, 
2001).  Bloor’s (1997) description of case studies where research has greater 
relevance for the micro-processes of practice than the macro development of 
policy fits well within this remit.  He suggests that such research can both 
influence practitioner participants and practitioners who make up the audience 
for research.  For interested practitioners external to the research, rich 
descriptions of case-based studies enable them to add to and make judgements on 
their own practice knowledge.  As Flyvbjerg (2006, 238) argues, “The dense case 
study…is more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for social theory 
than…generalisations of theory [or findings]”.  Reaching “conceptual closure” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, 239) on research findings risks overly simplifying the 
‘messages’ that can be taken from research, and denying the reader the 
possibility of interpreting and ‘translating’ such findings into their own world.   
 
The same thinking can be applied to the process of doing research. Through 
reflecting on my findings, I have noted that whilst being able to contrast and 
synthesise different kinds of data and differing participant views has given a 
good reflection of CTO practice, I am also aware that I have not made as many 
references as I would have liked to about differences between the case study field 
sites, particularly between the two Trusts.   I have also had to excise the 
contrasting findings that resulted from discussions with practitioners who used 
CTOs within the field of learning disability.  This is partly due to the sheer 
volume of data I have generated through the study, but also because my analysis 
provided much more in the way of similarities across field sites than differences, 
which in turn seemed more significant to report on.  As I have stated, my 
findings present significant variability and complexity in CTO practice and the 
responses of service users and practitioners to their use; however this variability 
was similar in range and nature across the field sites.  This perhaps says 
something in itself about the operation of CTOs and the common issues that may 
arise in their use, which in turn suggests the potential for transferability of the 
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findings.  With that in mind, it is my plan to revisit the data and carry out 
secondary analysis so as to pick out the contrasts between different areas of 
practice and different sites, which I can then report on elsewhere.   
 
In a similar sense, the decisions made during the access and recruitment phase 
brought positives and negatives for what data could be included.  A decision 
made early on was to find teams where I could gather a lot of rich data on CTOs, 
which meant Assertive Outreach Teams where they were used regularly.  
However, an alternative approach may have been to choose one of the teams as 
an example of where CTO usage was lower.  Consequently, it is not known if the 
practices disclosed through the research would occur in teams with lower rates of 
CTO use; specifically I do not know how issues of expertise would play out in a 
lower use setting.    I attempted to mitigate this through the inclusion of 
interviews with practitioners from other kinds of teams, but given more 
resources, it would have been helpful to include more variation within the field.   
 
Turning to the methods deployed, one of the challenges of observational research 
is that the presence of the researcher may affect how participants act.  Certainly, 
at the beginning of the fieldwork I was aware that practitioners and service users 
alike could be careful about what they did and did not share or allow me to see.  
However, I think this is where my identity as a social worker was helpful, in that 
having that professional background allowed me to ‘fit in’ with team life 
relatively quickly, and as the research went on access and participant behaviour 
became less of an issue.  Achieving this status raised ensuing ethical questions 
about what I should include or exclude from the research, which has been a 
process of judgement on how significant ‘sensitive’ knowledge is to the research 
findings, particularly around team cultures.  I think however that in being as 
honest and transparent as possible about my intentions, I was able to manage 
‘good enough’ field relations.  This, as far as I can be aware, seemed to enable 
most participants to reciprocate and be honest about their thoughts, feelings and 
experiences of CTOs.  In turn, I have shared my findings with participants at 
various points of the study, thus enabling potential sensitivities to be accounted 
for.  
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The attitude of participants was not the only challenge in ensuring data 
collection. In addition it should be acknowledged that the ‘messy’ nature of 
ethnographic fieldwork meant that I did not always get access to data as planned.  
Although I did follow CTO cases over eight months, I would have spent longer 
in the field if I could.  Not all the cases I followed were at the same stage, which 
although allowing for a breadth of experiences to be examined, meant that I did 
not get the same amount and kinds of data for each of the cases.  This was 
especially so for those cases where the CTO was removed shortly after the 
individual was recruited, which meant I could not observe CTO related meetings.  
Conducting the fieldwork over eight months was a conscious choice however 
within the time constraints I was operating within, and was chosen as a time 
period as I knew it would encompass most of a six month CTO cycle.  I also 
found that when examining decision-making processes at different points of the 
CTO that certain elements could not be accounted for.  In particular, the more 
‘informal’ aspects of decision-making were not always captured.  Although I 
spent a great deal of unstructured time in both teams, I know that I missed key 
phone calls and ‘corridor conversations’.  My partial response to this was to ask 
practitioners to retrospectively reflect on decisions in as much detail as they 
could, which helped fill in some of the missing pieces.  More fundamentally, 
there were aspects of the CTO process which I was not able to consider in as 
much depth as I would like.  In particular, whilst I learnt about recall ‘second 
hand’ through meetings, office discussions and interviews, I was not able to 
observe any recall procedures due to their time-critical nature, as well as their 
often difficult nature, which mean practitioners felt only those people who were 
necessary should attend.  I was also not able to observe any decisions regarding 
converting recall to revocation of a CTO.  Only one service user had their CTO 
revoked during the field work and I was not privy to that process.  Following 
CTOs from the beginning through recall, revocation and then back into the 
community would have ‘closed the circle’ so to speak, and let me see what drove 
decisions at these later stages.  More broadly, I would have liked to have had 
more access to the ‘hospital’ part of the CTO cycle, and in particular spoken to 
hospital-based practitioners about their perspectives on CTO use.   
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Finally, although not necessarily a strength or limitation of the research, I should 
acknowledge the specific way that I have approached outcomes.  I have argued 
that taking a generative approach by following cases through within context can 
allow some sense of what can result in particular circumstances and constraints 
to particular people, and can also allow for unexpected and unwelcome 
consequences to be accounted for.  Whilst I have highlighted what some of the 
possible ‘hard’ outcomes might be – for example in relation to risk - my focus on 
individual journeys and questions of identity has by its nature prioritised ‘soft’ 
outcomes generated by CTOs, related to service user self-perception, beliefs and 
engagement. In addition, I have taken an interest in both how consequences of 
the CTO relate to each other, and connectedly, how they are perceived by 
practitioners and service users.  This has meant that I have taken account of 
consequences such as ‘recall cycles’ for example, which as an output rather than 
an outcome, would not be included in ‘typical’ outcome focused studies.  It is my 
view however that it is important to include such consequences, firstly because 
they are demonstrably significant as consequences to practitioners and service 
users, secondly because they highlight what matters in outcome sequences (for 
example medication adherence being prioritised over ‘secondary’ outcomes), and 
thirdly because they provide a starting point to understand what further outcomes 
might arise (for example periods spent in the community versus in hospital).  I 
believe I have argued consistently for the value of the approach I have taken.  
However, given more time and resources, and returning to the earlier discussion 
of generalisability, a mixed methods approach could have brought an additional 
‘big picture’ dimension to the tracking of outcomes. On that note, I turn to ideas 
for a future CTO research agenda. 
 
Future research  
 
Taking into account the above overview on limitations, and the conclusions that 
were reached in the preceding chapter, a future research agenda on CTOs could 
consider the following: 
 
 Given the range of purposes and associated outcomes that are possible 
from the CTO, it seems that research on CTOs, particularly within the 
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national context, could broaden its scope.  In particular using CTOs for 
risk and protective related purposes could be further examined in a more 
focused way than has been possible within both the ‘whole-policy’ 
orientation and constraints of this thesis.  I have highlighted a number of 
areas that would benefit from more research such as: defensive decision-
making within the CTO criteria and group forums; practitioner 
conceptualisations of risk in relation to CTO use; an analysis of risk and 
protection-oriented outcomes, for example how well the CTO does or 
does not enable the management of various kinds of risk to others; and 
how reciprocity is understood and enacted in more or less ‘formal’ ways 
through the CTO and within the constraints present within the system. 
 
 More in-depth research on the various ‘CTO cycles’ that I have brought 
attention to would also add to understandings of how CTOs are 
operationalised, how discharge is and is not made possible, and the 
phenomena of being placed on multiple CTOs.  This would involve more 
longitudinal work, following CTOs through recall, revocation and beyond 
to see how such decision-making takes place, and to examine the effects 
of ‘long-term’ CTOs, both for those individuals who are kept on a CTO 
for a significant length of time and those who are placed on one CTO 
after another.   
 
 Research on how CTOs are used in other populations and settings would 
also be a helpful addition to the field.  I noted earlier that I had found 
some support that CTOs are used in learning disability services for 
example in a very different way to how they are used for ‘typical’ CTO 
cases, and this would merit further investigation.  Analysing patterns and 
methods of CTO use in less high-intensity teams would also give a fuller 
picture of the use of CTOs in mental health services more broadly. The 
tensions between hospital and community have pointed to significant 
issues for the CTO process, and it would be helpful to have the view of 
hospital-based practitioners on the impact of CTOs on their work, and 
how they manage CTO cases, particularly during recall.  Finally, the 
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influence of identity formation on CTOs would suggest that a study of the 
experiences of younger service users on CTOs would be helpful.  CTOs 
do not have an age limit and very little if anything is known about their 
use with young people under the age of 18.   
 
 As far as I am aware, this thesis is the first study that has explored the 
appeals system and process as applied to CTOs in this country.  Again, 
the wide scope of the thesis in looking at the CTO as a whole meant that 
this aspect of the findings was one part of a larger picture.  In light of the 
conclusions drawn related to CTO decision-making, a national and more 
systematic study of decision-making - perhaps comparing practitioner 
reasoning and decisions to appeal panel members as Jaworowski and 
Guneva (2002) did in Victoria, Australia - and a more in-depth analysis 
on how appeal panels understand and apply CTO criteria, would provide 
valuable evidence for when, how and why CTOs are discharged.     
 
 Given the part that team-level cultures and associated tensions between 
different organisational roles – for example between care coordinators, 
AMHPS and psychiatrists – play in CTO practice, a more in-depth study 
of the influence of such roles on ‘street-level’ CTO policy-making would 
be of merit.  As I have noted, the emphasis in research on mental health 
social work in particular has been on delineating the role of the social 
worker from other professional actors, particular regarding value 
positions for professional practice.  It may be that an emphasis on role 
rather than  profession in future research would yield interesting and 
useful findings in how and why CTO practice evolves as it does in 
localised settings.   
 
 Finally, an analysis of CTOs as they reside within the broader policy and 
practice landscape would benefit from further attention.  I briefly outlined 
some of the changes in mental health policy that have occurred over 
recent years, and as I mentioned in the findings, the relationship between 
CTOs, care clustering and payment by results may demonstrate evolution 
305 
 
in where CTOs are being used and for what reasons, especially given the 
additional financial component that comes with such policy innovations.  
Looking beyond mental health services, the use of CTOs as related to 
other agencies, and particularly in relation to multi-agency working on 
complex cases might also shed some light on how CTOs are perceived by 
non-mental health professionals who are involved in their use, and how 
they see CTOs adhering with their mandate. 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have drawn out both how CTOs act on individuals through 
coercive, disciplinary and reflexive forms of power, and why they might or might 
not work in particular circumstances and ways.  In doing so I highlighted how 
governmental and causal analyses do not necessarily contradict each other, but 
instead may helpfully complement each other.  A governmental analysis of how 
practitioners and service users think and act in response to differential forms of 
power has implications for why CTOs follow particular pathways, and in 
introducing an ethical dimension to policy-practice evaluation also moves causal 
analysis beyond asking what factors make CTOs ‘effective’ or not. Conversely, 
exploring why CTOs play out as they do through context-mechanism 
configurations has highlighted the ways that a governmental analysis, which can 
emphasise the ‘strategic games’ (Foucault, 2000) individuals play out in response 
to reformatory forces, may be complicated by accounts of agency and interaction 
which situate such responses as also co-constructed and “embedded in broader 
practices of self-making and personhood” (Barnett et al, 2008, 644).  As Sayer 
(2005, 51) explains, interpreting this normative dimension of everyday life is 
necessary to avoid a representation of “bloodless figures who seemingly drift 
through life, behaving in ways which bear the marks of their social position and 
relations of wider discourses, disciplining themselves only because it is required 
of them, but as if nothing mattered to them”.  Dawson et al (2003, 253) suggest 
that research on CTOs “cannot resolve the fundamental ethical and political 
conflicts this form of treatment delivery presents.  Only though evaluative 
judgements can we determine the priority to give different criteria of success in 
compulsory community care…”.  What I hope to have demonstrated is that 
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research on CTOs may not settle such conflicts, but it can shed light on ethical 
dilemmas and the ensuing evaluative judgements that occur in practice in relation 
to CTO ‘success’, in a way that refers to both the multiple and overlapping 
implications of CTOs and what matters to practitioners and service users in their 
use.   
 
In this way, synthesising governmentality within a critical realist framework has 
also allowed some movement beyond the dichotomous perspectives that have 
emerged on CTOs over the years of their existence, consequently engendering 
different kinds of knowledge which have addressed some ‘gaps’ in what we 
know about CTO practice..  Taking a view of the operation of power in micro-
political and generative, causal terms has instead enabled CTOs to be understood 
as a complex, diversely realised intervention positioned within the social and 
ethical world of service users and practitioners.  Consequently, whilst I have 
discussed the evaluative judgements made as part of CTO practice, I have been 
careful to not place myself as a researcher within a strong value position on 
CTOs, without at the same time being ‘value-free’.  In this, I am with Dean 
(2010, 46) that “we need to adopt a stance that is neither enamoured with the 
‘will to govern’ nor utterly opposed to the practice of governing”.  Indeed in my 
view, exploring the variety of ways CTOs are interpreted, experienced and 
responded to by practitioners and service users precludes such a judgement.  The 
connections that can be made between forms of conduct and counter-conduct in 
the face of CTO means and ends particularly demonstrates that the operation of 
power in this light does not neatly fit into categories of “power and 
powerlessness, consent and constraint, subjectivity and subjection” (Dean, 2010, 
84).  This excavation of CTO practice suggests that CTOs cannot be aligned 
simply or only with the more authoritarian arguments for their use made by 
government and critiqued by opponents.  It seems therefore that the criticisms 
CTOs engender have perhaps overshadowed those elements of the policy that 
may result in positive practice and outcomes.  At the same time, CTOs cannot be 
said to always or only reach the more ‘Utopian’ goals (Dean, 2010) also put 
forward by policy-makers and by advocates of their use; the perverse 
consequences I have highlighted suggest the ways that CTOs are not always 
without adverse implications, particularly in the way of coercive effects.  In this 
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sense, ‘taking a side’ on CTOs does not allow for the contradictions that lie 
within such rationalities to begin with, nor with how there are continuities and 
breaks between these rationalities and practice which appear in sometimes 
unexpected ways.  Holding such a view does not imply relativism however.  As 
Sayer (2009) argues, a critical approach involves exploring what it is that may 
cause avoidable suffering as well as flourishing in society, and I have tried to 
impart the relationship of CTOs to both states of being, and consequently distil 
what messages can be carried forward into CTO policy and practice. 
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Appendices 
 
  
Appendix One: Consent forms 
 
Community Treatment Orders:  Their Implications for Mental Health 
Practice in England 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PRACTITIONERS WHO PARTICIPATE (1) 
 
                                     
Please initial each box 
          
             Yes  No 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet for this project.  I 
have had time to think  
about the information and to ask any questions. 
 
2. I understand that taking part is voluntary and that I am free to change 
my mind and  
withdraw at any time, without having to give a reason. 
 
3. I agree to take part in interviews with the researcher and for them to be 
recorded.  
I understand that I can refuse to answer a question if I don’t want to. 
 
4. I agree to take part in a focus group with my colleagues and the 
researcher and for  
it to be recorded.  I understand that I can leave the group at any point if I 
need to. 
 
5. I agree for the researcher to attend relevant meetings and for them to 
take notes on  
what is said and done in the meetings.  I understand that I can request for 
the researcher  
to leave at any point. 
 
6. I agree for a one to one meeting between myself and a service user to 
be recorded.   
I understand that I may not be asked to do this.  I understand that if I do 
take part in this,  
I can stop the recording at any point. 
 
7. I understand that any information I give will only be used for the study.  
I agree that the  
researcher can use this (anonymous) information in reports and 
presentations 
 
8. I agree that the researcher can keep this information for up to three 
years in a secure  
place. 
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9.I agree that if I choose to withdraw from the study, the researcher can 
still use information  
collected about me up to that point. 
 
10.  I understand and am happy with how the researcher will protect my 
rights to  
confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
_______________________     ___________________           
___________ 
Name of participant      Signature             Date 
 
________________________      ___________________ 
 ___________ 
Name of researcher       Signature             Date 
 
1 copy for participant, 1 copy for researcher 
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Community Treatment Orders:  Their Implications for Mental Health 
Practice in England 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PRACTITIONERS WHO PARTICIPATE (2) 
 
                                         
Please initial box 
           
        Yes  No 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet for this project.  I 
have had time to think  
about the information and to ask any questions. 
 
2. I understand that taking part is voluntary and that I am free to change 
my mind and  
withdraw at any time, without having to give a reason. 
 
3. I agree to take part in a focus group with my colleagues and the 
researcher and for  
it to be recorded.  I understand that I can leave the group at any point if I 
need to. 
 
4. I agree for the researcher to attend relevant meetings and for them to 
take notes on  
what is said and done in the meetings.  I understand that I can request for 
the researcher  
to leave at any point. 
 
5. I understand that any information I give will only be used for the study.  
I agree that the  
researcher can use this (anonymous) information in reports and 
presentations 
 
6. I agree that the researcher can keep this information for up to three 
years in a secure  
place. 
 
7. I agree that if I choose to withdraw from the study, the researcher can 
still use information  
collected about me up to that point. 
 
8.  I understand and am happy with how the researcher will protect my 
rights to  
confidentiality and anonymity. 
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_______________________     ___________________           
___________ 
Name of participant      Signature             Date 
 
 
________________________      ___________________ 
 ___________ 
Name of researcher       Signature             Date 
 
1 copy for participant, 1 copy for researcher 
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Community Treatment Orders:  Their Implications for Mental Health 
Practice in England 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR SERVICE USERS WHO PARTICIPATE 
 
                                         
Please initial box                  
                                                                                                                                                
Yes    No 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet for this project.  I 
have had time to think  
about the information and to ask any questions. 
 
2. I understand that taking part is voluntary and that I am free to change 
my mind and  
withdraw at any time, without having to give a reason and without the 
services I receive  
being affected. 
. 
3. I agree to take part in interviews with the researcher and for them to be 
recorded.  
I understand that I can take a break or stop the interview if I need to, and 
can refuse to  
answer a question if I don’t want to. 
 
4. I agree for the researcher to sit in on meetings held about me and for 
them to take notes  
on what is said and done in the meeting.  I understand that I can request 
for the researcher  
to leave at any point. 
 
5.I agree for the researcher to have access to my case records and to 
take notes of any  
information that is relevant to the project.. 
 
6. I understand that any information I give, or that is gathered about me, 
will only be used for  
the study.  I agree that the researcher can use this (anonymous) 
information in reports  
and presentations 
 
7. I agree that the researcher can keep this information for up to three 
years in a secure  
place. 
 
8.I agree that if I choose to withdraw from the study or can’t carry on with 
it, the researcher  
can still use information collected about me up to that point. 
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9.  I understand and am happy with how the researcher will protect my 
rights to  
confidentiality and anonymity.  
 
 
_______________________     ___________________           
___________ 
Name of participant      Signature             Date 
 
________________________      ___________________ 
 ___________ 
Name of researcher       Signature             Date 
 
1 copy for participant, 1 copy for researcher 
  
315 
 
Appendix Two: Information Sheets 
 
 
 
Community Treatment Orders:  Their Implications for Mental 
Health Policy and Practice in England 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PRACTITIONERS WHO PARTICIPATE 
 
My name is Hannah Jobling and I am a PhD student at the University of 
York.  I would like to invite you to take part in my research project looking at 
how Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) are being used in community 
mental health services.  Before you decide whether to take part, it is 
important you understand why the research is taking place and what it would 
involve for you.  This information sheet will help you make your decision by 
answering common questions you might have.  You will also be given the 
opportunity to talk with me individually to discuss your involvement and ask 
any questions before deciding if you want to take part.  You may want to ask: 
 
‘Why are you doing this study?’ 
 
CTOs generated considerable debate when they were introduced in 2008 
and nationally relevant research is necessary to determine their impact on 
mental health services.  The majority of research on CTOs has tended to ask 
the question, ‘Do they work?’  We know far less about how they are being 
used and experienced ‘on the ground’ by the various people who have been 
affected by their implementation.  The study therefore aims to find out how 
CTOs are being practiced and with what implications for the experiences of 
service users, carers and practitioners.  The study also has an educational 
purpose in that I will submit a piece of academic work based on the findings 
for my PhD.   
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‘Why have I been invited to take part?’ 
 
I got in touch with the senior management team to see if they thought there 
would be interest within the Trust in participating in my research project.  
Your team was identified by them as being a potential site for the study, as it 
holds a number of CTO cases.  The study aims to involve practitioners from 
across a range of professional backgrounds, and consequently all 
practitioners in your team will be approached to participate.   
 
‘What will the study involve for me?’ 
 
I will be spending time within the team from April to November, following the 
progress of a small number (approx. five) CTO cases.  During this time, I will 
be interviewing practitioners, service users and carers (with their 
permission), as well as observing a range of meetings and reading 
documents relating to the cases.  As a practitioner, the level of your 
involvement in the study will depend on your relationship to the cases that 
are being followed.  If you are a key practitioner for one of these cases, at 
the most you may be asked to participate in: 
 
 One interview near the start and one near the end of the research 
period, which are aimed at understanding how you think about and 
use CTOs.  These will last about an hour and would be at a time and 
place of your choosing.   You won’t have to do anything to prepare for 
the interviews.   
 Observations of two meetings in relation to the case (i.e. care 
reviews) which will allow me to find out how CTOs are talked about 
and how decisions about them are made.  I will not intervene in the 
meeting or ask you to do anything beyond normal practice.   
 One audio-recording of an interaction between you and a service user 
(with their permission), in order to understand how you make sense of 
the CTO together.  A recording device will be given to you prior to the 
meeting and it will be collected from you after the meeting.  You will 
not be expected to do anything different from normal practice aside 
from ensuring the recording device is turned on.   
 
Alongside these activities, I will invite all practitioners in the team to 
participate in: 
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 A focus group roughly an hour long near the beginning of the 
research period, in order to gauge how the team talk about CTOs 
together and gain an overall idea of the teams’ views on CTOs.   
 Observations of some team meetings by me throughout the research 
period.  It is likely that I will be spending time in the team office during 
the research period and if events relevant to CTOs occur, I will also 
draw on them for the study. 
 
If you are a practitioner who is not directly involved in one of the chosen 
cases, then your involvement in the research will be limited to the two 
activities above.   
 
The interviews, focus group and interaction with a service user will be audio-
recorded, transcribed and kept as computer files.  In the meetings I will take 
notes, writing down what is said and done, by whom and when.  If during 
interviews, you don’t want to answer a question or want the interview 
stopped, this will be respected. When recording an interaction with a service 
user, you or the service user will both have equal say over how it is used and 
can stop recording at any time.  If during observation of a meeting you or any 
other attendees do not feel it is appropriate for me to be there, I will leave the 
meeting.   
 
‘Do I have to take part?’ 
 
Taking part in the study is entirely up to you.  I will arrange to talk with you 
before the research starts in order to explain the study and answer any 
questions.  You will then be asked to sign a consent form.  At this point or at 
any time in the research period you can choose not to take part, without 
having to give a reason.  Deciding not to participate will not affect your work 
in any way.   
 
‘Will the information you collect about me be kept confidential?’ 
 
All information collected about you will be kept confidential and will be 
accessible only to me.  Transcripts, audio files and field notes will be kept in 
locked cabinets and/or on a password protected university computer.  
Personal details about you such as signed consent forms will be stored 
separately, but in a similarly secure way.  Any information that identifies you 
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will be removed from the transcripts and field notes, and you will be given a 
false name.  Whilst you may be quoted in the final reports, care will be taken 
to ensure you cannot be identified from what you say.  This will include not 
identifying *** Trust in the final report.  All data will be kept for three years 
following the end of the project in accordance with the University of York’s 
data protection procedures.   
 
Anything you say to me will not be shared with anyone else.  The study is 
not aiming to ‘judge’ your work and any information you give will not affect 
your position.  I am independent of the Trust, and management will not be 
told of what you say and do during the research.  However, if you tell me 
something that indicates someone may be at risk of serious harm, I may 
have to share that information as appropriate, in line with the ‘whistle-
blowing’ policy of the Trust. 
 
‘What will happen to the information I give if I change my mind about 
participating?’ 
 
If you say something during an interview which you consequently do not 
want included, this will be removed from the transcript on request.  You will 
also be given an opportunity at the end of the interview to generally review 
your remarks.  If you request it, I will be happy to give you a copy of the 
interview transcript for you to comment on accuracy.   
 
If you change your mind about being involved in the study after you have 
taken part in research activities, information collected up to that point may 
still be used, but will still be kept confidential and anonymous.   
 
‘What are the risks and benefits for me in taking part?’ 
 
The study presents minimal risk to practitioner participants and I have been 
careful to design the study to avoid inconvenience or excessive obligation on 
the part of practitioners.  However, although every effort will be made to 
keep information anonymous, the relatively small-scale nature of the 
research means there is a small risk that your contribution may be 
identifiable.  I am confident that the steps I plan to take to ensure anonymity 
will mitigate this risk. 
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In other studies of practice in health and social care, some practitioner 
participants have commented that being able to discuss and reflect on their 
work has been a positive experience.  More generally, the research aims to 
provide a good picture of how CTOs work, which could benefit future 
practice. 
 
‘What will happen to the results of the study?’ 
 
I will write a report for the Trust, along with a shorter summary of the findings 
which will be made available to all participants.  If the team wishes, I will 
return to give a presentation of the study findings and discuss them with you.  
I will also submit the findings of the study as a piece of academic work for 
my PhD.  Aspects of the study will be used in articles published in academic 
journals and for academic conference presentations.  
 
‘Who is organising, approving and funding the research?’ 
 
I am working on this study alone, supported by two experienced supervisors 
from the University of York’s Social Policy and Social Work Department.  
The study has been funded by the University of York.  Before the research 
starts, it will be approved by the Social Care Research Ethics Committee 
and by the *** Research and Development Department. 
 
‘Who can I contact if there is a problem?’ 
 
This is very unlikely.  But if you do feel unhappy about anything that happens 
during the research, I will be happy to talk about it with you at any time. If 
you don’t feel comfortable talking to me about any complaints or concerns 
you may have, then you can contact my supervisory team, Professor Ian 
Shaw and Dr Mark Hardy at: The Department of Social Policy and Social 
Work, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Tel: 01904 32 1231 
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‘Who can I contact for more information about the study?’ 
 
I will be in touch with you soon to gain your consent to take part in the 
research.  However, If you would like to discuss anything, please don’t 
hesitate to contact me at: 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work, Postgraduate Unit, Alcuin 
Research Resource Centre, University of York, YO10 5DD.  Tel: 01904 
321261, Email: hjls500@york.ac.uk 
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Community Treatment Orders:  What they Mean for Mental 
Health Practice in England 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SERVICE USERS WHO 
PARTICIPATE 
 
My name is Hannah Jobling and I am a research student at the 
University of York.  I would like to invite you to take part in my research 
project looking at how Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) are being 
used in community mental health services.   
 
I have asked your care coordinator to give you this information sheet to 
so you can decide whether you want to be involved in the research 
project.  Before you decide whether to take part, it is important you 
understand why the research is taking place and what it would involve 
for you.   
 
This information sheet will help you make your decision by answering 
common questions you might have.  I will also go through this 
information sheet with you before the project starts.  Please feel free to 
get in touch with me at any time, or talk to others about the project.  
You may want to ask: 
 
‘Why are you doing this study?’ 
 
The study’s main aim is to find out how CTOs are being used and how 
they have affected you, and anyone who might care for you, or work 
with you.  I am hoping that the study will give us a better understanding 
of CTOs, which could benefit how they are used in the future. 
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 ‘Why have I been invited to take part?’ 
 
I asked all the care coordinators in the *** team to approach service 
users like yourself, who are on a CTO and who they thought would be 
happy to take part in the research.  It is important to include the views 
of people like yourself who are on CTOs so that the research gives a 
fair picture of their use.  I am hoping to involve about five service users 
from these teams. 
 
‘What will the study involve for me?’ 
 
I am going to be doing the study from April to November and will be 
asking you to take part in four different kinds of activities during this 
time.   
 
1. I would like to meet with you a couple of times, to talk with you in 
complete confidence about your experiences of CTOs.  I’m happy to 
meet you wherever is most convenient for you.  These interviews can 
be as long or as short as you want and we can take breaks if you need 
to.  On average, I would expect them to last about an hour.  You can 
invite someone supportive to sit in on the interview if you want. If at 
any point you want to stop or don’t want to answer a particular 
question, that will be fine with me. 
If it’s OK with you, I’d like to record the interviews, so that I can write 
up exactly what you say for the research. You will be given a £15 
voucher for each interview as a thank you for taking part. If you need 
to travel to meet with me, I will give you money to cover this.   
 
2. I would like to sit in on a meeting such as your care plan review, so 
that I can get an idea of how the CTO is talked about with you by the 
people who work with you.  I wouldn’t take an active part in the 
meeting, but I would take notes on what is said and done during the 
meeting.  If at any point you don’t want me in the meeting, I’d be happy 
to leave. 
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3. I would like to take an audio recording of a one to one meeting 
between you and someone from the team who you work with.  I won’t 
be there personally, but would ask you and the worker to take the 
recording for me.  You will be able to control how the recorder is used 
and stop the recording at any point. 
 
4.  Although it does not involve you directly, I would like to ask your 
permission to read and take notes on your case file.  This is so I can 
get a good idea of how CTOs are written about.  I will only make notes 
on things relevant to the study. 
 
‘Do I have to take part?’ 
 
Taking part in the study is entirely up to you.  Your care coordinator will 
ask you if it’s OK for me to get in touch with you.  If you agree, I will 
contact you to arrange to meet before the research starts so that I can 
explain the study and answer any questions.  You can ask someone to 
come along to support you when we meet if you like.  If you’re happy 
to take part, I will ask you to sign a consent form.  At any time you can 
choose not to take part, without having to give a reason.  Deciding not 
to participate will not affect the services you receive in any way.   
 
‘Will the information you collect about me be kept confidential?’ 
 
Anything you say to me will not be shared with anyone else.  I am 
independent of the *** team, and they will not be told of what you say 
and do during the research.  The only time I will speak to another 
appropriate person about you is if I am really concerned for your safety 
or the safety of other people.  If possible, I will tell you my concerns 
and let you know what I plan to do, before I speak to anyone else. 
Any audio recordings and notes that are about you will be stored 
securely on a password protected computer.  I will keep audio 
recordings and notes for three years after the study is finished, in a 
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safe place at the University of York.  I will make sure your name and 
any other personal details are stored separately.  Only I will have 
access to any information about you. 
 
Often when researchers write up their work, they like to include quotes 
to show what people have told them.  If I want to include something 
you have said to me in any reports, no one will know it is you because 
I will refer to you using a false name and will remove any other 
identifying details about you.  I will refer to the teams and the *** Trust 
by a false name as well.    
 
‘What will happen to the information I give if I can’t carry on with 
the study, or don’t want to carry on with the study?’ 
 
If you say something to me which you regret during an interview, I will 
make sure it is not included in any information I use about you.  You 
will also be given an opportunity at the end of the interview to generally 
review what you have said.  If you request it, I will be happy to give you 
a copy of the interview for you to comment on.   
 
If you change your mind about being involved in the study after you 
have taken part in research activities, or have to stop taking part for 
whatever reason, information collected up to that point may still be 
used, but still in complete confidence and anonymously.   
 
‘Is there anything for me to be worried about if I take part?’ 
 
When I talk with you I am not going to be looking for ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
answers and I hope that the interviews will feel relaxed.  However 
there is a chance we might get talking about things which are difficult 
for you, and could make you feel upset.  If this happens, I would ask 
you whether you would like to end the interview, have a break or talk 
about something else.  I would not expect you to carry on with the 
interview if you don’t feel up to it.  It is not a problem, however, if you 
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do get upset while we are together, and it will not embarrass me or 
make me feel uncomfortable.   
 
‘What benefits will there be for me in taking part?’ 
 
Some research participants have said they have enjoyed taking part in 
research and that being able to express their views and be listened to 
has been positive for them.  You would also be contributing to a better 
understanding of CTOs, which might improve how they are used in the 
future.   
 
‘What will happen to the results of the study?’ 
 
I will write a report for the *** Trust, along with a shorter summary of 
what I have found out about CTOs, which will be made available to all 
participants.  If you would like, I could return to talk about the findings 
with you and answer any questions about them.  I will also submit the 
research as a piece of academic work for my PhD.  Some parts of the 
research will be published in academic journals and presented at 
conferences  
 
‘Who is organising, approving and funding the study?’ 
 
I am working on this study alone, supported by two experienced 
supervisors from the University of York’s Social Policy and Social Work 
Department.  The study has been funded by the University of York.  
Before the research starts, it will be approved by the Social Care 
Research Ethics Committee.  A Research Ethics Committee is an 
independent group of people who check that research protects the 
dignity, rights and safety of participants. 
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‘Who can I contact if there is a problem?’ 
 
This is very unlikely.  But if you do feel unhappy about anything that 
happens during the research, I will be happy to talk about it with you at 
any time.  If you don’t feel comfortable talking to me about any 
complaints or concerns you may have, then you can contact my 
supervisory team, Professor Ian Shaw and Dr Mark Hardy at: The 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York, 
Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Tel: 01904 32 1231 
 
‘Who can I contact for more information about the study?’ 
 
If you would like to discuss anything, please don’t hesitate to contact 
me at: 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work, Postgraduate Unit, 
Alcuin Research Resource Centre, University of York, YO10 5DD.  Tel: 
01904 321261, Email: hjls500@york.ac.uk 
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Appendix Three: Topic Guides 
 
Service users 
 
Introduction 
 
 Introduce myself 
 Housekeeping (expenses, voucher) 
 Purpose of research 
 Purpose of interview 
 To understand what their experience of the CTO has been  
 To gain their views on CTOs 
 Describe interview format – length, relaxed and loosely structured 
 Reiterate that driven by them -  can take breaks/stop/not answer a question 
 Check OK to be recorded 
 Explain will be taking notes and why 
 Any questions 
 
Significance of CTO 
 
1. How would you describe your feelings about being on a CTO?  
 Follow-up: Does the CTO help you and if so in what way does it help you? 
 Follow-up: Does the CTO harm you, and if so in what way does it harm you? 
 
2. What difference, if any, does it make to you being on a CTO? 
If it does make a difference: 
Why do you think the CTO has caused this change in your life? 
If it doesn’t make a difference: 
Why do you think the CTO hasn’t changed much for you? 
 
3. Do you care whether you are on a CTO or not? 
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 Follow-up: Can you explain why you feel this way? 
 
4. Do you think the CTO is for your benefit or for the benefit of others? 
 
5. Overall would you describe the experience of being on a CTO as positive or 
negative? 
 
6. What do you think would happen if you were not on a CTO? 
 
Effect on relationships 
 
7. Who do you receive the most help or support from? 
If not mentioned, ask specifically about the following people: 
 Your worker/support person you see most often? 
 Your psychiatrist? 
 Your family? 
 The people you live with? 
 
8. How, if at all, does being on a CTO affect your relationship with these people? 
 Prompts: Does being on a CTO help or harm your relationship 
with these people? 
 Why does it help or harm your relationships? 
 
Relationship with services 
 
9. How often do you see your workers? 
 Follow-up: Has the amount you see them changed since being on a 
CTO? 
 
10. Have there been any changes to the support and treatment you receive since 
being on a CTO? 
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 Follow-up: Do you think being on a CTO should change the support  and 
treatment you receive? 
 
11. Would you describe the contact you have with services as helpful or not? 
 
Involvement with process at time of discharge 
 
12. Can you remember what happened what happened when it was decided you were 
going be discharged onto a CTO? 
 Prompt: What were your initial thoughts about the CTO? 
 
13. Lots of different things could have happened, for example you could have stayed 
in hospital or been discharged.  What do you think were the reasons you were 
given a CTO?   
 Follow-up: What do you think of these reasons? 
 
14. How much were you involved in decision-making about your CTO when it was 
made? 
 Follow-ups: 
 Who do you think had influence in the making of the CTO? 
 How was the CTO presented to you as an option? 
 What involvement did you or your carer have in the CTO conditions? 
 Were there any disagreements between you and the professionals 
working with you about the CTO? 
 Were there any disagreements between your carers and the 
professionals working with you about the CTO? 
 
15. What information were you given about your CTO at the time of discharge? 
 Follow-ups:  
 In what ways were you given information? 
 How helpful has this information been? 
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 Are you still talked to about the CTO by workers? 
 
Compliance with the CTO 
 
16. What does being on a CTO require you to do? 
 Follow-up –what conditions do you think you have to keep to? 
 Prompt – if mention substance use, ask: has the CTO had an 
effect on your use of alcohol or other drugs?   
 
17. Do you think you have to do what the doctors and nurses tell you, because you 
are on a CTO? 
 Follow-up: Why do you think that? 
 
18. If you were not required to by the CTO, do you think you would still see your 
worker? 
 Follow-up: Why would that be? 
 
19. If you were not required to by the CTO, do you think you would still take your 
medication? 
 Follow-up: Why would that be? 
 
20. What do you think would happen if you refused to take your medication?   
 Follow-up: Has that ever happened to you? 
 
21. If you take your medication regularly, what are your reasons for doing so? 
 
22. Overall, is it a good or a bad thing you are required to take medication? 
 
Recall, Renewal and Discharge 
 
23. What do you think would have to happen for you to be recalled to hospital? 
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 NB If they have already mentioned medication noncompliance earlier, ask 
about other reasons. 
 Follow-up: How do you feel about returning to hospital? 
 
24. If they have been recalled before: 
 Prompt: What has your experience been of being returned to hospital because 
of the CTO? 
 
25. If their CTO has been renewed:  What involvement have you had in the process 
of renewing your CTO? 
 Follow-up: What involvement has your carer or family had in the process of 
renewing your CTO? 
 
26. Has there been a Tribunal or Manager’s Hearing since being on your CTO? 
 Follow-up: If no:  Would you go to the meeting when it happens?   
 What would be your reasons for deciding to go/not go? 
 Follow-up: If yes: Did you go to the meeting? 
 If yes: what was that experience like? 
 Prompt: How much were you involved in the meeting? 
 If no: what were your reasons for deciding not to attend? 
 
27. What do you think would have to happen for you to be discharged from the 
CTO? 
 Prompt: When do you think you will be discharged from the 
CTO? 
 Prompt: How do you feel about discharge from the CTO? 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
28. How do you think the use of CTOs could be improved, if at all? 
 If you could change one thing about the CTO, what would it be? 
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 What advice would you give to professionals about how CTOs are 
used?   
 
29. What do you see happening for you in the future? 
 What hopes do you have for the future? 
 What worries do you have for the future? 
 
Ending 
 
 Would you like to add anything else? 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Is there anything you’ve said today that you would rather I didn’t include in 
the research? 
 Would you like a copy of your transcript to read? 
 Thank you for giving me your time today.  Either I or your care coordinator 
will be in touch soon about next steps. 
 If you want to contact me in the mean time you can on… 
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Practitioners 
 
Note: Questions will make specific reference to the particular case practitioners are linked 
to in the research where relevant. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Describe the aims of interview 
o To talk with them about their experiences and views of using CTOs, 
drawing particularly on the case under research 
o To explore how they practice CTOs 
 Describe format of interview 
o Relaxed and loosely structured 
 Check length of interview OK (about an hour) 
 Check OK to be recorded 
 Explain will be taking notes and why 
 Any questions  
 
Background 
 
1. Can you tell me a bit about your role within the team? 
2. How does your role interact with the use of CTOs? 
3. In what ways have you been involved with CTOs? 
 
Practice Experiences 
 
4. What has been your experience of using CTOs? 
o Follow-up: Can you tell me about the CTO cases you’ve been 
involved with? 
o What has gone well? 
o What has gone not so well? 
o What practical issues, if any, do CTOs raise for you?  
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o What ethical issues, if any, have CTOs raised for you?   
 
5. Looking at CTOs more broadly,  
o How have they impacted on your practice and the practice of the 
team? 
o If we think about your particular team model (i.e. AOT, EIP, CMHT), 
how do you think CTOs fit within that? 
o How do you think service users feel about them? 
 
 
6. How has the use of CTOs affected the therapeutic relationship between you 
and service users?  
o NB: Most practitioners tend to automatically answer this question in 
negative terms, so prompt them to think about how CTOs have 
affected relationships in positive ways as well. 
 
Decision-making 
 
7. Can you describe how decisions have been made on the CTO in relation to 
your cases?  
o Follow-up: At each of the following stages: 
 Discharge from hospital 
 Renewal or discharge from CTO 
 Recall 
 
8. What do you think influenced the decisions on each case? 
o Risk 
o Best interests 
o Resources 
9. Who do you think had most influence on decisions?  
o What was the balance of influence with other practitioners? 
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o How were service users and carers involved? 
o For AMHPs: Are you given enough time to complete your enquiries? 
 
10. For AMHPs: In your view, should AMHPs be independent of the team and 
the case in question, or is it better to have prior involvement? 
 
11. Can you tell me about any particular issues that deciding whether to 
discharge a CTO or not has raised for you? 
 
12. In your experience, what kinds of conditions have been placed on CTOs? 
o What tends to happen when these are breached? 
o Have you come across any cases where conditions have been a 
particular issue? (i.e. been varied, or debate at what to put on at 
discharge) 
o Do CTOs make any difference to how much service users can 
negotiate medication choices? 
 
13. Can you tell me about the role of other professionals in CTOs? 
o SOADs  
o IMHAPs  
 
14. What has been your experience of Manager’s Hearings and Tribunals? 
o How do you think service users experience these meetings? 
o What do you think could be done to encourage their attendance? 
 
Influences on practice 
 
15. Why do you think CTOs were introduced by the government at the time? 
o Follow-up if experienced: How do they compare to section 25 and 
section 17 long leash leave? 
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16. What purposes do you think CTOs have? 
o Do CTOs meet these purposes? 
 
17. What are your views on CTOs more generally? 
o Professional identity and ethics 
 
18. How do you think these views compare with other people’s views? 
o In your team 
 
19. How do you think the practice of CTOs could be improved? 
 
Ending 
 
20. Is there anything you want to add? 
21. Do you have any questions? 
22. Check anything they don’t want included and if want copy of transcript 
23. Thank for time and thoughts. 
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Consultants 
 
Introduction 
 
 Describe the aims of interview 
o To talk with them about their experiences and views of using CTOs, 
drawing particularly on the case under research 
o To explore how they practice CTOs 
 Describe format of interview 
o Relaxed and loosely structured 
 Check length of interview OK (about an hour) 
 Check OK to be recorded 
 Explain will be taking notes and why 
 Any questions  
 
Practice Experiences 
 
 What role do you think CTOs play in the work of the Assertive Outreach 
Team? 
 Have you any view on whether they have impacted on services more 
generally? 
 How do you think they have affected clients (both on and off CTOs)? 
o What is the difference when someone is on or off a CTO? 
o What do you think are the benefits of CTOs? 
o What are the drawbacks of CTOs? 
 
 How have they impacted on your practice? 
o What has gone well? 
o What has gone not so well? 
o What practical issues do CTOs raise for you? (paperwork, 
communication, understanding guidelines) 
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o What ethical issues have CTOs raised for you?  (medication, user 
rights) 
 
 What kinds of persuasion do you use with service users? 
o How have conflicts been resolved? 
o How much ‘teeth’ do CTOs have? 
o How coercive do you think CTOs are? 
 
 Have you any view on whether CTOs affect the therapeutic relationship 
between practitioners and service users?  
 
Decision-making 
 
 Can you describe to me how decisions are made at different stages of the 
CTO?  
o Discharge from hospital 
o Recall 
o Revocation 
o Discharge/extension of the CTO. 
 
 Who tends to be involved, in what way and at what stage? 
o Does the inpatient/outpatient divide cause any issues? 
 
 If we look at all the CTOs you’ve dealt with, do any stand out in your mind 
for the way decisions were made? 
o If so what happened? 
 
 What are the reasons when you have/have not kept someone on a CTO? 
 What significant factors do you think influence your decisions on CTOs? 
o Risk 
o Best interests 
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o Resources 
o Bureaucracy 
 
 Who do you think influences decisions on CTOs?  
o What is the balance of power with other practitioners? 
o How are service users and carers involved? 
 
 Can you tell me about any particular dilemmas CTOs have raised for you? 
o For example when discharging from a CTO? 
o How were these dilemmas resolved? 
 
 Can you tell me a bit about the role of Manager’s 
Hearings/Tribunals? 
 
Influences on practice 
 
 Why do you think CTOs were introduced by the government at the time? 
 Do you think that the reality of practice of CTOs reflects these concerns? 
 
 What difference, if any, do you think there is between CTOs and s.25 or 
s.17? 
 
 What problems do you think CTOs solve? 
 
 What about alternative solutions to CTOs? 
 
 Do you think your view as a psychiatrist is different to what may be that of 
social workers and CPNs? 
 How do you think your views on CTOs compare with other people’s views 
in your team? 
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 How could the practice of CTOs be improved? 
 
Ending 
 
 Is there anything you want to add? 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Check anything they don’t want included and if want copy of transcript 
 Thank for time and thoughts. 
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AMHPs 
 
Background 
 
 Can you tell me a bit about your role? 
 How does your role interact with the use of CTOs? 
 In what ways have you been involved with CTOs? 
 
Practice Experiences 
 
 What has been your experience of the use of CTOs? 
o What has gone well? 
o What has gone not so well? 
o What practical issues do CTOs raise for you? (paperwork, 
communication, understanding guidelines) 
o What ethical issues have CTOs raised for you?  (medication, user 
rights) 
 
 Looking at CTOs as a policy more broadly,  
o How have they impacted on your practice? 
o How do you think they have impacted on services more generally? 
o How do you think they have affected service users? 
o What do you think are the benefits of CTOs? 
o What are the drawbacks of CTOs? 
o How could the practice of CTOs be improved? 
 
 How do you think the use of CTOs affects the therapeutic relationship? 
 
Decision-making 
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 If we look at all the CTOs you’ve dealt with, do any stand out in your mind 
for the way decisions were made? 
o In terms of starting out, revocation, renewal 
 
 What factors do you think influence decisions? 
o Risk 
o Best interests 
o Resources 
o Bureaucracy 
 
 What is the balance of power with other practitioners? 
o How much do consultants involve you? 
o Are you given enough time to complete your enquiries? 
 
 How are service users and carers involved? 
o How are CTOs communicated to them? 
 
 What has been your experience of the kinds of conditions put on CTOs? 
o What issues have conditions caused in terms of compliance and when 
to recall and revoke for example? 
o Note: ask about residency 
 
 Have you ever been told that the service user won’t be discharged 
unless a CTO is agreed to? 
 
 In your view, should AMHPs be independent of the team and the case 
in question, or is it better to have prior involvement? 
 
Influences on practice 
 
 Why do you think CTOs were introduced by the government at the time? 
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 How do they compare with s17 leave and the old s25? 
 
 What purposes do you think CTOs have? 
 
 What are your views on CTOs more generally? 
o Professional identity and ethics 
 
 How do you think these views compare with other people’s views? 
o In your team 
o With service users (Particularly the service user in the case under 
research) 
 
 How do you think your views affect your practice? 
 
Ending 
 
 Is there anything you want to add? 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Check anything they don’t want included and if want copy of transcript 
 Thank for time and thoughts. 
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Managers’ Hearing Chairs  
 
Can you tell me about your experiences of CTO renewal hearings? 
 
What problems have arisen in the running of hearings? 
 Role of IMHA 
 Role of solicitor 
 Service user involvement 
 NR involvement 
 
What kinds of reasons do RCs and care coordinators give for wanting to extend the 
CTO? 
 
What factors are you looking for in deciding whether a CTO should be extended or 
not? 
 
Have there been any cases you can think of where you have decided not to uphold 
the CTO? 
 Have there been any cases you can think of where there has been debate with 
the panel about whether to extend or not? 
 
How have CTOs changed the work of Manager Hearings? 
 
What support did you receive from the Trust in ensuring you were prepared for their 
introduction? 
 
Do you have any general views on how they are being used in the Trust? 
 
From your perspective, how do you think the use of CTOs could be improved? 
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Appendix Four: Practitioner Interview Framework 
 
A. What purposes the CTO holds 
 
Immediate purposes 
1. Maintenance (Wellness, safety, stability, small gains (not necessarily 
about change)) 
Links to conditions - CTO and depot (C2d), recall - reasoning behind use 
of recall (C3b), discharge - view on risk-taking (C5b), discharge – CTO 
cycles (C5f),  CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), CTOs and broader 
practice context (D6), how the CTO works – insurance policy (E8b), the 
nature of proof and causality (F1), the temporal nature of outcomes (F2) 
2. Protection (Paternalism, managing vulnerability, ethics of care, making 
compulsion kinder, alleviating distress; but also professional 
comfort/safety net as below) 
Links to risk (B6) and recall - reasoning behind use of recall (C3b), 
personal vs. state responsibility (E3) 
3. Surveillance/risk management (Safety of others, professional 
comfort/safety net, control, monitoring of medication) 
Links to risk (B6), levels of relational knowledge (B7), recall - reasoning 
behind use of recall (C3b), recall - certainty and uncertainty (C3d), 
discharge - view on risk-taking in discharge (C5b), personal vs. state 
responsibility (E3), trust and distrust (E5), depth and surface work (E6), 
how the CTO works – insurance policy (E8b), explanatory tool (E8e), the 
kinds of outcomes practitioners referred to (F4) 
4. Knowledge/relationship management (Kick-start for relationship; 
managing lack of knowledge with new service users). 
Links to levels of relational knowledge (B7), discharge - proof for 
discharge (C5e), how CTOs work – contract (E8a), relationship builder 
(E8c) 
Longer lasting purposes 
5. Positive liberty (Compulsion leading to less coercion in future, mediation 
adherence basis for psychosocial work; CTO length and consolidation; 
managing ethical discomfort) 
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2) and balancing act (B3), discharge - 
the nature of individual change (C5d), discharge – service user attitude 
(C5c), response of service users (E2), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), 
developing a relationship within compulsion (E7),  how CTOs work - 
relationship builder (E8c), all of F (except F5) 
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6. Individual change (Stimulating reflection, developing insight, developing 
responsibility, becoming self-managing; external compulsion vs. internal 
change; rates of change; evidence of change; direct vs. indirect causal 
relationship to CTO). 
Links to insight and beliefs (B4), recall – reasoning behind use (C3b), 
discharge – service user attitude (C5c), discharge – the nature of 
individual change (C5d), discharge – proof (C5e), personal vs. state 
responsibility (E3), depth and surface work (E6), how CTOs work – 
bargaining tool (E8d), all of F except 5 
7. Policy purposes comparison (As contrast: social control, risk 
management scepticism, resources, revolving door management, 
limiting discretion) 
Links to view on the CTO (B1), Conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), 
Oversight – system centred or person centred (C4c), the AOT ethos (D1), 
CTOs and resources (D2), broader practice context (D6) 
 
B. What influences practitioners’ judgements on appropriateness of use of 
CTOs  
 
First three are interrelated frameworks for how practitioners approach CTOs 
based on personal/professional understandings and beliefs 
1. View on the CTO (Ambivalence (across a spectrum); Concerns about – 
unnecessary coercion – least restrictive principle, narrowing of choices, 
impact on practice, not bringing anything new) 
Links to policy purposes comparison (A7), recall – how recall happens 
(C3a), recall – continuity and discontinuity (C3c), discharge – ethical 
concerns (C5a), CTOs and resources (D2), CTO interaction with AOT (D3), 
CTOs and practice remit (D4), CTOs and broader practice context (D6), 
the relationship between CTOs and other legislation (D7), tension 
between discourses (E4), the nature of proof and causality (F1) 
2. Perceptions of discretion (Views on level of discretion in CTO process; 
Necessary vs. helpful; moral/ethical justification; Influences include – 
perception of power of CTO, perceived impact on service users, efficacy 
of local policy/practice mechanisms, beliefs on: autonomy and 
personhood, the medical model, the power of relationship and how 
change occurs) 
Links to positive liberty (A7), decision-making (C1), conditions – 
boundaries to compulsion and areas of choice (C2a and b), recall – 
blurring boundaries of compulsion (C3e), discharge –ethical concerns 
(C5a), What ‘good’ CTO practice looks like (D5), CTOs and practice remit 
(D4), CTOs and broader practice context (D6), response of service users 
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(E2), personal vs. state responsibility (E3),the nature of proof and 
causality (F1),  balancing outcomes (F3), the kinds of outcomes referred 
to (F4) 
3. Balancing act (A bioethical endeavour – harms vs. benefits; influenced 
by conception of professional identity and aims). 
Links to positive liberty (A7), decision-making (C1), conditions (C2), recall 
– certainty and uncertainty(C3d), recall – blurring boundaries of 
compulsion (C3e), oversight – networks of power/knowledge (C4b), 
discharge – ethical concerns (C5a), service user attitude (C5c),responses 
of service users (E2), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), tension 
between discourses (E4), trust and distrust (E5), depth and surface work 
(E6), how CTOs work – contract (E8a), balancing outcomes (F3) 
Insight as an overarching factor which influences views on risk and 
capacity/consent 
4. Insight and beliefs (Differing conceptions of what insight means, 
problematising insight, views on beliefs held by service users, insight as 
connected to autonomy and competence, Manager Hearings – help-
seeking) 
Links to individual change (A6), conditions - CTOs and depots (C2d), 
discharge - the nature of individual change (C5d), response of service 
users (E2), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), the temporal nature of 
outcomes (F2), the kinds of outcomes that practitioners referred to (F4) 
5. Capacity and consent (‘Grey area’ for practitioners; capacity and 
variable role in decision-making; capacity and insight; different kinds of 
capacity; capacity and ‘best practice’; relationship between capacity and 
consent; consent and ‘best practice’; judging ‘true’ consent) 
Links to decision-making – involvement of service users (C1c), conditions 
– CTO and depots. (C2d), recall - blurring boundaries of compulsion (C3e), 
what ‘good’ practice looks like (D5), perceived levels of understanding 
(E1), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), depth and surface work (E6) 
6. Risk (Risk and insight, perceived vulnerability, socially problematic 
behaviour, risk of stigma, risk to others, predicting or proven risk, 
presence of alternative strategies, ability to monitor/measure risk; view 
of other agencies (police)). 
Linked to protection (A2), surveillance/risk management (A3), recall – 
certainty and uncertainty (C3d), discharge- view on risk-taking (C5b), 
discharge – proof (C5e), How CTOs work – insurance policy (E8b), 
explanatory tool (E8e), the kinds of outcomes practitioners referred to 
(F4) 
7. Levels of relational knowledge (If people are ‘known’ or not; 
perceptions of individual characteristics – categorisation and expected 
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individual response; relapse profile – speed, intensity, pre-existing 
coping strategies, presentation to professionals, obviousness, 
consequences; timing and history) 
Links to surveillance/risk management (A3), knowledge/relationship 
management (A4), recall – reasoning behind use (C3b), certainty and 
uncertainty (C3d), discharge – service user attitude (C5c), discharge – 
CTO cycles (C5f), how CTOs work – relationship builder (E8c) 
8. Contextual factors (Accommodation type, social network, involvement 
of family, reassuring family, other ‘checks and balances’, kinds of 
medication able to be used, drug/alcohol use)  
Links to Conditions – CTOs and depots (C2d), discharge – proof (C5e), CTOs and 
broader practice context (D6), the kinds of outcomes practitioners referred 
to (F4) 
 
 
C. How key mechanisms work (Decision-making, Conditions, recall, 
oversight, discharge) 
 
1. Decision-making  
a. (AMHPs – negation of safeguards, rubber stamping and routinisation, 
unilateral vs. joint decision-making, practice dilemmas, 
knowledge/power, inevitability, working within the CTO;  
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), CTO 
interaction with AOT model (D3), what ‘good’ CTO practice looks like 
(D5), CTOs and broader practice context (D6), the relationship between 
CTOs and other legislation (D7), the nature of proof/causality (F1), 
corroboration by others (F5) 
b. Care coordinators and responsible clinicians – style of the RC, shared 
responsibility and risk, care coordinator as advocate and ‘middle man’;  
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), CTO and 
practice remit (D4), perceived levels of understanding (E1), developing a 
relationship within compulsion (E7), corroboration by others (F5) 
c. Involvement of service users – being told, explained to, persuasion and 
bargaining, choice over choices and the nature of consent, getting under 
the surface; negotiating within the CTO framework) 
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), capacity and 
consent (B5), AOT ethos (D1), what good practice looks like (D5), 
perceived levels of understanding (E1), depth and surface work (E6), 
developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), how CTOs work – 
bargaining tool (E8a), explanatory tool (E8e)  
2. Conditions  
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a. (Limits to compulsion/discretion – self-administered limitations, how 
conditions are negotiated, informal criteria (law, ethics, feasibility);  
Links to policy purposes comparison (A7), perceptions of discretion (B2), 
balancing act (B3), AOT ethos (D1), CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), 
perceived levels of understanding (E1), response of service user (E2), 
tension between discourses (E4), developing a relationship within 
compulsion (E7), levels/layers of compulsion (E8f), psychological leverage 
(E8g) 
b. Areas of choice – autonomy, rights and social norms; moral justification 
(lifestyle choices vs. medication, kinds of ‘treatment’);  
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), what good 
CTO practice looks like (D5), personal vs. state responsibility (E3) 
c. Certainty and uncertainty – the level of certainty of predication in 
operation of conditions, how practitioners construct what would happen 
if and when conditions are breached; relationship to ethical stance; hard 
and soft conditions 
Links to balancing act (B3), CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), trust 
and distrust (E5), developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), how 
CTOs work – contract (E8a), levels of compulsion (E8f) 
d. 41CTOs and depots – symbiotic relationship, relationship to purpose of 
CTO, relationship to how the CTO is perceived to work, questions of 
choice and autonomy) 
Links to maintenance (A1) (this specifically but also A more generally as 
the foundation for the CTO), perceptions of discretion (B2), insight and 
beliefs (B4), capacity and consent (B5), contextual factors (B8), CTO 
interaction with AOT model (D3), CTOs and practice remit (D4), response 
of service users (E2), the kinds of outcomes practitioners referred to (F4) 
3. Recall  
a. (How recall happens - Guidance vs. challenges of practice (time-
consuming, bureaucratic, complex, confusing), working round the 
legislation, changing of care coordinators role, variable circumstances of 
recall, communication with other agencies, inpatient-community 
relationship, 42imaginative vs. mechanistic use, recall cycles;  
Links to view on the CTO (B1), CTOs and resources (D2), CTOs and AOT 
model (D3), CTOs and practice remit (D4), CTOs and broader practice 
context (D6), perceived levels of understanding (E1), response of service 
users (E2), developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), levels/layers 
of compulsion (E8f), psychological leverage (E8g) 
                                                 
41
 How depots and CTOs relate is the key example of the above three sub-categories of 
boundaries to compulsion, areas of choice and certainty and uncertainty. 
42
 This ties in with both Continuity and discontinuity, and certainty and uncertainty. 
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b. Reasoning behind use – ensuring medication compliance, behaviour 
modification, preventative intervention, quick response to risk, 
legislative short-cut;  
Links to maintenance (A1), protection (A2), surveillance/risk 
management (A3), individual change (A6), levels of relational knowledge 
(B7), CTOs and resources (D2),  CTOs and the broader practice context 
(D6), the relationship between CTOs and other legislation/systems (D7), 
response of service users (E2) 
c. Continuity and discontinuity – dislocation for service users, discontinuity 
of care and knowledge, mediation of the nature of practice, service 
centred vs person centred;  
Links to view of the CTO (B1), what good CTO practice looks like (D5), 
CTOs and broader practice context (D6), depth and surface work (E6), the 
kinds of outcomes practitioners referred to (F4) 
d. Certainty and uncertainty – uncertainty about the recall process, levels 
of certainty of response to service user behaviour, recall as managing 
uncertainty, catch-22 and defensive decision-making; recall and complex 
cases, impossible cases;  
Links to surveillance/risk management (A3), risk (B6), levels of relational 
knowledge (B7), CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), perceived levels of 
understanding (E1), response of service users (E2), tension between 
discourses (E4), depth and surface work (E6), how CTOs work – contract 
(E8a), levels of compulsion (E8f), balancing outcomes (F3), corroboration 
by others (F5) 
e. Blurring boundaries of compulsion – psychological leverage, the nature 
of consent, porous boundary between community and hospital) 
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), capacity and 
consent (B5), CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), CTOs and practice 
remit (D4), response of service users (E2), personal vs. state responsibility 
(E3), tension between discourses (E4), depth and surface work (E6), how 
CTOs work – psychological leverage (E8g), balancing outcomes (F3) 
4. Oversight  
a. (Enforcing rights – real or abstract rights, automated nature of CTOs, 
paradox of safeguards; tribunal view on their role; procedural justice 
Links to what good practice looks like (D5), response of service users (E2), 
depth and surface work (E6), how CTOs work – contract (E8a) 
b. Networks of power/knowledge – professional knowledge and expert 
truths, presence or absence of conflicting accounts (patients), 
professional identity (legal vs care), disenfranchisement, distancing; 
identity and stigma; 
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Links to balancing act (B3), CTOs and practice remit (D4), tension 
between discourses (E4), trust and distrust (E5), how CTOs work – 
explanatory tool (E8e), balancing outcomes (F3), corroboration by others 
(F5) 
c. System centred or person centred – who the CTO is for, inflexibility of 
SOADs, nature and protocol of Tribunals, what service users perceive to 
be part of the system (supportive or disciplinary). 
Links to Policy purposes comparison (A7), AOT ethos (D1), what good 
CTO practice looks like (D5), CTO and broader practice context (D6), 
developing a relationship within compulsion (D7), perceived levels of 
understanding (E1), balancing outcomes (F3) 
5. Discharge (also how it works – lapsing, discharge) 
a. (Ethical concerns – differing conceptions of justice and fairness, 
institutionalisation and dependency; looking beyond legislative 
requirements 
Links to view on the CTO (B1), balancing act (B3), what good CTO 
practice looks like (D5), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), trust and 
distrust (E5), developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), the kinds 
of outcomes practitioners referred to (F4) 
b. View on risk-taking – positive risk-taking, practitioners providing hope, 
practitioners proving trustworthiness, defensive thinking (insurance 
policy) note: unexpected alignments – i.e. psychiatrists who think care 
coordinators are too risk averse.  The medical model not aligned with 
risk (because about wellness or not), whereas the social model can be 
more so 
Links to maintenance (A1), surveillance/risk management (A3), risk (B6), 
CTO interaction with AOT model (D3), what good CTO practice looks like 
(D5), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), trust and distrust (E5), 
developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), how CTOs work – 
insurance policy (E8b), bargaining tool (E8d), the nature of proof and 
causality (F1), the temporal nature of outcomes (F2) 
c. Service user attitude – persuasion and reverse compulsion, defuse 
conflict, shifting the nature of interactions, shifting responsibility, 
emphasising interdependence;  
Links to positive liberty (A5), individual change (A6), balancing act (B3), 
levels of relational knowledge (B7), response of service users (E2), 
personal vs. state responsibility (E3), developing a relationship within 
compulsion (E7), balancing outcomes (F3) 
d. The nature of individual change – the length of the CTO, how change 
relates to the CTO framework, weightings given to past/present/future, 
beliefs on possibility of change, measuring and predicting the depth and 
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nature of change, what counts as change, difficulty and uncertainty, 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of change; discharge as symbolising wellness 
Links to positive liberty (A5), individual change (A6), insight and beliefs 
(B4), CTO interaction with the AOT practice model (D3), trust and distrust 
(E5), surface and depth work (E6), all of F (apart from 5) 
e. Proof – ‘testing out’ service users, environmental change/stability – 
strategies that professionals use to keep the CTO on in oversight settings 
, the paradox of proving active compliance under compulsion; 
paradoxical use of recall 
Links to Knowledge/relationship management (A4), individual change 
(A6), risk (B6), contextual factors (B8), response of service users (E2), 
trust and distrust (E5), developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), 
how the CTO works – bargaining tool (E8d), the nature of proof and 
causality (F1), the temporal nature of outcomes (F2) 
f. CTO cycles – evidence and assumptions of causality, becoming drawn in 
to long-lasting compulsion, last resort and last chances). 
Links to maintenance (A1), levels of relational knowledge (B7), the nature and 
proof of causality (F1), the temporal nature of outcomes (F2), corroboration by 
others (F5) 
 
 
D. Perceived interaction of CTOs with practice 
 
CTOs and team practice 
1. Assertive Outreach Team ethos/culture (Skilful work, resource 
intensive; assertive vs. coercive, service change vs. individual change; 
role – being a resource, finding out what will work, mutual ground). 
Links to policy purposes comparison (A7), decision-making – involvement 
of service users (C1c), conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), oversight - 
system centred or person centred (C4c),response of service users (E2), 
personal vs. state responsibility (E3), tension between discourses (E4), 
trust and distrust (E5), how CTOs work – levels of compulsion (E8f), 
corroboration by others (F5) 
2. CTOs and resources (less referrals, less manpower, less use of sections; 
bureaucracy, recall difficulties, paperwork; impact on face time, whether 
resulted in better quality care). 
Links to policy purposes comparison (A7), view on the CTO (B1), recall – 
how recall happens (C3a), recall - reasoning behind use (C3b), response 
of service users (E2) 
3. CTO interaction with AOT model (AOT as natural home of CTOs; 
compulsion and clarity (for both); routinisation; contrast of ‘skilled’ 
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practice (‘quality’, incremental, acceptance of relapse, acceptance of 
uncertainty, understanding behaviour, creativity, social focus, 
depth/relational work) with deskilled CTO practice (‘‘black and white’ 
work, immediate change, no need for understanding, medical focus, 
maintenance, surface/mechanised work).  
Links to maintenance (A1), view on the CTO (B1), decision-making – 
AMHPs (C1a), conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), conditions – 
certainty and uncertainty (C2c), conditions – CTOs and depot (C2d), recall 
– how recall happens (C3a), recall – certainty and uncertainty (C3d), 
recall – blurring boundaries of compulsion (C2e), discharge – view on 
risk-taking (C5b), discharge – the nature of individual change (C5d), 
tension between discourses (E4), depth and surface work (E6), 
developing a relationship within compulsion (E7), how CTOs work – 
contract (E8a), relationship builder (E8c) 
CTOs and individual practice 
4. CTOs and practice remit (CTOs and reformation of practice; discretion 
paradox; narrowing choices; medical model; social police) 
Links to view on the CTO (B1), perceptions of discretion (B2), decision-
making – CCs and RCs (C1b), Conditions – CTOs and depots (C2d), recall – 
how recall happens (C3a), recall - blurring boundaries of compulsion 
(C3e), oversight – networks of power/knowledge (C4b), response of 
service users (E2), tension between discourses (E4), trust and distrust 
(E5), depth and surface work (E6), how CTOs work – levels of compulsion 
(E8f) 
5. What ‘good CTO practice’ looks like (critical thinking – taking the CTO 
seriously, not taking it for granted, considering alternatives first, using it 
selectively; encouraging service users to take up their rights; trying to 
gain ‘proper’ consent – agreement/partnership/exchange; being clear 
and accountable; doing it for the good of the service user, not the 
service; treating it as a process not an event – increasing service user 
understanding of it over time, making clear what needs to happen for 
discharge to occur; following practice guidelines; planning carefully and 
early; mitigating coercion with reciprocity; continuity of care). 
Links to perceptions of discretion (B2), capacity and consent (B5), 
decision-making – AMHPs (C1a), involvement of service users (C1c), 
conditions - areas of choice (C2b), recall – continuity and discontinuity 
(C3c), oversight – enforcing rights (C4a), system centred or person 
centred (C4c), discharge – ethical concerns (C5a), views on risk-taking 
(C5b), perceived levels of understanding (E1), developing a relationship 
within compulsion (E7), how CTOs work – contract (E8a), relationship-
builder (E8c), bargaining tool (E8d) 
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CTOs and practice context 
6. CTOs and broader practice context (‘Payment by results’  – 
categorisation and impact on care plans – maintenance vs. recovery; 
resource cuts; shrinking number of beds and lack of respite/crisis care 
(impact on family of having to cope but also on pre-existing coping 
strategies of service users) (interesting also that challenges assumptions 
that CTOs are being used to free up beds by discharging early – instead it 
is  easier just to discharge so might not be in interests of inpatient team 
to decide n CTO); inpatient/community services separation.  Note – it’s 
interesting how much defensiveness in interviews there was about this ). 
Links to maintenance (A1), policy purposes comparison (A7), view on the 
CTO (B1), perceptions of discretion (B2), contextual factors (B8), 
Decision-making (C1), recall – how recall happens (C3a), recall – 
reasoning behind use (C3b), recall – continuity and discontinuity (C3c), 
oversight – system centred or person centred (C4c), response of service 
users (E2) 
7. The relationship between CTOs and other legislation/systems (The 
uniqueness of the CTO; Section 17 – psychological separation, resource 
management, discretion and restriction; section 25 – lacking ‘teeth’, 
intrinsic power vs. psychological power; Guardianship – welfare 
orientated vs. treatment orientated, ‘greyness’ and interpretation; 
Sections – trauma and difficulty, hot vs. cold; Criminal justice – influence 
of CTO on CJ outcomes, language and understanding, protection and 
diversion, surveillance and proof of ‘wellness’; Benefits – persuasive 
shorthand). Links to view on the CTO (B1), decision-making – AMHPs 
(C1a), recall – reasoning for use (C3b), perceived levels of understanding 
(E1), response of service users (E2), personal vs. state responsibility (E3), 
how CTOs work – contract (E8a) 
 
 
E. CTOs and the practitioner-service user relationship 
How practitioners viewed and dealt with service users’ responses to the CTO 
1. Perceived levels of understanding (Service user perceptions of purpose 
and power of CTO; clarification, challenging ‘black and white’ thinking; 
‘helpful’ misunderstandings; CTO as on-going, interactive). 
Links to capacity and consent (B5), decision-making (C1), conditions – 
limits to compulsion (C2a), recall – how recall happens (C3a) and 
certainty and uncertainty (C3d), oversight – system centred or person 
centred (C4c), what good CTO practice looks like (D5), the relationship 
between CTOs and other legislation/systems (D7) 
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2. Response of service users (How practitioners interpreted service user 
responses; Typology (response to authority/legal power, values and 
means) – active/passive, resistance/acceptance (reluctant compliance), 
ambivalence, subversion (subversive obedience/disobedience), 
relationship to how and if the CTO works (agreement-based only?), CTO 
as point of conflict, community care as battle; disruption of coping 
strategies – closing down of alternatives, disruption of choices -  ‘forced 
to be well’) 
Links to positive liberty (A5), perceptions of discretion (B2), balancing act 
(B3), insight and beliefs (B4), conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), 
conditions – CTOs and depots (C2d), recall – how recall happens (C3a), 
recall – reasoning behind use (C3b), recall – blurring boundaries of 
compulsion (E3e), discharge – service user attitude (C5c), discharge – 
proof (C5e), AOT ethos (D1), CTOs and resources (D2), CTOs and practice 
remit (D4), CTOs and broader practice context (D6), the relationship 
between CTOs and other legislation (D7), balancing outcomes (F3), the 
kinds of outcomes referred to (F4) 
3. Personal vs. state responsibility (Getting the balance right – compliance 
and dependence/passivity, conditioning and institutionalisation, limiting 
emotions/behaviours; limiting service responsibility; exacerbating 
service user irresponsibility; compulsion as structurally or individually 
driven; ‘right’ kinds of autonomy, choosing to do the right thing). 
Links to protection (A2), surveillance/risk management (A3), positive 
liberty (A5), individual change (A6), balancing act (B3), insight and beliefs 
(B4), capacity and consent (B5), conditions – areas of choice (C2b), recall 
– blurring boundaries of compulsion (C3e), discharge – ethical concerns 
(C5a), view on risk-taking (C5b), service user attitude (C5c), AOT ethos 
(D1), the relationship between CTOs and legislation (D7), balancing 
outcomes (F3), the kinds of outcomes referred to (F4) 
 
The relationship and the CTO 
4. Tension between discourses (Contrast between work doing and work 
wanting to do, partnership, responsibility/independence, creativity, 
needs, recovery; damage to the therapeutic relationship; differences in 
professional values) 
Links to view on the CTO (B1), balancing act (B3), conditions – limits to 
compulsion (C2a), recall – certainty and uncertainty (C3d), blurring 
boundaries of compulsion (C3e), oversight – networks of 
power/knowledge (C4b), AOT ethos (D1), CTO interaction with AOT 
model (D3), CTOs and practice remit (D4) 
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5. Trust and distrust (Honesty – being upfront, difficult conversations 
(enables practitioner but may disenable service user); persuasive 
conversations – justification to service user and to self (integrity); 
obfuscatory ‘soft’ language; uncertainty – not knowing/believing (both 
ways); role of hope and promised change; lack of trust – fear, hiding 
(figuratively and literally), disengagement, reinforcing barriers). 
Links to surveillance/risk management (A3), balancing act (B3), 
conditions – certainty and uncertainty (C2c), oversight – networks of 
power/knowledge (C4b), discharge (C5), AOT ethos (D1), CTOs and 
practice remit (D4), balancing outcomes (F3), the kinds of outcomes 
referred to (F4) 
6. Depth and surface work (contrast – depth and surface ways of working; 
mutual reinforcement - ‘good’ CTOs’ involve exchange, difficulties with 
reading and working with ‘surface’ compliance - doubt, ‘impossible’ 
relationships and on-going struggles, personality disorder). 
Links to balancing act (B3), capacity and consent (B5), recall – continuity 
and discontinuity (C3c), recall – certainty and uncertainty (C3d), recall – 
blurring boundaries of compulsion (C3e), oversight – enforcing rights 
(c4a), discharge – the nature of individual change (C5d), CTO interaction 
with AOT model (D3), CTOs and practice remit (D4), the temporal nature 
of outcomes (F2), the kinds of outcomes practitioners refer to (F4) 
7. Developing a relationship within compulsion ((Perceived power of 
relationship; empathy, mediation, advocacy; small meeting points – 
mutuality of purpose/common ground (focusing on aims, not means); 
keeping the CTO positive – reciprocity mitigating coercion; providing 
hope and being optimistic that the situation will change; attempting to 
work in a person-centred way in a service centred context; use of 
professional identity in strategies for engagement (distancing from the 
CTO and medical model); negotiating within boundaries (medication, 
where to meet, ‘testing out’). Note: although if testing out (e.g. giving 
service user the opportunity to take medication orally of own accord) it 
can be viewed as a ‘last chance’ as if it doesn’t work with the CTO it can 
be deemed not able to work at all). 
Links to positive liberty (A5), decision-making (C1b and C1c, conditions – 
limits to compulsion (C2a), conditions – certainty and uncertainty (C2c), 
recall – how recall happens (C3a), oversight – system centred or person 
centred (C4c), discharge – ethical concerns (C5a), discharge – risk-taking 
(C3b), service user attitude (C5c), proof (C5e), CTO interaction with AOT 
(D3), what good CTO practice looks like (D5), balancing outcomes (F3) 
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The general characteristics of CTOs in practice as mediated by the interaction 
between practitioner and service user (inclusive of positive influence on 
relationship) 
8. How CTOs work 
a. Contract (clear guidelines for both practitioner and service user to 
operate within and know what they can and can’t do; the CTO as 
clarifying and therefore protecting service user rights; reciprocity as 
mitigating coercion) 
Links to knowledge/relationship management (A4), balancing act (B3), 
conditions – certainty and uncertainty (C3c), recall – certainty and 
uncertainty (C3d), oversight – enforcing rights (C4a), CTOs interaction 
with AOT model (D3), what good CTO practice looks like (D5), the 
relationship between CTOs and other legislation (D7) 
b. ‘Insurance policy’ (CTOs as an insurance policy “kept in the background” 
and used when necessary.  This is a point relevant to the issues around 
discharge).   
Links to maintenance (A1), surveillance/risk management (A3), risk (B6), 
discharge – views on risk-taking (C5b), the temporal nature of outcomes 
(F2) 
c. Relationship builder (The CTO could be used as a framework to see 
individuals regularly who had previously avoided services and try and 
build some kind of a working alliance with them; provides structure to 
build up interaction; enables calmer, goal-orientated work with less fire-
fighting). 
Links to knowledge/relationship management (A4), positive liberty (A5), 
levels of relational knowledge (B7), CTO interaction with AOT (D3), what 
good CTO practice looks like (D5), the temporal nature of outcomes (F2) 
d. Bargaining tool (setting out what someone needs to do to come off the 
CTO as an encouragement for change; pointing out what the CTO has 
done for them so far).  Note: this could also apply (although not in the 
same sense of power) for service users – e.g. ‘I’ll agree to this if…’   
Links to individual change (A6), decision-making – involvement of service 
users (C1c), discharge – perception of risk-taking (C5b), discharge – proof 
(C5e), what good CTO practice looks like (D5) 
e. Explanatory tool (Enabling the practitioner to talk to the service user 
about difficult topics, particularly how the practitioner perceives the 
service users’ level of risk) 
Links to surveillance/risk management (A3), risk (B6), decision-making – 
involvement of service users (C1c), oversight – networks of 
power/knowledge (C4b) 
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f. Levels/layers of compulsion (the different strategies used before the 
final level of recall – reminders, ‘threats’, persuasion). 
Links to conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), certainty and uncertainty 
(C2c), recall – how recall happens (C3a), certainty and uncertainty (C3d), 
AOT ethos (D1), CTOs and practice remit (D4) 
g. Psychological leverage (Setting out the consequences of noncompliance 
in a way that is understandable to the individual service user and 
effective in maintaining compliance) 
Links to conditions – limits to compulsion (C2a), recall – how recall 
happens (C3a), recall – blurring boundaries of compulsion (C3e) 
Note: in regards to the above all the practitioners believed that nevertheless 
for a specified minority, the CTO had to be used in a straightforwardly 
coercive way 
 
F. When CTOs judged to work or not (how practitioners talk about CTO 
outcomes and what they judge to be good or bad outcomes) 
 
1. The nature of proof and causality (what does ‘working’ mean; 
evaluation of CTOs as change agent; proximal and distal effects – 
present and future outcomes, chains of causality) 
Links to maintenance (A1), positive liberty (A5), individual change (A6), 
view on the CTO (B1), perceptions of discretion (B2), Decision-making – 
AMHPs (C1a), discharge – view on risk-taking (c5b), the nature of 
individual change (C5d), proof (C5e), CTO cycles (C5f) 
2. The temporal nature of outcomes (Outcomes when CTO is still active, 
outcomes post-discharge; view on ‘internalisation’ of CTO (connected to 
view on indefinite use or not). 
Links to maintenance (A1), positive liberty (A5), individual change (A6), 
insight/beliefs (B4), discharge – perceptions of risk-taking (C5b), the 
nature of individual change (C5d), proof (C5e), CTO cycles (C5f), depth 
and surface work (E6), how CTOs work – insurance policy (E8b), 
relationship builder (E8c) 
3. Balancing outcomes (How practitioners managed ethical discomfort, 
‘sacrifice’, working in some ways and not working (or worsening) in 
others; the tangibility of effects the CTO might bring and how they might 
be qualified – ability to ‘prove’, ‘hard’ positive outcomes vs. ‘soft’ 
negative outcomes; who the CTO is supposed to be ‘good’ for – service 
user views about meaning of success weighted against practitioner 
views) 
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Links to positive liberty (A6), individual change (A7), perceptions of 
discretion (B2), balancing act (B3), recall – certainty and uncertainty 
(C3d), oversight – networks of power/knowledge (C4b), system centred 
or person centred (C4c), discharge – service user attitude (C5c), the 
nature of individual change (C5d), response of service users (E2), 
personal vs. state responsibility (E3), trust and distrust (E5), developing a 
relationship within compulsion (C7) 
4. The kinds of outcomes practitioners referred to (ensuring treatment – 
primary outcome and foundation; behavioural change – lessening 
problematic behaviour, bringing about positive changes in engagement, 
broader social as well as clinical change, short term ‘forced’ change and 
long-term ’internalised’ change; Lowering levels of restriction – ‘lesser of 
two evils’, length community compulsion vs. shorter hospital compulsion 
– kinds of freedom; lowering levels of risk – monitoring and supervision, 
fixing holes in the safety net; negative outcomes – exacerbation of 
revolving door, reinforcement of negative behaviour, creation of 
dependency/passivity, negative psychological repercussions, 
disengagement from services/practitioner; ambivalence over what CTOs 
can change - insight) 
Links to surveillance/risk management (A2), positive liberty (A5), 
individual change (A6), perceptions of discretion (B2), insight and beliefs 
(B4), risk (B6), contextual factors (B8), CTOs and depots (C1d), recall – 
continuity and discontinuity (C3c), discharge – ethical concerns (C5a), the 
nature of individual change (C5d), response of service users (E2), 
personal vs. state responsibility (E3), trust and distrust (E5), depth and 
surface work (E6),  
5. Corroboration by others (the role of multi-disciplinary teams and 
manager’s hearings/tribunals, group reinforcement, managing doubt) 
Links to decision-making (C1a, C1b), recall – certainty and uncertainty (C3d), 
oversight – networks of power/knowledge (C4b), discharge - CTO cycles (C5f), 
CTO ethos (D1) 
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Appendix Five: Access Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear  
 
I am writing in order that you may consider the possibility of my gaining access to a 
Community Mental Health or Assertive Outreach Team in your Trust, for a research 
project I am currently undertaking. I am a social work qualified, full-time PhD student in 
the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University of York. The 
research project concerns the use of Community Treatment Orders within Community 
Mental Health Services.  The title of the research is: 
 
‘Community Treatment Orders: Their Implications for Mental Health Policy and 
Practice in England’ 
 
Community Treatment Orders are complex policy interventions.  The majority of 
research on the use of CTOs has tended to ask the question ‘Do they work?’  We know 
far less about how they are being used and experienced ‘on the ground’ by the various 
people who have been affected by their implementation.  This represents a notable gap 
in our knowledge of CTOs.  By carrying out research which asks ‘How do they work?’ 
my aim is to make a significant contribution both to our understanding and the future 
development of best practice in the use of CTOs.   
 
The research will involve service users, carers and practitioners from across disciplines 
as research participants, and provisionally will utilise a range of qualitative methods, 
including:  
 
• A focus group with practitioners 
• In-depth interviews with practitioners, service users and carers 
DEPARTMENT OF  
SOCIAL POLICY AND  
SOCIAL WORK 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
Telephone (01904) 430000 
Direct telephone (01904) 321260 
Facsimile (01904) 321270 
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/spsw 
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• Observations of a selection of team meetings, case reviews, and meetings between 
Approved Mental Health Professionals and Responsible Clinicians. 
• Tape recordings of interactions between an agreed number of service users and 
practitioners. 
• Case file analysis. 
 
I envisage starting the fieldwork phase of the research in April 2012, and that this will 
last no more than eight months.   
My academic supervisors are Professor Ian Shaw and Dr Mark Hardy, who respectively 
hold expertise in qualitative research and the study of mental health policy and practice.  
They will oversee all aspects of the project. The research will also be scrutinised by the 
University of York, a NHS Research Ethics Committee and by the Research and 
Development Team of your Trust.   
 
My intention is to carry out fieldwork in more than one Trust, and as part of this I have 
also written to nine other Trusts in the region.  I will make contact with you in the next 
ten days to explore further the potential involvement of your Trust in the research.  I 
would be happy to meet with you and/or appropriate members of your management 
team, to give a more detailed overview of the project.  In the meantime, if you have any 
questions or would like further information, please don’t hesitate to contact me. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Hannah Jobling 
PhD Student 
Tel: 07962821648 / 01904 321261 
Email: hjls500@york.ac.uk 
Profile: www.york.ac.uk/spsw/research/phd/hannah-jobling/ 
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Appendix Six: Ethics Procedures and Safeguards 
 
Informed consent   
 
For all participants, care was taken to ensure that they had full understanding of the 
research prior to taking part, especially in regards to its voluntary nature and that they 
could withdraw at any time.  All information given to participants was developed in 
consultation with the Trusts’ respective service user and carer forums, and presented 
clearly and written using non-technical, lay language.  Information sheets given to 
participants was appropriate to their status and covered topics such as; the main aims 
and objectives of the research, what their involvement entailed, what would happen to 
the data and how research findings would be disseminated.  A signed declaration of 
consent was obtained from each participant before the research commenced verifying 
that they had read and understood the information sheet, understood their rights and 
were happy to take part in the research.  The consent form included separate statements 
for each research activity that participants were asked to agree to (e.g. for service users, 
this would be for interviews, researcher presence at meetings and access to their files).  
In addition, a process approach was taken to consent, whereby ongoing information-
giving, assessment of understanding and evaluation of participant willingness to be 
involved occurred at each research activity (Keogh and Daly, 2009). 
 
Anonymity and Data Protection 
 
All electronic information was stored solely on a University computer.  Audio files were 
given a unique identification number. Transcripts were given a corresponding 
identification number to their audio file and were also anonymised with pseudonyms 
used, as were written up field notes of observations.  Audio files and transcripts will be 
held for up to three years following the end of the study, as per Principle Five of the 
Data Protection Act (1998) which allows data to be held indefinitely for research 
purposes.  This will initially be by me and following the end of the study, in the 
University of York archives.  This will allow the audio files to be used for on-going 
research purposes.  Personal information such as name and contact details were coded 
with the corresponding identification number and pseudonym, but kept in a separate 
password protected file and a hard copy backup was kept in a locked filing cabinet in a 
locked office.  Hard copies of signed consent forms were also kept in the same way.    
All personal data will be destroyed after the study has finished.  Any quotations used in 
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the thesis, publications or reports, were anonymised with local identifiers removed, and 
participants were made aware of this on the information sheet.  Case file analysis took 
place in the Team office, and no documents relating to the case were taken out of this 
environment.  Service users were asked for their consent for access to files as part of the 
consent process.  I made notes from case files only pertaining to areas of interest in the 
research.  
 
Confidentiality and Disclosure 
 
All participants were informed on the information sheet and consent form that 
information they shared would not be reported to anyone else.  Specifically, practitioners 
were assured that management would not be told of what they say or do and the same 
was stated to service users in regards to services.  It was stressed that whether the service 
user takes part or not, the services they received would not be affected.  Alongside the 
more general reassurances in regards to confidentiality and anonymity, my independence 
from services was made clear. The usual caveat to confidentiality regarding serious harm 
to the participant or others was also explained on information sheets and verbally prior 
to interviews.  If I felt information given by the participant necessitated further action, it 
was decided that where possible the participant would be informed of this at the time, 
and what the action will be.  However it was recognised that circumstances may not 
always allow for this.  A protocol was clarified with the team manager in the event that a 
participant did disclose something of this nature.  If a service user disclosed poor 
practice it was planned that they would be informed of the complaints procedure of the 
Trust, unless it was of a level of seriousness that it met the harm criteria.  In addition, I 
made myself familiar with the whistle-blowing policy of the Trust, in order that I could 
use it if necessary. 
 
Researcher and Participant Safety 
 
I consulted with the teams before meeting alone with service user and carer participants 
to ascertain whether there are any risks involved.  A judgement was made on this basis 
whether to go ahead with the research contact or to ensure it is in a setting where support 
is available. It was agreed with the team manager that the interview would be 
immediately terminated if I felt at risk of harm. When visiting participants in their 
homes, I used the teams’ lone worker procedures and checked in and out with the duty 
worker.  In regards to participant safety, service user and carer participants were met in a 
place that was comfortable for them and I carried identification to the first meeting.  As 
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per Trust requirements, I completed an enhanced CRB check.  When using team office 
space, it was ensured that the room used protected participant privacy and 
confidentiality.   
 
Distress and Providing Support 
 
I was aware that discussing their experiences of CTOs may be at times difficult for some 
service user participants.  As highlighted in the research overview, previous qualitative 
research has demonstrated that some service users can feel angry and frustrated at what 
they perceive to be the restrictions placed on them by CTOs. The following strategies 
were employed in the event that a service user displayed signs of distress during 
interviews: 
 
• The consent procedures were on-going and it was emphasised to participants 
that the interview could be stopped either for a break or altogether at any time if 
involvement became overly upsetting. 
 
• Participants’ rights to not disclose information or answer questions they deemed 
to be too sensitive were respected.  If it was judged that a particular topic was causing 
distress, I moved on to another area of discussion. 
 
• It was made clear to participants that they could bring a supportive person to the 
interview if they wished. 
 
• If held at home, I would be sensitive to the wishes of the participant in regards 
to whether they would like me to leave straightaway or remain with them for a period of 
time to debrief.  If held in the community or treatment setting, I supported the participant 
to make their way home. 
 
• When necessary I would check out whether the participant had someone they 
were able to talk with once I had left, be it a carer, family member, friend, support 
worker, or a voluntary organisation.  I carried details of local organisations that may be 
able to provide support, and these were made available to participants prior to the 
interview starting.  
 
• In regards to observation of meetings, I would leave the meeting if any of the 
participants feel my presence was not appropriate.   
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Incentives 
 
Travel expenses were paid to service user participants, along with a small voucher 
payment (£15) of their choice for each interview.  A record of vouchers given was kept.  
Whilst I was aware of the views that offering payment can sometimes undermine 
participants’ ability to take part in research of their own free will, the amount of £15 was 
believed sufficiently low for this not to be a concern.  Furthermore, taking account of 
service user perspectives on research (Faulkner, 2004), it is understandable that 
participants’ may wish to be offered some recompense for their time.  A thank you card 
was also sent to participants at the end of the fieldwork period and refreshments were 
provided during interviews. 
 
Risks and benefits 
 
Given the nature of the research, the risk of harm to participants was small, and evidence 
suggests that in non-clinical research such as this, participants’ feel that the benefits to 
them outweigh potential harm (NRES, 2011).   As stated earlier, the risk to service user 
participants’ primarily related to the triggering of an emotional response.  However, this 
risk cannot be said to universally apply, or that the potential to feel distressed is 
significantly greater than it would be in a clinical encounter. The strategies outlined 
earlier to deal with distress helped to manage this risk.  Moreover, the fieldwork took 
account of the view that it can be ethically questionable to exclude participants from 
social and healthcare research on the basis of assumptions around vulnerability, as it 
does not allow them the right to make their own choice (Liamputtong, 2007, Ulivi, 
Reilly and Atkinson, 2009).   
 
In regards to practitioners, there was a risk that they would find taking part in the 
research burdensome.  However I was very careful to ensure that the research was as 
unobtrusive as possible, by acting on practitioner views on the appropriateness of some 
fieldwork activities, and by drawing on my own experience of working in a busy 
multidisciplinary team. 
 
More generally, I was aware that all participants’ may feel there could be a risk of their 
confidentiality being breached, either through the mishandling of data, or through me 
telling others about what they had said.  In the first instance, I made participants’ aware 
that a clear protocol for data storage, handling and anonymisation had been developed 
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which would minimise the risk of a data leak.  In the second instance, I made clear to 
participants what confidentiality meant, the boundaries in place and my independence 
from services. 
 
In terms of benefits, although again not assumed to be universal, involvement in the 
research may have been a positive experience for participants, in being able to express 
their views, have their story heard and feel they are contributing to a better awareness of 
CTO practice.  Indeed this view was expressed by a number of participants, who refused 
the offer of a voucher because they wanted to make it clear they were taking part solely 
in order to be listened to, and to help the development of services.  For practitioners in 
particular, the opportunity to reflect on aspects of their work may have been a helpful 
experience.  Both potential risks and benefits were described on the information sheet. 
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List of Acronyms 
 
AMHP – Approved Mental Health Professional 
AOT – Assertive Outreach Team 
CMHT – Community Mental Health Team 
CPS – Crown Prosecution Service 
CQC – Care Quality Commission 
CTO – Community Treatment Order 
EIP – Early Intervention in Psychosis 
IMHA – Independent Mental Health Advocate 
MHA – Mental Health Act 
SOAD – Second Opinion Appointed Doctor 
SCT – Supervised Community Treatment 
SD – Supervised Discharge 
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